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Foreword
This thesis Is concerned with the study of British Indian 
internal policy between 1885 and 1898. The growth of English education, 
the Press, and swift means of communication brought the British Government 
into contact with developing Indian opinion, which called for a new 
approach. The difficulty of reconciling the principles of equality and 
of freedom of expression and association with the circumstances of an 
automatic foreign rale was fundamental.
This study does not cover all Important aspects of British 
policy. The addition of a few more topics, such as, the fiscal policy 
of the Government, more particularly the question of import duties on 
cotton goods, relations between the Supreme and Provincial Governments, 
and social legislation including tenancy reforms, would have certainly 
made the picture complete. It was, however, not possible to discuss 
them within the limits of a thesis. Even the topics Included here 
have not been treated in all their aspects. The chapter on the problem 
of IndianiBation, for instance, deals only with the Indian Civil Service 
in two aspects: the mode of recruitment and the scope of Indian employment.
The present study is not concerned with organisational details. 
Statistics have been given only where absolutely necessary.
In the examination of British policy of so recent a period as 
the present one, it is easy to exaggerate things either way. This study 
is, however, an attempt to view them in an objective and sympathetic 
manner.
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Introduction
The Mutiny closed the era of internal wars and was followed 
by a long period of peace. Except for the Afghan War of 1878-80, the 
Burmese War of 1885, and the North-West Frontier campaigns of thefnineties 
no Important military operations took place during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. The progress of English education, the Press, 
commercial development, and swift means of communication brought the British 
Government into contact with forces which called for a new approach to 
Indian questions. The problem therefore was not merely one of consolidation 
but also of adjustment.
The period of our study covers fourteen years (l884~98) during 
which Dufferln, Lansdowne, and Elgin were Governors-General, and in England 
the Conservatives were In office for ten years, and the Liberals for four 
years. Dufferln and Elgin were appointed by a Liberal and Lansdowne by a 
Conservative ministry. One finds, however, a good deal of continuity in 
policy. Their attitudes to questions of the Indianisation of the services 
and legislative development were more or less the same.
The period is immediately preceded by four years of Eipon*s
viceroyalty which was marked by a sympathetic approach to certain questions.
Judged by actual results he did not accomplish much, but he became very
popular partly because of his liberal views and partly because of the
opposition of his own countrymen to the Ilbert Bill. He was subjected
to Insults and ultimately had to yield to their pressure. It was indeed
a lesson in race-relations which, as Coupland aptly remarks, no educated
1
Indian could forget. The most important achievement of his period was „
1 E. Couplagd, Britain and India (l600-194l)* 42.
Vthe development of local institutions which gave the people a greater
and more real share in the management of their own affairs. Another
popular measure was the repeal of the Vernacular Press Act which
restored to newspapers written in Indian languages the freedom which
they had enjoyed before Lytton. Despite this modest record of
achievements Bipon came to be regarded as an ideal Viceroy* His
popularity is to be attributed not to what he achieved but to what he
was believed to have stood for.
Bipon was succeeded by Dufferln who had a long career in
politics and diplomacy as Governor-General of Canada, and as ambassador
at St. Petersburg and Constantinople. On the one hand, he was called
upon to calm the agitation engendered by the controversy over the Ilbert
Bill, and on the other, to continue the policy of his predecessor. In
a letter of June 1884 to Gladstone, Bipon had emphasised that his
successor should be a man of "really liberal opinions," adding that in
the existing condition of India a "truly and broadly liberal policy"
1
was essential to the security of British power. Dufferln was on
the whole in general agreement with Biponrs liberal policy but was
also careful that European settlers should be given no cause of
resentment. Early in 1886 he expressed the view that the objects
even of more advanced party In India were "neither very dangerous nor
2
very extravagant." His sympathy towards the national movement in 
the beginning and his strong advocacy of Council reform show that he 
was aware of the forces which had been at work.
1 Bipon to Gladstone, 25 June 1884* Add. MSS, 44» 287, 27*
2 Qyoted in Lyall, Dufferln, ii, 151*
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Dufferln*s successor was lansdowne who before his appointment
as Viceroy had also been Governor-General of Canada* He initiated no
new policies, and was content to continue the old ones* He strongly
supported Dufferln*s scheme of Council reform including the introduction
of election. His terra of office passed without any Msensational
 1
incidents.*
Lansdowne was succeeded by Elgin whose appointment was made
when Sir Henry Norman asked to be relieved of the office only a few
days after he had accepted it. Queen Victoria was not in favour of
Elgin*s selection. She wrote to Gladstone: "He is very shy and most
painfully silent, has no presence, no experience whatever in administration.
2
He would not command the respect which is necessary in that office. 11 
His dependence on his colleagues and subservience to Whitehall are evident 
from his correspondence. Curzonfs estimate of his character, in a letter 
to George Hamilton, deserves mention: "He (Elgin) was a painstaking, up­
right, sagacious man, who, knowing nothing whatever either of India or of 
administration, decided that the safest thing was to place himself in the 
hands of his officials. He stuck to them most manfully, and rewarded 
them lavishly, and they stuck to him. But I cannot find that he communicate< 
one new idea to Government or left any question more forward than he found 
It, except in so far as that result was brought about by the compulsion of
3
events or the march of time." Later in 1902 he characterised Elgin*s
1 Diet. National Biography (1922-1930), 669*
2 To Gladstone, 12 Aug. 1&93» Buckle, Letters, Third Series, li (1931 )* 3^0
3 Curson to Hamilton, 5 April 1900, Pr. 6or. Ind., XVI, 294*
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1
administration as “the apotheosis of bureaucracy.w Even after making
due allowance for the element of exaggeration into which Curzcn often
slips, Elgin1 s career as Viceroy was marked by no initiatitra.
Unfortunately a number of calamities, such as, earthquake, plague and
famine, made his work still more difficult. The currency position
during half the term of his office remained a cause of anxiety. The
problems of his administration would indeed have put to the severest
test the qualities of even much abler men.
« . « *
British Indian policy cannot be studied in isolation from 
affairs in England. India was a British dependency pure and simple.
Not only matters of policy but even details of administration were 
controlled from London. As Indian affairs were kept outside the limits 
of party politics and the grant of political concession was not contenplated, 
the authority of the Secretary of State remained undlmlnished.
The later nineteenth century was a period when Britain enjoyed 
an unrivalled financial and commercial prosperity. She had a vast 
empire covering about on^* fourth of the surface of the globe and possessed 
the most powerful navy. Even the closing decades of the century witnessed 
a vigorous imperial activity in Africa and the Par East. The revival of 
British Imperialism, which took place under the leadership of Disraeli In 
the 1 seventies1, continued its onward march. It was then that Queen 
Victoria assumed the title of Empress of India. Besides seeking to 
produce a psychological effect on the Indian Princely class, the event 
was significant in revealing the place of India in the imperial structure.
1 Curzon to Hamilton, 2b Oct. 1900, Pr. Cor* Ind., XXIV, 123*
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During the long period of Conservative rule, which lasted from 1886 to 1905
(with only one interregnum of three years of Liberal rule) no efforts were
made to introduce any change in thie relationship. It is more than doubtful
whether Liberal rule would have been different in this respect. British
political parties were unanimous on the question of India's position in the
Empire. No attempts were made to score party points on Indian matters.
The British looked upon India as a permanent possession. While in
the pre-Mutlny period men like Munro, El phi net one and Henry Lawrence
envisaged the withdrawal of British power, though no doubt at a distant
date, rulers of the second half of the century believed in its permanence.
To ensure its stability, the British kept all the higher administrative
offices In their hands and devised a system of military organisation which
reduced the chances of combination against them to a minimum. Moreover,
two~fifths of the army, all the arsenals, and practically the entire
artillery were in British hands.
The character of the British Government in India, under such
circumstances, could not but be autocratic. Iytton characterised it as
1
"personal and paternally despotic." In August 1885 Lord Bandolph
Churchill, then Secretary of State for India, described it as "purely
2
irresponsible and despotic." The British Government was despotic not in 
the sense that Indians had no freedom of expression and association, and 
equality before the law, but in the sense that the executive was responsible 
to London. As early as 1871 Lord Mayo, then Governor-General, explained
1 Minute, 16 May 1880, para. 66.
2 Hansard, ccc, Third Series, 1302.
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this point thus* *3kere is a great deal of nonsense talked about
despotic rule in India* If despotic rule means the unrestrained and
unregulated will of any one man or any body of men, I say no such thing
exists* Here, private rights and individual liberty Is guarded as
strictly as it is in any country in the world* Everywhere Freedom of
action and of thought prevails* But we cannot conceal from ourselves
the fact that we administer a system of Government under which the
rulers are appointed by a Sovereign who by her responsible ministers
1
rules In a far and distant land*”
Difficulty arose from the fact that British rulers sought to
reconcile the principles of autocracy with certain conditions which
they themselves had created* Lord Hamilton, the Secretary of State,
gave expression to the view that a free press and uncontrolled education
2
were incompatible with autocracy. In a letter of January 1901 to 
Curzon, he said that ”the most serious difficulties and dangers ahead in 
India are not inherited, or even inherent in Indian society, but are our
5
own creation.” British rulers were placed in a great dilemma caused 
by a lack of direction in their policy* Biey had acknowledged the 
principle of equality of their own accord but were unable to impldisthUt 
In the circumstances of an autocratic rule. Educated Indians found no 
difficulty in showing that there lay a vast gap between theory and 
practice*
1 Progs* of the Leg* Council of India (167l)»
2 See below, it
5 Hamilton to Curzon, 9 Jan* 1901, Pr* Cor. Ind., 71, 9*
The most important principle of British policy was embodied
in the Charter Act of 18J5 ^ d  in the Queen's Proclamation of 1858*
Curzon wrote that ever since 1858 the Proclamation had been regarded
1
as "the Charter of Indian rights and liberties*9 One finds innumerable
references to these documents in the speeches and writings of Indian
leaders of the late nineteenth century* Their claim to a share in tfta 
administration was inmeasurably strengthened - at any rate on a 
theoretical basis - by the British acceptance of the principle of racial 
eluality.
It is difficult to say how far the authors of these documents
would have been prepared to go in the direction of political concessions*
It is true that Macaulay gave expression to fine sentiments in his speech
2
in Parliament in July 18J5, but the facts of British rule should not be
confused with the views of a few individuals* So far as the Proclamation
was concerned, it is well known that Queen Victoria wished that it should 
contain some p ledges which her future reigi was to redeem, and accordingly, 
the draft Proclamation was altered, but she oan hardly be credited with 
having a broad outlook towards India’s constitutional progress* Even 
after thirty years of intellectual progress in India she was not in 
favour of the Government of India's proposal for the introduction of
5
the election principle in the constitution of the Councils* Viewed 
in the context of conditions then prevailing, these pronouncements can
1 Curzon to Hamilton, 15 Oct* 1902, Pr* Cor* Ind*, XXIV, 105*
2 "it may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system
till it has outgrown that system; that by good government we may 
educate our subjects into a capacity for better government; that,
having become instructed in European knowledge, they may, in some 
future age, demand European institutions*■ Hansard, XIX (1852)# 55^*
5 Queen Victoria to Lansdowne, 28 June 1889# Buckle, Letters (1886-1890),
Third Series, 5^7*
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be said only to have removed certain racial barriers* .They had their
strength as well as their weakness as principles of a vague and
indefinite character always have* While the British Government could
point out that it had recognised the principle of equality and that it
was up to Indians to make themselves fit for any office, it was exposed
to attack on the ground that it gave effect to it in a very imperfect
manner* Iytton1 s scheme of an exclusive Indian service fitted in with
the actual working of British policy though it was at variance with
1
the principle of equality*
Ihe inconveniences of the Proclamation were expressed by
lytton, Hamilton and several others* In a letter to Elgin, Hamilton
said that forty years of practice had shown #the extreme difficulty of
2
giving effect to the academic utterances as to equality of races** 
Nevertheless, the repeal of the Proclamation was out of the question*
The maintenance of British supremacy was not a point at issue 
even among those who advocated the grant of political concessions* In­
deed it was regarded as the foundation-stone of all reform* The 
question was how far British policy should be adapted to changing 
circumstances* Writing in 1685, a few months after his retirement from 
the Finance membership of the Government of India, Sir Evelyn Baring 
said that two policies were possible in India, the one was the policy 
of those who were against the freedom of the Press and dreaded the 
progress of education, and the other was the policy of those who
1 See below, 22*
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 7 May 1897* Pr* Cor* lad*, iif 187.
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supported the admission of Indians to a share in the administration*
He emphasised that the problem was how to deal with the new-born spirit
of progress* He strongly advocated the adjustment of the administrative
1
system to new conditions* In introducing his scheme of local self- 
government, Ripon had laid strong emphasis on the political education of 
the people* He maintained that the British Government could be made 
popular by & sympathetic approach to Indian questions* Curzon, on the 
other hand, did not believe in the policy# of political concessions* 
Efficiency of administration was to him "a synonym for the contentment 
of the governed*11 Broadly speaking, the principle of efficiency persisted 
throughout the period* Ourzon’s contribution lay in pushing it too far*
He sought to resolve the dilemma by ignoring the forces which had been at 
work for a pretty long time and by introducing economic reforms designed 
to improve the condition of the masses*
The area of State activity was still based on the principle of 
minimum interference with the social and economic life of the people* 
Internal and external peace, the establishment of law and order, the 
development of communication, and the organisation of famine relief were 
the main functions oftfcEndian Government* Explaining the policy of the 
British Government in India, James Stephen, a former Law Member of the 
Government of India, wrote in 1685 s *Now the essential parts of European 
civilisation are peace, order, the supremacy of law, the prevention of 
crime, the redress of wrong, the enforcement of contracts, the development
1 Article on "Recent Events in India,* The Nineteenth Century, Oct* 1885» 
585-86, 589*
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sind concentration of the military force of the state, the construction of
public works, the collection and expenditure of revenue required for these
objects in such a way as to promote to the utmost the public interest,
interfering as little as possible with the comfort, or wealth of the
1
inhabitants, and improvement of the people." These functions are obviously 
what are termed the essential functions of the State. And indeed the British 
Government, in reply to its critics, laid the greatest emphasis on the 
blessings of peace and order. The benefits of security conferred by British 
rule were fully acknowledged by Indians. They had no desire to replace 
British by any other rule.
Laissez fairs remained the accepted policy of the British Govern­
ment in India. The Indian demand for protection was not accepted. In 
the Nineties a fierce controversy arose over the question of tariff. In 
169^ owing to the fall in exchange, fresh taxation became necessary, and 
in December an import duty of 5 per cent, was imposed on cotton goods and 
yam. In I896 under Inncashire pressure the import duty was lowered 
from 5 Per oent# to 5^ per cent; an excise duty at the same rate was placed 
on all Indian mill woven cloth, and cotton yam was admitted free of duty.
The proceedings drove home to Indians the fact that British industrialists, 
in the name of free trade, sought their own interests and impeded Indiafs 
industrial progress*
As the century proceeded towards its close, the economic aspect 
of British rule became a subject of strong criticism in Indian
1 J.F* Stephen's Article on "Foundations of the Government of India,"
The Nineteenth Century* Oct. 188J, 55^*
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political circles* Hie Congress drew the attention of the Government
to the poverty of the masses and criticised it for draining away a
large proportion of India's wealth to Sag land*
Hie British attached the greatest importance to the benefits
of peace and security which India enjoyed under them* Hiey maintained
that their rule was much better than what she had before the British
connection. In 189^ Fowler, then Secretary of State for India, told
Parliament that the question was whether India was better or worse off
1
by being a part of the British Sapire. His successor, Lord Hamilton
remarked in I896 that the merit of British rule should be judged in
comparison with the "Government which it superseded or the Government
a
which might supersede it*" Such an attitude towards India's political 
development ruled out the question of preparing Indians for self-government*
1 Indian Pari* Debates, 14 Aug. 189^ * 275*
2 Ibid., 15 Aug. 1896, 571*
1CHAPTER I,
The Problem of Indian Employment in the Givil Service,
The question of the Indianisation of the Civil Services is 
highly significant in revealing the working of British policy* It 
had a twofold aspect; the extent of Indian employment consistent with
■f
the stability and efficiency of British rule, and the mode of recruit­
ment suited to Indian conditions* The settlement of the first 
presented a problem because of the extremely small number of higher 
posts that were made available for Indians, and that of the second 
because of the difficulty in applying a uniform system of recruitment 
due to the unequal diffusion of education in India. The question 
assumed considerable importance when educated Indians began to make 
persistent demands for a larger share in the administration than the 
Government was willing to concede*
The broad principles of British policy towards Indian employ­
ment h^ been embodied in the Charter Act of 1833 and in the Queen* s 
Proclamation of 1858* The Statute declared; "ho native of the said 
territories, nor any Enthral born subject of His Majesty resident 
therein, shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth,
descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place,
1
office, or employment under the said company4* This provision
1 3 & U  Will.IV, c*85, s.87.
2legally removed a great racial disability, as Lansdowne said, every
1
Indian was **by law equally admissible*1 to every office in India. 
Explaining the meaning of the Act, the Directors saids **Fitness is 
henceforth to be the criterion of eligibility.** They went on to say 
that the object of the clause was not to ascertain qualification but to
remove disqualification. Though Indians from then onwards no longer 
remained under legal disabilities, they had still to overcome insur­
mountable difficulties in gaining official employment. The condition 
of compulsory training at Hailebury was a major obstacle. The result 
was that not a single Indian was appointed to the Covenanted Service 
during the Company*s regime. But in facilitating the policy of Indian 
employment, the Directors had laid emphasis on the promotion of education, 
which, in the course of time,revolutionised the whole situation.
In 1853 the Covenanted Civil Service was thrown open to 
competition. The principle of competition had been suggested by Lord 
Grenville as early as 1813. It was later provided in the Charter Act 
of 1833, according to which, for every vacancy in .the Civil Service
four candidates were to be nominated and the best candidate was to be
3
with the connivance of the Board, the Directors ncleverly and quietly
4
cheated Parliament, and they retained their,patronage until 1853.”
2
selected by examination. The scheme was not put into practice, and
1 Hansard. Third Series, XIX, 171.
2 Directors* Bes. Mo.44, 10 Dec. 1834, paras. 105-6
3 Act (1833), s.103.
4 C.H. Philips, Bast India Company. 297.
3In implementing the competitive system, the Macaulay Committee of 1854
made certain recommendations according to which admission to the Service
was to be gained on the results of competitive examinations. By 2854
both racial disability and patronage had been abolished by law.
Thenceforth appointment to the Covenanted Service legally depended on
merit and ability. In 1858, when India came under the Crown, the
1
competitive system was embodied in the Act.
The scheme of examination , dr awn up by the Macaulay Committee, was
designed to suit the conditions of the British educational system and'.the
needs of British competitors. The subjects for examination were
”confined to those branches of knowledge to which it is desirable that
English gentlemen who mean to remain at home should pay some attention.t
Indian Vernacular languages were rejected as valueless, but Sanskrit
and Arabic were included because, first, they were not 1 without intrinsic
value” and, secondly, they could also be learnt in England. The
Committee was against the inclusion of branches of knowledge ttspecially
oriental”, the study of which would be of no use to the unsuccessful 
2
competitors.
The Macaulay Committee did not provide additional facilities to 
Indians for employment. In fact, its scheme of examination was bound 
to place them at a great disadvantage. On 24 June 1853 Macaulay had 
told Parliament that under the proposed system the admission of Indians 
to the Covenanted Service would entirely depend upon themselves. ttAs
1 21 & 22 Viet., c. 106, s. 32
2 Pari. Papers. XL (1854-55).
Asoon as any young native of distinguished parts ... should have enabled
himself to be victorious in competition over European candidates, he
would, in the most honourable manner, by conquest, as a matter of right,
1
and not as a mere eleemosynary donation, obtain access to the Service*”
Macaulay emphasised that an Indian should not be put into the service
just because he was an Indian* The new system of selection, though, in
principle, free from the defects of race distinctions and of patronage,
produced most unequal results, because the conditions under which it
worked created inequality.
The principle of equality between Indians and Europeans in
matters of appointment was re-affirmed in the Queen1 s Proclamation of
1 November 1858. The words “so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever
race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our
service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education,
ability, and integrity, duly to discharge” were understood to contain
the most important principle of British policy. Indian leaders almost
%
invariably referred to the Proclamation whenever they put forward demands 
for a larger share in the administration, and British politicians not
4
uncommonly made reference to it when the grant of some concessions was
contemplated. Queen Victoria had, indeed, wished that the Proclamation
2
should contain some pledges which her future reign was to redeem. It 
was, therefore, quite natural that educated Indians should have looked
3
upon the Proclamation as the “Magna Charta“ of their rights.
1 Hansard. Third Series, COTIII, 757-58.
2 Queen Victoria to the Earl of Derby, 15 Aug 1858; Letters, iii, 
(1854-60, 379.
3 “We take our stand upon the Proclamation - The Magna Chart a of our
rights - and who will dislodge us from it it* Surendranath Banerjeafs
speech, 12 July, The Bengalee. 15 July 1893, 331.
5A contemporary writer, one Ludlow said that the Statute of
1833 was only "negative, a mere removal of disqualification" while
the Proclamation was "positive, pledging admission to office". But
the snag lay in the phrase "so far as may be", which according to
' - - " i
Ludlow, might be so interpreted as to nullify the whole promise. In
a memorandum of 1893 the Government of India interpreted these words
as limiting the admission of Indians to such offices as could be thrown
  2
open consistently with the paramount interests of the Empire.
The Charter Act of 1833 and the Proclamation constituted 
together the only documents which indicated the lines along which 
British policy was to develop in using Indian agency in the administra­
tion. Since the documents were susceptible of elastic interpretation, 
the Government found it difficult to rebut the charges of breach of 
promise, and yet it could not repeal them. The Aitchison Commission, 
for example, refused to support any proposal, however sound or likely
to be a final solution of the problems, which involved a departure from
3
the principles laid down in them.
4
In a report of 20 January I860, a Committee of the India Office, 
which had been appointed by the Secretary of State to examine certain
1 J.M. Ludlow, Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown. 204-5.
2 Memorandum, para. 16, Pub.Progs.. No#70, Nov. 1893.
3 Report (1886-87), para# 58.
4 The Committee was appointed on 27 Oct. 1839 to consider the letter
from the Government of India and the Report of Ricketts on the
question of the salaries of the Civil servants in India. It
consisted of William Arbuthnot, Mangles, Macnaghten, Erskine, Perry, 
and J.P. Willoughby. Minutes of the Council of India, iii,
559-60.
6matters connected with the Civil Service, observed that the difficulties
associated with a competition held in a distant land npractically
excluded*1 Indians from the service. 1 Were this inequality removed,
we shall no longer be exposed to the charge of keeping promise to the
ear and breaking it to the hope11. As a remedy, the Committee suggested
that selection should be made on the results of competitive examinations
which should be held simultaneously both in India and England, It
further recommended that in justice to Indian candidates three
colloquial oriental languages should be added to the three modern
European languages. These recommendations are the more striking because
they emerged from a body - the India Council - which was later to gain
1
such a conservative reputation, and because they were made soon after
the mutiny when there was no Indian demand for such a change. The
Committee1s proposals, however, suffered an ignominious fate. The Home
2
Government treated this document as a dead letter.
In 1861 the Indian Civil Service Act was passed, according to 
which, all vacancies happening in any of the offices specified in the 
schedule annexed to the Act were to be filled by Covenanted Civil 
servants. Secondly, the "authority in India11 was invested with power
1 In 1889 the majority of the members of the India Council were against 
the Secretary of State1s decision to raise the age-limit to 21-23 
and in 1893 they were opposed to the wording of Kimberley*s despatch 
with which FauPs resolution regarding simultaneous examinations was 
transmitted to the Government of India. See below,
2 On 2 June 1893 George Russell, Under Secretary of State, remarked 
that the Committee1 s report was not an official or authoritative 
document. "It was merely an expression of opinion on the part of 
three eminent men of that time, and was never adopted by the 
responsible Government.1 Indian Pari. Debates, 1893, 360.
7to make appointments under special circumstances to any office or place
specified in the Schedule irrespective of the "recited qualifications”
and restrictions, provided that the person so appointed must have
resided at least seven years in India, and previously to his being
appointed to any of the offices in the revenuea£fjudicial departments
specified in the- Schedule, should pass an examination in the vernacu-
1
lar language of the district in which he was to be employed. A
minimum seven-year term of residence was provided as a check on any
2 ' .....
abuse of patronage by the Governor-General. Lord Canning suggested
’that in making appointments to the Covenanted posts from among the
members of the Uncovenanted Service, of not less than seven years1
standing, no distinction should be made between Europeans and Indians,
though, as a measure of economy, the latter might be given a lower
salary. He also proposed that on being appointed to a Covenanted post,
an Uncovenanted officer should become a regular member of the higher
........... 3
service, qualified to hold any office open to a member of that service.
The Secretary of State ruled that admission under special circumstances
to offices ordinarily held by members of the Covenanted Service was
%
"not to the service itself”. Some members of the India Council were 
against this provision for special appointments on the ground that it
5
would open the door to favouritism and jobbery.
1 Z4 & 25 Viet., c.54, ss. 2-5.
2 Wood's speech, 6 June 1861, Hansard, clxiii, 659*
3 Minute, 8 June 1861, Pub.Progs.. No.58* Oct. 1861.
A Leg. Bes. to India, No.21, 14 Sept. 1861.
5 Minutes of dissent by Mangles afcd Charles Mils, Pari.Paper s.
xliii (1861).
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According to Sir Erskine Ferry, the Schedule of offices was
annexed to the Act of 1861 at the instance of Covenanted civilians who
feared that the restrictions contained in the Bill did not go Aar
enough to prevent the authorities in India from making improper 
2
appointments. It may be noted that very little use was made of 
this provision. Only two substantive appointments were made in all,
3 '   /
one in 1862 and the other in 1880. If the opportunity of appointing w
Indians under this provision had been utilised, a larger number of posts
could have been made available for them, but Sir Charles Wood in
particular and the Home Government in general, from the very inception
of the scheme, were not serious about it.
*
In 1867 Sir Stafford Northcote, the Secretary of State, asked
the Government of India to take into Mcareful review11 the question of
Indian employment. He was, in his turn, impressed by a passage in the
Administration Report of Oudh which pointed to an evil in the British
system under which Indian officers of ability were shorn of all
4
incentive to exertion by the bar to their promotion. The Government
of India recognised the tturgent political necesstity” of Indian
5
employment in the higher services. In a resolution of August 1867 
it observed that many Europeans had been appointed to the posts of 
Deputy Collectors and of extra-Assistant Commissioners in the non-
1 He was Chief Justice of Bombay in 1847, became a member of Parliament
in 1854> and was appointed a member of the India Council in 1859.
Diet.National Biography. XLV, 39-40.
2 Memorandum, 9 Dec. 1876. Collections to Pub.Despatches. (1878).
3 Report of the Public Service Commission. (1886-87), para. 37.
A  Bes. to India, 31 May 1867, e.2376 (1879).
5 Bes. from India, No.38 (Foreign), 13 Sept. 1867.
9Regulation Provinces for their services during the Nfotiny, and had 
obtained promotion to the grades of Assistant Commissioner and Deputy 
Commissioner, but no Indian had yet advanced beyond the grade of extra­
assistant, As all higher appointments in the Regulation Provinces had 
been reserved for the Covenanted Service, the Government of India looked 
ttrather to the Non-Regulation Provinces as the field in which to satisfy 
the legitimate ambition of deserving Natives”, It decided to recognise 
at once the eligibility of Indians of approved character for promotion
to the rank and emoluments of Assistant Commissioners and Small Cause
1
Court Judges in the Non-Regulation Provinces, The Secretary of State
approved of the suggestions contained in the Resolution, but remarked
that there was considerable room for carrying out the principle in the
Regulation Provinces also. He recognised the ninherent rights” of
Indians to many posts, not reserved for the Covenanted Service but
exclusively held by Europeans, to which able Indians could be appointed
 2
both in the Regulation and Non-Regulation Provinces.
In 1867, when Northcote had been in correspondence with the
Government of India on this question, the East India Association adopted
Badabhai Noorojifs memorial in favour of holding competitive examinations
in India for a portion of the appointments to the Covenanted Service.
A deputation of the Association waited on Northcote on 21 August and
' ' 3 “ " ■
submitted the memorial. From 1867 onwards Indian public bodies also
1 Resolution, No. 14-15 (Foreign Dept), 19 Aug, 1867.
2 Rev. (Foreign) Bes. to India, No.10, 8 Feb, 1868.
3 Indian Expenditure Commission (Mnutes and Appendices), iii, U 79.
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began to press unceasingly for simultaneous examinations in India*
In 1868 the British Indian Association submitted a memorial to the same
# .. ..   ..................
effect. The Secretary of State turned down the proposal with the
remark that "we ought to judge of the merits of any particular system
of selection, not with reference to its affording greater or less
facilities to this or the other class of candidates, but with reference
 1
to its providing or failing to provide suitable public servants." He, 
however, pointed out that the Government had created scholarships for 
Indians to study in England, and had decided to appoint them more 
generally to the Uncovenanted service. He also referred to a Bill 
submitted to Parliament, the object of which was to enable the Govern­
ment to appoint Indians of ascertained fitness to posts in the Covenanted 
service. In May 1868 Henry Fawcett, a friend of India, moved the Civil 
Service resolution which provided for simultaneous examinations at 
important centres in India, but withdrew the resolution when Northcote 
told the House that he intended to insert in his India Bill a clause
empowering the Government of India to appoint persons of proved fitness
2
to appointments held by Covenanted Civilians.
The Government of India was also of opinion that no opportunity
should be lost of admitting Indians of tried ability and character to a
large share in the administration of the country, though it regarded
3
the demand for simultaneous examinations as "highly inexpedient". In
1 Pub. Bes. to Bombay Govt., No.36, 1 U  Oct. 1668.
2 Hansard. CXGI, 1858.
3 Pub. Des. from India, No.79, 13 June 1868.
A
1868 nine scholarships were created of the value of £200 per annum
1
each, tenable for three years. The object was to encourage Indians 
to resort more freely to England for the purpose of wperfecting their 
education, and of studying for the various learned professions, for
2
the Civil Service, and for other public employment in this country.*
In 1869 the Duke of Argyll suspended the scheme of scholarships 
The suspension in itself was a decision of minor importance, but the 
reasons adduced for suspension were significant. They had already 
been pointed out by his predecessor, Northcote, who doubted whether 
competition could be s&fely relied upon as being the most suitable mode 
of Indian recruitment. On 23 April 1868 in Parliament he said that 
competitive examinations did not suit India where various other quali­
fications, not likely to be assessed by means of an intellectual test,
3
were required of the candidates. In May, replying to the debate on 
Fawcett1s resolution, he remarked that persons possessed of ruling and 
governing qualities would not be found among those most likely to be 
successful at competitive examinations in India. He emphasised that 
the employment of a small intellectual class would not be of benefit to 
the masses, in whose interests the Government should provide the best 
possible machinery for administration. He told the House that he 
intended to include a clause in his Government of India Act Amendment
1 Resolution, No.360 (H.D. Ed.), 30 June 1868.
2 Ed. Bes. from India, No.9* 7 July 1868.
3 Hansard, cxcl, 1214.
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Bill, giving the Government power to make appointments in India, and
that method, he thought, would be better than competition and, at
1
all events, safe and for the benefit of British rule.
The Duke of Argyll expressed similar opinions in a more 
unambiguous manner. He said that the results of the competitive system 
as applied to. Europeans, who generally possessed ruling qualities, were 
not the same as in the case of Indians. In a competitive examination, 
Argyll said, Pathans and Sikhs would have little chance before a 
Bengali and it would be a dangerous experiment to place the latter over 
the martiil races of Upper India. In his opinion, in making appoint­
ments in India, the circumstances of rank and caste should not be 
disregarded. He preferred rather the system of a”careful and cautious 
selection*1 to competition by promoting fit persons from the Uncovenanted 
to the Covenanted Service. He emphasised that 11 the wide diversities of 
character which prevail between different parts of India make it 
essential that each Province and Race should be treated by itself11. He 
went on to say* ttIt should never be forgotten, and there should never be 
any hesitation in laying down the principle, that it is one of our first 
duties towards the people of India to guard the safety of our dominion. 
For this purpose we must proceed gradually, employing only such natives 
as we can trust, and these only in such offices and in such places as.
in the actual condition of things, the Government of India may determine
2
to be really suited to them*1.
1 Ibid. 1853-57.
2 Ed. Des. to India, No.3, 8 April 1869. ftfcr italics.
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Although Northcote and Argyll belonged to different parties, 
their views on this question were essentially the same. Liberals 
and Conservatives both agreed that for the maintenance and efficiency 
of British rule a preponderant British agency was indispensable, but in 
view of the changing circumstances, they also recognised the need of a 
larger use of Indian agency. The question, therefore, centred on the 
extent and mode of Indian recruitment in the Covenanted Service.
Argyll stressed the principle of treating Heach province and race by 
itselfw, which meant, in other words, that the adoption of a system of 
unfettered competition was inexpedient, as it might result in the unequal 
representation of Provinces and, within the Provinces, in the unequal 
representation of communities. It appears that British politicians 
preferred to regard the Government, rather than the educated classes, 
as the custodian of the interests of the masses. Indeed, in the battle 
of arguments there can hardly be a more powerful weapon in the armoury 
of a foreign government than to arrogate to itself the claim to represent 
the interests of the masses of the subject country.
The Government of India felt that the suspension of scholarships 
would give occasion for the misrepresentation of its intentions and 
therefore urged that some action was necessary to demonstrate that its 
views on the more liberal employment of Indians had undeigone no change. 
In March 1870 Parliament passed an important act which sought to provide 
nadditional facilities ... for the employment of natives of India of
1 Ed. Des. from India, No.l, 25 Jan. 1870.
H1
proved merit and ability in the Civil Service of Her Majesty in India.”
The Secretary of State, Argyll, emphasised that the provisions of the 
Statute were calculated to neffectually carry out” the policy of
1
employing Indians and were more complete than the system of scholarships. 
The despatch also sought to establish that since 1867 the Home Government 
had taken a more liberal view about the question of Indian employment 
than the Government of India; that in 1867 it was the Home Government 
which took the initiative, and in 1868, it was again the Home Government 
which pointed out that there was enough room in the Regulation Provinces 
also for the appointment of Indians, and that thereafter the Statute of 
1870 provided a more complete system than that of scholarships. It may 
be remarked here that whereas the scheme of scholarships emphasised the 
competitive system, the Statute provided for an altogether different 
method of recruitment* But what educated Indians wanted was not 
nomination but competition on equal terms with English candidates. In 
1870 Sir Charles Wingfield said in the Commons that from ccjversations 
with Indians pursuing their studies in England, and from articles in 
the Indian Press, he gathered that Indian educated opinion was by no
•3
means in favour of a nomination system.
The Statute of 1870 authorised the Government of India to make 
appointments to posts in the Civil Services according to such rules as 
might be from time to time prescribed by the Governor-General in Council,
1 33 Viet. , C.3, s.6. 3. Ee(. 2)^ . fo koli'a t f^o • l\ t ■a)| tyarytk I Q  70 «
3 Hansard, cxcix, $65.
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and sanctioned by the Secretary of State in Council, Under the 
Statute the words nnatives of India11 included any person "born and 
domiciled within the dominions of Her Majesty in India of parents 
habitually resident in India, and not established there for temporary 
purposes only ..." In 1872 the Secretary of State asked the Govern­
ment of India "to give immediate consideration” to the question of 
making rules for recruitment. He laid down three principles which 
had a very important bearing on this questiont (l) the employment of 
a very large proportion of British officers in the more important posts;
(2) the appointment of Indians generally to judicial posts and in
"exceptional cases” to the executive offices of collector and magistrate;
1
(3) a lower rate of salary to be fixed for Indian civilians. All the
three principles, though laid down by a Liberal Government, were later,
2
in 1878, "unreservedly” accepted by Lytton.
The first set of rules were submitted in 1874* They prescribed
a fixed term of Government service as a necessary condition for appoint- 
3
ment. The Government of India was not in favour of fixing a definite 
proportion of Indians in the service, on the ground that it might be 
inconvenient and difficult to maintain a settled ratio. In its opinion
also it would not be desirable "to impose upon the selection of natives
of India for the public service any preliminary restrictions in the sense
either of limiting or of enlarging their admission to any particular
4-
class of appointment."
1 Pub. Des. to India, No.113, 22 Oct. 1872.
2 Pub. Des. from India, No.35, 2 May 1878, para. 9.
3 For Rules see App. H. to Report (1886-87).
U  Pub. Des. from India, No.6, 23 Jan. 1874..
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The Secretary of State negatived the draft rules. The Law
Officers of the Grown, who had been consulted9were of opinion that the
Government of India had placed too narrow a construction on Section 6
of the Statute. They maintained that the restriction of previous
service for any definite period or upon any definite terms in some
employment under the British Government was opposed to the spirit and
1
intention of the Statute. Accordingly, in 1875 revised rules were 
submitted, which, with certain modifications, were sanctioned by the 
Secretary of State 1 as a tentative measure”. The rules were drawn up 
in f,the widest possible terms” • Forwarding the new set of rules, the 
Government of India observed that while the draft rules of 1874 had 
been drawn up with a view to ensuring the method advised in the
Secretary of State*s despatch of 8 April 1869, especially relating to
the promotion of Indians from the Uncovenanted to the Covenanted Service,
t’he revised rules made no attempt to prescribe merit and ability and left
2
such points to the judgment of the executive.
The rules, however, remained practically inoperative, only one,
or at most three, appointments being made thereunder to the executive
3
and judicial branches of the service.
1 See footnote to para.40 of Report (1886-87).
2 Pub. Des. from India, No.6, 22 Jan. 1875.
3 Report (1886-87), para 41. The Report says that at most two judicial
appointments were made. Perhaps it takes no note of the appointment,
under the Rules of 1875, of Kunwar Rameshwar Singh of Barbhanga, as
Assistant Magistrate and Collector. The Govt, of India justified the 
appointment on the ground that the Act of 1870 was not intended to 
preclude the admission into the reserved appointments of men who had
not proved their ability in the public service, but who might have
afforded evidence in other ways of having essential qualifications.
The Government laid stress on the expediency of encouraging !lyoung
men of good family and in easy circumstances”. The Secretary of State 
approved the appointment. Pub.Des. from India, No.20, 22 Feb. 1878;
Pub. Des. to India. No.51. 2 Mav 1878.
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In 1874, soon after coming to the India Office, Lord Salisbury,
turned his attention to matters relating to the age-limit for the Civil
Service and the mode of training for selected candidates* He sought
1
advice on this question, finally making up his own mind to reduce the
2
maximum age-limit from 21 to 19* It was said in favour of the
alteration that selected candidates would be able to resort to University
education and that English parents would be exposed to less risk in
making a choice of profession for their sons at the lower than at the
3
higher age-limit* Salisbury emphasised that ** every candidate who
enters at 22 is staking far more on his success than one who enters at
19.** In arriving at this decision he acted in disregard of the views
4
of the majority of those who were consulted. The Governor-General,
Lord Northbrook, was in favour of fixing the age-limit at 19-22.
From the London-Calcutta correspondence of the period 1874-76, 
it appears that Salisbury1s aim in introducing the change was to improve 
the quality of British candidates in the Civil Service, and he considered 
the question with sole reference to them. But in considering the qubjfcd&n
1 The Civil Service Commissioners, Prof. Jowett of Balliol College, 
the Bean of Christchurch College, the Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge 
University, and the Govt, of India.
2 Pub. Des. to India, No.19, 24 Feb. 1876.
3 Salisbury*s Minutes, Pari. Pacers. LV (1876).
4 Lord Ripon remarked that the alteration was carried out in opposition 
to the advice of the majority of the members of the Indian Government, 
including the then Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, and of a majority of the 
officials consulted in India, and of the Civil Service Commissioners 
in England, and of such an expert as Professor Jowett, who expressed 
his opinion in favour of raising the age-limit. Ripon* s Minute,
26 Sept. 1883, para. 2.
According to Lord Northbrook*s Minute, out of 101 officers 5 did 
not refer to the subject of age, 27 recommended reduction, 36 were 
in favour of retaining the existing limit and 33 were in favour of 
raising it. Minute of 22 Sept. 1875, para. 12.
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it was impossible to overlook its bearing upon the question of the
admission of Indians to the Covenanted Service* Ripon argued thus*
ttThe effect of the change, in this respect has undoubtedly been
altogether to shut the door of the competitive examinations in England
to natives of India ... There is a widespread belief in India that the
object of the change made in 1876 was to exclude educated natives from
1
the Civil Service . ..n Ilbert, a member of Ripon1 s Government,
remarked that the change gave ground for complaint that Indians had been
excluded by indirect means from a competition to which they were
2
admissible by law*
The difficulties associated with a competition, designed to
suit the British educational system and held in Iiondon, were sufficiently
discouraging, and were further increased by the reduction of the age-
limit. It may also be remarked that Salisbury did not make out a
convincing case in favour of the change, inasmuch as he could not show
that the English candidates selected under the old age-limit were not
up to the mark* It could not be proved even later by the protagonists
of the change that the products of the new experiment, which lasted from
1878 to 1891, were in any way better than those selected under the old
rules. In 1889 the Under-Secretary of State for India indicated that
the men appointed since 1878 showed, as a rule, no superiority to their
predecessors. The efficiency of the Civil Service, he said, would not
' ' 3 ....
be diminished and might be increased by raising the age-limit. In its
1 Ripon*s Minute, 26 Sept. 1883, para. 7.
Z  C.P. Ilbert*s Minute, 27 Sept. 1883, Farl. Papers. LVIII (1884-85).
3 Letter to Secretary, Civil Service Commission, 24 July 1889.
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political effects, the change must be regarded as a great blunder.
It produced a serious discontent among the Indian educated class and 
provided it with a rallying cause. In 1877-78 Surendranath Banerjea
1
practically began his political career with the Civil Service movement,
which In a sense became a precursor of the more comprehensive political
movement, namely, the Indian National Congress.
In taking his decision, Salisbury seems to have been influenced
by the fact that there had been an unusual increase in the number of
Indian competitors in 1873-74, though, in fact, only three out of the
2
twenty-three who had competed were successful. Any fear on the score
that Indians would flood the service was purely imaginary. In 1883
Ripon said that they could not succeed in large numbers in a competition
against the pick of the intelligent youths of the United Kingdom carried
on at their own doarrs and based upon the educational system of their own 
3
schools. As to the argument that English parents would be unwilling to
wait for their sons* professional choice till the age of 21, Ripon
remarked that, on the contrary, they would be unwilling to send them at 
4
an early age. The Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, C.U. Aitchison, 
criticised the change from a different point of view. He said that 
Hthe interests of Indian administration should not in any degree be
1 Benerjea, A Nation in Making. Chapter V.
2 In 1873 the number was 11, in 1874 it was 12, whereas in other
years between 1862 and 1877, it never went above 6. For table
showing the number of Indian competitors during 1835-86, see
Pub. Progs.. Jan. 1887.
3 Ripon1 s Minute,'26 Sept. 1883> para. 8.
4 Minute, 10 Sept* 1884, para. 13.
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“   1
sacrificed to the interests of unsuccessful youths and their parents *H
In his minute of 10 September 1884 Ripon pertinently asked whether it
was wise or politic to keep up political discontent, especially among men
who supplied the writer*s in the Press, public speakers, pleaders and
not infrequently the officials of Indian States,
In explaining the reasons for Salisbury1s decision one must
remember that he also shared with his predecessors a deep distrust of
the competitive system. He told Lyttons MI can imagine no more
terrible future for India than that of being governed by Competition 
2
Baboos,1 Thus it is clear that the change was introduced to secure 
two objects? the improvement of the quality of British candidates and 
the restriction on the recruitment of Indians by competition. The 
achievement of the former was at best uncertain, while that of the 
latter was certain, though it was attained at an enormously disproportion­
ate cost. The reduction of the age-limit was one of the few measures 
adopted in the latter half of the nineteenth century which shook the 
faith of Indians in the justice of the British Government. Politicians 
like Salisbury allow imaginary fears and prejudices to get the better of 
reason and do incalculable harm to the cause which they want to serve.
The change was unnecessary, impolitic and unjust,and untimely.
1 . Minute of C.U* Aitchison, 7 July 1884, para* 13*
2 Letter of 13 April 1877, quoted in Cecil1 s Life of Salisbury, 
ii, 68*
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In 1876, the year in which the age-limit was reduced,
Lytton took up the question of Indian employment under the Statute
of 1870. Confidential communications were made to the Governments
of Madras, Bombay and Begal. Madras declined to make any appointment,
1
and Bombay nominated to only one reserved judicial post. Ashley
Eden, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, brought to bear on the question a
new approach. His views appealed to Lytton, largely influencing the
2
ideas contained in the latter's minute of 30 May 1877. Eden advocated
a closer Covenanted Service to be reserved exclusively for Europeans
who, under 1 the exceptional circumstances” of the occupation and
administration of India, must carry on the ” supreme supervision” of the
administration. He supported the appointment of Indians to posts not
3
reserved for Europeans on political and financial grounds.
In his minute of May 1877 Lytton pointed out that, on the one 
hand, the Government had to discharge its imperial responsibilities by 
restricting the most important executive posts to Europeans and, on 
the other, it had to fulfil certain obligations under which an Indian 
admitted to the Covenanted Service was entitled to expect and claim
appointment in the fair course of promotion to the highest post in
A  ............
that service. Lytton's solution lay in the reduction of the number
1 The Bombay Government appointed one Gopal Hari Kao. His first 
appointment in 1863 was cancelled because he had not passed in 
the Vernacular.
2 Lytton1 s Minute, 7 Jan. 1878, Pub.Progs.. No.319/May 1879.
3 Bengal to Govt, of India, 8 March 1877, Pub.Progs.. No.309,
May 1879.
A  Balfour, Lytton's Administration. 528-29.
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of admissions to the Covenanted Service and the establishment of a
close 1 native civil service1 which was to include a proportion of the
posts reserved to the Covenanted Service, and a portion of the posts
then held by Uncovenanted officers. On political grounds he preferred
the system of nomination to the principle of ”proved merit and abilityt
*
whiche, if adopted, would exclude all those whom the Government would
attract to its service. The qualifications of this class of influential
persons, whose employment was calculated to add to the strength and
populatity of the Government, were Hpartly inherited, partly developed
by early habits of command, partly proved by the readiness with which
their right to command is recognised by large numbers of their native
1
fellow-subjects.” Lytton1s Government proposed, as a measure of
economy, a lower rate of salary for the members of the proposed service.
The despatch referred to the difficulty - rather the ”utter impossibility” - 
of getting European officers of position to serve cheerfully under Indian 
officers. It was emphasised that since within any foreseeable time the
most important executive posts could not be given to Indians, it was
objectionable to encourage them to enter a service which nostensibly
A
offers them as legitimate objects of ambition posts to which it is
„2
notoriously impossible to appoint or promote them.'1 Such a practice 
as kept the higher offices ttnominally open11 but ”virtually closed” 
would, in the Government’s view,perpetuate dissatisfaction among Indians.
1 Pub. Des. from India, No.35, 2 May 1878, para. 22.
2 Ibid.. para. 32.
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The new scheme was thus designed to keep the aspirations of Indian 
incumbents within the defined limits of the proposed service and to 
give strength to the British administration by associating with it 
the influential classes. It was also intended to render the 
administration economical.
Cranbrook, Salisbury1s successor at the India Office, while 
agreeing with the Government of India1 s policy of opening high employ­
ment to Indians, refused to accept those proposals which provided for 
a close 1 native1 service and their exclusion from the Covenanted Service. 
He remarked that any scheme which involved a departure from the principle 
of 1833 would not be acceptable to Parliament and asked the Government 
of India to give immediate effect to the Act of 1870. Cranbrook was 
not against the selection of Indians of high executive capacity for 
administrative posts in exceptional cases. Referring to the argument 
that English civilians were unwilling to serve under Indian officers, he
remarked that in Egypt, Turkey and even in the Indian States they were
1
not unwilling to accept subordinate posts.
In 1879, in forwarding the new set of rules, Lytton1 s Government
remarked that whereas the Act of 1870 spoke of H employment in the Civil
Service*, the Secretary of State1 s despatch inferred n appointments to
2 - -   - -
the Civil Service.*1 The Secretary of State sanctioned all the rules
1 Pub. Des. to India, No.125, 7 Nov. 1878.
2 Pub. Des. from India, No.31, 1 May 1879, para. 6. Cranbrook 
in his despatch of 7 Nov 1878 had used the term nto the Civil 
Service of India.”
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1
with the exception of Rule III, which was omitted. He thought it
undesirable to lay down a special rule for appointment to a certain
category of posts, as selection for high offices depended upon fitness 
2
and efficiency.
Under the Statutory rules of 1879 the Local Governments were
authorised to nominate persons, not above 25 for nemployment in Her
Majesty1 s Covenanted Civil Service.w The age-limit was waived for
those who were to be nominated on the grounds of merit and ability
proved in Government service, or in the practice of a profession.
The total number of persons to be so appointed was not to exceed one-
fifth of the total number of civilians appointed by the Secretary of
State in one year. Each selection was subject to the approval of the
Governor-General in Council and the selected candidates, save under
exceptional circumstances, were to be on probation for at least two 
3
jrears. In a resolution of December 1879 the Government of India 
expressed the view that the majority of appointments should be made 
from young men below 25. It was pointed out that the object of the 
rules was to attract to Government service young men of good family 
and social position to whom the employment in the Uneovenanted service 
had not proved sufficiently attractive. The appointment of persons
1 Rule III provided that Statutory Civilians could not, without the
previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council, be appointed
to posts of Members of a Board of Revenue, Chief Magistrate of a 
District, and Commissioner of Division or of Revenue.
2 Pub. Des. to India, No.68, 17 July 1879*
3 Notification (Public) No.1534, 22 Aug. 1879.
of proved ability was to be the exception, being confined to those
who had obtained great distinction in the offices they had held or the
professions they had followed, that is, persons whom the Government
would a spontaneously11 desire to appoint to superior offices. The
Resolution remarked that though these principles might not be in
accordance with the anticipation in some quarters arising from Section 6,
they had been adopted by the Government of Indian and were in clear
1
coincidence with the views of Her Majesty1s Government.
The ereation of the Statutory Civil Service marks a significant
stage in the Indianisation of the Civil Service. Rules had been framed
twice before, but they proved practically nugatory. The scheme of
1879, under which Indians were assured of one-sixth of the total number
of Covenanted posts in addition to any number of offices to which they
were entitled on the results of competitive examinations, placed at
their disposal a larger number of posts than a scheme of competition in
2
London, even under favourable conditions, would have thrown open; and 
yet the Statutory Service never became popular with educated Indians.
A scheme designed to provide them with adequate facilities for the London 
competition would have been more popular, though, in its practical 
results, it would not have, for a long time to come, disturbed the 
 ^-____________________
1 Resolution, 24 Dec. 1879, Pub. Frogs.. No.371, Dec. 1879*
2 During 1862-78 the total number of successful Indian candidates 
was 11, being less than one a year; whereas during 1879-86, under 
the Statutory Scheme, the rate of recruitment, on an average, was 
6 a year. Report (1886-87), para. 45. For table showing the 
number of candidates who appear and were successful see Pub .Progs.. 
Jan. 1887.
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proportion, as provided in the resolution. Thus, the question arises*
why did the Government not adopt such a popular course ? The main
reason is that ever since the authorities took up the question of
^ndian employment seriously they had entertained istrfong- misgivings
about the merits of the competitive system. The Home Government laid
emphasis on nomination, and Lytton threw his entire weight on the same
side, Iij consequence, the area of selection was mainly restricted to
young men of social status. Remarking on this change, Lyall,
Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces (N.W.P.), said that
the rules of 1679, as explained by the resolution of December 1879,
initiated a policy somewhat different from the earlier proceedings and
relaxed the statutory condition of proved merit and ability as the
1
antecedant qualifications for these appointments.
An important point in favour of the Statutory System was that 
it enabled the Government to distribute appointments among the educa­
tionally backward Provinces and also to recruit men from some important 
communities which had little chance in a purely competitive examination.
The Aitfhison Commission remarked that the rules of 1879 Mwere designed
' 2
to reserve local recruitment to natives of I n d i a . T h e  Government 
regarded the employment of certain classes, who were believed to possess 
governing qualities, though they were educationally backward, as of the 
utmost importance. Lytton supported the recruitment of the influential
1 Minute, 10 July 1884, Pub. Letters from India. (1884), 871-7$.
2 Report. (1886-87), para. 84.
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classes on grounds of political expediency* In 1888 the Government
of India remarked that the object of the arrangement of 1879 was to
bring nterritorial or political influence1* to its support and,
accordingly, the selections were made more on grounds of **political
1
expediency than of administrative advantage.*1 The Chief Commissioner
of the Central Provinces expressed the same view when he said that the
object of the rules of 1879 was not to strengthen the service or to
obtain the best public servants, but to induce influential young men of
2
good family to take employment under the Government.
In so far as the scheme of 1879 threw open a fixed percentage
of appointments, and provided for the representation of Provinces in
the higher services, it marked a definite improvement on the existing
system. Its greatest weakness, however, lay in the mode of recruitment.
/ Within five years of its existence the method revealed its shortcomings,
and during the later half there developed a tendency to appoint men of
3
proved fitness in the subordinate branches of service. The change in 
the method of recruitment meant the acceptance of the system as contem­
plated in the Act of 1870. Thus the mode of selection, as embodied in 
" Section 6 of the Statute, and the proportion of recruitment, as provided 
under the rules of 1879, together formed to the end of the century, or 
rather to the appointment of the Islington Commission in 1912, the main 
principles of Indian employment in the higher services.
1 Pub. Des. from India, No.58, 9 Oct. 1888.
2 Letter to Govt, of India, 11 June 1884, Pub. Letters from India. 
1884., 887-88.
3 Govt, of India* s Memorandum, 1893, para. 25, Pub. Progs.. No.70, 
Nov. 1893.
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1 .............
Cranbrook1 s despatch of 1873 , together with the rules of 1879
produced, though vaguely, the impression that the Statutory system was
just a different mode of appointment to the Covenanted service.
Cranbrook consulted the Government of India about the training of
2 ......
Statutory Civilians in England, but the latter expressed its opinion
3
against compulsory training on grounds of religious difficulties.
The fact that they were desired to receive education in England and that 
their allowance was to be the same as that received by candidates 
selected there, indicates that originally the idea was to treat them on 
an equal footing with their Covenanted colleagues. Under the
4
resolution of 1880 they were graded in the list of Covenanted Civilians.
Their pension was also fixed on the tt analogy” of the Covenanted Civil
.............5
Service rules in contradistinction to those of the Uncovenanted Service.
As regards the Indianisation of the Uncovenanted Services, British
policy had been clearly defined by successive Secretaries of State.
Northcote had recognised the winherent rights’1 of Indians to these
services both in the Regulation and non-Regulation Provinces. Argyll
desired their nmore free employment” in that branch and emphasised that
the Uncovenanted Services should be Hprincipally reserved” for them
6
Salisbury concurred in the views expressed by his predecessors. A
1 Pub. Des. to India, 7 Nov. 1878, para. 10.
2 Ibid., para. 16.
3 Pub. Des. from India, No.31, 1 May 1879*
4 Resolution, Nos. 36_________  (Pub.), 25 Aug. 1880.
1322 - 1327
5 Pub. Des. to India, No.22*^11 March, 1880.
6 Rev. (Foreign) Des. to India"pNo*10> S Feb. 1868; Ed. Des. to India,
No.3> & April 1869; Fin. Des. to India, No.84, 10 March, 1870; Fin.
Des. to India, No.48, 10 Feb. 1876.
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circular of 18 April 1879 provided that all offices other than those
reserved for the Covenanted Service, or those for which technical or
professional qualifications were desirable, should be held by Indians.
It deprecated the tendency of appointing Europeans to posts for which
Indians were eligible.! To prohibit the appointments of Europeans,
it was provided that no person other than an Indian should be appointed
to an office carrying a salary of Rs.200 a month or above without the
1
previous sanction of the Governor-General. Although the orders did
not apply to the appointments in the Opium, Salt or Customs,Survey,
Mint, Public Works and Police departments, it was made clear that the
higher offices in those departments were not intended to be reserved
2
for Europeans and should be conferred more freely upon Indians. To
the Bombay Governments inquiry as to whether the principles laid down in
the Circular applied to temporary appointments also, the Secretary of
3 ...
State replied in the affirmative. He withheld his sanction from two
appointments made by the Bombay Government in contravention of the
instructions of the Circular; and also turned down its suggestion, which
provided that in future the instructions should not be applicable to
appointments in the Political Department. He emphasised that the
1 In the case of Madras and Bombay, the sanction of the Secretary of 
State was required for the appointments of Europeans to posts 
carrying a salary of Rs.200 or above. Despatches to Madras and 
Bombay, 10 July 1879#
2 Circular No. 21 , 18 April 1879.
746 - 53 '
3 The Bombay Govt, wanted to include special famine officers in the 
list of exceptions, but the Secretary of State held that Indians 
could be as fitly appointed as Europeans to these offices. Pub. 
Des. to India, No.107, 6 Nov. 1879.
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object of the rule originally laid down by the Duke of Argyll and repeated
by Lord Cranbrook was to open, as far as possible, appointments to
qualified Indians, and not to set them aside, as had frequently been the
1
case, in favour of English candidates. In October 1880 the Secretary
of State explained that the object of the rule was to prohibit the
appointments of Europeans who, by exercising pressure and influence on
the dispensers of local patronage, had obstructed the strict observance
of the declared policy. He went on to say that despite the fact that
in some instances and in the earlier stages Indian agency might not be
so efficient as European agency, the policy of Indian employment was
2
expedient for political and financial reasons.
During Ripon1 s Viceroyalty, T.C. Hope, the Finance Secretary, 
drew up, at the instance of the Government, a note which dealt with the 
entire question relating to the strength, organisation, pay and recruit­
ment of the services. According to the note, the principles already 
accepted by the Government were* (1) to make the Covenanted Service a 
corps dTelite: (2) to fill all other appointments, not reserved to it, by 
the cheaper Indian agency; (3) to appoint Indians to the Covenanated 
posts, not exceeding one-fifth of the number appointed in England, in 
addition to those who might succeed at the competition; (4) to retain
in the frontier commissions of the Punjab, Sind, Assam and British
" ' 3
Burma, military officers in the proportion of one to three civilians.
1 Pub. Des. to Bombay, No.5, 3 June 1880.
2 Ibid.. No.10, 14 Oct. 1880.
3 Hopefs Note, 16 Nov 1881, para. 6.
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The note also referred to the difficulty of fixing the minimum strength of
the Covenanted Service consistent with the requirements of safety and
efficiency. In December 1881, the Government of India pointed out that
the existing strength of the Service could not be considerably reduced
while the business of civil administration had a tendency to increase
with the social, industrial and commercial needs of the people. It,
however, admitted that an increasing use of Indian agency, apart from its
1
economic aspect, would add to the popularity of the Government.
The merits of Ripon* s Government lay not in the initiation of a
new policy but in the liberal interpretation of the existing rules.
Its important recommendations were? (l) to extend the principle of one-
2
sixth to the composition of the Calcutta High Courts (2) to calculate
the number of Statutory appointments on the total number of nominations,
3
including military recruits for the Commissions; (3) to look upon 
competition as the primary method of recruitment; (4) to fix the age- 
limit at 18 - 21; and ($) to put Sanskrit and Arabic on a par with Greek 
and Latin in the schedule of marks. BWe would then lookrt, observed 
the Government of India, nto the open competition to supply as far as 
possible, the required number of natives for the Superior Civil Service.
68
1 Resolution (H.D.), No.2024 - 35 , 15 Dec. 1881.
2 Hud.. Des. from India, No. 29, 2 7  July 1880, No.37, 14 Sept. 1880.
3 Pub. Des. from India, No.71, 19 Dec. 1881; No.36, 3 June 1882.
The Govt, of India pointed out that the deduction of military 
appointments from the total number of nominations sfcd fyhe* division 
of the residue between recruitment in India and England would bring
the Statutory ijuota below ohe-fifth and as such would be a contravention 
of the Government* s policy towards Indian employment.
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To make up the difference between the number thus appointed and the
1
full 18 per cent, we must fall back upon the Statute of 1870*.
Lord Ripon regarded the reduction of the age-limit as a mistake and
pressed strongly for an early return to the old arrangement. He was
of opinion that the reduction indirectly effected a change which would
not have been acceptable to Parliament had it been proposed in the form
2
of an alteration of the law.
Thus, it is clear that Ripon1 s Government was fully convinced of
the necessity of maintaining a strong British element in the Covenanted
Services inasmuch as it was not in favour of simultaneous examinations
3
and of the admission of Indians beyong 18 per cent. Its suggestions 
were intended to make the London competition the primary method of 
selection by giving Indian candidates more facilities.
The Secretary of State had rejected the first suggestion on the 
ground that the constitution of the High Courts had been based on a
4
different principle. As regards the calculation of Statutory appoint­
ments, he ruled that the military element of services should not be
5
included in fixing the number of Statutory appointments. Other
1 Pub. Des. from India, No.51? 12 Sept. 1884-.
2 Minutes of 26 Sept. 1883 and 12 Sept. 1884.
3 This figure was determined on the basis of the actual rate of 
recruitment by both methods, nomination and competition. Out 
of a total of 18 per cent. 16.2/3 per cent, of the appointments 
were made by nomination.
4 Jud. Des. to India, No.4, 27 Jan. 1881.
5 Pub. Des. to India, No.23, 8 March 1883.
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important suggestions relating to facilities for Indian candidates,
which had been so strongly emphasised by Ripon and his Government in
1884, were also not accepted. In a despatch of 8 January 1885 Lord
Kimberley, then Secretary of State, observed that a free and open
competitive system was hardly compatible with any restriction on the
percentage of Indian recruitment. He maintained that the proposal for
putting Sanskrit and Arabic on an equal footing with Greek and Latin
would make the examination” substantially oriental*1. Such a change,
he stressed, would not only be opposed to the principles of the
competitive system as contemplated by its authors, but would also be
unfair to a majority of Indians who would be prevented by religious
scruples from appearing at the London competition. . Kimberley went on
to say that competition was not intended to be the primary method of
selection, nor was the Statute of 1870 meant to fall into a secondary
place. In his opinion, the Act was **a measure of remarkable breadth
and liberality*1 and supplied the **parliamentary remedy** for any defects
which might appear in the competitive system. The main point at which
he drove was that the very defects of the competitive examinations held
in England provided a safeguard against the inconveniences of an
unfettered competition. However, he asked the Government of India to
1
reconsider the arrangements made under the Act of 1870.
1 Pub. Des. to India, No.l, 8 Jan. 1885.
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The Government of India drew up a draft of revised Statutory
rules. However, it was strongly of opinion that without a radical
change of the system, no scheme possessing the necessary elements of
1
finality could be devised. Its letter, together with the revised
set of rules, sent to the Local Governments for their consideration,
clarified the position of Statutory Civilians, Strong emphasis was
2
laid on the selection of persons of proved merit and ability.
According to this interpretation, the Statutory Civilians held appoint­
ments to specific offices and whre not members of the Covenanted Service; 
their promotion involved a fresh appointment to a new office and such 
promotion could not be claimed as of right but depended entirely on 
individual merit and capacity and was altogether at the discretion of
3
the local Government.
The Local Governments looked upon the question from different 
points of view. The Bombay Government doubted whether the Secretary of 
State had put the right construction on the Statute of 1870. wIt seems
likely that the intention of the Act was to assimilate completely natives 
appointed under it with members of the Covenanted Service.” In its 
opinion the admission of Indians to a service which would neither be
4
Covenanted nor Uncovenanted would not be liked by them . The Lieutenant
1 Pub, Des. from India, No.11, 9 Feb. 1886.
2 Letters to Local Govts. Nos. 25 (Pub.), 18 June 1885.
1074-83
3 Letter to N.W.P., No.1457 (Pub.), 24 Aug. 1885.
4 Letter to Govt, of India, No.4656 (Pol. Dept), 28 July 1885.
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Governor of Bengal was of the view that the whole principle of admission
1
to the Service was wrong. A year earlier he had recommended the
2
abolition of the system and its replacement by competition in England.
The Lieutenant-Governor of the N#W.P. said that the exclusions of
Statutory Civilians from the general list would cause great disappoint- 
3
ment to them. Aitchison, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, had already
expressed strong'views against the system. In his view the rules of
1879y by failing to afford any guarantee for proved merit and ability,
had offended against the spirit of the law. He emphasised that the
System had opened nThe side-door of charity”, and that no rules were
U
likely to make it successful.
The object of the revised Statutory rules was, first, to improve 
the efficiency of the Service and, secondly, to clarify its status.
Since 1880 the Statutory Civilians had been treated practically on a 
footing of equality with their Covenanted colleagues, although such 
factors as their mode of selection, Indian training, and lower salary 
were not calculated to give them the same amount of respect in the eyes 
of the educated classes as the latter enjoyed. The Lieutenant Governor 
of Bengal said that the Statutory Civilians had been ranked and graded 
with the regular service and had outwardly the same position and to some
1 Letter to Govt, of India, No.2610.A, 21 July 1885.
2 Letter to Govt, of India, No. 1166 A-U, 12 June 1884-.
3 Letter to Govt, of India, No.15, 10 July 1885*
U  Minute, 7 July 1884..
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1
extent its privileges, but they had been regarded as inferior in status.
The Lieutenant Governor of the N.TfcP. observed that, Statutory Civilians
«
had been treated in a manner as if they had all been appointed to the
2
regular Covenanated Service. According to Aitchison, the rules of
1379 practically admitted them to the Civil Service itself with all the
3
ordinary claims to advancement in ordinary routine. From these 
observations it is quite clear that the Government of India1 s inter­
pretation, intended to give effect to the Secretary of State's ruling of 
1883,did not accord Mth the actual state of things.
Taking hbtice of the Government of India1 s remark that the 
existing system called for a radical change, the Secretary of State 
authorised it to appoint a commission to inquire into the whole subject 
of Indian employment. Remarking on the question of Indian employment,
the Secretary of State said that nmany perplexing questions would become 
more easy of solution . . .  If a conclusion could be arrived at as to 
the approximate number of European public servants who must necessarily, 
for the efficiency of the administration and the political security of
■ ‘ " 4
the empire, be maintained in each branch of the public service in India.
But the question of the minimum strength was most difficult of solution
1 Letter to Govt, of India, No.1166 A-D, 12 June 1884.
2 Letter to Govt, of India, No.15, 10 July 1885, para.7.
3 Minute, 7 July 1884, para. 8.
4 Pub. Bes. to India, No.65, 15 July 1886.
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because the views of the Government and Indian politicians were sharply 
divided on it.
The Commission, with Sir Charles Aitchison as President, also
1
included six Indian members. Broadly speaking, it was required to
!,devise a scheme which may reasonably be hoped to possess the necessary
elements of finality, and to do full justice to the claims of Natives
of India to higher and more extensive employment in the public service.M
Its inquiry included all branches of the public service except the
questions connected with the conditions on which English candidates
2
were admitted to the Civil Service examination. In the first instance 
it inquired into the question of Indian employment in the posts, 
ordinarily reserved for the Covenanted Service, and in the executive 
and judicial branches of the Uncovenanted Service. At a later £  age it 
held inquiry into questions relating to the special departments, such as, 
Accounts, Archaeological Survey, Jail, Meteorological Survey, Mint, Opium, 
Pilot Service, Post Office and Telegraph, Police, Public Works, Registra­
tion, Salt and Survey. The second division of its inquiry, held under
a resolution of 8 March 1887, also embraced the question of the admission
3
of Indians and Europeans to these services*
1 It consisted of a trained English lawyer, six members (including the 
President) of the Covenanted Service, a representative of the non- 
official European and of the Eurasian community respectively, a member 
of the Uncovenanted Civil Service, and six Indians selected from various 
Provinces as wsufficiently representative of the different classes and 
modes of thought.Report. para. 2.
2 Resolution No. 2 k _____  (H.D.), U  Oct. 1886.
1573 - 98
3 The inquiry was conducted by a Sub-Committee of members of the 
Commission, aided by professional colleagues. Report. para. 12.
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The Aitchison Commission was of opinion that any rule or
practice based on race disqualification would not only mean departure
from the policy laid down in 1833 1858, but would also be invidious
and inexpedient, and that the only Bjust criterion is that of fitness
ascertained, where it is possible, by adequate tests, and where this is
1
impossible, by impartial selection.To meet the claims of Indians to 
higher and more extensive employment, it recommended the reduction of 
the strength of the Covenanted Civil Service and the transfer of a 
corresponding number of appointments to the proposed Provincial Civil 
Service. Accordingly, the Covenanted Service was to be reduced to a 
corns dTelite. and the English competitive system was to continue as the 
method of selection. The Provincial Service, recruited under different 
methods adapted to local circumstances, was intended to secure a fair
2
representation of the various ^aces* of India in the administration.
Appointments to the Provincial and subordinate Services were to be made
by the Local Governments from men who must have recently resided in the
Province for at least three years. The Commission was not in favour
of making provincial recruitment wholly exclusive, though no doubt it
was alive to a danger likely to result from the indiscriminate employment
3
of men from other Provinces. The grades of pay in the Provincial
Service and the pay of higher appointments to be held by its members
...............   4-
were tdi be fixed independently of the conditions of the Imperial Service.
1 Report, para. 58.
2 Ibid., para. 73.
3 Ibid., para. 84-.
U  Ibid., para. 85.
■H
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The Commission recommended the abolition of the Statutory Service
1
and the absorption of its members into the Provincial Service* The
main objections to the former, as pointed out by the witnesses, werei
the appointment of men to specific posts in the Covenanted Service and
not to the Service itself; the introduction of patronage; a lower salary;
the emphasis on birth and status in selection; the recruitment of less
qualified men in disregard of the claims of more competent men, and the
2
lower status of the Statutory Civil!an*. The Commission expressed the
view that the experiment had proved a failure but added that the Kuslim
witnesses, for the most part, favoured, for reasons of the educational
3
backwardness of their community, a system of nomination,. The Report 
pointed out that whereas out of 1 $  Statutory appointments the ifotslimg 
had secured as many as 15, they had failed to secure a single appointment
A
through the door of competition. The Commission1s proposals for the 
transfer of a number of Covenanted posts to the Provincial Service 
retained the existing arrangement of provincial representation with the 
difference that the principle of tried merit and ability was substituted 
for simple nomination.
The Commission strongly supported the continuance of the London 
competition for appointment to the Covenanted Service, remarking that 
it "may be said to represent the only permanent English official element
1 Ibid,, paras, 72, 87.
2 Ibid., para, 67,
3 Ibid,, para. 71
U  Ibid., paras. 61, 45. In 1885 K,B« Ty&bji, eon of Badruddin Tyabji ,
third President of the Congress, became successful at the London 
competition and Joined the service in Jan. 1883,
in India, the importance of recruiting that service with reference to
the maintenance of English principles and method of government cannot,
in the opinion of the Commission, be overrated. Any uncertain note
1
of policy in this respect might produce undesirable results.” Its 
stand against the proposal for simultaneous examinations was unequivocal. 
The main arguments were* The question was simply one as to the qualifica­
tions required and the arrangements under which officers possessing the 
necessary qualifications could best be secured; the education and 
training supplied by Indian schools and colleges could not be relied upon 
for this purpose; a competition in India would result in great inequality
of provincial representation; and the viva voce test, a very important
2
part of the system, could not be properly arranged in India. Most of 
these objections had been emphasised before. In 1868 Northcote had 
said that the merits of any particular system should be judged with 
reference to its nproviding or failing to provide suitable public servants. 
Both he and Argyll had pointed out that competition would result in the 
disproportionate distribution of appointments. As regards the viv& voce 
test, it may be observed that in view of the presence of a large number 
of European professors and experienced civilians in India, it would not 
have been difficult to arrange it on a satisfactory basis. So far as 
the deficiencies of the Indian educational system were concerned, 
compulsory foreign training of candidates selected in India - a proposal
1 Report. para. 59*
2 Report, para. 60.
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which hah a very large number of supporters among the advocates of
simultaneous examinations - would have, to a very great extent, redressed 
1
the balance. The fact is that the Commissions approach to the question 
of Indianisation was conditioned by the paramount consideration of main­
taining a strong **permanent English official element1* in India, for which 
the competition in London provided the surest guarantee.
However, the Commission recommended that the age-limit should be 
fixed at 19-23. It was also inclined to raise the marks assigned to 
Sanskrit and Arabic provided that the standard of examination was 
materially enhanced. But it was against the inclusion of vernacular 
languages among the subjects for the competitive examination, being of 
opinion that their introduction would affect the distinctive English 
character of the examination. The Commission expressed its opinion 
against the proposal that it was necessary to fix a limit on Indian 
recruitment. In its opinion the disadvantage of competing in a foreign 
country, in a foreign language, in subjects of study peculiarly English
and against the flower of English schools and colleges, left no room for
2
fear that the Indians would flood the Services. It^A^not accept the
Bengal Government*s suggestion that a fixed proportion of Indian
candidates should be selected in London by an examination separate frok
3
that for European candidates. The grounds for rejection were: first,
1 A resolution of the Congress in 1885 provided that selected candidates 
in India should receive training in England, but in 1886, on account 
of the opposition of some members, especially of Rajendralal MLtra, 
the point was not pressed, though many members were in favour of 
dompulsory foreign training.
2 Pephr,t j'-p as^62—6/
3 Letter to the Govt, of India, No.1166 A-D, 12 June 1884.
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a differential mode of appointment would be distasteful to the Indian 
community, secondly, persons appointed on the results of separate 
standards of examination would be liable to be regarded as not 
possessing the same qualifications; thirdly, the allotment of appoint­
ments would involve Man artificial exclusion of candidates on grounds
of race from appointments for which they may be in other respects the
1
best qualified persons,tt and thus mean a departure from the principles
laid down in 1883 and 1858.
As a substitute for the Statutory Service, the Commission
2
recommended the transfer to the Provincial Service of 108 posts, which 
were to be excluded from the Schedule to the Act of 1861. This number was 
arrived at on the basis of the one-sixth of the appointments made under 
the Statutory rules. The Commission expressed the view that the scheme 
would meet the Indian demand on areasonable basis. With a view to 
meeting the requirements of the changing condition, it recommended the 
amendment of the Statute of 186l in such a way as to give power to the 
Secretary of State, subject to the control of Parliament, to make from 
time to time such alterations in the Schedule as might be necessary.
1 Report. para. 64-.
2 The more important of these were* Under-Secretaries to the several 
Govts, one-third of District and Civil and Sessions Judges; one- 
tenth of Magistrates or Chief Magisterial Officers of Districts; 
one-sixth of Joint Magistrates in all Provinces; one Member of the 
Board of Revenue in Madras, Bengal and N.W.P., and one of the ' 
Financial Commissioners in the Punjab; one of the Chief Revenue 
Officers of Divisions in all Provinces except Bombay and Assam; 
one-tenth of Collectors of Revenue or Chief Revenue Officers of 
Districts; one-sixth of Assistant Collectors or Assistant 
Commissioners. Rebbtt.. para. 77.
Six members of the Commission, including two Indians, were not in 
favour of removing any appointments to the Board of Revenue from 
the schedule.
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The Commission, in the course of its inquiry, was faced with 
conflicting opinions regarding the proportion in which Indians were to 
be appointed to judicial and executive posts. The Provincial Govern­
ments had been in favour of their extensive employment in the judicial 
service but not of their exclusive employment in the higher grades of 
the Judiciary. Many witnesses suggested their complete exclusion from 
district charges. The Commission was of opinion that Indians should be 
given opportunity to prove their fitness for holding the executive charges 
of districts, and accordingly, it recommended the exclusion of a small 
proportion of district charges from the Schedule. As regards Indian 
employment in the High Courts, the Commission, impressed by the success 
of the experiment, recommended that the number of Judges selected from
the judicial branch of the Provincial Service or from advocates or
1
pleaders of the High Courts should be increased.
Though no attempt was made by the Commission to fix the 
representation of various communities in the public services, its proposal 
to have no uniform system of recruitment for all Provinces and the 
provision of filling the listed posts by members of the Provincial Service 
gave the Local Governments sufficient discretionary power to distribute 
appointments among the important communities. At the time of the 
Commission* s inquiry the proportion of appointments held by Hindus and 
Muslims, though not uniform in all the Provinces, corresponded more or
1 Report.. paras. 77, 83.
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1
less closely with the percentage of their total population. In
Bengal, Assam and Bombay, the percentage of Hindus was largely in excess
of their population, and in the N.W.P. and Oudh, the Hyderabad Assigned
Districts and the Central Provinces the proportion of Muslims largely
2
exceeded their population. The main cause of the disparity was the
unequal diffusion of education among various communities. It may be
noted that even among the Hindus one or two communities had secured
3
employment far in excess of their population.
Some of the witnesses suggested certain methods for the
representation of minorities, especially of the Muslims, Theodore 
4
Beck expressed the view that at the open competition Mthe classes who 
would fare worst are Mahomedans and the upper classes in general, such 
as the Rajput aristocracy.” He advocated the appointment of persons 
belonging to old families - the nnatural leaders” of the peopel. Beckfs 
fear was that if the nsystem of numerical representation were adopted, 
there would be five Hindus to every one Mahometan in the North-Western 
Provinces, the result.would be the enormous political preponderance of 
the Hindus, and the practical extinction of Mahomed an influence in civil
1 Of 2,588 persons employed, 1,866 or 72.1 per cent, were Hindus and 
514 or 19*8 per cent, were Muslims. Their proportion to the total 
population was approximately 75 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. 
Report, para. 53.
2 According to the Report the percentage of Muslims employed in the 
Executive and judicial branches was as followsi
Madras 4 (6.2); Bombay and 5<£ind 5.4 (18.3); Bengal 8.5 (31.2);
N*WJP. and Oudh 45.1 (3tf*£); Punjab 39.3 (51.3); Central Provinces 
18.1 (2.4); Hyderabad Assigned Districts 16.6"’(7); and Assam 9 (26.9). 
Report, para. 53. The figures in brackets represent the percentage 
of Muslim population.
3 Repost ,para. 54.
4 He was the Principal of Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh, and was 
strongly pro-Muslim.
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1
affairs.* Another witness, S^ red Mahmud, a District Judge (N.W.P.),
was of opinion that competition would be detrimental to the interests
of such important communities as Rajputs, Muslims and Sikhs and would
2
alienate their sympathies from British rule. Ghulam Mahomed, the founder
of the Anjumani Islam Society, Bombay, favoured the rets&tion of the
Statutory system and the reservation of appointments for principal
3
religious sections in each Province. In the opinion of Wordsworth,
Principal of Elphinstone College, Bombay, who was an advocate of
simultaneous examinations, the Statutory system was necessary ”for
correcting any such irregularities as may exist In regard to caste or
4 5
race differences.” M.G. Ranade suggested that the claims of the back­
ward classes should be satisfied by resorting to nomination for such
6
reserved posts as were not filled by competition. Nawab Munir Jang,
Political and Foreign Secretary to the Nizam* s Government, was strongly
against the proposal for extending facilities for the London competition
7
and remarked that each deterrent had worked for good. H.W. Bliss, 
Additional Member, Board of Revenue (Madras), suggested that the only 
remedy against the influx of ”an undue number of a single class of natives” 
was to limit the number of vacancies for candidates of particular religions
1 Progs, of the Public Service Commission (P.S.C.), ii, Sec.ii, 33-39.
2 Ibid., 132.
3 Ibid, 17, Sec. II, 34-35.
4 Progs, of P.S.C.. IV, 105.
5 An eminent social reformer, afterwards a judge of the High Court.
6 Progs, of P.S.C.. 17, 143.
7 Ibid., 7, Sec. II., 236-37.
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1
and castes. Sfcred Amir All, a representative of the fcfehomedan Central 
Association and a former member of the Central Legislature, said that 
due to the lack of uniform advance in education the system of simultaneous 
examinations would be inexpedient, and its introduction would preclude
2
the Muslims absolutely from having a chance of entering the Civil Service.
The Muhammad©bi Literary Society of Calcutta asked for a proportionate share
of appointments in both Covenanted and Uncovenanted Services and advocated
3
the retnetion of the Statutory system. The Punjab Government was of
opinion that one competitive examination would bring the administration
4
of that Province largely under foreigners1.
The above views were no doubt peculiar to some individuals and a
few associations, but none the less they indicate the lines along which
the question of the representation of minorities was being approached in
certain quarters. The Commission made no proposal for the distribution
of appointments on a communal basis, nor could its recommendations regarding
more facilities for competition in London be expected to improve the
prospects of the educationally backward classes. In fact the Government
of Madras had expressed its opinion against the proposal to fix the
proportion of Hindus and Muslims in the Covenanted ranks on a population
5 ........
basis* Thus in the absence of any definite recommendations on this
question, the proportion of Muslims and other communities depended on the
system of recruitment a Local Government decided to adopt. In 1888,
1 Ibid, VI, Sec. II, 284.
2 Ibid, 196.
3 Frogs, of F.S.C.. VI, Sec. Ill, sub-sec. A.
4 Ibid, i, Q.158.
5 Ibid., V, Sec.A, Q.234.
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in reply to a memorial from the Central Muhammedan Association, the
Secretary of State observed that the fact that in certain Provinces
the Muslims had acquired a considerable share of public offices showed
that the Government was willing to avail itself of their services to
whatever extent they were qualified. Their less employment in certain
Provinces, he remarked, was due to the appointment of those who had
equipped themselves with special knowledge which could be acquired only
1
by making use of the educational advantages provided for all.
The declarations of Dufferin, Lansdowne, and Elgin were also 
not very encouraging. On 10 April 1888 replying to a farewell address 
from the Muslim associations, Dufferin said at Lucknow that however much 
the Government might sympathise with the Muslims it t!was precluded by 
those strict principles of impartiality which, I trust, no Indian 
administration will even be tempted for a moment to violate or neglect,
l
from extending to you advantages which could only be enjoyed at the
    2
expense of the interests of Her Majesty*s other Indian subjects.M
On 22 December 1888, in reply to an address from the Central National
Mahomedan Association, Lansdowne said that the Government would not select
a Muslim candidate for a public post solely on account of his religious 
3
denomination. On 26 November 1897 Elgin said at Mohamedan Anglo-
Oriental College, Aligarh, that the Muslims must qualify themselves
4
properly if they wanted to have a larger share of appointments. Even 
after making full allowance for the formal character of such speeches,
1 Pub. (Ed.) Des. to India, No.120, 22 Nov. 1888.
2 Dufferin, Speeches. 213.
3 Lansdowne, Speeches. 24.
4 Elgin, Speeches. 369•
AB
we may remark the Government had not yet adopted a policy of conciliating
the Muslims by giving them privileges at the expense of the Hindus,
One gathers from the evidence of the witnesses that many of
those who advocated the extensive employment of Indians by extending to
them.’ all facilities including simultaneous examinations felt the
necessity of having a large proportion of European element in the
Covenanted Service. Wordsworth was in favour of a scheme of allotting
a fixed proportion of appointments to the extent of one-third or one half,
to be competed for in India with two years1 compulsory training in England
1
for successful candidates. Ranade suggested that places between one-
third and one-fourth of annual appointments should be reserved for
2 ‘   ' ‘
Indians. Muthuswami Aiyer, a Judge of the Madras High Court, was in
favour of raising the proportion of Indian appointments to Covenanted
3
posts from one-sixth to one-third. B.C. Butt said that 1 we still
require a majority of Englishmen in the Service." He was content with a
A  .......................................   '
proportion of "somewhat less than a third". Narendra Nath Sen, Editor
of the Indian Mirror, while in favour of an identical competition,
proposed that the proportion of recruitment in India should be fixed at 
5
one-third.
1 Frogs, of P.S.C.. IV, Sec.II, 108.
2 Ibid., 143.
3 Ibid., V, See.II, 364.
4 Ibid., VI, Sec.II. 271.
5 Ibid., 34.
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The views of certain Provincial Governments, officials and 
papers like the Pioneer on the question of the Indianisation of the 
higher services, deserve some attention. Mackenzie, Chief Commissioner 
of the Central Provinces, was of opinion that in view of the fact that
the entire fabric of British administration rested on Divisional and
.... x
District Executive officers, they must necessarily be Englishmen.
Fraser, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, said that the competitive
2
examination was a means of obtaining Englishmen and not Indians. A.W. 
Croft, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, suggested that the
3
executive head of a district should, without exception, be an Englishman.
In the opinion of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, a scheme of substituting
Indians for Europeans, to any considerable extent, in the charges of
districts and other important executive posts was nabsolutely subversive
not only of efficiency, but of the political stability of the British
4
Empire in India.” C.J. Lyall, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of 
Assam, objected to competition in India on the ground that the proposal 
ignored the raison d1etre of the Covenanted Service. He emphasised that 
At must, under the existing condition of British administration, consist
of Englishmen, or of Indians who had adopted English manners of thought
5 ‘ * .. " ..... ...
and received a tsining in England. W.E. Ward, Chief Commissioner of
Assam, observed that an open competition would give a decided advantage
 §
to Bengalis as compared with candidates from the N.W.P. of Assam.
1 Progs, of PIS.C., iii, Sec.I, Sub-sec. B.
2 Ibid., Sec.Ill, Sub-sec. B.
3 Ibid., VI, Sec.II, 372.
4 Ibid., Sec.Ill, Sub-sec. A.
5 Ibid., Sec.III, Sub-sec. B.
6 Frogs, of P.S.C.. VI, Sec.I, 56.
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In view of the presence of European tea-planters in the Province, he
emphasised the necessity of having a portion of European officers among
1
the Extra-Assistant Commissioner class. The Government of the N.WJ.P.
and Oudh was against a uniform competitiwa system and suggested a local
2
examination in the interests of the residents of the Province.
Commenting on the evidence of some witnesses of the N.W.P., the Pioneer 
remarked:! nIf open competition is to be the sole gate of entrance to high 
office in India, it is perfectly clear that the natives of Northern India 
must make up their minds to give place to the Bengali and Madrasi for an 
indefinitely long term of years. If, however, the natives of Northern 
India want to have a share in the sweets of high office, they must , . .
3
content themselves with the less perfect way of provincial appointments.” 
The views of some of those European witnesses who were in favour 
of an identical Indian competition may be briefly pointed out. Wordsworth 
suggested that competition in India should be held for a fixed proportion 
of appointments. H.E. Stokes, Chief Secretary to the Government of 
Madras, expressed his personal opinion in favour of an Indian competition
U
without reservation of posts, H.J. Reynolds, Member of the Board of
Revenue, Bengal, was in favour of an identical examination in India. He
also suggested that the age-1imit should be fixed at 20, and that Sanskrit
should be placed on the same footing as Greek and Latin. He did not
5
attach much importance to the viva voce test. Reynolds, however,
1 Ibid., 63.
2 .Ibid., ii, Sec.I, Sub-sec. B.
3 The Pioneer. 10 Jan. 1887.
A  Progs, of P.S.C.. V, Sec.II, 135*
5 Ibid., vi, Sec.II, Qs.75, S A  & 85.
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recognised the difficulty of appointing Indians in charge of districts
which contained a large number of European settlers.
Broadly speaking, among Indians the advanced section was in
favour of an identical competition, while the educationally backward
classes were either indifferent or opposed to it; among Europeans, the
opinion was largely against it.
The Report of the Aitchison Commission was sent to the Local
Governments for their observations. The Madras Government expressed its
3.
opinion against the selection of Provincial servants by competition.
The Bombay Government preferred the plan of n responsible nomination*1 to
a "mechanical" competition, being of opinion that the adoption of some
principle of representation alone, and not open competition, could secure
2
the appointment of different communities. The Chief Commissioner of
the Central Provinces observed that competition would result in flooding
' 3
the service with Maratha Brahmans to the exclusion of every other class. 
Steuart Bayley, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, said* **For my part I should 
be content to recruit two-thirds of the vacancies by competition, and 
leave one-third to be filled by promotion from the subordinate service or
4
nomination.w Auckland Colvin, Lieutenant -Governor of the K.W.P. was
in favour of "pure and simple" nomination for the recruitment of the 
Provincial Service. On the controversy over the age-limit, he said 
that the question should be considered wholly with reference to English
1 Letter to Govt, of India, 5 June 1888.
2 Letter to Govt, of India, 7 June 1888.
3 Minute, 31 March 1888.
U  Minute, J+ May 1888.
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candidates, and how it affected Indian candidates should be entirely 
subordinate to that consideration. In his opinion, the effect of 
appointment to the Covenanted Service through two doors, nomination and
competition, would be prejudicial to the existence of that strong English
' 1 ...
element which was the sine qua non of its efficiency. James Lyall,
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, was against any system of competition,
limited or unlimited. ttUnless you exclude certain classes, such as
khatris, Kashmiri pandits, and Banias, which you cannot practically do,
they almost invariably win.” Competition, he emphasised, would result
in the recruitment of the great bulk of the service !,not from amongst
the classes who would naturally take the lead, but from amongst the men
who obtain degrees in the Universities.” Lyall favoured, for political
reasons, the recruitment of men of European descent who had made homes 
2
in the Punjab.
It is clear from the above that none of the Local Governments ? 
except Bengal was in favour of the recruitment of Provicnial Service byj 
competition. The system of nomination was supported on grounds of 
efficiency, fairness to the less advanced sections, and political 
advantage. The Punjab Government was of opinion that it would have the 
additional merit of making the service more efficient. The Bombay
Government emphasised the political advantage of patronage. It may be 
remarked that the uneven spread of education in the Provinces called for 
a scheme of competition combined with nomination, or of selection, partly
1 24inute, U  May 1888.
2 Punjab to Govt, of India, 25 June, 1888.
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by competition and partly by nomination. The Government of India 
desired that rules should be framed in such a manner as to ensure 
indispensable educational attainments and the due representation of the 
different classes in the public service.
The Government of India accepted the recommendations of the
Commission with a few amendments of a minor character. It observed
that the Commission* s proposal would ultimately result in the transfer of
about one-sixth of the appointments, held by Covenanted and Statutory
Civilians, to members of the Provincial Service though their promotion
to a Covenanted post was to depend entirely on special proved fitness.
The Government of India did not accept the recommendation regarding
the exclusion from the Schedule of one member of the Board of Revenue in
Madras, Bengal, and the N.W.P. and Oudh, and one Financial Commissioner
in the Punjab. While it was favourable to the exclusion from the
Schedule of one of the chief Revenue officers of divisions, it thought
it undesirable to amalgamate the excluded appointments with the Provincial
Service. As regards recruitment from the Indian States, the Government
of India was of opinion that their inhabitants should have the opportunity
1
of entering the public service.
The Secretary of State gave his * entire assent** to the main 
principles of the scheme. However, he did not accept certain 
recommendations. The Commission had recommended the amendment of the 
Schedule with a view to facilitating the transfer of a number of appoint­
ments to the Provincial Service. Lord Gross rejected it on the ground
1 Pub. Les. from India, No.58, 9 Oct. 1888.
5U
that it would create vested rights of the Provincial Service in the
higher appointments and this would be against the existing practice of
promoting a person to a Covenanted post on grounds of fitness. He
objected to the proposal also on the ground that for political reasons
special reservations of a particular class of executive offices . such
as the chief executive officer of a district, the commissioner of a
division and the administrative offices of higher rank might be justified,
while there were many other classes of offices, such as Commissioner of
1
Salt, Opium and Customs for which no restrictions were required. The 
principle on which Cross justified the reservation of certain categories 
of offices was in accordance with Argyll1s dictum that Indians should
be appointed only to such posts as,win the actual condition of things,
' ' * 2
the Government of India may determine to be really suited to them.**
To Cross the Commissions proposal for exclusion appeared, in the words
3
of the Government of India, ttboth too wide and too narrow.0
Cross also rejected the proposal for repealing Section 6 of 
the Act of 1870. The Commission had been of opinion that the above 
Section did not admit Indians to membership of an organised service and 
that its retention was inconsistent with the principle of the equality 
of all classes of Her Majesty*s natural-born subjects in matters of
............. u   -
recruitment. Cross rejected It, first, because the repeal would be
1 Pub. Des. to India, No.104, 12 Sept. 1889*
2 Ed. Des. to India, No.3, 8 April 1869, para. 11.
3 Draft Resolution, Encl. to Pub. Des. No.9, 10 Feb. 1892. 
U  Report, para. 72.
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represented as the withdrawal of an important statutory right from 
Indians; secondly, because Parliament was not likely to accept a 
yproposal which might appear to it to reduce rather than increase the 
facilities for their admission to the higher offices. He maintained 
that the proposals eould be aubstantially carried out without parlia­
mentary legislation.
Lord Gross approved of the proposal which empowered the
I Government of India to make, in very special cases and under prescribed
conditions, direct appointments, whether of Indians or Europeans, to
offices in the higher grades of the Provincial Service. He preferred
the expression 1 The Civil Service of India1 to the Commission1s term
1
’The Imperial Service*. The age-limit was raised to 21-23 in disregard 
of the wishes of the majority of the members of the India Council. The 
dissentients advanced the stock arguments against higher age-limit, such 
as, the disadvantages of sending civilians to India at an advanced age, 
the unwillingness of English parents to wait for a long time for the 
choice of their son* s profession, the danger of encouraging resort to 
crammers, and the increase in the number of Indian candidatesi Hie last 
was indeed by far the most important ground for objection. Lieutenant- 
General Lumsden, a member of the Council, said that he doubted "whether 
the time has yet come when the Government can safely enter on a speculative
. i
political measure of so far-reaching a character as substitution in the
' " ' - '   " ‘ ‘ 2
highest posts of administration of natives for British elements."
1 Pub. Bes. to India, No. 104-, 12 Sept. 1889.
2 For Minutes of dissent, see Pari. Papers. LIV  (1890)") •
The Commission1s recommendations, as accepted by the Secretary
of State, were intended to devise a reasonable scheme of Indian
employment. As regards the Indian Civil Service, the revision of the
age-limit removed a great grievance and improved the chances of Indian
1
candidates at the London competition. But the transfer of 108 posts
to be filled gradually over a long period marked no improvement on the
existing system of appointing on an average six Statutory Civilians
a year. With one half of the Covenanted posts still occupied by
2
Statutory Civilians, promotion from the Provincial Service to the 
transferred posts could not but be a very slow process, Moreover, the 
Secretary of Stated refusal to remove 108 posts from the Schedule by 
Parliamentary legislation did not confer on the members of the 
Provincial Service any statutory right to promotion to a covenanted post. 
Under the new scheme the Provincial and Subordinate Services were 
to be recruited, as far as possible, on a local basis. The principle 
was not new, but from the Commissions proposals it emerged far more 
effective. The new scheme also enhanced the dignity and status of the
Provincial Service by holding out to its members the prospects of high 
3 "
employment. The change was to be effected by discontinuing appoint­
ments under the Statutory rules, which had restricted the privileges of 
higher appointments to a few selected individuals. But it must be 
remembered that the members of the Provincial Service, even after 
promotion, were not accepted as full members of the higher service, that
1 Actually the number of listed posts was 93#
2 The Statutory Civilians had occupied $2 posts.
3 Letter to Bengal, No. 1838 (Pub.), 22 Aug. 1892, para. 1A.
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is, they remained, as before, members of a lower service. On the 
working of this arrangement the Royal Commission remarked that officers 
promoted from the provincial branches were appointed to fill only certain 
specific posts in the Civil Service, which did not include any of the
higher appointments, and remained confined to those charges throughout
 1  .
their careers. Suffice it to say that the scheme never became popular
with the educated classes, because what they wanted was not only that
Indians should occupy Covenanted posts, but should occupy them as full
members of the Service. Sir Stevart Bay ley rightly observed that
ttthey wish to hold not merely appointments usually reserved to Covenanted
2
Civilians, but to hold them as Covenanted Civilians.”
Under the new arrangement, the status of the senior members of
the Provincial Service appointed to Covenanted posts was not higher than
that of Statutory Civilians. It is mainly due to this that the latter,
with a very few exceptions, declined to join the Provincial Service. In
this respect, the Commissions recommendation for the absorption of the
1 Statutories1 into the Provincial Service did not succeed. As has been 
3
said above, the Statutory Civilians were originally intended to occupy 
an almost equal status with the Covenanted officers. They were entitled, 
at least in principle, to any post in the Covenanted Service. Although 
their status was adversely affected by the Secretary of State1s ruling of
1 Report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India. 
(1917), i, para, 27.
2 Progs. P.S.C.. vi, Sec.I, 30-31.
3 See above, 23.
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1883 and subsequent developments, it was still superior to that of the
members of the Provincial Service. Despite the ruling that they were
not members of an organised service, their promotion, unless they were
unfit, had depended on seniority. The Government of India recognised
that in practice it had not been unusual to promote a Statutory Civilian
1
side by side with his Covenanted > contemporaries* The Madras Govern­
ment said that 1 ■ rightly or wrongly Statutory Civilians stand appointed 
for employment in the Service, and that their status as members of that 
service, entitled to promotion according to seniority and fitness like
other members of it, has hitherto always been acknowledged in this 
2
Presidency.1 It is obvious that Statutory Civilians, who were 
appointed at 25 or below and were eligible for promotion in the ordinary 
course like Covenanted Civilians, could well be expected to occupy some 
of the highest posts open to the members of the Covenanted Service, 
whereas a senior member of the Provincial Service, on being promoted to 
a listed post, after a long term of apprenticeship in an inferior service, 
whose membership he still retained, could not be expected to step up 
beyond a few lowest rungs in the ladder of the Civil Service.
It is thus clear that the object of the change was neither to 
throw open to Indians a larger number of appointments to Covenanted 
posts nor to improve the status of the holders of those offices but 
mainly to adopt more systematically the method of recruitment as 
originally provided in the Act of 1870. The Government of India pointed
1 Pub. Des. from India, No.58, 9 Oct. 1888, para. 15*
2 Madras to Govt, of India, No*401 (Pub.), 4 June 1890.
out that Section 6 was retained as the basis of the Provincial Service
Rules which took the place of the Statutory Rules of 1879, and that only
such members of the Provincial Service as were 1 natives1 of India and
were men of tried ability were eligible for the posts listed as open to 
1
that service. The unpopular practice of appointing them to specific
posts continued and, therefore, remained exposed to criticism much for
the same reasons as had made the Statutory Service unpopular. Thus the
Commission failed to suggest any method which Indians could be
appointed to superior posts on equal terms with the Covenanted Civilians.
According to the Royal Commission, the scheme failed because it had been
supposed that the only way into the Indian Civil Service must be through
a single and Identical examination, whether held in one centre or two,
and failing that the best that could be offered was tta side entrance into
specific posts and appointments as distinguished from the Service itself.H
The Secretary of State approved the Government of India1s draft
resolution embodying a statement of its decision and orders on the
recommendations of the Commission. Altogether 93 posts were assigned to
3
the Provincial Service. Broadly speaking, they included a certain
1 Letter to Bengal, No.1838. (Pub.), 22 Aug. 1892.
2 Annexure X to Report (1917), para. 17.
3 The number of appointments allotted to various Provinces was*
Madras - 15; Bombay - 18; Bengal - 20; N.W.P. - 21; Punjab - 12.
The designations of officers occupying identical places were not
uniform. The Central Provinces1 quota was fixed at 7, though It' 
was not included in the resolution. Thus the total number of posts
allotted to all Provinces was 93* Resolution No. 2 _______  (f^b)*
21 April. 1892. 1342 - $2
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number of posts of heads of Districts, District Judges, Joint and 
Assistant Magistrates, Secretary to the Board of Revenue. Assam, for 
reasons of educational backwardness, was excluded from the list. The 
Resolution contained a number of important provisions# First, it was 
provided that appointments to Scheduled posts would depend upon absolute 
fitness to be ascertained by the Local Governments. Secondly, the 
maximum extent of appointments amounted to one-sixth of those in the 
cadre of the Indian Civil Service, and in the case of the Commissions, 
to one-sixth of the total obtained after deducting the portion reserved 
for military officers. Thirdly, such appointments were subject to 
the preferential right of officers who had entered the service before the
i
reduction of recruitment in 1880, that is, of Indian Civil Servants who
had passed the competition in or before 1879* and of officers of the
Commissions appointed in or before 1881. Fourthly, they were further
subject to the right of the remaining officers of the Indian Civil
Service or the Commission recruited after 1879-81, who were entitled to
have their claims considered to the extent of five-sixths of the posts
for which recruitment was or might have been made in any one year.
Fifthly, in the absence of fit men from the Provincial Service, members
1 .......
of the Indian Civil Service were to be appointed. Lastly, the posts 
occupied by Statutory Civilians, too decided to remain in their service, 
were to be deducted from the number of posts open to the Provincial
1 Draft Resolution, Encl. to Pub. Des. from India, No.9, 10 Feb. 1892.
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1
Service, In case a Statutory Civilian elected to join the
Provincial Service he was to be given preference in matters of promotion
to the listed post.
Under the rules of November 1892, which superseded those of
22 August 1879, the Local Governments were authorised to appoint any
member of the Provincial Service subordinate to them to any of the listed
offices^ but for appointments, for a period of more than three months, to
the office of District and Sessions Judge, or Chief Administration
Officer of a district, or any administrative officer of high rank, the
2
sanction of the Government of India was made necessary. It is to be 
noted that the rules of 1879 bad prescribed this condition for all 
categories of posts. With regard to the appointment of Europeans to 
the Provincial Service, the sanctioning authority of the Government of
' “ 3 ' “    ' "
India was extended to the Presidencies also. In the same despatch the 
Secretary of State observed that their appointment involved the question 
of their eligibility for promotion to the listed posts. The Government 
of India was of opinion that since Section 6 of the Statute of 1870 and 
the rules framed thereunder authorised the appointment of Indians only, 
the promotion of Europeans could only be made according to Sections 3 and
4
4 of the Act of 1861.
1 Letters to Local Govts, Nos. 1479-63 (Pub), 31 July 1890. /
2 Notification, H.D. (Pub), No.2159, 2 Nov. 1892.
3 Pub. Des. to India, No.85, 31 Aug. 1892.
4 Govt, of India to Madras, No.2194 (Pub), 10 Nov. 1892.
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In a representation of 1892 the Indian Association pointed out
that the rules of 1879 were more liberal than the new arrangements,
because at the rate of six appointments a year a larger number of posts
would have been made available in the course of some years. It was
also emphasised that the number of listed posts, as provided under the
scheme of 1892 was less than what the Aitchison Commission had recommended
and that the Resolution had reduced the number of Judgships from one-
third to one-fifth and excluded the posts of Members of Board of Revenue
1
and Divisional Commissioner.
In reply to the above representation, the Government of India
observed that the strength of the Indian Civil Service - which also
included a margin for men under training and a reserve to fill leave
2  .
vacancies - was necessarily larger than the number of actual posts, and
therefore the proportion of one-sixth represented a figure higher than
the number of posts to be filled, whereas in the case of listed posts no
reserve was required. In other words, the new arrangements threw open
a certain proportion of the actual appointments and not, as in the case
of the Statutory Civil Service, a certain proportion of the annual
recruitment. Secondly, in its opinion, the rules of 1879 fixed one-
sixth as the maximum, that is, the Government was tinder no Statutory
obligation to appoint any minimum number of Indians in one year.
Thirdly, it maintained that the maximum proportion of one-sixth was fixed
at a time when, owing to the low age-limit, the conditions of competition
1 For its representation and accompanying note, see Pub.Progs. Aug. 1892.
2 According to the Govt, of India, the number of men in excess bore a 
proportion of 37.97 per cent, to that of the actual posts to be filled 
up.
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 1
were unfavourable to Indians. As to the percentage of judicial
appointments, it remarked that the provision of 22 per cent, of the
total was sufficient for the present. The Government of India
emphasised that an essential feature of its scheme consisted in its
being open to alteration and expansion whereas the Commission^
proposals were intended to possess finality. In 1893 it reiterated
that the list was drawn up with reference only to "proximate reasonable 
2
requirements."
The Government of India was unable to disprove that the
Commission had recommended a larger number of posts than the Resolution
provided. In seeking to justify a settled arrangement, which it had no
intention of disturbing,itput forward an argument which, by no means
original, was certainly mischievous. The point that the proportion of
one-sixth had been fixed with reference to Salisbury*s decision of 1876
logically implied that the number of listed posts should be reduced if
a larger number of Indians, owing to increased facilities, succeeded at
the London competition. It is to be remembered that the Commission had
recommended the transfer of 108 posts independently of its proposal, for
raising the age-limit, and even Lord Cross, who had fixed it at 21-23
and had been opposed to the transfer of certain categories of posts -
though on grounds different from the Government of India1s - was not
3
unwillingly to throw open some appointments in other departments.
1 Govt, of India to Bengal, No.1838 (Pub), 22 Aug. 1892.
2 Letters to Local Govts, Nos. ::_____  (Pub), 5 Aug.1893, para 10.
1081 - 88
3 See above, 54,
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A serious defect of the above scheme was that the number of
listed posts was fixed without any reference to the increase in the
1
number of appointments in England. Since 1887 the rate of recruitment
there had been on the increase. Sometimes the Secretaries of State
expressed a little concern over it, but did nothing to arrest it. In
1891, for instance, while sanctioning the increase of high offices, Lord
Cross remarked that it was not expedient to increase the strength of
2
the Civil Service beyond what, was absolutely necessary. In
1893 Lord Hamilton said that the increase in the number of persons
recruited in England might not leave sufficient room for employment of
3
the members of the Provincial Service. Nevertheless, the increase 
went on. If the original proportion of one-sixth had been maintained, 
there would have been a corresponding proportionate increase in 
recruitment in India.
It is interesting to note that some confusion still prevailed 
regarding the exact position of Statutory Civilians who, with a few 
exceptions, did not opt for the Provincial Service, In 1893, for 
instance, the Government of the N.W.P. maintained that Statutory 
Civilians had no claim as of right to receive substantive appointments
1 The average annual rate of recruitment for some years before 1887, 
when a considerable Increase took place, was 37131. In 1893 ^he 
proposal was to fix it at 54, inclusive of an extra-recruitment of 
12 to meet deficiencies. During 1894-97 the rate registered a 
further increase. In 1898 the Govt, of India proposed a normal 
rate of 49 and an extra-recruitment of 16, or 65 in all. In 1893 
the sanctioned strength of Civilians and Military officers was 1,112, 
and in 1898 the Govt, proposed an increase of 115. Pub. Despatches 
from India, No.10 of 10 Feb. 1898 and No.86 of 10 Nov. 1898.
2 Pub. Des. to India, No.19, 29 Jan. 1891.
3 Pub. Des. to India, No.104, 14 July 1898.
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to such superior offices as Commissioner, of Excise and Legal
Remembrancer in case they were added to the listed posts, while a
1
member of the Provincial Service would have his claims to them.
The Government of India ruled that they were entitled to any listed 
2
posts, but in the same year it itself narrowly interpreted the rules 
relating to the eligibility of Statutory Civilians for superior posts.
In a despatch, purporting to be a reply to Sir .'Wedderburn1 s letter on
\
this question, it expressed the view that their promotion was confined
3
to the limits of listed posts. But the Secretary of State maintained 
that they were eligible for promotion to all posts, whether listed or
4
not.
Another important question arose from the orders of 14 February
1890 which provided that the claims of Statutory Civilians to promotion
5
were to be considered with reference to the date of their confirmation 
and not of first appointment. This change was introduced asa favour 
to Covenanted Civilians whose actual service commenced from the date of 
their first covenants whereas Statutory Civilians started their service 
immediately after their appointment* The views of the Local Governments
were divided on this decision. Bengal and the N.W.P, were in favour of
it, and Bombay and the Punjab were against it. The Punjab Governments
6
view was that the change was unjust. The Bombay Government remarked
1 Govt, of N.W.P. to Sri Lai, 8 July 1893, Pub.Progs. No.82, Sept.1893.
2 Letter to N.W.P., No.1136, 14 Aug. 1893, Pub.Progs. No.85, Sept. 1893.
3 Pub. Des. from India, No.64, 1 Nov. 1893.
4 Pub. Des. to India, No.31, 5 April 1894.
5 Letters to Provicnial Govts, 14 Feb. 1890.
6 Letter to Govt, of India, 22 March, 1893, Pub.Progs.. No. 159, June 1893.
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1
that it would amount to a breach of faith. Because of this difference 
of opinion it was finally decided to enforce the orders in all 
Provinces except Bombay and the Punjab.
It is interesting to note that the Statutory Civilians, with 
the exception of a few, remained in their own service. The reasons 
were mainly two. First, in matters of promotion they were to be given 
priority. Secondly, they felt, and to some extent rightly, that they 
enjoyed a higher social status than the members of the Provincial Service.
The history of the Statutory Service is an instance of how a 
foreign Government is apt to bungle when It attempts to seek the partici­
pation of the ruled within the framework of an autocratic system. The 
Statutory Service was an experiment in recruitment by nomination. In 
all 69 appointments were made. At the beginning they were mainly confined 
to young men of good family and later to members of the Provincial Service. 
Both systems of recruitment were subjected to criticism* the first because 
it failed to guarantee a modicum of fitness; and the second because it 
denied the promoted officers a status equal to that of the members of the 
Indian Civil Service. As has been said above, the arrangements of 1892 
were, neither in quantity nor in quality, in conformity with the political 
utfc*educational^  progress of India. Tilifc the end of the century, or to be
2
more accurate, till the appointment of the Islington Commission in 1912, 
the Government was satisfied with the principle of the one-sixth
1 Letter to Govt, of India, 31 July 1893, Pub.Progs.. No.103, Nov. 1893.
2 The Report was published in 1917.
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proportion laid down as early as 1879. What is more regrettable?is
that the Government was not disposed to carry out even that modest
scheme as quickly as possible. Up to 1909 only 51 posts had been
listed and even until the appointment of the Lee Commission the process
of transfer was not complete inasmuch as only 88 posts had been filled
by members of the Provincial Service. In the opinion of Sir Reginald
Craddock, a member of the Commission, the reasons for the slowness were,
firfet, that the Local Governments hesitated to entrust important charges
to the members of the Provincial Service; and, secondly, that the
recruitment to the Indian Civil Service was based not upon five-sixths
of the superior posts, but upon the total superior posts at any moment
in existence less only those that had actually been transferred; and in
consequence, for the posts still awaiting transfer, fresh vested
interests came into existence, and thus the process of transfer was 
1
retarded. Meanwhile, the rate of Indian recruitment in the Civil
Service by competition was far from satisfactory. During 1892-1912,
under the revised age-limit, it rose to 5.6 per cent, of the vacancies
2
as compared with the 2.5 per cent, of 1878-91. In general, the
percentage of Indian appointments to posts in the higher salary groups 
3
was very small.
1 Minute, Report of the Royal Commission (1924).
2 Annexure X to Report of the Royal Commission (1917), para. 7.
3 In 1887 the percentage of Indians and Burmans in posts carrying a 
salary of Rs.200 a month and above was 34; in posts of Rs.500 and 
above 12; and in those of Rs.800 and above 4; in 1913 their percent­
age in the respective groups was 42, 19* and 10. Report of the Royal 
Commission (1917), i, para. 34.
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In 1893 the question of the Indianisation of the Civil
Service came into sudden prominence when on 2 June H.W. Paul*s
resolution on simultaneous examinations was carried by 84 votes to
78. In opposing it George Russell, Under-Secretary of State for
India, used all those arguments which the opponents of this proposal
had advanced earlier. He stressed that India was composed of many
races, of which the intellectually superior were deficient in ruling
qualities and that the turbulent and fierce tribes would strongly
resent the administrative control of the former. The Government of
India, he emphasised, was a sacred and, in some respects, a "perilous
charge", and in "administering it we must be equally on our guard against
allowing ourselves to be carried away by theories, however specious, by
appeals to sentiment, however just; and by the mistaken application of
1
principles in themselves sound." In the Lords, Cross expressed the
opinion that the Government should have at once taken steps to rescind 
2
the resolution. Salisbury remarked that he could not imagine any
project more fatal to the Indian Empire than that of identical 
3
examinations.
Kimberley, then Secretary of State for India, was decided on this 
question. He regretted that the Liberal Party had "blindly supported 
so dangerous a resolution." He expressed the view that its acceptance
would be a "fatal mistake", and declared? "I need hardly say that I am
1 Indian Pari. Debates. 2 June 1893, 362-65.
2 Ibid., 13 June 1893, 385.
3 Ibid., 389.
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1
not prepared to give effect to it.11 With a view to **weakening the
promise to act upon the resolution**, Kimberley omitted the word 
2
**best?f from the reply which Gladstone made in Parliament. Though
even the amended reply conveyed the impression that the Government of
India was desired to consider how and with what limitations the
3
resolution could be carried into effect, nothing of the kind was 
intended. Kimberley was dead against simultaneous examinations and 
so was the Government of Indial The fate of the resolution was, 
therefore, a foregone conclusion.
Kimberley sent the resolution for the Government of India*s 
consideration with the remark that it was indispensable that the Civil 
Service should always contain an adequate number of Europeans. He,
4
however, allowed it unfettered discretion to make ahy observations.
The majority of the members of his Council were opposed to the resolution
in general and to the terms of the instructions to the Government of
5
India in particular. Strachey remarked* **A measure has been suddenly
1 Kimberley to Gladstone, 2,3,4- June 1893, Add.MSS. (Brit.Mus.), 44-229, 
85, 87-89.
2 "Kimberley to Gladstone, 5 June 1893.
3 W.E.Gladstone ”...There should be a prompt and careful examination
of the subject by that Government (India), who are instructed to say
in what mode in their opinion, and under what conditions and limita­
tions, the Resolution could be carried into effect.**
A.J. Balfour* ”...whether the Government in the course of this 
despatch, mean to imply that, in some shape or other, the Government 
of India are obliged to carry out this Resolution!** Indian Pari. 
Deabtes. 8 June 1893, 380.
4- Pub.Des. to India, No.61, 22 June 1893.
5 Strachey, Stewart, Arbuthnot, Lumsden, Peile, and Lyall recorded
minutes of dissent. Their main objection was to the words **In 
what mode and under what conditions and limitations the Resolution 
could be carried into effect.** C.7075 (1893).
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taken which promises to revolutionise in its most essential condition 
the policy under which India has hitherto been governed.*1 In his 
opinion, the number of Englishmen had been reduced so greatly that 
there were hardly enough of them to fill the posts which they must 
necessarily hold. He felt that the Government of India could construe 
the despatch as an instruction to give practical effect to the Common^ 
resolution. Peile, another member of the Council, was of opinion that 
it would be a sheer waste of Indian revenues to recruit Indians of 
inferior quality on the terms on which Englishmen were recruited.
If Kimberley had meant business, he should have asked the 
Government of India to make arrangements for holding simultaneous 
examinations. On the contrary, he gave it full discretion to sabotage 
the plan. In view of the excessive interference by the Secretaries of 
State in Indian affairs, it looks hypocritical that Kimberley should have 
left such an important question to the discretion of the Government of 
India. The fact is that to avoid a rift in his party, which had a 
small majority in Parliament, he did not think it advisable to reject 
the proposal himself, but asked the Government of India to do the job 
for him.
The Government of India consulted the Local Governments on the
1
expediency and practicability of the adoption of the resolution.
Dennis Fitzpatrick, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, was of opinion 
that the differences between Hindus and Muslims made the appointment of
1 Letters to Local Govts, Nos. 27______  (Pub), 5 Aug. 1893.
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strong and impartial men absolutely necessary* He significantly
remarked that the provision of one-sixth of the listed posts had been
made to compensate for the disadvantages of the competition in London
and if they were removed, Indians would not be entitled to retain
1
that compensation. Crosthwaite, Lieutenant Governor of the N.W.P*,
suggested that the total number of Indians in the Civil Service should
be fixed at 18 per cent., and that, in case it was decided to fill all
the places by competition in India, the posts thrown upeiiy to the
Provincial Service should be withdrawn. Though a scheme of holding
a district examination in India, he said, was quite practicable, it
would be unjust, administratively bad, and politically dangerous,
2
inasmuch as it would result in the exclusion of the Muslims. Woodburn,
chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, expressed the view that
a scheme of examination even on a provincial basis would be defective
3
as the Marathas would monopolise all the posts. The Bombay Govern­
ment observed that simultaneous examinations would badly affect the
quality of English candidates and that the best would speedily cease
A
to compete. The Bengal Government remarked that it would be unfair
to the tax-payer of India to extend the conditions of the Indian Civil
Service, which had been defined with reference to recruitment fcom
5
England, to those succeeding at competition in India.
1 Note of 23 Sept. 1893.
2 Letter to Govt, of India, 3 Sept. 1893; Pub.Frogs.. No.60, Nov.93.
3 Minute, 7 Sept. 1893, Pub.Progs.. No.63.
A  Bombay to Govt, of India, 7 Sept. 1893, Pub.Progs. No.61.
5 Bengal to Govt, of India, 2A Aug. 1893, Pub.Progs.. No.56.
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Strangely enough, the Government of Madras did not concur in
these views. In its opinion, the proposal was expedient and no danger
to the Empire was likely to arise from an increase in the number of
Indians whose Hvery existence would be bound up in the maintenance of
British supremacy**. ^t also remarked that the new scheme, by relegating
them to a ndistinct and limited service** had caused disappointment to
them, adding that the Presidency could be effectively administered with
1
two-thirds of the Civil Servants as Europeans.
The Governments of India* s despatch of November 1893 with an
accompanying memorandum dealt with the question in all its important
aspects. It was pointed out that the Civil Service of India contained
2
in its cadre 898 posts, of which 731 were reserved for Covenanted and 
Military officers, on whose administrative capacity and impartiality the 
orderly government of the country depended, and who represented the 
British Government in India and were, in the eyes of the people, the
3
British Government. The Government of India remarked that the 
necessity of maintaining an adequate number of Europeans, on which the 
Secretary of State had laid so strong an emphasis, was in itself 
destructive of the Commons* resolution, which required that all competi­
tors would be classified in one list according to merit. In its 
opinion, the strength of Europeans was at its minimum and would not admit
J 1
of further reduction for some years. It also suggested that in order
1 Madras to Govt, of India, 7 Sept. 1893, Pub.Progs.. No.62.
2 Out of 898 posts 74- were in special and technical departments and 
93 were assigned to the Provincial Service.
3 Pub. Des. from India, No.62, 1 Nov. 1893, para. 6.
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to maintain their number at that level, it would be necessary to watch
the proportion of Indians at the London competition and that it might
become necessary to restrict the total to 18 per cent, or to some 
1
similar figure.
To the commonplace objections to the system of simultaneous 
examinations, the Indian Government added one or two more saying, first, 
that it would affect the quality of European candidates who, with their 
Indian education, would lack the training essential for the service, and, 
secondly, it would discourage the better class of Europeans from 
competing in England for a service likely to be largely composed of 
Indians. Another serious objection was based on the ground that the 
withdrawal of the listed posts, which the decision to retain the deter­
mined minimum of Europeans would necessitate, was bound to lower the
efficiency of the Provincial Services. The Government of India
2
characterised the proposal as Mill-advised and dangerous.M
The Secretary of State, H.H. Fowler, concurred in the views of the 
Government of India. He asserted that the proposal was incompatible with 
the principle of maintaining an adequate number of Europeans, and also 
remarked that it was indispensable that a reasonable proportion of the 
high offices should be filled by Muslims, Sikhs and others if they were 
not to .be alienated from British rule. He expressed the view that 
serious difficulties might be caused by the influx into the service of a 
large number of Indians recruited by competition, who could not be
1 Ibid., para. 8, 11.
2 Pm3b. Ibid., paras. 1A, 16, 19.
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absorbed into their own province beyond a certain point and whose
1
appointments would not be favoured by other Provinces.
During 1894-93, the arrangements of 1892 continued. In a few
instances, when the Local Governments desired to have more discretion
in the interpretation of the rules, the Central Government intervened.
For instance, it took exception to a temporary appoihtment of a non-
Indian in Bengal. The Bengal Government justified it on the ground
that it was made as an emergency measure for afew months only. The
Government of India emphasised that any temporary appointment made on
the ground of emergency should be reported for its confirmation
2
immediately after it was made. In 1898 the Madras Government desired
to have discretion to fill the six listed posts either as Collectors or
Judges independently of the number of appointments so held in each
class. t^ sought the withdrawal of restriction on the ground that it
was convenient to find suitable judicial officers and difficult to get
3
fit men for the executive charges. Needless to say that the Madras
Governments case was most unconvincing. It is inconceivable that in
a Presidency like Madras the Provincial Service was so inefficient that
it could not provide fit men even for two executive posts. The Indian
Government turned down the proposal because it was inconsistent with the
Commission1 s recommendation which had laid emphasis on affording duff
4
opportunity to Indian officers to prove their fitness.
1 Pub. Des. to India, No.37, 19 April 1894.
2 Letters to Local Govts, 28 Jan. 1895, Pub.Progs.. No.311. Jan. 1895.
3 Madras to Govt, of India, 14 Sept. 1898, Pub.Progs.. No.156, Dec.1898.
4 Govt, of India to Madras, 27 Dec. 1898, Pub.Progs.. No.157.
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In influencing the Governments policy to throw open a
larger number of posts, important associations like the Congress and
the Indian Asscoiation, and the Press played an important role. A
large share in the administration was a demand which they never ceased
to press. Resolutions, memorials, articles, deputations to England,
and questions and discussions in Parliament by men like Wedderburn,
Kaoroji and others, were the means by which the attention of the
Government was drawn to this question. It is indisputable that the
British Government could not affcTd to ignore the growing influence of
the educated classes. Sometimes it availed itself of the opportunity
of explaining its policy when the memorials were presented to it. In
1868, for instance, Northcote informed the British Indian Association
that he was contemplating to insert a clause in his Bill, empowering
 1
the Government of India to appoint Indians without competition. In
April 1884-, Kimberley told the deputationists that if it had been the
intention of the Government to exclude Indians from the Civil Service,
2
the provision of one-sixth appointments would not have been made. In
1898, when the Indian Association pointed out the defects of the scheme
of 1892, the Government of India took the opportunity of clarifying 
3
certain points.
The story of the Indian demand for a larger share in the high 
offices may be briefly told here. In 1867 Naoroji*s resolution for
1 See abovej i°.
2 Pari. Papers. LVIII (1884-85).
3 See above, 6i .
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holding simultaneous examinations was accepted by the East India
Association, and a memorial was presented to Northcote. In 1868 and
again in 1874- the British Indian Association sent memorials on the same
subject. In 1877-78 Banerjea started his Civil Service movement. A
deputation was also sent to England and a meeting was held at Willis*s
Rooms with John Bright as president. The effect of this meeting, says
Banerjea, was so great that the rules which had been f,delayed for seven
1
years, were published within twenty-four hours of that meeting."
In 1884- he undertook another tour of the N.W.P. and the Punjab. The
fruits of that agitation, according to him, were the Government of India1 s 
despatch recommending a higher age-limit, and the appointment of the 
Public Service Commission. Ever since its establishment in 1885, the 
Congress pressed unceasingly for a larger Indian employment and for 
simultaneous examinations. Banerjea, as one of its most prominent leaders, 
played an important part. However, one finds it difficult to accept his 
opinion, in its entirety, that the publication of Statutory rules, Riphn’s 
despatch of 12 September 1884-, and the appointment of the Commission were 
the immediate outcome of his efforts. In fact, the main object of his 
agitation - the raising of the age-limit - was not accepted in 1878, and 
again in 1883 the Indian Association’s memorial on simultaneous 
examinations failed to have any effect on Kimberley, who again in January 
1885 did not accept Riponfs recommendations. The above remark is not,
1 Benerjea, op.cit.. Chap. V.
2 Ibid., 87-88.
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however, intended to detract from the importance of the great work
which Banerjea has to his credit. In the minute of September 1883,
in which Ripon criticised Salisbury*s decision of 1876, he made reference
to the memorial from the Indian Association. While making an estimate
of the work of Indian public bodies on this question, one must also
bear in mind that the sympathetic approach of Viceroys like Ripon and
Duffer in went a long way to facilitating the work of reform. Much of
what the despatch of September 1884* contained would not have been
possible without Ripon*s favourable attitude to the whole question.
Similarly Dufferin*s remark that without a radical change no satisfactory
scheme was possible, led to the appointment of the Commission of 1886.
Indeed, in 1900 Gurzon criticised Dufferin for not effecting restrictions
1
on the admission of Indians into the higher ranks of the service.
Remarking on this and some other popular measures of his viceroyalty,
Hamilton observed that he did not believe **he (Dufferin) has been in
any single place of responsibility and authority in which he did not more
or less purchase popularity by leaving to his successors unpleasant
2 ..........
legacies.” Though Ripon and Dufferin were not prepared to go very far
in the direction of Indianisation, their sympathetic policy made the
introduction of the reforms easier. As regards the work of various
associations, it consisted in this that they brought before the
Government an organised body of public opinion which it thought expedient
1 Curzon to Hamilton, 23 April 1900, Pr.Cor.Ind.. xvii;y*
2 Hamilton to Curzon, 17 May 1900, Pr.Cor.Ind.. v, 169,
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to take into consideration and the absence of which was certain to 
result either in the abridgement or in the postponement of reforms.
British political parties were remarkably unanimous on the 
question of Indianisation. In 1867 it was Northcote, a member of a 
Conservative Government, who seriously took up. the question and it was 
a Liberal Government which passed the Act of 1870 though it failed to 
make rules to carry it into effect. It was again Argjill, a Liberal 
Secretary of State, who laid down the limitations under which Indianisa­
tion was to be effected and, indeed, they continued to guide his 
successors. In 1876 it was under a Conservative Government that the 
age-limit was reduced, but it was also under the same Government that 
the Statutory rules of 1879, which gave effect to the Act of 1870 and 
threw open one-sixth of the appointments, came into force. In 1885 it 
was Kimberley, a member of the Liberal Government, who rejected the 
Government of India's proposal for raising the age-limit, but again it 
was he who authorised it to appoint the Commission of 1886. In 1889, 
it was Cross, a member of the Conservative Government, who fixed the 
age-limit at 21-23, and gave effect to the Commission's recommendations.
In 1893 it was a Liberal Parliament which passed Paul's resolution of 
June 1893, which Fowler, a Liberal Secretary of State, rejected in 1894.
British policy towards Indian employment was inspired by certain 
important considerations. As early as 1832 the Select Committee had 
observed that "it is contended that their admission, under European control, 
into the higher offices, would have a beneficial effect in‘Correcting the 
moral obliquities of their general character, would strengthen their
79
attachment to British dominion; would conduce to the better
administration of justice, and would be productive of a great
1
saving in the expenses of the Indian Government.tt Among these
considerations economy and political advantage were emphasised most.
That the use of Indian agency was less expensive, was indisputable; but
as regards the second, opinions were divided. Ripon believed that the
employment of Indians would make the Government popular, whereas Sir
John Strachey, an eminent administrator in the second half of the
nineteenth century, maintained that a government of foreigners would
2
nover be really popular. On the question of efficiency, the British 
official class was of opinion that the substitution of Indians for 
Europeans would not be conducive to the good government and, indeed, in 
opposing the policy of Indianisation it laid the greatest emphasis on 
this aspect.
According to the Government of India*s memorandum of 1893, the
necessities of British rule, which required that the supervising and
controlling offices must be held by Europeans, limited the scope of -1 ^
3
Indian employment in the higher offices. But the point at issue was 
the number and Category of posts which were still to remain a monopoly 
of Europeans. The conditions of British rule, it was maintained, ruled 
out the appointment of Indians to a large number of high posts but this
1 Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the E.I.C. (1832),21,
2 John Strachey, India? Its Administration and Progress. (3rd ed), 4-95.
3 Memorandum, Pub.Frogs.. No.70, Nov. 1893.
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view came into conflict with the principle of equality embodied in 
the Proclamation of 1858* Indians wanted nothing more than the 
fulfilment of that pledge,. Speaking at the Convocation of the 
Calcutta University, Lytton had said* 1 Now, whatever else it may rest 
upon, the claim of native subjects to official employment rests, 
primarily and principally, on the pledge spontaneously given and
1
repeatedly affirmed, to them by the Crown and Parliament of England.M 
Referring to the inconveniences of the Proclamation, Hamilton observed* 
f,0ne of the greatest mistakes that ever was made was the issue in the
I
! Proclamation annexing India of the principle that perfectequality was
!
A  to exist, so far as all appointments were concerned, between European 
i/  2
and Native.” And yet with all its inconveniences its repeal was 
out of the question. Educated Indians interpreted it as making 
accessible to them, subject, of course, to fitness, higher offices 
without any restrictions as to number and quality. This interpretation, 
logical though it was, did not fit in with the logic of the facts of 
nineteenth-century British rule. Since the Government was unable to 
repudiate the principle of legal equality and yet it had no mind to 
give full effect to it, it saw in the London competition the most 
effective safeguard against the influx of Indians; and for exactly the 
same reason it was opposed to simultaneous examinations. A scheme of 
unfettered competition was, indeed, incompatible with the reservation
1 Speech, 10 March 1877, Selected Speeches of Lord Lytton (1877).
2 Hamilton to Curzon, 17 May 1900, Pr.Cor.Ind.. V, 169.
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of posts for Europeans; and that of a limited, though identical, 
competition was inconsistent with the principle of racial equality. 
Lytton1s scheme of an exclusive Indian service was intended to remove 
some of the inconveniences of the Proclamation, but it was turned down 
because it violated its very spirit. Thus in theory the Proclamation 
remained unscathed, but in practice it was greatly modified by the 
overriding considerations of the stability and efficiency of British 
rule.
'Ultimately, the rate of Indianisation depended on the extent 
to which the European element was to be maintained. The overnment 
of India was of opinion that the provision of 93 listed posts, besides 
those which were secured on the results of the London competition, 
should constitute the maximum scope of Indian employment. In 1893 
it suggested that to maintain a certain proportion of Europeans, which, 
in its opinion, had reached its irreducible minimum, the Home Govern­
ment should watch the results of the competition and fix the total 
percentage of Indians at 18. In 1896 Elgin emphasised that it was not
”safe to proceed too fast in entrusting the higher work of administra-
1
tion to other than European officers.” In 1900 Curzon remarked that 
the British administration was confronted with the greatest peril by 
the Hsystem under which every year an increasing number of the 900 
and odd higher posts that were meant, and ought to have been exclusively 
and specifically reserved, for Europeans are being filched away by the 
superior wits of the Native in the English examinations.” In 1909
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 23 Dec. 1896, Pr.Cor.Ind. iii,
2 Curzon to Hamilton, 23 April 1900, Pr.Cor.Ind.. xvii, 7.
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he said* ”The question at issue is rather not what is the maximum number of
offices that can safely be given to Indians, but what is the minimum that
1
must of necessity be reserved for Europeans.” It is to be noted that
at the beginning of 1909 out of a total number of 1,2J + U members of the
Indian Civil Service, there were only 65 Indians, and out of 93 posts
2
only 51 had been filled by the members of the Provincial Service* It 
is evident that the progress of indianisation was very slow, but the 
British Government, tied to the principles of stability and efficiency, 
was content with it*
A comparison between the views of Thomas Munro and John Strachey, 
two of the ablest of the British administrators of India, will not be
i
out of place* Munro, expressing his views early in the nineteenth 
century, said that the British Government would never be popular unless 
it entrusted Indians with posts of responsibility, and emphasised that 
the Governments aim should be so to improve their character as to 
enable them Mto govern and protect themselves11; and that the best way 
of doing that was to appoint them to ” almost every office under the 
Government.” His scheme envisaged, no doubt, at a distant date, the
3
withdrawal of British power from India- Strachey, on the other hand, 
was of opinion that the number of British officers was ”extraordinarily 
small”. He emphasised that since a foreign government - like the
1 Quoted in 0*Malley, The Indian Civil Service* 225.
2 East India (Fifty Years Administration)* Cd.4956, (1909).
3 Gleig, Munro. i, 519-20; ii, 58, A23-2A; iii, 386-88.
S3
British - would never be popular, it was indispensable that all the
higher offices must be held by Englishmen. nBut let there be no
hypocrisy**, writes Strachey,1* about our intention to keep in the hands
of our people those executive posts - and there are not very many of
them - on which, and on our political and military power, our actual
1
hold of the country depend s. ** Strachey differs from Munro in this
that while the latter expressed his personal opinions, shared only 
by. a few individuals, he represented the views of the most dominant 
school of thought, which believed in the permanence and not in the 
withdrawal of British power, and sought tits stability not in 
popularity but in the restriction of Indian employment. And it was 
this school which played the important role in the determination of 
British Indian policy.
1 Strachey, oo.cit.. 494-97.
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CHAPTER II 
The Development of Legislatures
The growth of the Indian legislature "between 1833 and 1909 reveals 
a significant feature# The nucleus of the legislature was the executive 
council to which more members were added for legislative purposes. The 
use of the term fadditional* for them was retained even in the Minto - 
Morley reforms of 1909 although under the new provisions they far out­
numbered those who formed the nucleus# The term no doubt was indicative 
of the relationship between the legislature and the executive inasmuch as
legislative power residing in a body distinct and separate from the
1
executive was not recognised* However, the presence of additional members, 
not belonging to the executive, and entrusted only with legislative work 
tended to differentiate the enlarged body more and more, both in its 
composition and functions, from the nucleus#
The Charter Act of 1833 made the first attempt to differentiate 
the legislative from executive functions by providing for a fourth 
ordinary member whose duties were solely legislative# It was also laid 
down that the transaction of the former required the presence of at least 
three ordinary members as distinguished from the latter which could be
2
performed by the Goveraor-G-eneral and one ordinary member of the Council#
1 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, I, para. 130.
2 3 & 4 Will. 4, c.85, s*48.
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William Grey, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal* went so far as to say that
1
,the Act constituted what was "virtually" a separate legislative body. It 
would he more correct to say that the emphasis of the Act was more on the 
differentiation of functions than on the composition of the law-making 
"body* because the Governor-General was fully entitled to make laws with or 
without the fourth member.
Another important change was the abolition of the legislative 
authority of Madras and Bombay and its concentration in the hands of the 
Supreme Government. The Governor of a Presidency could* however* act as 
an extraordinary member of the Council when it assembled there. He was
also invested with power to make proposals of any laws to the Governor-
Z
General in Council.
The next step in the direction of "differentiating the legislative
machine much more decisively from the executive" was taken in 1855 under
5
the impulse of Dalhousie# The Council was expanded by the addition of
six new members to be called legislative councillors* of whom two* including
the Chief Justice* were judges of the Supreme Court* and four were
officials of at least ten year* s standing appointed by the Governments of
Bengal* Madras* Bombay* and the N#W#P. The legislative Councillors were
entitled to sit or vote only at its meetings held for legislative purposes.
The Governor-General* s assent was essential for any law passed by the 
4
Council# The fourth ordinary member became a full-fledged member of the
1 Minute* 15 March 1868* Pub. Progs.* Ho#150* March 1868.
Z 5 $ 4 Will. 4, c.85* s.66.
5 M/C Report (1918)* para# 5®*
4 16 & 17 Viet#* c#95* ss#22-24. The Act made provision for the appoint­
ment of two more civilians to the Legislative Council, but they were 
not added.
86
executive•
The Council of 1853 assumed in practice more or less a distract
character though the position of legislative councillors was "exactly”
1
similar to that of the fourth ordinary member of 1833* its assuming 
the role of what was termed a "quasi-independent” "body or a "petty 
parliament"* Dalhousie’s attitude was an important factor. He was
concerned to enlarge the sphere of its activity. The Council transacted
2
its business with a large number of standing orders. The discussions 
were oral and full publicity was accorded to its proceedings. The exam­
ination of bills was performed by select committees and all the formalities 
of the three readings were observed. The Council also formed itself into
a body for the redress of grievances. In his diary of 12 October 1854
Dalhousie wrote: "Tho Legislative Council transacts the business before it
5
on mch the same system as is observed in our Parliament....” Sir Charles
Wood, then President of the Board of Control, was not happy at this
development. He remarked that he had never wished to raise up a great
4
independent body in India.
In its composition the legislative council, as constituted under 
the Act of 1853* had two important features. First, the legislative 
councillors in a full council formed a majority if any member of the 
Government happened to be absent. Secondly, the Act, by providing for 
the appointment of provincial representatives, recognised "the principle
1 Leg. Des. from India, Ho.6, 14 March 1861.
£ There were as many as 136 standing orders.
3 Quoted in Lee-Wamer, Life, il, 234.
4 Wood to Dalhousie, 23 Dec. I854, quoted in A.C.Banerjee,
Indian Constitutional Development, I, 292.
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of local representation in the Indian legislature11, which from then
1
onwards he came an important part of reform schemes.
The Act made no provision for the appointment of an Indian to
the Council though Dalhousie remarked that he would have heen "personally
2
glad to see such a gentleman appointed at once under the Act". He 
expressed the view that Indians of experience and intellectual quality 
were available and that the presence of any one of them would he valuable 
to the Council.
The records of the Council as a purely law-making body was of high 
standard. In the words of the authors of the Report of 1918, legislation 
for the first time was treated "as a special function of government
5
requiring special machinery and special processes". The Council was never
accused of making bad laws. Even Lord Canning, who was by no means
friendly to it, found no fault with it on this score. He did not seek
to justify the proposed scheme of 1859 as one calculated to improve 
4
legislation. The main reason for its falling into disfavour with his 
Government was its assertion of independence. * Dalhousie had encouraged 
this tendency; Canning resented it.
Among the many causes which led to the passing of the Councils 
Act of 1861 the events of I857-58 were important. Syed Ahmad Khan 
attributed the Mutiny to the non-admission of Indians into the legislative
council, other causes being of a secondary character. He observed that
the Government had no means of knowing the reactions of the people to its
1 M/C Renort* para. 5®*
2 Lee-Warner, op. cit., 252.
5 M/C Report, para. 5®*
4 Des* from India (H.D.), No.5» 9 Dec. 1859.
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measures. Bartle Frere* an outstanding member of the Governor-General* s
Council* also said that the Government * in legislating for millions of
people* had "few means of knowing* except by a rehellion* whether the laws
2
suit them or not"* He emphasised that unless the Government had "some
barometer and safety-valve combined in the shape of a deliberative council*
I believe you will be always liable to very unlooked-for and dangerous 
3
explosions". But while the Mutiny opened the way for the admission of 
Indians into the Councils* it produced* on the other hand* Councils with 
extremely limited functions. The reason was that the conditions created 
by it were favourable to the cause of autocracy rather than to the grant 
of political concessions. Moreover, what the Government wanted was to 
establish a weak* and not a strong* Council.
The Indian Councils Act of 1861 was in a measure the extension, 
abridgment* and modification of the existing arrangement. The provisions 
for the establishment of local councils and the appointment of non-official 
members marked an improvement on the previous system* while the restrictions 
on their functions deprived them of some essential attributes of a 
legislature and in this respect the Act was a retrogade step. Uhder the 
arrangements by which the Central legislature dispensed with the preponder­
ance of the Bengal element in it and the Governor-General was invested with 
power to issue ordinances the previous system was modified in the light of
1 Syed Ahmad Ehan, The Causes of the Indian Revolt* 11-13* This book 
was written in Urdu in I858, but was published much later. Its English 
translation appeared in I873.
2 Minute* 16 March 1860.
3 Frere to Wood, 10 April 1861, Martineau, Bartle grere* I* y±0.
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actual experience* The Act, however, maintained the continuity of a
system of law-making hy a hody functioning in a legislative capacity.
In shaping the scheme of 1861 Bartle Frere played an important
part. He was of opinion that the spread of education and a "feverish
curiosity" among Indians made the change necessary. "Your legislative
bodies", he emphasised, "will make fatal mistakes unless they have some
native members to aid them". His scheme provided for the representation
of influential classes and interests on the councils. He suggested that
1
non-officials should be at least one-third of official members.
The Government of India submitted two schemes of reform, one in
December I859 and the other in January 1861. The first provided for the
inclusion of a few non-official members, the establishment of councils in
Madras and Bombay, and the amendment of the modes of procedure followed
by the existing council. The object of reforms was to "stimulate and
2
expedite" the amendment of the law rather than to improve the laws. A 
year later, the Government of India modified its proposals. The events 
which led to this development were: first, differences arose between the 
Supreme Government and the Government of Madras about the Income Tax Bill; 
secondly, serious doubts were raised as to the validity of laws introduced 
into the non-Regulation Provinces without enactment by the Legislature 
Council; thirdly, the Legislative Council presented an address for the 
communication to it of certain correspondence between the Secretary of 
State and the Government of India. The new proposals were: (1) the
1 For details, see minute of 16 March 1860 with memo.; minute of 29 Dec. 
1860; Martineau, op. cit., I,
2 Des. from India (H.D.), Ho.5, 9 Dec. I859.
3 M/C Benort, para. 62.
establishment of councils for Bengal * the Eorth-We stern Provinces* and 
the Punjab; (2) the exclusion of judges from councils; (J) raising the 
number of non-official members from three to five in the Presidencies;
(4) the addition of members* not exceeding twelve* to the Supreme legis­
lature* of whom half were to be non-officials; (5) the holding of its 
meeting in other places besides Calcutta and of so conducting the business 
as to take the opinion of persons not skilled in English; (6) the appoint­
ment of members for a short term* and certainly not longer than two years;
(7) legislative business to be transacted as done in a committee or
1
commission* and not in the form of set parliamentary debate.
Sir Charles Wood regarded the Indian Councils Bill of 1861 as "by
far the most important of the measures" he had introduced. He admitted
that the Act was framed on the basis of the proposals contained in Canning’s 
2
despatches. He supported even such defective proposals as the peripatetic
character of the Supreme Council* the appointment of additional members
for not more than two years* and the small size of the Councils. Canning*
for his part* was anxious that the measure should be passed* and; indeed*
he consented to defer his departure from India so that he might introduce 
3
the reforms.
In Parliament John Bright had suggested that members should be 
appointed for a term of three years. But even this very reasonable 
proposal was not accepted. Commenting on the peripatetic character of the
1 Des* from India* Bo.2A.* 13 Jan* 1861.
2 Wood to Frere* 17 Aug* 1861, Martineau, op. cit.* i, 343-44*
3 Hansard* Third Series, CLXIII* 640.
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Council* Bright observed: ”It would be most unfortunate if they destroyed
the work of the Council at Calcutta for some doubtful or visionary advan-
1
tage of catching a wiseman at some distance from Calcutta”. It may be 
noted that almost all the meetings of the Council during 1862*88 were held
either at Calcutta or at Simla excepting one at Allahabad in 1871 and three
' 2..................................
at Agra in 187
Earl de Grey and Ripon, who was in charge of the Bill in the Lords» 
stated that the Bill steered a midway course between tho opposing opinions*• 
the concentration of legislative power in the executive and the establish­
ment of a representative assembly. The adoption of the first* he said* 
was inadvisable and that of the second would be injurious to India because
it would be exposed to the selfishness of its European inhabitants who
3
demanded a representative assembly*
The Government's plan for the association, of Indians in legislation 
was intended to be an intermediate course. It was not the aim of the 
framers of the Act to make the Legislative Council strong. In fact the 
existing council had been strong enough and it was its strength* not weak- 
ness* which had discredited it with the authorities. In 1861 they took 
the opportunity to clip its wings and as a result the Council emerged from 
the Act shorn of much of its powers# Even the term ’Legislative 
Councillors’ previously used for additional members was dropped. The 
Governor-General was Invested with power to prevent the Introduction of
1 Ibid., 1361.
2 Pari. Paners« LIV (1890), 105.
3 Hansard# CLXIV, 590-91.
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any “bill* to veto any 1)111 passed ty the legislature, and to issue
ordinances for a period of six months. The previous sanction of the
Governor-General was necessary for legislation hy the local councils in 
1
certain cases; and no law or regulation passed hy them could he valid
without his assent. The Governor-General in Council was also authorised
2
to create councils for Bengal, the North-Western Provinces and the Punjab.
5
In accordance with the instructions of the Secretary of State the Bengal
Council was established in January 1862, hut the establishment of other
4
councils was much delayed.
For legislative purposes the Governor-General1 s Council was
increased hy additional members, not less than six and not more than
twelve in number, nominated for two years, of whom not less than half were
to be non-officials. The Act, however, provided that no law made by the
Governor-General in Council was to be deemed invalid by reason only that
the proportion of non-official additional members was not complete at the
5
date of its introduction or enactment.
The Madras and Bombay executive councils were reinforced by addition 
of not less than four and not more than eight members, nominated for two 
years, of whom not less than half were to be non-officials. The functions 
of the new councils were strictly limited to the consideration and enact­
ment of legislative business. The Provincial Councils were not given any
1 24 & 25 Viet., c.67, s.43.
2 Ibid., s.44.
3 Leg, Des. to India, No.14, 9 Aug. 1861, para. 56*
4 See below, *4f>*
5 24 & £5 Viet., c.67, s,14.
¥
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exclusive area for the exercise of their functions. The Act made no 
attempt "to demarcate the jurisdictions of the central and local legis­
latures as in federal constitutions. The Governor-General1s Council 
could legislate for the whole of India; and the Provincial Council for 
the whole of the province* with the reservation that “before doing so in
respect of certain matters the Governor-General* s sanction had to “be 
1
obtained".
Sir Charles Wood* in a covering despatch which accompanied the
Act of 1861, made it clear that the rules of legislative procedure should
he few and simple and that the business should be conducted in the same
2
way as in a committee or commission. The new councils were not to sit 
permanently for the purpose of making laws* but were to be called when 
projects of law we?e ready for discussion. Wood was against the making 
of any rule or the use of any expression which might tend to create an 
impression that the meetings for legislative purposes were fixed or limited
as to time* place* or duration. The use of the term 1 session* was avoided
3
lest it might imply a degree of certainty as to time and duration*;.
The Indian Councils Act of 1861 was an extremely cautious measure.
All possible steps were taken to prevent the Governor-General’s Council
1 M/C Report* para. 63: Report of the Indian Statutory Commission* I.
para. 132.
2 leg. Res. to India* Ho.14* 9 Aug. 1861.
3 Leg. Des. to India, Ho.25* July 1862. Wood went on to say: "Ho 
rule ought to be framed* and no expression ought to be used, tending 
to create an impression that there is a Legislative Council separate 
and distinct from the Executive Council. There is only the one 
Council* that of the Governor-General* or of the Governors as the case 
may be, which sits with certain members for executive purposes* but who 
are aided by additional members when the Council meets for the purpose 
of making laws and regulations" •
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from developing into a miniature parliament# But in providing against
such a development the principle of caution was carried to such an extent
that the councils were denied the opportunity of making themselves really
useful todies# Consistent with the widening of their functions on a
reasonable scale* it would not have teen difficult to lay down the rules
to te followed by the official members of councils.
An important question connected with the growth of legislative
authority in India was the manner in which the Secretary of State exercised
his power in regard to legislation. Under the Act of 1861 he was
empowered to disallow any rule made by the Governor-General in Council for
1
the conduct of legislative business* and also, any law or regulation passed
2
by the council and assented to by the Governor-General. The control of
the Secretary of State was* however* not only limited to the final
rejection of a bill. He was to be informed of all that passed respecting
legislative measures of any importance* and mere formal acknowledgment by
him of the receipt of bills* or mere silence* involved no judgment of
their contents# On first receiving a bill* the Secretary of State could
intimate to the Governor-General his objections to it or suggestions for
3
additional provisions'. In 1864 Sir Charles Wood asked the Government of 
India to postpone the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure* pending 
before the Governor-General*s Council* till further instructions# In reply 
to the Government of India* s observation that the Act did not contemplate
1 24 & £5 Viet.* C.67* s#18#
2 Ibid#* s#21.
3 Leg# Des. to India* No#58* Jl Dec# 1863*
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the suspension hy the Home Government of any hill regularly introduced 
into the Council* and not falling within the proviso contained in 
Section 22, the Secretary of State said that the suspension or with­
drawal of a hill on the suggestion of the Secretary of State was more
courteous and more calculated to maintain the dignity of the council
 1
than disallowance without any intimation of his opinion*
In 1870 the Duke of Argyll, then Secretary of State, expressed
the view that the Home Government must hold in its hands the ultimate
power of requiring the Governor-General to introduce a measure and
2
require all the members of his government to vote for it* The occasion, 
which called for this ruling, was the omission hy the Select Committee 
on the Indian Contract Law of Section 75 from the draft. The Secretary 
of State was in favour of its adoption. The Government of India took 
the view that such a course would invest the Secretary of State with the 
"character of the legislator" for British India and convert the legisla-
5ture into a mere instrument to he used hy him for that purpose.
In March 1874 Argyll’s successor, Salisbury took exception to
the Government of India's practice of submitting measures, without
4
previous sanction, for Her Majesty's approval or disallowance.
1 Leg* Des. to India, Ho* 12, J1 March 1865*
2 Leg* Des* to India, Ho.47 , 24 Hov* 1870,
In 1868 the Government of India sought the ruling of the Secretary 
of State on the position of the members of Government in relation 
to any measure introduced into the Council* Sir Henry Durand, a 
member of the Council, denied the applicability of the cabinet rule 
to the Council. Sir Stafford Horthcote did not express any authori­
tative opinion on the question. Argyll's ruling was clear and unam­
biguous. In 1895 Sir Henry Fowler strongly emphasised the principle 
of the unity of action, and said that united action was necessary for 
all measures introduced by the Governor-General in Council. (Fowler's 
Leg* Des*, Ho.21, 26 June 1895*).
5 Leg* Des. from India, Ho.8, 18 March 1869.
4 Leg* Des. to India, Ho*9, J1 March, 1874*
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It was asked to submit to the Secretary of State a copy of the draft hill, 
together with an explanatory despatch* before it was introduced into the 
Council* Measures of slight importance and those requiring speedy 
enactment were excepted; hut in the case of the latter the Government of 
India was required to communicate subsequently the grounds on which it acted. 
If the draft of, a hill, approved hy the Secretary of State* was materially 
changed during its passage through the Council* the progress of the hill 
was to he delayed until he had a fresh opportunity of expressing M s  opinion. 
In 1875 Lord Salisbury directed that when the Indian Government contemplated 
to introduce a measure on grounds of .urgency* he should he informed* with­
out delay* of its intention hy telegraph*
In 1875 controversy arose over the Tariff Act, wMch had been 
passed without previous reference to the Secretary of State. Lord North­
brook’s government justified the procedure on the grounds, first, that
2
the changes in the duties were urgent; secondly* that the Act was far from
being a proposal for large financial change; thirdly* that the practice
pursued hy the Government was in accordance with the opinion given hy
Lord Stanley in 1859 which provided that all questions regarding fiscal
3
legislation should he disposed of with the least possible delay.
Lord Salisbury took a strong stand on this question. He
emphasised the necessity of effective control hy the Home Government over
4
India’s financial policy; and added that in passing the Act the Government
1 Leg. Des. to India, N0.5I* 11 Nov. 1875*
2 Pub. Des. from India* No.48, 16 Aug. 1875*
3 Pub. Les. from India* No.9, 17 March 1876.
4 Leg. Des. to India, No.25, May 1876.
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of India did not avail itself of the advice of non-official members.
Such a procedure , he said, was contrary to the intention of Parliament
which had provided that laws should he passed at a Council consisting of
“both officials and non-officials. In another despatch, while authorising
the expenditure for erecting offices and quarters at Simla, he remarked
that the growing practice of legislating at Simla was at variance with
the spirit of the Act of 1861 because non-official members were precluded
from participating in the business of the Council. He suggested that the
the period of residence at Simla should be devoted to the preparation of
legislative measures, and the period at Calcutta to their discussion and 
2
enactment. It is difficult to say how far Salisbury was really sincere
about the association of non-official members. The figures, however, do
not suggest that the Home Government was anxious to reduce the Government
of India* s practice of legislating at Simla to a minimum; The explanation
of Salisbury9 s attitude is to be sought in his disagreement with the policy
of the Tariff Act passed at Simla in 1875*
The first instalment of reforms had a longer span of life than
4
any one of the subsequent measures in the post-Mutiny period. It was 
not until 1886, when the Act of 1861 had already been in force for twenty-
1 Leg. Des. to India, H0.5I, 11 Hov.1875.
2 Pub. Des. to India, Ho.64, 25 May 1876.
5 Between 1877 and 1888 the number of sittings of the Governor-General* s
Council at Calcutta and Simla was 14J and 1^9 respectively.
Pari. Papers. LIV (1890), IO5.
4 The Acts under which the Councils were reformed were passed in 1892,
1909, 1919 and 19J5* 2?he interval between subsequent reforms was 
not so long as that between 1861 and 1892.
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five years * that Lord Dufferin gave attention to the question of reorgan­
ising the Councils. Even Lord Bipon, well-known for his literal views, 
does not appear to have seriously thought along these lines. His hands 
were so full with the project of local self-government and later he had 
to face such a strong opposition over the Xlhert Sill that he would have 
heen too rash a politician had he ventured to introduce any Council reform. 
But though there were no concrete proposals for reform the inconveniences 
of the system were sometimes openly expressed. For instance* on 31 March 
1871 Lord Mayo said: "The Government of this country is in one respect
in an unfortunate position* for there is no assembly or any means of 
discussion similar to that which prevails in other countries* whereby 
members of Government can give an immediate reply to statements made* and 
administer on the spot the negative to extravagant and inaccurate assertions. 
We are often obliged to wait for weeks and months before an answer can be 
given to even the most absurd accusations".
The most obvious defects of the councils were the want of 
opportunities for discussion* their small size and the inadequate represent­
ation of Indian members. On an average* the Supreme legislative council
consisted of four Indians* of whom not a few were drawn from the landed 
Z
aristocracy. An important consideration in the appointment of members of
1 Progs, of the Leg. Council of the Governor-General* 1871, 431.
2 Pari. Papers, LIV (1890), IOI-IO5.
According to Return showing the appointment of additional members of 
the Governor-General1s Council between 1862-1888* there were in all 
36 Indians* of whom 7 were ruling chiefs and 23 landholders. Of J6 
members 3 were appointed thrice and 7 twice. Most of them were 
titleholders.
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higher social status was largely political* It is rather remarkable
that sometimes even in the appointment of official members other
considerations played a part. For instance* the appointment of W.W.Eonter
to the Governor-General* s Council in 1882 and his subsequent reappointments
1
were made just to increase his emoluments. The attendance of Indian 
members at the meetings of the Governor-General* s Council* and especially 
when they were held at Simla* was quite often incomplete. The 
proceedings were marked by want of vitality and vigour. Lady Dufferin* 
who visited the Council chamber in March 1885* when the Bengal Rent Bill 
was under discussion* records that the speakers mostly read their speeches; 
/proceedings were dull; and it was not easy to hear them. These 
impressions being those of one whose visit to the chamber was purely 
accidental have an extremely limited value as a piece of evidence; but a 
study of the proceedings of the Council does not enable us to arrive at a 
different conclusion. The fact is that the limitations under which the 
councils were constituted made them purely advisory bodies. They were 
intended to function like cons&ittees and they were nothing more than this.
In the * eighties* when Lord Dufferin gave his attention to the 
question of Council reform* many forces had been powerfully working in 
that direction. The growth of English education and of the Press* and 
the establishment of many associations urging the reconstitution of the
1 Fin. Des. from India* tfo«546* 26 Oct. 1886. As an additional 
member he received an allowance of Rs.666§^ per month besides salary.
2 The Marchioness of Dufferin, Our Tice regal Life in India, i, 7J.
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councils* paved the way for another instalment of reform. In December
1885 the Madras Mahajan Sahha, a provincial political body, put forward 
the demand for the selection of members hy a limited electorate* 
consisting of local bodies* universities and the Chambers of Commerce.
At the same time the Indian National Congress laid stress on the 
necessity of reconstituting the Supreme and Provincial Councils by 
admitting into them a considerable proportion of elected members. In
1886 the Congress elaborated its resolution of 1885^ Early in the same 
year Dufferin recorded his opinion in favour of carrying out the experi­
ment of liberalising* if not the Supreme* at least the subordinate 
legislative Councils. He indicated that the quick introduction of
reforms in the nature of a final settlement of the Indian question for
2
ten or fifteen years would popularise the acts of the Government. Lord 
Dufferin pursued this subject to the end of his Viceroyalty, and just a 
month before his departure* he recorded his famous minute. In 1886 he 
gave his full support to Sir Alfred Lyall’s proposal for a council for 
the North-Western Provinces. The Secretary of State agreed to the
3
proposal* and in January 1887 the new Council was inaugurated* On 
16 February 1887* the day on which the Queen* s Jubilee was celebrated, 
Dufferin said in a speech at Calcutta: glad and happy should I be
if during my sojourn amongst them circumstances permitted me to extend 
and place upon a wider and more logical footing the political status which
1 For details* see below*f$f.
2 Lyall, Life, II, 151-52.
3 See below t tsi,
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was so wisely given a generation ago by that great statesman Lord 
1
Halifax ” Thus Dufferin1 s contribution to the cause of reform lay
in taking the initiative and in impressing upon the Home Government the 
urgency of reorganising the Councils?
In 1886-87 the Chambers of Commerce of Madras* Bengal and Bombay 
emphasised the necessity of investing the legislature with power to 
discuss the budget. The Madras Chamber of Commerce remarked that it 
was a poor commentary on the progress of civilisation that 200 millions
3
of people did not possess the smallest voice in the passing of the budget.
In December 1887 it re-emphasised that in view of the rapid advance of
education the restrictions on the power of the Supreme Council were 
4
anomalous. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce said that the free discussion
of the financial arrangement as a whole* and not of the isolated items of
5
the budget, would be of great value. The views of the Bombay Chamber 
6
were similar.
1 Dufferin’s Speeches* 159.
2 In a private letter to Lord Hamilton* Lord Elgin said: "I had no idea 
that the changes introduced by the Act of 1892 had really been
initiated in India and that a Committee had submitted* and the
Government of India had unanimously adopted even wider proposals than 
those in the Act itself”. Letter of 25 Aug. 1896, Pr. Cor. Ind.*
Vol.II, 827.
It is surprising that Lord Elgin came to know after two and a half years 
that the Act of 1892 had its origin in the proposals of the Dufferin 
Committee.
3 To Secretary to Finance Committee* Simla, 3 1886* Fab. Progs. *
Ho.34, April 1888.
4 To Secretary to Govt, of India, 15 Dec. 1887, Pub. Progs.* Ho.33,
April 1888.
5 To Secretary to Govt, of India, 20 Oct. 1887* Pub. Progs., H0.3I*
April 1888. The Bengal Chamber pointed out that since 1872 the budgets 
had been presented for discussion before the Council in 1877* 1880 and 
1882. The others were published in the form of a minute or statement.
6 To Secretary to Govt, of India, 24 Hov. 1887, Pub. Progs., Ho.32,
April 1888.
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In 1887, the year of tiie Queen's Jubilee, resolutions were passed
at numerous meetings held in many parts of India* The one point to
which they invariably referred related to the enlargement of the Councils.
The memorialists looked upon the Jubilee as an occasion specially suitable
for the granlf of such a concession. Most of the provincial memorials were
1
identical in contents, and were congress-sponsored. Referring to the
memorials from the Punjab, the Punjab Government remarked that the meetings
were convened in accordance with the plan arranged by the "so-called
2
National Congress’1 at Calcutta. Surendranath Banerjea, one of the top-
ranking leaders of the Congress in those days, writes that he took special
care that the addresses which were presented by the municipalities on the
occasion of the Jubilee should contain a prayer for the reform of the 
*
Councils^
Though the reform of the Councils had always attracted Lord
Dufferin's attention, it was not until 20 September 1888 that he
communicated his views in considerable detail to the Executive Council.
His views on the enlargement of the Provincial Councils and the extension
4
of their functions met with the unanimous support of the Council, and
1 Encl. to Pub. Des. from India, No.15* 19 Feb. 1889.
The memorials from Madras suggested the appointment of a commission, 
consisting of Congressmen to a proportion of one-fourth, to prepare 
the scheme of reform.
It is remarkable that most of the printed memorials from Bengal 
make no reference to the reconstitution of the Central Council. In 
some of them the word * supreme1 has been inserted after the word 
’provincial1.
2 To Govt, of India, 2 Sept. 1887, Pub. Progs.. Ho.367, April 1888.
3 Banerjea, op. cit., 91.
4 Dufferin1 s minute. Encl. to Pub. Des. from India, Ho.67, 6 Nov. 1888.
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accordingly* a Committee* consisting of Sir George Chesney* Sir Charles
1
Aitehison and James Westland* was appointed to draw up a scheme for the 
reorganisation of the Councils* The Committee submitted its proposals 
on 10 October 1888. The Government of India accepted them in their 
entirety.
The main recommendations of the Dufferin committee were: (1) The 
expansion of the Madras* Bombay and Bengal councils with enlarged functions; 
(2) the establishment of an executive council in Bengal as a condition 
precedent to the reconstitution of its legislative council; (3) "the re­
organisation of the councils with reference to the representation of the 
more important interests; (4) the provision for direct election to the 
First Division of the council* consisting of the representatives of the 
hereditary nobility and landed classes* and for indirect election to the 
Second Division* consisting of the representatives of trading^professional 
and agricultural classes* of the interests of the planting and commercial 
European community, and of the interests of stable and effective 
administration; (5) the representation of Muslims in proportion to their 
population; (6) the reservation of a few seats to be filled by nomination 
as a safeguard against any inequality in the results of election; (7) the 
division of provincial administration into two branches* general and local, 
and the Council to be invested with larger powers over the latter. The 
recommendations of the Committee were limited to the reconstitution of the 
Councils of Madras* Bombay and Bengal. Even the reorganisation of the
1 All of them were members of the Governor-General’s executive council. 
Westland was an officiating Finando Member.
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Central Legislature was to await the results of the experiment in the 
provincial field.
The size of the provincial councils was to he dicided upon the
advice of the Local Government. The Committee expressed the view that
a large Province like Bengal might require nearly 40 members to give a
fair representation to all the interests involved* It suggested that*
in general* the First Division should have a membership of one-third of
the total strength* and that* in each Division* not less than two-fifths
1
should be elected* Both orders were to sit together for voting* but, 
upon demand* each division was to be permitted to vote separately, and in 
such a case* no motion was to be carried unless the majority in both 
concurred* In this way each division was to exercise a check on the other.
The most important proposals of the Committee related to the enlarge­
ment of the functions of the Councils* The Committee recommended that the 
Councils should have power to originate advice and suggestions on any 
subject connected with internal civil administration* and to ask questions 
and* subject to certain restrictions* to call for papers* It further 
proposed that provincial finance should be divided into general and local 
branches, the first relating to the subjects classified as belonging to 
general administration, and the 'second to such expenditure as incurred on 
schools, hospitals, sanitation* communication, town police* etc. Over
1 The Committee suggested that the First Division of the Bengal Council 
should consist of 7 officials and 6 elected members, and the Second 
Division should have 12 officials, 7 elected and 4 nominated members. 
In each Division the officials were to have a majority of one.
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the local part of the budget9 the Council was to exercise its control 
raach in the seme manner as the district boards* under the local self- 
government acts* administered similar matters within their areas. In 
regard to the general branch of provincial finance* the Council was to 
have less powers; but the committee suggested that the budget should be 
laid before it for discussion. This part of the Committee’s recommenda­
tions dealing with the Council’s control over provincial finance may be 
summed up in its own words: "In all these matters relating to local
finance we think the object should be to give to the Provincial Councils 
a real control and a real responsibility, and that the Local Government 
should endeavour to confine its control and direction of the councils
proceedings to the broader questions of policy, and to the assurance of
1
general financial stability”.
Lord Dufferin characterised the above scheme ”as a plan for the 
enlargement of our Provincial Councils* for the enhancement of their 
status, the multiplication of their functions* the partial introduction 
into them of the election principle* and the liberalisation of their 
general character as political institutions”. These proposals, he said* 
would place the Government in contact with a large surface of Indian 
opinion. Ee expressed the view that the association of the loyal* 
patriotic and educated classes with the Councils would shift the centre
of gravity of Indian political activity from the ” self-constituted
—^v
associations and the little knot of politicians and newspaper writers” to
1 Beport on the Subject of Provincial Councils, 10 Oct, 1888* Encl. to 
Pub, Des, from India* No, 67, 6 Nov, 1888.
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the "really responsible classes". In his opinion the proposals marked 
a fresh advance along the path of reasonable political progress. But he 
emphasised that it was not the aim of the Government to introduce any 
radical change or parliamentary system. The provisions relating to a 
nominated majority in the Councils and the Governor’s power to overrule 
them* he said* left no room for an approach to the English constitutional 
system. The Committee* too, had emphasised that "the only possible way 
of proceeding is to develop established methods, and not to introduce 
new and untried ones".
Bufferin’s minute* in one respect, went beyond the limits set by 
the Committee* which had limited its scheme of reform to the Provincial 
Councils. It suggested that the Supreme Council should also be invested 
with power to have a full, free* and thorough examination of the policy 
of the Government. James Westland* then officiating Finance Member, 
concurred in this view. Bufferin’s other proposal was to invest the 
Council with power to ask questions on matters of domestic interest.
These two changes* he said, would provide the Government with an adequate 
medium through which it would be able to explain its policy and neutralise 
the effects of the misrepresentation of its measures. He limited his 
proposals to the functions of the Supreme Council* and made no reference 
to the increase of its size. It seems that the large scope of the 
Committee’s recommendations in on* important direction and its definite 
stand against the introduction of similar changes in the Supreme Council
1 In this minute Bufferin criticised the Congress severely.
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made M m  cautious in his proposals.
The Committee’s proposals relating to the right of interpellation, 
the discussion of the budget, the power to move resolutions* the 
provision for an adequate control over a sector of provincial finance, 
the introduction of the elective system, and the proportion of official 
and non-official members would have certainly enhanced the prestige and 
usefulness of the Councils. The authors of the Report of 1918 were 
impressed with the bold approach of the Committee to many questions. 
jThey remarked that some of its recommendations contained the germ of
I
proposals - which bulked so largely in their inquiry - for standing
committees, grand committees, upper houses, reserved and transferred
1
subjects, and the like. Another question to which the Committee addressed 
itself and which subsequently became a major issue of Indian constitutional 
development, related to the representation of the Muslims. While recom­
mending the introduction of the elective system in India, the Committee 
pointed out the difficulty of providing, under Indian conditions, for an 
adequate representation of religious minorities by a method of pure 
election. In view of the uneven diffusion of education and of religious 
differences, the problem of securing representation even for important 
classes and communities was extremely difficult. An important section 
of the Muslims, under Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, was bitterly hostile to any 
system of election. A few months before the appointment of the Dufferin 
committee, he had delivered two speeches which were severely critical of
1 M/C Report, para.67.
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the Congress and its programme# The Government was quite aware of this 
development, and perhaps the provision for Muslim representation on the 
basis of population was, to some extent, in response to it; hut it does 
not appear that the other principles of the scheme were in any way 
influenced hy Sir Syed’s opposition# The Committee’s proposals relating 
to the introduction of election and the powers and functions of the 
Councils would not have heen acceptable to him. As regards the reserva­
tion of seats on a religious basis, it was no doubt an objectionable 
feature inasmuch as it was inconsistent with the principles of parliamentary 
institutions# But in relation to Indian conditions a mode of selection 
partly by election and partly by nomination was a practical suggestion, 
and it was also free from the evils to which exclusive electorates give rise.
The Committee’s proposals regarding the constitution and functions 
of the First Division were hardly a satisfactory part of the scheme, 
though no doubt they were ingenious# The Dufferin committee recognised
1 Syed Ahmad Khan, The Present State of Indian Politics.
In his speeches at Lucknow (Dec# 1887) and at Meerut (March 1888) he 
was ruthless in his criticism of the Congress. He said that, under a 
system of universal suffrage, the Muslims would be in a minority of 
one to four; that, under a system based on property qualifications, 
being poor, they would have no chance; and that, even under a system 
of separate representation, with an adequate number of seats reserved 
for them, they would not fare well when pitted against the intellectu­
ally superior Hindus# Sir Syed challenged the very principle of 
representative government as applied to Indian conditions. He was 
against the extension of the functions of the councils, and emphasised 
that the interests of the Muslims demanded a strong British rule. It 
is significant that a man who had advocated the appointment of Indians 
to the Council JO years earlier was now such a great opponent of reform.
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that the constitution of separate orders in the same body was o£dn to 
objection, hut supported the scheme on the ground that the circumstances 
of Indian society and the considerations of constitutional stability 
made it desirable that the admission of the aristocracy should be 
independent of popular election- It may be remarked that the presence 
of a division* composed entirely of officials and members belonging to 
the hereditary nobility and landed class* and enjoying equal powers with 
the Second Division* would have acted as a great impediment in the way of 
constitutional progress. In its total effect the good points of the 
scheme would have been greatly neutralised by this provision.
The Committee’s scheme marked a definite improvement on the
existing system. Lord Salisbury* the Primp Minister* in a memorandum
of 31 December 1888, remarked that Dufferin’3 proposals inaugurated the
most important change undertaken since the dissolution of the Company,
and that they ought to have been settled in communication with the Cabinet
before any official step was taken in that respect. Salisbury regarded
the introduction of the elective system as dangerous. "We shall"* he
remarked, "in no way please the classes on whose good will the submission
of India depends: we shall not reconcile our enemies; but we shall give
1
them arms against ourselves".
After Dufferin’s departure* his successor, Lord Lansdowne pursued 
this subject* and in this he was supported by the Secretary of State*
Lord Cross. On 29 March 1889 Lansdowne announced that the Secretary of
1 Lady G. Cecil* Life* iv* 194-96.
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State had agreed that the Legislative Council should he given regular
1
opportunities to discuss the budget and to ask questions. In a despatch
the Government of India referred to this announcement as a pledge to he
implemented. The question* therefore* was how to introduce the necessary
changes into the procedure of the Councils* hoth Local and Central. Under
the Act of 1861 the Legislative Council was forbidden to transact any
business other than the consideration and enactment of measures introduced
2
for this purpose. The practice of financial discussion existed on 
3
sufferance. It was only when a new tax was to be imposed that the Finance
member was required to submit his financial proposals and the members got
an opportunity to make observations in regard to them. The Government
of India emphasised that the right of financial criticism should be
conferred on the Council by law and should not depend upon an accident.
Hegarding the right of interpellation, it suggested that the Council
should not be restricted* as Lord Dufferin had proposed, to current matters
of domestic* as distinguished from those of imperial* interests. In its
opinion, it was desirable in certain circumstances that questions should
be addressed to the Government even upon matters ordinarily excluded from
4
public discussion.
Lord Cross, while favourable to the scheme which provided for the 
enlargement of the size and functions of the Councils, objected to the 
Dufferin9s committee’s proposal for election on the grounds that the
1 Progs, of the Leg. Council of the Governor-General (1889), XX7III, I63.
2 24 & 25 Viet., c.67, s.19.
3 Progs, of the Leg. Council of the Governor-General* 2 Feb. 1893*
XXXII, 46.
4 Pub. Des. from India, Ho.35* %5 1889.
Ill
principle was foreign to oriental institutions? and that its recognition 
in local bodies had not passed beyond an experimental stage and
1
consequently, its extension to the Provincial Councils was not desirable.
In a despatch of the same date, accompanying a draft Bill, he suggested
that the representation of considerable sections of the community might
be best effected by "a simple extension of the existing system", Lord
Cross indicated that at a suitable opportunity he would submit to
2
Parliament the proposals for the reconstitution of the Councils* It may 
be remarked that the provisions contained in the draft Bill did not under-
3go any material alteration during its passage through Parliament*
The Government of India, invited the opinions of the Local Govern- 
4
ments on the draft Bill# The Governments of Madras and the North­
western Provinces approved of the Bill* Lord Beay, Governor of Bombay, 
supported it, but other members of his Executive Counill objected to 
certain provisions. He remarked that the plan was in Conformity with
the changed conditions and would result in an increased sense of
5responsibility in the Administration* The members of his Council held 
the view that the doubling of the number of additional members would
1 Pub. Des* to India, No*80, 1 Aug* 1889*
£ Pub, Des. to India, No*81, 1 Aug* 1889.
3 Under the draft Bill, the number of additional members of the
Governor-General1 s Council was fixed at 10 as mimimum and at 16 as
maximum, and of the Madras and Bombay Councils at 8 as minimum and
20 as maximum. Additional members were to be appointed for two years. 
The right of discussing the budget and the right of interpellation 
were conceded. Neither in the draft Bill, nor in the Act, the word 
’election1 occurs*
4 For replies of provincial governments, see ends, to Pub* Des. from 
India, N0.75, 24 Dec. 1889.
5 Minute, 19 Oct# 1889*
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render the conduct of legislative "business "troublesome* tedious, 
costly, and uncertain"« They suggested that tjie minimum number of 
additional members should be retained at its existing figure and the 
maximum be fixed at fourteen. In their opinion the Governor should 
have power to appoint two or three additional members* possessing 
special knowledge* when some special matter formed the subject of 
legislation. They justified the maximum number of additional members 
at a smaller figure on the ground that, as compared with the proposed 
strength of only sixteen additional members for the Governor-General1 s 
Council, a Provincial Council hardly required twenty. They objected 
to the change relating to the discussion of the budget and the right of 
interpellation on the ground that it would embarrass the Local Government 
and result in financial controversies between Central and Provincial 
Governments. "Licence of discussion", they said, "has repeatedly been 
found to be mischievous and even fatal to a Provincial Government 
dependent on a metropolitan one".
According to Sir Steuart Bay ley, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, 
the maximum limit of additional members was "altogether too low". He 
was in favour of raising it to thirty, so that ”due representation of 
considerable sections of the community" and an adequate number of officials 
to answer questions might be provided. Regarding the financial power of 
the Council, Sir Steuart sgggested that if the nature of restrictions to 
be imposed on discussion could not be laid down in the Act, it should
1 Letter to Govt, of India, R0.4J88, 22 Oct. 1889.
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be clearly explained "before Parliament go that no mi sunder standing 
might arise in the future* As a safeguard against attach on imperial 
finance* he proposed that the annual Financial Statement should he 
divided into two parts* one of which* dealing with the receipts and 
expenditure fixed hy Contract* was not to he placed before the Council* 
while the other dealing with the items of revenue entirely within the 
control of the Local Government, was to he submitted for discussion.
As to the right of interpellation, he suggested that it should he confined 
to a single question and answer and that such matters as were under 
discussion with the superior authority or had been under discussion not 
long before* should not he the subject of discussion, except with the 
previous consent of the superior authority?’
The Governoffhtof India entirely approved of the maximum and 
minimum limits of additional members. In its opinion a larger increase 
in the strength of the Supreme Council would involve more expenditure 
without increasing efficiency or satisfying those who demanded a much 
larger council. It further suggested that in order to avoid misappre­
hension, a proviso should be added that no member would have the right to 
propose any resolution, or to divide the Council* in respect of any 
matter arising out of financial discussion, or the answer to any question, 
or the rules made under the Act. Referring to certain points raised by 
the Local Governments, the Government of India made it clear that they 
were entitled to deal with the local budget only; that the questions
1 Letter to Govt, of India, No.112 JVD., 16 Oct. 1889.
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might he permitted not only when the "budget was under discuss ion * "but
at other times also; and that the rules for the conduct of "business
should "be made "by the Central and Provincial Governments in their
1
executive capacity.
The Government of India was in complete agreement with the draft
scheme except in one respect. The Secretary of State had rejected its
proposal of election. Remarking on this* the Government of India said
that if circumstances did not warrant the introduction of the elective
principle on the scale advised "by the Committee« it would have "been well
if the Bill did not "absolutely preclude us from resort to some form of
election where the local conditions are such as to justify a "belief that
it might "be safely and advantageously adopted”. It suggested that a
provision authorising it to make rules* subject to the sanction of the
Secretary of State* for the appointment of additional members would have
the advantage of preventing agitation likely to follow upon the passing
2
of the bill in its present form.
The Indian Councils Amendment Bill was ready for Parliament in 
1889* but it was not introduced in that year* as Lord Cross said* owing
3to the "extreme pressure of business” in the House of Commons.
1 Pub. Des. from India* Ho.75* 24 Dec. 1889.
2 Pub. Des. from India* Ho.76* 24 Dec. 1889.
In a letter to Queen Victoria* Lansdowne said that it would not be
desirable to exclude altogether the possibility of admitting, sooner
or later* a certain number of elected members into the local councils.
He urged that a "moderate and yet liberally conceived measure" should 
be passed without delay. This letter was in reply to the Queen’s 
letter of June 1889 in which she expressed doubt as to whether India 
was ripe for the introduction of the elective principle. Lansdowne 
to Queen Victoria* 19 July 1889* Buckle, Letters* Third Series, i 
(1886-1890)* 525.
3 Hansard1 s Indian Debates* 21 Feb. 1890, 27.
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On 21 February 1890 the Bill wag introduced into the House of Lords.
When Lord Herschell inquired about the papers received from India* Lord
Cross remarked that as the Bill related to a "very unimportant matter"
he did not know whether there was any communication which could he laid
"before Parliament* and added that papers of a confidential character
ought not to he laid on the table for some time. The Bill passed
through all the successive stages by 18 March 1890, and was sent to the
House of Commons, but it did not succeed in getting beyond a first reading.
On 26 January 1891 the Bill was read for the first time in the House of
Commons, On 26 February 1891 when James Bryce asked when the Government
proposed to take the second reading, W.H.Smith, First Lord of the Treasury
1
declined to give any undertaking.
In June 1891 the Bill was withdrawn. In February 1892 the Bill,
as amended in 1890, was introduced into the House of Lords, and was
passed without alteration. On 28 March 1892 G.U.Curzon, then Under 
Secretary of State for India, introduced the Bill into the Commons, This 
time the Bill was passed by both the Houses. It received the Royal 
assent on 20 June 1892* In August 1892 the Conservative Government was 
replaced by the Liberals. Thus, while the Indian Councils Act was passed 
under a Conservative Government, the rules and regulations regarding the 
appointment of non-official members, the asking of questions and financial 
discussion were sanctioned by a Liberal Government.
Both Dufferin and Lansdowne had been anxious for the early
1 Hansard^ Indian Debates (1891), J4*
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reorganisation of the Councils* Early in 1886 the former had expressed
the view that whatever concessions were possible should he given quickly
1
and with a good grace* Lansdowne* soon after his arrival* pursued this 
matter. In December 1889 the Government of India expressed its opinion
in favour of introducing the Indian Councils Bill into Parliament without 
Z
delay* Lord Cross had also supported the scheme* but the enactment of 
the Bill was delayed due to the comparative unimportance of the subject, 
in the eyes of the British Government, before the problems of home and 
imperial politics. Besides this attitude of general indifference to 
Indian matters , there were certain considerations of a general and 
special character which weighed with the Government in not pushing the 
Bill through. The general reason* to which Lord Salisbury refers* 
related to the position of the party which had been labouring under dis­
integrating influences. He said that it was difficult to have a success­
ful passage for the Indian Bill which had "some enemies* and no ardent 
supporters". Lord Salisbury’s special reason was rather fantastical.
He feared that the passage of the Bill in the Commons would lead to a
series of inflammatory speeches by the votaries of popular government in
3
India, and especially by Gladstone. While regretting the disappointment
1 Lyall, Life, ii, 1J1*
Z Pub. Des. from India, Ho.75* 24 Dec* 1889.
5 "To speak plainly - and asking your pardon if I wound any political
sympathies - I dread this question being discussed while Mr, Gladstone 
is still a political force. He has, to my eyes, so entirely lost all 
sense of responsibility*, that it would be a capital danger to the 
Empire if the language he is sure to use is taken as a watchword by the 
innovators in India." Salisbury to Lansdowne, 27 June 1890, quoted 
in Newton* Lansdowne * 73-74.
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caused to Lansdowne. he remarked that it would he fully repaid if a 
speech from Gladstone on the rights of the Indian people could he 
avoided•
Lord Newton, Lansdowne’s biographer, comments that Salisbury
was correct in so far as he referred to the weakness of his government,
supported as it was by the Unionists, but his special reason was far
from convincing. If Gladstone, says Newton, wanted to make trouble, he
could have easily done so without reference to this particular question.
The fact is that Gladstone’s speech on Schwann’s amendment was so moderate
and conciliatory that his interpretation was accepted by the Government
1
without any amendment. In explaining Salisbury’s attitude towards
Indian constitutional development, one has to bear in mind that he was
not a believer in the policy of political concessions for India.
The Indian Councils Bill, during its passage through Parliament
in 1890 and 1892, remained unchanged except in one respect. The Draft
Bill of 1889 had left the power of appointing additional members with the
executive, and it is on this aspect of the Bill that important discussions
took place# On 6 March 1890 Lord Northbrook pointed out the necessity
of introducing "some system of selection or election” into the Provincial 
2
Councils. He suggested that the Bill should include a clause enabling 
the Governor-General in Council to make rules, with the approval of the
1 See below, lai.
2 Hansard’s Indian Debates, 1890* 60.
Lord Northbrook preferred the term representation to election. In 
1892 he remarked that under Indian conditions any system of popular 
election by large constituencies would not be workable. Indian Pari. 
Debates, 15 Feb. 1892, Jl.
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Secretary of State* for the appointment of members. Northbrook*s other
suggestion related to the desirability of selecting four or five members
1
of the Supreme Legislature by the*Local Legislatures. These proposals
were strongly supported by Lord Ripon who remarked that a system of pure
nomination impaired the influence of Indian members among their fellow
countrymen. Ripon was in favour of making the Bill an empowering bill,
being of opinion that the absence of such a provision would require a
2
fresh act of Parliament which, it was not so easy, to carry through.
Both Northbrook and Ripon remarked that in the absence of the papers
from the Government of India, the House felt greatly handicapped in
5
discussing the Bill. Lord Kimberley concurred in the proposals for the
introduction of some element of election into the Local Councils and for
the extension of some representation to the Supreme Council. Referring
to the delay in introducing reforms, Kimberley observed that if the
matter had been dealt with three or four years earlier, much of the
4
agitation could have been avoided.
1 Hansard* s Indian Debates (1890) , 61.
2 Ibid., 62-65.
5 Only an extract from Dufferin*s minute was laid upon the table,
though it had appeared in some Indian papers. Banerjea writes
that The Bengalee, of which he was the editor, was the first paper 
to publish this minute in March 1889. A Ration in Making, 95.
4 Hansard1 s Indian Debates (1890), 79.
In I885 Lord Randolph Churchill advocated the appointment of 
a committee to consider the different acts which regulated the 
machinery of the Government of India, including the Legislative 
Councils., In 1886, when Lord Kimberley was Secretary of State for
India, the House of Lords agreed to his proposal for the appointment
of a Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament for the purpose 
of considering those acts. But the proposal fell through. Kimberley 
told the Lords that the Commons'Committee was not appointed on 
account of the opposition of Churchill.
Hansard1 s Indian Debates (1886), 285-4.
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Although Liberal members like Northbrook and Kimberley were in
favour of some form of elective system* they were decidedly opposed to
any scheme of parliamentary government for India. Kimberley emphasised
that the notion of a parliamentary system for a vast country like India
was "one of the wildest imaginations that ever entered the minds of men".
Lord Salisbury* the Prime Minister* said: "the principle of election or
government by representation is not an eastern idea* it does not fit
eastern tradiation or eastern minds"# He urged the House not to slip
into that "great innovation" which, one£ accepted, would not admit of
2
being confined to a restricted area# The application of occidental
machinery in India* said Salisbury, would bring into power not the strong
and natural elements of Indian society, but its "artificial and weakly"
5
parts.
Replying to the debate* Lord Cross remarked that the only fault
found with the Bill was not with regard to what it contained, but as to
4 5
what it left out# In Committee he accepted Lord Northbrook’s amendment.
He remarked that it would make clear the intention of Parliament and
6
would also satisfy the people of India. Lord Kimberley regarded the 
acceptance of this amendment by the Government as "to a certain extent
1 Ibid.* 84.
2 Ibid., 86.
3 Indian Pari. Debates* 15 Feb. 1892, 35*
4 Debates, 6 March 1890, 73..
5 "Provided that the Governor-General in Council may from time to time,
with the approval of the Secretary of State in Council, make regula­
tions as to the conditions under which such nominations* or any of 
them, shall be made by the Governor-General, Governors, and Lieutenant 
Governors respectively, and prescribe the manner in which such regula­
tions shall be carried into effect." This amendment was incorporated 
in the Act.
6 Hansard’s Indian Debates, 13 March 1890* 101.
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admitting the elective principle” , In February 1892 he said that the
opposition would have preferred the more explicit recognition of the 
2
principle.
Drawing the attention of the House to the omission from the Bill
of a provision contained in the third clause of the original Bill* Lord
Herschell said that its removal would seriously, fetter the power and
5
functions of the Provincial Councils. The insertion of the above clause 
had removed the disability imposed upon the Provincial Councils under 
Section 42 of the Act of 1861, which debarred them from legislating upon 
any matter dealt with by the Governor-General in Council between 1861 and 
the time of its constitution. Lord Cross said that the clause was
s'
omitted in order to "lighten” the Bill. He agreed to its re-insertion
4 5
in Committee» and accordingly, it was restored.
In February 1892 the House of Lords passed the Indian Councils
Bill, on its re-introduction, vdthout any modification. In March 1892
Curzon, Trader Secretary of State for India, introduced the Bill into the
House of Commons. A number of amendments were moved by certain members
who were "endeavouring to fight the cause of the Indian people", but
6
none was accepted. The most important amendment, which was later with­
1 Ibid., 101. Kimberley’s construction was neither modified nor 
controverted by the Government.
2 Indian Pari. Debates, 15 Feb. 1892, 30.
J Hansard’s Indian Debates, 13 March 1890, 95*96.
4 Ibid., 97.
5 See Sec.5 of 1892 Act.
6 Indian Pari. Debates, 25 April 1892, 285, C.E.Schwann, Seymour Keay,
Samuel Smith and Swift Mac Heill were strong supporters of the 
Congress movement. • They strongly urged that the Bill should provide 
for election.
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drawn, related to the introduction of the elective principle. The mover
of the resolution, C#E.Schwann spoke like an ardent Congress man?’
Gladstone, speaking for the Opposition, deprecated any division on this
question* He expressed the view that "the acceptance of the elective
principle by the Under Secretary, though guarded, and necessarily guarded,
2
was, on the whole, not otherwise than a frank acceptance". Curzon
concurred in this interpretation, and thds, the elective principle for
India was recognised without being embodied in the Act# J# Maclean, who
was opposed to Schwann*s amendment, characterised this procedure as
3
introducing election by a "side wind". Sir Hichard Temple, an experienced
4
Indian administrator, suggested that the right of selection should be
conferred on certain cities, to be so selected as to represent as nearly
5
as possible the various sections of the population,
Schwann’s other amendment related to the increase of the number
6
of additional members to forty. He remarked that the proposal to add 
only four members to the Governor-General’s Council was "a very paltry and 
miserable" addition# Curzon defended the strength proposed in the Bill 
on many grounds# First, any larger addition, he said,would involve an 
increase of expenditure without any corresponding increase in efficiency.
1 Ibid*, 28 March 1892, 137-38# Schwann had attended the Congress 
Session of 1890# He said in Parliament that India had a national 
voice, and that voice, to a large extent, was the National Congress.
2 Ibid*, 149-50.
3 Ibid., 157.
4 He was a member of the Governor-General’s Executive Council (1868-74), 
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (1874-1877), and Governor of Bombay
(1877-80).
5 Indian Pari. Debates, 28 March 1892, 164#
6 Ibid., 25 April 1892, 239.
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Secondly, there would he considerable difficulty in securing good men
willing to devote sufficient time to the purposes of these Councils.
Thirdly* the larger the Council* the longer would he the time spent on
the dehates* Fourthly* any increase in the number of non-official
members would necessitate a corresponding increase in the number of
official members) which* Curzon said* would not only result in taking
away the officials from their important duties* but also in dividing the
1
Council into Government and Opposition parties* Replying to Sir William
Plowden* s amendment that village Councils should be utilised for purposes
of nomination* Curzon remarked that they had no legal status and were
2
extremely small as an electoral unit* A third amendment moved by Schwann 
to invest the Council with power to propose resolutions* when financial 
matters were under discussion# and to divide it in respect of any such 
financial discussion* was also ruled out. Curzon observed that such a 
provision would be incompatible with the object of the Bill which only
4
sought to provide the councils with more facilities for useful criticism. 
The Indian Councils Bill emerged from the Commons exactly in the 
form in which it had been accepted by the Lords, On all important 
provisions* such as* the size of the Councils and their functions, both 
parties in Parliament were practically unanimous. Important Opposition 
members like Gladstone* Kimberley* and Rorthbrook were quite satisfied 
with the measure of advance the Bill made on the existing system. Lord 
Horthbrook expressed the view that the Bill "provided fully for all present
1 Ibid., 245-46*
2 Ibid., 275.
3 Ibid.* 281.
4 Ibid., 282.
12}
needs in respect of the increase of numbers". Even Gladstone did not
think it necessary to make any observations on the strength and functions
of the Councils as provided in the Bill* His entire speech was devoted
to the discussions connected with Schwann1 s amendment relating to election*
The only change with which the Opposition was really concerned was the
introduction of some sort of elective system* hut* even in that respect*
only a very mild;amendment was moved. The Act sedulously avoided the
term "election". Sir Alfred l^ rall* who as a member of the India Council
had much to do with the Bill as framed by the India Office* wrote to his
brother, James Lyall, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, that the Cabinet
had resolved to resist any measure which involved electoral representation
2
in the Legislative Councils of India. Explaining the conduct of the
Opposition for not having pressed for the direct mention of the term
"election"* Lord Kimberley said: "We had reason to think that Cross was
not unfavourable to some elective element, but that Salisbury would not
consent to any direct mention of it, we thought it politic to be content
with getting in the thin end of the wedge". He went on to say that the
introduction of the elective element must In the first instance be "most
cautiously applied", and that the mode of doing it should be left in the
5
hands of the Government in India*
The Act of 1892 increased the minimum number of additional members 
of the Governor-General’s Council from six to ten and the maximum number
1 Hansard’s Indian Debates (1890), 55*
2 Durand* Life. 355" 5® *
3 Kimberley to Arnold Morley* . 27 March 1892, Add. Mss (Brit. Mus.) 
44229, 19-20.
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from twelve to sixteen, of whom, as under the Act of 1$61, not less than 
one half were to he non-officials. The minimum number of additional 
members of the Madras and Bombay Councils was increased from four to 
eight and the maximum number from eight to twenty, of whom not less than 
one half were to be non-officials# The maximum number of nominated 
members of the Councils of Bengal and the North-Western Provinces was 
increased from twelve tod nine to twenty and fifteen respectively, of 
whom not less than one-third were to be non-officials. The period of 
appointment was fixed at two years# As regards powers, both the Central 
and Provincial Councils were entitled to discuss the budget and ask 
questions#
It is quite evident that the Supreme Council wa3 not enlarged to
the same extent as the Provincial Councils# It was anomalous that the
former should have received an addition of only four members to its
existing strength whereas the maximum limits of the Councils of Bombay
and Madras were increased by twelve. Curzon defended the scheme by
pointing out that even Lord Dufferin, a strong advocate of Council reform,
did not recommend the expansion of the Supreme Council, and added that
since the nature of business to be transacted by the Supreme Council was
1
different from that of Parliament, a large increase was not necessary. 
Suffice it to say that the reasons for not having a larger Central Council 
were far from convincing# A vast country like India with its multitudinous 
problems needed a larger council than the Act provided.
1 Indian Pari. Debates, 28 March 1892, 188-89.
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The Act did not lay down any cut and dried scheme as to the
manner and proportion according to which nominations were to he made.
Gladstone was in favour of giving the Indian authorities sufficient power
to devise the means for carrying out the principles laid down' hy the Home 
1
Government. Curzon endorsed this view* and said that the Government of 
India would have a large amount of initiative* subject to the approval
2
of the Secretary of State* to give effect to the provisions of the Bill. 
Kimberley also emphasised that any attempt to frame regulations by Act
5
of Parliament would be most unwise.
The Secretary of State ashed the Central and Provincial Governments
to frame’ rules* and to devise means to give representation to the views of
"different races* classes, and localities". He indicated that Corporations
with a recognised administrative basis and associations formed upon a
substantial community of legitimate interests, professional, commercial,
4
or territorial might be consulted for that purpose. Accordingly, the 
Government of India, in consultation with the Local Governments, drew up 
the draft regulations. The principles adopted in the preparation of 
draft rules were: (1) The determination of the number of interests to be 
represented; (2) the selection of members on the recommendation of bodies 
representing those interests; (5) the appointment of members to the 
remaining seats by nomination with a view to "redressing any inequality 
or defect" found in the system of recommendation. This scheme of
1
representation, according to the Government of India* became necessary
1 Hansard’s India Debates* 28 March 1892, 147.
2 Ibid# * 190.
5 Kimberley to Morley, 27 March 1892.
4 Leg# Des. to India, H0.I5* JO June 1892#
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"because the numerical limits fixed "by the Act precluded "the idea of any
detailed and individual representation of the multifarious interests and
local divisions" of India* In fixing the proportion of official and
non-official members* the Government of India acted on the principle of
restricting the preponderance of officials as much as possible consistently
 1
with the need of retaining an official majority.
The draft regulations relating to the Local Councils were marked 
"by slight differences due to local peculiarities. For instance, the 
landholders in Madras and Bengal were represented "by a nominated member 
whereas Bombay and the North-Western Provinces preferred their seats to 
be filled by nomination*** The Government of India did not accept the 
suggestion of the Bombay Government that officals should be eligible for 
recommendation. Referring to the inquiry made by Bombay and the North- 
Western Provinces as to whether the Councils could be summoned for 
discussing the Financial Statement or for giving replies to questions 
when no legislative work was befofe them* the Government of India pointed 
out that if it were held that the Councils could not meet except for 
legislative purposes* it would not be difficult in most cases to arrange* 
for some formal legislative business* meetings at which they could be 
undertaken. Lord Kimberley* the Secretary of State* did not accept these 
interpretations* He observed that it was not necessary to place any 
restrictions upon the power of recommendation vested in certain bodies. 
Consequently, rule 7, under which officials were declared ineligible for
1 Pub* Des* from India* No.68* 26 Oct* 1892.
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recommendation* was not sanctioned* Regarding the second point*
Kimberley said that a meeting could not he legally summoned for the
purpose of merely discussing the Financial Statement or of giving replies
1
when there was strictly no legislative business before it.
The Government of India was confronted with the question of 
fixing the number of seats for the various interests to be represented 
and of devising the ways to fill them. In view of the fact that the 
seats were few and the interests and classes were many* the solution* so 
far as the Provinces were concerned, was quite complicated. The problem 
at the Centre was* however, not so difficult, because out of sixteen 
additional members* ten were to be non-officials, of whom only four were 
to be appointed on the recommendation of the non-official members of the 
Local Councils and one on the recommendation of the Calcutta Chamber of 
Commerce* The remaining five seats were to be filled by nomination.
In making Selection for these seats* the Governor-General had to take 
into consideration the character of the business before the Council, which 
might call for the appointment of persons possessing skilled knowledge* 
or representing certain interests or local divisions. Regarding the
appointment of a member from the legal profession, the Government of India
2
preferred nomination to recommendation.
1 Pub* Des. to India, Ho.24, 16 Feb. 1895*
It was left to the discretion of the Governor or the Lieutenant- 
Governor to accept the recommendation, with due regard to the main­
tenance of right proportion, in favour of an official. If this 
appointment disturbed the proportion he was authorised to reject the 
recommendation unless some other official member consented to resign. 
Govt, of India to Madras, Pub. Progs. Ho.140, March 1895*
2 Pub. Des. from India, Ho.9, 22 March 1895•
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The Government of India consulted the Governments of the Punjab,
the Central Provinces, Burma and Assam as to whether those provinces
contained organised classes and interests whose aid and advice could he
1
sought in selecting members for the Governor-General1 s Council. Sir Dennis
Fitzpatrick, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, replied in the negative,
emphasising that even if the materials for such arrangement existed, the
adoption of the system, in view of religious antagonisms, would not be 
2
expedient. A. MacdonneH, Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces,
preferred some system of recommendation to one of pure nomination* but
5
added that organised classes did not exist there. The Chief Commissioner
of Assam said that the only organised class in that province was the tea-
4
planting community. The Chief Commissioner of Burma expressed the view
that there was nothing approaching to political organisation among the 
5
Burmese’.
The Government of India1s plan for the selection of non-official 
members struck an even balance between recommendation and nomination. Cue 
half of the members were to be recommended and one half to be nominated.
In its view the scheme of election, as provided in the regulations,
1 Pub. Letters, Nos. I834-37, 22 Aug. 1892.
2 Letter to Govt, of India, 31 Oct. 1892, Pub. Progs., No.84, Feb. 189J.
3 Macdonnell proposed a plan according to which the Chief Commissioner 
was to select one member out of four to be recommended by the district 
councils and important municipal committees. The Province was to be 
divided into two circles, one comprising the Jabbalpur and Narbada 
Divisions* and the other comprising the Nagpur and Chhattisgarh 
Divisions. Bach circle had to recommend two members for appointment 
to the Governor-General1 s Council. Pub. Progs.. No.82, Feb, I893.
4 Chief Secretary, Assam to Secretary, Govt, of India. (H.D.), 14 Sept. 
1892, Pub, Progs.. No,81, Feb, 1893#
5 Chief Secretary, Burma to Secretary, Govt, of India, (H.D.), 3 Jan. 1893 
PtA. Progs.. Ho.94, Pet. 1695. '
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adequately carried out the intention of Parliament, while under the
system of nomination the Governor-General could fill seats in such
manner as he thought "best with reference to legislative business before
the Council and the due representation of the different classes of the 
2
community*
The scheme of Provincial representation was necessarily more
elaborate* Each of the Provincial Councils consisted of official and
non-official members, of the latter a major proportion of the seats was
3
filled by recommendation. The seats were distributed among a certain 
number of bodies, such as, the district and municipal boards, the land­
holders, the mercantile community, and the universities. The total 
number of seats allotted to municipalities and district boards in each 
Province was between three to four. These bodies represented the urban 
and rural classes and were the only form of local self-government 
resting upon a partially elective basis. In Bombay difficulty arose in 
reconciling the principle of class representation with that of the 
representation of localities. The Bombay Government pointed out that
1 Pub* Des. from India, No* 9, 22 March 189J.
2 Notification, No.19, Leg. Dept., 23 June 1893*
3 According to the regulations made under Sec. 1(4) of the Indian 
Councils Act, besides the Advocate General or the officer acting in 
that capacity, not more than nine officials were to be appointed in 
Madras and Bombay. In Bengal and the North-Western Provinces, the 
number of officials was not to be more than 10 and 7 respectively.
In Madras, Bombay, Bengal, and the North-Western Provinces, the 
number of seats to be filled by nomination was 7, 8, 7 and 6 respect­
ively. Notification, H.D. (Pub.), 17 March 1893*
ljo
the Presidency had four territorial divisions* differentiated from;each
other hy such languages as Sindhi, Gujarati* Marathi and Canarese. It
was in favour of allotting seats in those areas to more important interests,
and on this principle it suggested that the appointment of a Zaminder in
Sind* the allotment of one seat to the urban population in Gujarat* the
selection of one member from the Deccan on the recommendation of the 
1
Sardars* and the appointment of one member on the recommendation of the
2
district boards of the Southern Division* The Bombay Presidency
Association suggested that the Presidency should be divided into five
divisions* namely* Sind* Gujarat* the Deccan, KarnataJc, and the Bombay
City# The Association proposed that twelve seats should be thrown open
to election, of which Bombay and the Deccan should each be allotted three
3
and other divisions two each;
In each province the Governor or the Lieutenant Governor was 
left with a small number of reserved seats to be filled by nomination#
The object was to provide for the nomination of Hindus, Muslims and non­
official Europeans or Eurasians if ho member of these communities
4
succeeded in securing recommendation. It is to be noted that these 
communities were included in the list which also contained the trading 
and manufacturing, urban* rural, professional or literary classes, but
1 The Deccan landed aristocracy#
Z Bombay to Govt# of India, Ho#223* Leg# 29 Sept* 1892#
3 To Secretary to Govt# of India (Leg# Dept.), 3 Etov. 1892,
Pub* Progs*# Ho#96, Dec# 1892#
4 Letters to Local Govt#, Hos# 1805-8, 15 Aug# 1892* The Govt*: 
of India’s letter to Bombay also included the Parsis.
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the regulations provided fixed seats for classes and interests and not 
for religious communities^ However, the arrangement was by no means 
inconsistent with the representation of communities, since persons 
representing interests would also belong to the above religious groups.
It is the other part of the scheme, namely, the introduction of election, 
which, it was apprehended, might produce uneven results, and to meet this 
eventuality, the Provincial heads were invested with discretionary power 
to fill a certain number of seats.
The scheme of Central and Provincial representation, on account 
of a very small number of seats for non-officials, left little room for 
territorial representation. Lord Lansdowne remarked that with the 
prescribed dimensions of legislative bodies it would be "altogether hope­
less to attempt the introduction of a representative system in the sense 
in which the words are understood in western communities". He referred 
to the difficulties of allotting a few seats by dividing the country, 
either on a geographical basis, or in respect of the different communities 
in such a manner as to provide for an equitable representation.
Remarking on the scheme of representation, Lansdowne said that the 
Government of India was not expected to create a complete and symmetrical 
system of representation but to make a bona fide endeavour to render the 
Legislative Councils more representative of the different sections of the
1 In Madras, municipalities, the district boards, the corporation, 
the university, trading interests, and zamindars were given in all 
8 seats. In the Horth-Western Provinces, 6 seats were distributed 
among municipalities, district boards, merchants and the university 
of Allahabad. The Bengal and Bombay arrangements were similar.
1}2
Indian community, and for that purpose, the use of hoth nomination and
1
recommendation was resorted to.
The Government* s scheme of representation of Mraces, classes
and interests" did not escape the critisism of Indian political "bodies.
The Sarvajanik Sabha of Poona criticised it as erroneous in principle.
The Sahha laid stress on territorial representation, and remarked that
a legislature was generally concerned with laws affecting the entire
community. It emphasised that encouragement to the principle of recog-
2
nising races and creeds would he harmful to the country. The Governor
of Bombay replying to a deputation of the Sarvajanik Sahha and several
other bodies observed that whereas the members of the deputation would
have started with the idea of making territorial divisions as the basis
of representation, the Government started with the idea that the
distribution of seats should be based on the division of races, classes
and interests, to be combined with the idea of territorial representation
3
only wherever possible.
While preparing the scheme of representation the Government was 
fully aware of the importance of Muslim representation. Lord Buffer in* s 
Committee had been in favour of the representation of Muslims in proportion
1 Progs, of the Leg. Council of the Governor-General, 16 March 1893 
XXXII, 105-8.
Lansdowne pointed out the difficulty of allotting a handful of 
seats in a Province like Bengal with a population of 70 millions.
The regulations provided for 7 recommended members, of whom three 
were to be selected by the Calcutta University, the Corporation and 
the Chamber of Commerce. Only 4 seats could, at the most, be filled 
on the basis of territorial representation.
2 From Sarvajanik Sabha to Govt, of India, 3 June 1893* Pub, Progs.,
No.137, July 1893.
3 Pub. Progs., No. 193, July 1893.
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to their population. Lord Dufferin, in his famous minute dealing with
the Councils, laid strong emphasis on the disunity of India and its
division into two f,mighty political communities" and "minor nationalities".
In Parliament references were made to the distinct interests of the
Muslims. Lord Kimberley emphasised that if the Government were to "be
guided entirely "by Hindu popular opinion, it would find itself in great
difficulty^ Lord Northbrook was in favour of investing the Governors with
some discretionary power of nomination, so that adequate representation of
2
people of "different races and different religions" might he secured.
\ Lord Salisbury remarked that the introduction of the elective system was 
^inconsistent with the condition of a community divided into two hostile 
sections?
In the absence of a we 11-organised and country-wide association 
it is difficult to say how the Muslims generally reacted to the reform 
proposals. But there is no doubt that an influential section was opposed 
to election. The Muhammadan Literary Society of Calcutta expressed
satisfaction at the omission of any elective principle from the Councils
4
Bill of 1890. The Society urged that since the Muslims were educationally 
backward and politically not well-organised, their interests would not be 
safe if election were introduced. In 1895 the Central Muhammadan 
Association told Lansdowne that the Muslims would have no chance of being 
returned by any one of the recommending bodies. It demanded three seats
1 Hansard1s Indian Debates, 6 March 1890, 85.
2 Ibid., 15 March, 100.
5 Ibid.,6 March 1890, 85.
4 Memorial from the Society, Pub. Progs*, N0.I52, April 1890.
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1
for the Muslims on the Supreme'Council. Lord Lansdowne* while
declining to undertake the appointment of a particular number of
additional members of any class* said that their request for represent-
2
ation would not he lost sight, of. In his farewell reply on 22 January 
1894 to sixty Muslims* representing the Central Association and a large 
number of Branch Associations* Lansdowne said that the vacancy caused by 
the retirement of C.B. Pantalu would* he hoped* be filled by the appoint­
ment of a Muslim* and the Council would then include eight Indian members,
3
of whom three would be Hindus, two Sikhs* two Muslims and one Par si.
So far as the functions of the enlarged Councils were concerned, 
the rules for both the Central and Provincial Councils were almost 
similar. The Financial Statement was to be laid before the Council 
every year and each member was entitled to make any observation on it.
The Finance Member, and in the Provinces the member who explained the 
Statement^was authorised to reply. In the case of Provinces the
discussion was limited to those branches of revenue and expenditure which
/
were under the control of the Local Government. The discussion of
4
Imperial finance was not allowed. The right of interpellation was given 
to both Central and Provincial Councils subject to certain restrictions. 
Questions were to be so framed as to be merely requests for information, 
and were not to be in any argumentative or hypothetical form. As the 
rules did not specify the subjects to which the questions were limited, 
the President had power to disallow any question without giving any reason
1 Pub. Progs.. No.52, Oct. I893.
2 Ibid., No.53, Oct. I893.
3 Lansdowne, Speeches, .
135
therefor. In the Provincial Councils questions were to "be confined to
matters under the control of the Local Government, and on matters which
were and which had "been till recently the subject of controversy "between
the Governor-General in Council or the Secretary of State* no questions
were to "be asked except as to matters of fact, and the answer was to he
confined to a statement of facts^
It may he noted that although the Act had provided for the maximum
and minimum limits of additional members* the Central and Provincial
Governments preferred to keep to the maximum strength. As regards the
proportion of official members, they did not appoint the full quota of
officials permissible under the Act, but were content with bare official
majorities. In the Councils of the North-Western Provinces and Bengal,
the strength of non-official members was fixed at about half, though it
could have been kept down at one-third. The Lieutenant-Governor of the
North-Western Provinces, Sir Auckland Colvin, was inclined to dispense
with an official majority. In a Council of fifteen members he was in
favour of having six officials* seven recommended and two nominated
members. He expressed the view that this proportion would in practice
2
secure a majority to the Government. In 1895 Sir Charles Elliotfc, 
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal* deliberately recommended a non-official 
majority in the Councils The Government of India, while sanctioning the
1 Pub. Progs., Nos.101, 104. Feb. 1895*
2 Letter to Govt, of India, No. 2841, 5 Oct. 1892. The Govt, of India 
fixed the number of officials at 7.
5 Tel. to Simla, 1 June I895. Pub. Progs., No.29, June I895.
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proposal* observed that it would "be preferable* at any rate* at the
outset to retain an official majority in the Council by appointing ten 
1
officials. The Lieutenant Governor appointed nine officials and eleven
2
non-officials* but the strength was equalised after some time.
The Indian Councils Bill of 1892 was not expected, as Gladstone
5 ..............................
said, to produce "large and imposing results". Curzon’s estimate of the
Bill was similar. "This Bill”, he said, "is not, perhaps, a great, or
heroic measure; but, at the same time, it does mark a decisive step, and
4
a step in advance". Lord Lansdowne observed that though the proposals
would disappoint those who liked to travel faster along the path of reform,
they marked "substantial steps" in advance. According to Keith, the
additional powers conceded in the Act were "not very important", but the
principle of representation was advantageous and in the case of the
6Provinces the gains of the system were more considerable'. Referring to 
the Act of 1893* the Government of India remarked in 1908 that the
facilities for debates were restricted and the nature of discussion
7became of a "desultory character"'.
The Acts of 1861 and 1892, designed as they were on the same 
pattern, can be conveniently read together. It is true to say that the 
Act of 1892 was the revised and enlarged edition of the Indian Councils
1 Pub. Progs.. K0.3I* June I893.
2 Fowler’s reply to Wedderburn, Indian Pari. Debates, 1894f 67.
3 Indian Pari. Debates, 1892, 147.
4 Ibid., 134.
5 Progs, of the Leg. Council of the Governor-General, 16 March 1892, 
XXXII, 111.
6 Keith, A Constitutional History of India, 177.
7 Pub. Des. from India, Ko.21, 1 Oct. 1908, para. 57.
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Act of 1861. It marked a "cautious extension" of that experiment which
had "been inaugurated thirty years "before* The aims of "both these reforms
were to provide a medium for the correction of the misrepresentation of
British policy and for having an intimate knowledge of the wishes and
feelings of Indians. The conrnon features of the Acts were: the use of
the term "additional” for members added to the executive councils; the
proportion of non-officials to "be not less than half; a two-year term
for the members; and the small size of the councils. And it is
remarkable that both Canning and Larisdowne were anxious to bring the
reforms into operation before their departure. The points of difference
between the two Acts lay in the number of additional members* the scope
of the functions of the Councils and the mode of nomination. The reforms
1
of 1892 introduced a "species of indirect election" and recognised the 
necessity of appointing the representatives of minorities. The principle 
of communal representation* though neither mentioned in the Act nor in 
the regulations Issued under it, was recognised. The Bocal Governments 
were directed to select the representatives of races, classes and interests. 
But the right of selection was not conferred upon any religious community.
It was left to the executive to nominate persons belonging to certain 
religious bodies in case they failed to secure an adequate representation 
by election.
The provision for election* though "limited and indirect", 
admitted into the Councils members who were calculated to carry more
%
1 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission* i, para.154.
weight than nominated members. As regards the proportion of recommended 
members, the Provincial Councils underwent a larger increase than the 
Supreme Council. An addition of four members to the Governor-General1 s 
Council, after an interval of thirty years, was not in consonance with 
the progress made by the country during this period. The fact is that 
the second instalment of reforms was not only delayed, it was conceded 
in a spirit of over-caution. Lord Lansdowne later characterised the 
reforms as a "very cautious measure”^  In fixing the strength of the 
Councils, the authorities followed the principle of no addition of non­
official members without a corresponding addition of officials. This 
principle persisted even in the Act of 1909, under which an official 
majority was retained at the Centre though abandoned in the Provinces.
But, even in the provincial sphere, the Local Governments could count on 
the support of nominated members who together with officials provided an 
adequate guarantee against any difficult situation. In view of the fact 
that the Supreme Council was considerably enlarged in 1909 without 
sacrificing the principle of an official majority, it is not difficult 
to see that the possibility of enlarging the Supreme Council in 1892 was 
much greater than the Act provided.
One looks in vain to find the introduction of any new principles 
into the Act of 1892. It marked, on a modest scale, the extension of 
’the provisions of the Act of 1861. The enlarged Councils remained advisory 
and consultative in character. Although the principle of election was
1 Pari. Debates on Indian Affairs, 24 Feb. 1909, 88.
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recognised, the term ’election* was neither mentioned in the Act nor in 
the regulations. Thanks to Lord Salisbury’s obstinacy that legal 
recognition was denied to a principle which was acknowledged in practice. 
His biographer remarks that the regulations issued under the Liberal 
Government provided for an elective element and thus went beyond the 
limits of Northbrook’s amendment^ Jt is broadly true that the spirit in 
which the regulations were framed imparted to the scheme a measure of 
liberalisation not expressly embodied in the Act of 189E.
It is difficult to say how far the changes introduced by the Act
of 1892 were intended to be an instrument of political education. In
a covering despatch Lord Cross explained that the objects of the Act
were to bring the legislatures Hinto closer relation with the best
representatives of public opinion in India, and of multiplying the
opportunities for an interchange of views and information between the
2
Governments and their Councils”. Thus the objects of the scheme were
*
extremely limited. The circumscribed radius within which the Councils 
had to function, the restricted number of additional members and the 
limited and indirect mode of election left little room for political 
training. This aspect of the scheme was neither emphasised in Parliament 
nor in the correspondence between the Home and Indian authorities. The 
constitution of the Supreme Council was not consistent with it; and even 
in the provincial sphere, such training could only be achieved through 
such seats as were filled by the recommendation of municipalities .
1 Lady Cecil* Life, iv, 201.
2 Leg. Des. to India* No.15* 3^ June* 1892.
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and district "boards. In December 1896, while sanctioning the establish­
ment of councils for Burma and the Punjab, Lord Hamilton, Secretary of 
State, referred to the educational value of local legislatures. He 
remarked that it had been the consistent policy of the Government to plan 
and develop them "as an important agency in drawing out the latent
capabilities of our Indian subjects, and leading them from indifference,
1
perhaps from estrangement, into active cooperation with the Government"* 
Here the emphasis appears largely to be on the political advantages of 
the scheme. This view is supported by the fact that the Councils of 
Burma and the Punjab were constituted according to the Act of 1861,: and 
in consequence, the opportunities for political education were practically 
denied to them.
•It is interesting to note how the question of Council reform was 
approached in non-governmental circles. In December 1885 the Madras 
Mahajana S&bha submitted a memorial emphasising the necessity of selecting 
members for the legislative councils by a limited electorate existing in 
the shape of local bodies, universities, and the Chambers of Commerce.
The memorialists suggested that the Councils should have power to put 
questions on matters of administration and finance and that the members
should be classified as official and non-official rather than ordinary
2
and additional.
Among Indian public bodies the national Congress was by far the 
most important* There was hardly any subject which claimed its 
attention so much as Council reform. In 1886 the Congress elaborated
1 Pub, Des. to India, Ho.116, 5 Dec. 1896.
2 Enel, to Pub. Des. from India, Ho.61f 2J Hov, 1886.
141
its resolution of I885 demanding a material increase in the strength 
of the Supreme and Provincial Councils# Its proposals provided for 
the election of not less than one-half of the members and for the 
nomination of not more than one-fourth of officials and of the same 
number of officials or non-officials. The Congress suggested that the 
members of the Local Councils should be elected by local bodies. The 
Chamber of Commerce and Universities were also given representation in 
certain Provinces. The members of the Supreme Council were to be elected 
by the elected members of the Provincial Councils. As regards the 
functions of the enlarged Councils* it was suggested that they should be 
invested with power to deal with all legislative measures and all 
financial questions including the budget. Information regarding matters 
of foreign policy* military strategy or of such a nature as could not 
be supplied consistently with public security might be declined by the 
Government. The executive was to possess the power of overruling the 
decision of the majority* but a full exposition of the grounds on which , 
such power was exercised was to be published. It was further provided 
that the overruled majority could represent the matter to the Standing 
Committee of the Commons^
In 1890 Charles Bradlaugh submitted two Bills for the reform of 
the Councils# The proposals of his first Bill had been fully discussed 
by the Congress of 1889, which he had attended. The First Bill provided 
for an enlarged Supreme Council consisting of not less than 80 members,
1 Resolution IV, Report of the Second Indian National Congress (1886) .
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half of whom were to he elected by the electoral bodies of the various 
Provinces. Members were to be elected or nominated for a period of 
three years. Regular sessions were to be held from December to March. 
All legislative measures and financial questions including the Budget 
were to be submitted to the Council. The Bill invested the Councils 
with power to move resolutions on all matters except those involving 
foreign policy* military strategy or such interests as could not be
disclosed in public interest. The composition and functions of the
/
Provincial Councils were also based on the same principles^
Bradlaugh* s Bill of November 1890 was somewhat different. It
provided for the election by ballot of at least one-third and not more
than half of the members of Councils for a period of three years. The
right of franchise was to be conferred on not less than two per cent of
the people. The Councils were to be invested with power to discuss the
budget* to ask questions* and to pass resolutions. Members could also
divide the Council on any financial discussion. An important provision
of the Bill was that the regulations for the election of members were to
2
be made by the heads of governments.
In 1890 and again im 1892 Sir William Plowden introduced a Bill 
which provided that the village nanchayats should be reorganised for 
purposes of election. They were to elect their representatives to sub­
division councils* which in their turn had the right to elect members to 
the District Councils. Each district council was entitled to select by
1 Pari. Papers* 7* (1890).
2 Pari. Papers* V* (1890-91).
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"ballot one member for the Provincial Council provided that the population 
of the district was not less than two millions. Districts with less 
population were to he grouped. Each Provincial Council was to select 
from among its representative members , one representative for the Central 
Council on the basis of one member for ten millions of population. The 
Bill conferred on the Councils power to ask questions and discuss the 
annual financial statement^
These bills had only a very small number of supporters and did 
not go beyond a first reading. All the three provided for an increase 
in the size and functions of the Councils and the introduction of the 
elective principle. But none of them sought to establish legislative 
control over the executive. Even Bradlaugh1 s Bills, which had the full 
support of the national Congress, did not provide for a majority of 
elected members in the Councils. What the Congress stressed most was 
the recognition of the elective principle in the choice of members.
The Central and Provincial Councils were reorganised according to 
the regulations framed in 1895. During 1894-98, excepting some adjust­
ment of seats and the establishment of the Punjab and Burma Councils in 
1897, no important changes were introduced. In Bombay the local boards 
in the Central Division were substituted as a nominating body for the 
Karachi Chamber of Commerce. In Bengal one seat was withdrawn from those 
allotted to the municipalities and was transferred to the landholders.
1 The Bill fixed the maximum number of Provincial representatives on 
the Central Council, Bengal, the N.W.P. Madras, Bombay, the Punjab, 
and the Central Provinces were entitled to send not more than 6, 4,
5, 2, 2, and 1 respectively. Pari. Papers, iii, (1892).
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In 1898 the Secretary of State inquired whether the regulations
called for any amendment, This inquiry was in response to the British
Indian Association* s allegation that the regulations had a tendency to
give undue preponderance in the Councils to the professional classes*
and especially to the legal profession^ The Government of India consulted
the Local Governments on this question. The Madras Government* s view
was that all the important classes had been represented and therefore the
regulations called for no amendment* It also pointed out that though all
the five recommended members belonged to the legal profession, no better
representation, under the circumstances, of the rural classes could be 
2
secured* The Government of Bengal emphasised that one seat should be
transferred to the landholders. The Lieutenant Governor of t5ae H.W.P.
pointed out that all the important classes had been represented, and
added that the representation of the Muslims and the landowning classes
had been provided in each case out of the two seats reserved to the 
5
Government. He was also not in favour of any modification in the system.
The Government of Bombay pointed out that the municipalities and district
boards had been invariably represented by the lawyers, and was of opinion
4
that the regulations had worked well and no changes were necessary#
The Government of India was also satisfied with the representation
5of the classes in the Supreme Council. Thus the Secretary of State's
1 Pub* Be s. to India* H0.I57, 15 Sept. 1898.
2 From Madras to Govt, of India, Ho.7, 51 Jan. 1899.
5 H.W.P. to Govt, of India, Ho. 16, 7 Jan. 1899.
4 Bombay to the Govt, of India, Ho.llJ, 12 April. 1899.
5 Pub. Des. from India, Ho.42, 6 July. 1899.
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inquiry resulted in no amendment except in the transfer of one seat from 
the municipalities to the landholders in Bengal, which was to he filled 
hy recommendation.
« • • •
Until I885 only three Local Councils had heen created. The
decision with regard to the establishment of Councils in certain other
Provinces, though taken much earlier, fell a victim to many postponements.
The reason was that the Government of India did not follow, in this
respect, a settled policy. In December 1859 Lord Canning recommended
1
councils only for Madras and Bombay* but in 1861 he revised his views and
proposed that each Presidency should have a legislative council, and that
the Supreme Government should be invested with power to create councils
2
for any Province or Chief Commissioner ship. Sir Bartle Prere suggested 
that in the Forth-Western Provinces and the Punjab local councils, 
composed of principal officers, and presided over by the executive heads, 
would legislate better than the Supreme Council or the Provincial heads.
He further proposed that the heads of Provinces in concurrence with their 
councils should be left to decide the time and manner of appointing non­
officials* In another minute he suggested that the Governor-General1 s 
Legislative Council should have power to pass laws for the purpose of 
constituting councils provided that not less than one-third of their 
members were non-officials?
1 Des. from India (H.D.), No. 5*'9 Dec. 1859.
2 Des. from India (H.D.), Ho.2A* 15 1861.
3 Frere’s minutes of 16 March 1860 and 29 Dec. 1860.
Frere said that though it was difficult for some time to provide
councils for the North-Western Provinces, the Punjab, Nagpur and Pegu 
on the model proposed for older Provinces, he would have preferred to 
have the assistance of a *darbar* of Indians of rank and experience.
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Sir Charles Wood was in agreement with these views and the 
proposals of the Government of India* He said in Parliament that the 
Governor-General would he empowered* with the sanction of the Secretary 
of State, to create a Council for the North-Western Provinces or the 
Punjab, or any other part of India, and also remarked that even Pegu,
1
when ripe for such a change, would he better administered with a council*
2
Accordingly, the Act of 1861 contained the necessary provisions* In his 
covering despatch Sir Charles Wood asked the Government of India to 
establish a council for Bengal with as little delay as possible* and left 
it to the latter to establish councils for the North-Western Provinces 
and the Punjab "either with it, or at such future periods as your Lordship 
in Council may deem expedient"* But it took the North-Western Provinces 
twenty-five years and the Punjab and Burma thirty-five years to have 
councils of their own. The delay was due to the attitude of general 
indifference, and sometimes to the opposition of the Governcrs-General and 
their Councils and the Provincial heads.
The question which had been practically settled provoked a good 
deal of controversy in 1868* This followed in the wake of the Orissa 
Famine of 1865-66. , The Bengal Administration came in for much criticism 
for mishandling the situation. Sir Stafford Northcote invited the 
opinion of the Government of India on matters relating to the Bengal 
Administration* including the necessity of forming an executive council in
1 Hansard* CLX111, 644.
2 24 & 25 Viet., c.67, s.44.
5 Leg. Des. to India* No. 14, 9 Aug. 1861.
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Bengal on the models of Madras and Bombay• Sir John Lawrence* then
Governor-General * emphasised that the best form of Government for many
parts of India* including Bengal* was personal administration hy a single
head. He was strongly of opinion that summary powers of legislation
should be vested in the Executive in the North-Western Provinces* the
Punjab, the Central Provinces, Burma, and Assam. Lawrence was against
1
a separate legislature even for Bengal. Sir William Muir, a member of
the Council, maintained that since the Imperial Legislature was unsuited
for local legislation, the North-Western Provinces and the Punjab should
2
have their own councils. G.N.Taylor, another member of the Council, 
expressed his opinion against a separate council for the North-Western 
Provinces, and suggested that occasional meetings of the Imperial Council 
should be held at Agra and Allahabad, at which local questions might be
3brought forward. Sir H.M. Burand was opposed to the creation of new
councils and stressed that the Local Government should not be encouraged
4
to assume the position of "confederate states". William Grey, Lieutenant 
Governor of Bengal, expressed regret at the imperfect execution of the 
policy of 1861 and was of opinion that there would be no insuperable
5
difficulty in any province in forming a local council. Sir Henry Maine 
supported the policy of "multiplying the local councils". He thought that 
the Supreme Council had to deal with too much of the "parish vestry"
1 Minute of 19 Feb. 1868 and Memorandum of 20 Jan. 1868; 
Pub. Progs., No.151, March 1868.
2 Minute of 24 Feb. 1868, Pub. Progs.* N0.I52.
3 Minute of 27 Feb. 1868, Pub. Progs.* No#156.
4 Minute of 17 March 1868, Pub. Progs.* Jfo.159*
5 Minute of 13 March 1868, Pub. Progs., No.150.
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■business of local Governments. Maine was in favour of a Council for
the North-Western Provinces, which should, in his opinion, meet only
1
when legislation was actually needed.
Commenting on the views of the members of his Council, Lawrence
again opposed the extension of the principle of local legislation to any
other Province, and stressed that the time had not yet arrived to take
2
steps in that direction. It may he remarked that the time was no worse
than in 1861 when a clear decision had been reached. The views of
Lawrence with which Taylor, Durand, and John Strachey agreed, prevailed
with the result that the formation of Councils in the North-Western
3
Provinces and the Punjab was postponed.
In September 1885 Sir Alfred Lyall, Lieutenant Governor of the 
N.W.P., raised the question of establishing a legislative council. He 
felt that a province of large area with a population of some 44 millions 
was insufficiently represented when legislative questions were considered 
by the Central Legislature- He pointed out thafcUadras, Bombay and 
Bengal, besides their own Legislative Councils, were invariably represented 
on the Central Legislature and the Lieutenant Governors of Bengal and the 
Punjab took part in its proceedings during the greater part of each winter 
and summer, whereas that Council had not assembled in the North-Western 
Provinces since 1873. Lyall suggested that under Section 44 of the Act
1 H.S.Maine. Minutes (1862-69). 162-67.
2 Minute of 23 March 1868, Pub. Progs., No.160.
3 Explaining the reason why councils were not established in those
Provinces, Grant Duff, Under Secretary of State for India, told
the Commons in Feb. 1870 that the "materials, in fact, for such
councils did not yet exist". Hansard, CXCIX, 557“58*
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a local council should he constituted and that under Section 47, according 
to which the Governor-General had power to fix the limits of any province, 
Oudh and the Horth-Western Provinces should constitute a single province 
for legislative purposes only. He proposed that ten councillors should 
he nominated to assist hinu The Government of ,India saw no difficulty 
in combining the two provinces, hut pointed out that the new legislative 
council would have an extremely limited field of action, because under 
the Indian Councils Act of 1861 a local legislature could not amend any 
act of the Governor-General in Council passed since 1861. The Government 
of India, however, suggested that the difficulty could he met by 
scheduling certain acts specially relating to the province and by declaring 
that nothing in those acts should prevent the local council from 
legislating on subjects with which they dealt, Lyall’s proposals were 
supported by the Government of India on several grounds. First, they 
had been put forward by a most experienced and cautious administrator. 
Secondly, the constitution of a separate legislature was in accordance with 
the statute of 1861, Thirdly, the Province had a population second only 
to Bengal, Fourthly, the peculiar interests of the Province obtained 
less representation than those of any of the larger Provinces, In reply 
to the argument that the Local Council would be inferior in character to 
the Supreme Legislature and might take a narrow view of things, the 
Government of India remarked that the drawbacks would be more than
1 Letter to the Govt, of India, Ho.16, 14 Sept, 1885, Frogs,, H.W.P. & 
Oudh (Gen,), May 1887. According to this letter, the population of 
Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and H.W.P, & Oudh was about 66.7, 5O.8, 16.5 
and 44.2 millions respectively.
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compensated for "by the local knowledge of the members of the local council.
The creation Of a council in the Korth-Western Provinces* it said,would
enable the Central Legislature to devote itself more exclusively to
general legislative measures of importance and would be popular with a
section of Indian public opinion. The Government of India emphasised
that the experience of previous twenty-five years warranted the more
extended application of the policy of 1861. T. Hope* a member of the
Governor-General1 s Council* dissented* being of opinion that the amount of
business to be performed by such a legislature and the supply of competent
men to hold the position of councillors were insufficient to justify its 
1
establishment.
Lord Kimberley* then Secretary of State, sanctioned the establish­
ment of a Council for the Forth-Western Provinces and Oudh, but he rejected 
the Government of India1 s recommendation that the new Council should be
enabled to repeal or amend any act of the Governor-General in Council
2
passed between 1861 and the date of its constitution.
5
The new provisions took effect from 1 December 1886. The Council 
consisted of nine members besides the President, Sir Alfred lyall 
grudgingly accepted the formation of the Council with restricted powers* 
lest* he thought* prolonged discussion over the question might indefinitely 
delay its establishment. It was his strong wish to open the Council, if 
possible* before his term ended. nevertheless* he urged the Government
1 Des. from India* Fo.J* 2 March 1886.
2 Jud. Des. to India, Fo.20, 27 May 1886.
5 notification, H.D. (Jud.), Fo.1704, 26 Fov. 1886.
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of India to remove these restrictions. He pointed out that the despatches
of Wood and Canning did not contemplate any such limitation, and emphasised
that the utility of the Council would he seriously impaired if it was
debarred from touching, by way of adjustment to local needs, any laws
passed between 1861 and 1886, a period during which many important laws
affecting the Horth-Western Provinces had been passed# Lyall expressed
the view that the disability to which the Council was subjected would also
affect its dignity and reputation} The Government of India accepted the
argument that the powers of the Council should not be unnecessarily 
2
fettered, but Lord Cross in London declined to alter the previous decision,
5
and thus the disability remained;
The establishment of the Council of the North-Western Provinces
and Oudh in 1887 was# as Dufferin said, the outcome of the efforts of Sir 
4
Alfred Lyall. To Lord Dufferin* s Government goes the credit for extending 
its constant support to Lyall*s proposals, including the removal of 
limitations on the powers of the Council. The Pioneer* s remark that "had 
it not been for the vigour and persistency with which he urged these claims,
5
they might have remained in the background for another twenty years" .was a 
fitting tribute paid to Lyall, though, in the light of the fact that the 
Punjab and Burma Councils were established in 1897, it may be said that the 
North-Western Provinces could hardly have gone without a Council for more
1 Letter to Govt# of India, 14 Feb. 1887.
2 Des# from India, Ho.19, 11 #une 1887.
5 Jud# Des# to India, No.25» 28 July 1887#
4 Dufferin, Speeches (1884-88), 209.
5 The Pioneer, 10 Jan# 1887,
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than another ten years.
Although Wood1 s despatch of 1861 envisaged the establishment
of Councils for the Rorth-Western Provinces and the Punjab almost
simultaneously with that of Bengal, it was not until 1897 that the
Punjab was provided with a Council of its own. In 1885* at its very
first session, the national Congress passed a resolution for the creation
1
of councils in these two Provinces. As late as 1888 the Dufferin 
Committee expressed the view that the time for the constitution of 
cofcncils in the Punjab and Burma had not arrived. In 1891 Sir tfames 
Lyall, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, submitted a note to the 
Government of India in anticipation of the reintroduction of Cross’s Bill 
in Parliament, saying that the codification of customary law, remedial 
measures in connection with agricultural indebtedness, sanitary legisla­
tion, and many other matters of local interest could be dealt with by a
local council. He also pointed out that it would not be difficult to
2
find a sufficient number of qualified non-official members. In view of 
the fact that the Indian Councils Bill was not likely to be reintroduced 
before February 1892, the Government of India preferred that the
5question should be reserved for lyall’s successor.
1 See Resolution III, Report (1885).
2 India Pub. Letters (1896), 521-25.
5 Jud, Letter to Punjab, Ho. 1297, JO Sept. 1891.
In 1892 Sir W. Plowden moved an amendment that the Bill should fix
the number of members of the Punjab Council, to be nominated by the 
Lt. Governor, at not more than 12, when the provisions of the Act 
of 1861 were extended. Curzon said that it would not be wise to
tie the hands of the Government of India, or "to impose numerical
restrictions upon a Council which is not yet called into existence, 
and the date of whose birth is not even approximately known”. 
(Indian Pari. Debates, 25 April 1892, 247).
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In March 1896 the question was reopened. The Central Government
invited the opinion of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, Lieutenant Governor of the 
1
Punjab, who put forward many arguments against the proposal for a Council 
in the Punjab. He maintained that legislation for the Punjab m s  
carried out in a very satisfactory manner by the Imperial Council at 
which the Lieutenant Governor also sat when meetings were held at Simla.
He was against allowing his officials to speak freely, and moreover, he 
remarked there was a dearth of "articulately speaking or articulately 
thinking men" in the Punjab. In his view the establishment of a Council 
m s  not desirable on political grounds, for those who demanded it 
represented none but themselves. He emphasised that in view of the
2
presence of many turbulent elements the Punjab needed a strong executive.
The members of Governor-General* s Council by a majority of five
to two rejected the proposal. Lord Elgin, the Governor-General, and
3
J. Woodbum were in favour. In a remarkable minute, Elgin strongly 
advocated the scheme of legislative decentralisation. He emphasised 
that the opponents of the policy of reforms must reckon with a different 
set of conditions, and pointed out that the object of the change was to 
make the people feel that matters connected with their daily life were 
decided with due regard to their interests. Decentralisation, he stressed, 
was the only remedy. He was of the opinion that non-officials, whose 
advice would be of great value, were not difficult to find. Eeplying
1 Pub. Progs.. No.171, Aug. 1896.
2 Note by Sir D. Fitzpatrick, 10 April 1896.
3 Pub. Des. from India, No.64 , 25 Aug. 1896.
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to the argument that the presence of turbulent elements in the Punjab
was not congenial to the institution of a counci1* Elgin said that such
elements existed in other Provinces also* and that in case any disorder
broke out, a strong military force was at hand to deal with it. He
observed that opposition to the institution of councils on the ground that
they might promote a recrudescence of sedition and disloyalty was based oh
a wrong appreciation of the situation. "Of one thing" he stressed, "I
am confident, and that is, that it (sedition) will not be overcome by
stifling criticism, but rather by inviting free discussion, whenever and
wherever we can, and by throwing open to the light of day and being
prepared to justify every act of our administration and of the officers
1
who carry out our orders". In a private letter to Lord Hamilton he
expressed the view that, on the whole, the population in the Punjab was
more loyal than elsewhere; and added; "Men who have grown old in the
2
traditions of the Civil Service like Fitzpatrick and Trevor, not 
unnaturally, cannot abide the representatives of the advanced school who 
are to be found on the reformed Councils""; He went on to say that Indian 
representatives, as members of councils, would be obliged to behave in a 
responsible manner. It was not the talk, he said, that was really 
dangerous but the silent movement, the motive nor manner of which the 
Government could discover. In reply to Sir Alexander Mackenzie’s
1 Minute, 24 Aug. 1896, Pub, Progs., Ho.182, Aug. 1896. *
2 A.C.Trevor, a member of the Council, was opposed to the establishment 
of councils. In his opinion, the idea of a council for Burma was 
"altogether premature" and fot the Punjab "distinctly mischievous". 
Minute, Pub. Progs., Ho.181* Aug, 1896.
5 Elgin to Hamiltoni 25 Aug. 1896, Pr. Cor. Ind., ii, 827-JO.
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objection to a council for Burma on the ground that representatives
would not he available* Elgin remarked: "Are we to wait until not only
Burmans learn English but to use Mackenzie’s phrase* ’the whole tone of
native society has been occidentalised’?”
Elgin’s opinion is the more remarkable because as late as
October 1895 he had voted against establishing a Council for Burma?' The
change may be accounted for by the fact that in the meantime the Governor-
General had become fully aware of the attitude of the Secretary of State
who had asked the Government of India in January 1896 to report on the
question as to whether the time had not arrived when Burma could have a
legislative council of its own# The Secretary of State further remarked:
"It will not escape your observation that in the event of such a
concession being made to Burma it cannot be withheld any longer from the 
2
Punjab#” In August 1896 Lord Hamilton atrongly stressed that some means
3
must be found of creating councils in Burma and the Punjab# In December
1896 he sanctioned the establishment of councils for both. The new
councils* in their organisation and functions* were constituted according
4
to the provisions of the Act of 1861; consequently, they started' their 
career under great limitations#
1 Fin. Des. from India* No#304, 23 Oct# 1895*
2 Pub# Des# to India, No#I, 9 Jan# 1896#
3 Hamilton to Elgin, 14 Aug# 1896, Pr. Cor# Ind.* i, J49.
4 Pub# Des# to India* Ho.116* 3 Dec# 1896# Lord Hamilton remarked that
it was anomalous that a Province like Burma, one half of which had been 
under British administration for only ten years* should be ripe for a
measure which was considered premature in the case of a Province under
British administration for about half a century.
Five members of the Governor-General’s Council were in favour of a 
council for Burma, but there were only two including Lord Elgin in 
favour of a council for the Punjab#
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In 1861 Sir Charles Wood had expressed the opinion that Burma
I
was not ripe for a council. In 1895 the question of constituting a
council was involved in the Government of India’s proposal to convert
the Chief Commission into a lieutenant-governorship]' Under Section 46
of the Act of 1861 no new province was to "be created without a local
legislature* and thus the question of converting Burma into a lieutenant-
governorship was inseparably connected with the constitution of a
council* The Secretary of State was in favour of a council for Burma*
The Government of India, by a majority of five to two, recommended the
2proposal. . Alexander Mackenzie* whose opinion the Government of India
had invited* objected mainly on two grounds: first, the absence of enough
work for a legislature in Burma, and secondly, the dearth of competent
Burmans. The opinion of Sir Frederic Fryer, then Chief Commissioner,
was also sought. In its letter the Government had expressed its opinion
4
in favour of a council, and Fryer said that the interests of the Province 
would be better promoted by a local council, and that it would be possible
to find councillors. He suggested that the strength should be fixed at
5
nine, of whom four should be non-officials. Lord Hamilton, who did not 
find the objections convincing, was in favour? The majority of the 
members of the Government of India supported the proposal. Two members
1 Fin* Be s. from India, Ho*304, 25 Oct. 1895*
2 Then Lt*-Governor of Bengal; Chief Commissioner of Burma from Bee* 
1890 to April 1892*
3 Minute 13 Aug* 1896; Pub* Progs., Ho. 178, Aug* 1896*
4 Letter to Burma, Uo*671, 28 March 1896, Pub» Progs *, No.172.
5 Letter to Govt, of- India, 14 April 1896, Pub* Progs., Ho.176.
6 Hamilton to Elgin, 9 July 1896, Pr* Cor. Ind*, i,
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of the Council, A.C .Trevor, and G.S.White, dissented. In the former’s
opinion the creation of a council for the sake of creating a Lieutenant-
Governor involved an inversion of the proper order of things. He pointed
out that the argument in favour of councils rested on the presence of
favourable political conditions, hut since they did not exist in Burma,
1
the proposal was premature. In December 1896, the Secretary of State
2
sanctioned the conversion of Burma into a lieutenant-govemorship. The 
Punjab and Burma Councils were established in 1897, each consisting of 
nine members, of whom four were non-officials,
* • • •
An important question relating to the system of representation 
was how and to what extent the aristocracy was to be associated in law­
making. On 6 June 1861 Sir Charles Wood had said in Parliament; "I 
believe greater advantages will result from admitting the native chiefs 
to cooperate with us for legislative purposes; they will no longer feel, 
as they have hitherto done, that they are excluded from the management of 
affairs in their own country, and nothing, I am persuaded, will tend \
3
more to conciliate to our rule the minds of natives of high rank”.
During 1861-88 a number of ruling chiefs and quite a large number of
members belonging to the landed aristocracy were appointed to the Supreme 
4
Council, As the power of nomination rested entirely with the Governor-
1 A.C. Trevor’s minute, 21 Aug. 1896,
2 Pub. Des. to India, No. 117, 3 Dec. 1896,
3 Hansard, CLXIII, 643.
4 Among those who were appointed to the Supreme Council were the ruling
chiefs of Patiala (1862-64), Rampur (1863-64), Jaipur (1869-75) Sirmur
(1877-79), and Jind (1880-82), Pari.Papers, LIT (1890), IOI-5. 
Appointments could be made under Sections 10 and 29 according to which 
the Governor-General or Governor was authorised to nominate such 
persons "as to him may seem expedient”.
1$Q
General or the Governor, the question of appointing members belonging
to these classes presented no difficulty.
At the very outset of his career as Governor-General, Lord Iytton
stressed the necessity of efficiently utilising the powerful aristocracy
constituted by the Indian Princes?’ Iytton* s scheme was ambitious. He
wanted to establish an Indian Privy Council, restricted, in the first
instance, to the great chiefs, and empowered to advise the Viceroy. He
also proposed to initiate a "Native Peerage" for the Empire of India.
Finally, the scheme was reduced to an association of the leading Indian
Z
Princes, called "Councillors of the Empress". Eventually only eight
5
chiefs received this title.
In October 1888 the Dufferin Committee recommended that the
Provincial Councils should have two divisions, one of which was to consist
4
of the representatives of the hereditary nobility and the landed classes.
In October 1889 the Government of Bombay suggested that the Governor
should have express powers to nominate Indian Chiefs of States under the
5
political control of the Local Government. The Government of India
remarked that the appointment of ruling chiefs had been made from time to
time, and that their validity had never been questioned, but added that if
any doubt existed on that point, it was desirable that the Bill should
6
provide for such appointments. It may be noted that though the Act of
1 Lytton to Salisbury, 11 May 1876, Personal and Literary Letters, ii,20-21.
2 Lady Balfour, op. cit., 111.
5 Pub. Des. from India, No.21, 1 Oct. 1908, para.9.
4 See above, f<>3.
5 From Bombay to Govt, of India, No. 4588, 22 Oct. 1889.
6 Pub. Des. from India, No. 75, 24 Dec. 1889.
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1892 made no specific provision* the rules according to which the new
councils were reconstituted provided for the representation of landholders.
Each Province allotted one seat to them, to he filled, in Bengal^and
Madras, by nomination, and in Bombay, by recommendation. In April 1898
the British Indian Association pointed out that the Zamindars were
inadequately represented in the Bengal Council though they had large stages
in the country. The Association submitted that its claims to representa-
Z
tion in the Council should be recognised. The Lieutenant-Governor of
Bengal recommended the transfer of one seat from those assigned to the
municipalities to the landholders?. The Secretary of State approved of
the proposal. The new seat withdrawn from the municipalities was to be
4
filled by recommendation.
In 1902 Lord Curzon pointed out the difficulty of appointing the 
Indian Princes to the Supreme Council owing to the restricted number of 
additional members, and suggested that he should have power to nominate
5
a small number of ruling chiefs as extraordinary members of the Council. 
Lord Hamilton did not accept the proposal mainly for two reasons. In 
the first place* their appointment, he said, would tend to upset the 
balance of the composition of the Council; and, secondly, there would be
1 The Zamindari Panchayat of Bengal represented that the zamindars 
"as natural leaders of society” should have more than one seat, and 
also exercise the privilege of recommendation. Memorial, 29 March, 
1895* Pub# Progs#, Ho#143, May 1893#
2 British Association to Govt, of Bengal, 3° April 1898, Pub# Progs.,
Ho#114, Novi 1898#
3 Letter to Govt, of India, 8 Oct. 1898, Pub# Progs#, Ho#113* Efov\ 1898#
4 Pub# Des* to India, Ho#111, 7 Sept# 1899#
5 Curzon to Hamilton, 10 Sept. 1902, Pr. Cor. Ind#, XXIII, 434-5;
22 Oct. 1902, XXIV, 112.
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difficulty in determining the class from which the selections were to 
he made^ In 1907 Lord Mintofs proposals provided for an Imperial
Advisory Council, consisting of the great ruling chiefs and the territorial
2
magnates of British India* The scheme did not materialise, for the 
Princes were unwilling to sit on a Council which also included the land­
holders. In the Act of 1919 provision was made for the appointment of
5
ruling chiefs to hoth Central and Provincial Legislatures.
Curzon remarked that though the appointment of the Princes was 
not likely to improve the practical utility of the Council, their presence 
would considerably add to its prestige. It is surprising that although 
the British Government was alive to the political advantages likely to 
result from the association of the Princes, it did not follow a well- 
conceived policy to secure their systematic cooperation.
1 Hamilton to Curzon, 8 Oct. 1902, Pr. Cor. Ind., VII, 367.
2 Cd. 3710 (1907), Circular, 24 Aug. 1907.
3 Act (1919), s.23 (2), s.7 (5).
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CHAPTER III 
Military Policy
#
On no aspect of British Indian administration was the effect
of the Mutiny so deep and lasting as on the army. The main principles
of military reorganisation* as laid down hy the Peel Commission in 1859,
were Based on the lessons learnt from it* For more than half a century
they continued to guide military policy. The lessons once learnt were
never forgotten^ and indeed ultimately "became the greatest obstacle in
the way of reform. The principle of racial equality which was. recognised,
though of course in an imperfect manner, in the civil service was
completely disregarded in the military service. "So far then as the
army is concerned”, writes Chesney, "the Queen’s Proclamation on assuming
2
the direct government of India is a dead letter.”
One of the main recommendations of the Peel Commission dealt 
with the proportion "between Indians and Europeans in the army. In I856
5
the European troops numbered 14 per cent, of the total army. The
Commission fixed the proportion of Indians and Europeans at not more
than two to one for Bengal and not* more than three to one for Madras and 
4
Bombay. In practice this proportion was fixed at two to one for the
1 In his minute of 8 Dec. 1888 Dufferin emphasised that the British 
"should.always remember the lessons which were learnt with such
terrible experience thirty years ago....
2 Chesney, Indian Polity, Jrd. ed. (1894), 268.
5 In I856 the army consisted of Europeans and 214,985 Indians
(Report of Army Commission (1879), para.11).
4 Report of Peel Commission, IZ.
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1
whole army# This part of the Commissions proposals came to he regarded 
as infallible. Even twenty years later when the conditions had consider­
ably changed owing to swifter communications, the Army Commission of 1879 
did not recommend the slightest redaction in the proportion of Europeans* 
In 1885 when the army was increased under the pressure of Eussian advance,
the proportion was strictly maintained by fixing the strength of Europeans
2
at 10,657 out of the total increase of 27,000*
According to another recommendation the control of all the
arsenals and practically the whole of the artillery was placed in
5 4
European hands. Indians, who were freely taken in the artillery before
1857, came to be practically excluded, their employment being limited to 
stations where Europeans were not employed for reasons of health. More­
over, they were entrusted with the weakest and smallest of guns. Military
1 In July the army consisted of 6,002 British officers, 60,541 British
and 125*254 Indian soldiers* Renort of Army Commission (1879), para*16. 
In 1896-97 the total European army numbered 72,994 and the Indian army 
amounted to 141,462. Besides, there were 5*145 European officers in 
both these armies* The India List (1899), 548.
2 Subsequent additions to the strength of Indians in the artilllery 
(including Indian drivers for British mountain batteries), and to that 
of the corps of Sappers and Miners, increased their strength by about 
20,000 men. The total increase thus amounted to 50*000.
Summary of Principal Measures of Buffering Viceroyalty (Mil. Dept.), 
57-59.
5 The only exceptions we$e the Hyderabad Contingent and the Punjab
Frontier Force. The latter maintained a small number of field, after­
wards mountain, batteries for securing a lightness of equipment in the 
organisation of small columns for rapid operations on the border.
Mil. Des* to India, No.26, 7 Feb. 1889.
4 In I856 the number of Indians and Europeans in the artillery was 
8,172 and 6,517 respectively. Report of Army Commission (1879), 
para. 181.
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men continued to regard this part of the Peel Commission’s recommendations
as perfectly sound* and were not disposed to make the slightest alteration.
This can he seen from the attitude of the War Office to & minor change
proposed hy the Government of India in December 1888. It related to the
conversion of the 21st. Bombay Marine battalion into Marine artillery.
The object was not to organise separate batteries entrusted with a distinct
portion of the defences but only to train the men for service as auxiliary
to the Boyal Artillery. The War Office maintained that the proposed
conversion of 600 men involved a departure from the principle of keeping
the artillery in British hands, adding that trained Indian gunmen by
passing into civil life after a specified period of service would
constitute a source of danger. In default of British gunners it was
inclined to prefer Africans to Indians as auxiliary artillerymen^ The
Secretary of State was also not favourable to the proposal. In February
1889 he had remarked that the proposal would result in the creation of a
considerable number of gunners and suggested that in case an increase
became unavoidable the number of British men could be increased to man
garrison guns in shore batteries at Bombay, Aden and Karachi. In 1891
2
he negatived the Government of India’s proposal.
It was this mentality which long delayed the arming of Indians 
with the same rifles as those used by the British. In March 1886 
Bandolph Churchill told Parliament that when he was at the India Office he
1 War Office to India Office, 19 June 1891, Mil. Progs., No.782, Jan.1892.
2 Mil. Despatches to India, No.26 of 7 Feb. 1889 and No.Ill of 25 July 1891.
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had decided to arm them with similar weapons} In November 1899 Curzon
urged the improvement of weapons for Indian soldiers but coupled with
this the view that it was still politically inexpedient to place them on
an equal footing with the British army in the matter of arms. He
therefore proposed that they should be armed with the shortened lartini-
Enfield rifle of *5^5" "bore which took the same cartridge as the Lee-
2
Ehfield rifle used by the British soldier, but was a single loader. In
January 1900 Hamilton, the Secretary of State, decided to remove the
distinction on the ground that the Indian army would be placed at a
disadvantage when called upon to fight against the Russians equipped with
magazine rifles. He pointed out that in the event of a rising or mutiny
the British would have their safeguard in the control of the whole of the
5
artillery and the stores of ammunition. The above decision is not to be 
attributed to any change in the attitude of caution and distrust, but to 
the exigencies of the external situation. The Government thought that 
the employment of well-equipped Indian troops, in the event of war, against 
Russia would involve far less danger than that of men armed with obsolete 
weapons.
To provide a complete safeguard against mutiny in the army, the
Peel Commission recommended that it should be composed of "different
nationalities and castes, and as a general rule, mixed promiscuously
4
through each regiment". In British opinion full security would have
1 Hansard's Indian Debates, 25 March 1886, 188; Churchill, Lord Bandolph 
Churchill, new ed. (1951), 374.
2 Mil. Des. from India, No,189, 2 Nov. 1899.
3 Hamilton to Curzon* 26 Jan. 1900, Pr, Cor. Ind., V, 22.
4 Report, XIV.
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consisted in the maintenance of an exclusively British army, though it
was out of the question on financial grounds* The Government of India
observed: "Considerations of economy on the one hand, and of security
on the other, prevent us from garrisoning and defending India exclusively
with Britush or exclusively with native soldiers, and the necessity of
maintaining a just equilibrium between the two has largely influenced 
1
our scheme." The employment of a large body of Indian troops was there­
fore not a matter of choice but of necessity* The question then was how 
to make the army as little homogeneous as possible. It was held that 
the mutiny of the Bengal army, three-fourths of which was drawn from the 
higher castes, was mainly due to its homogeneous character. As a complete 
safeguard, the British Government, besides having an effective counter­
poise in an enlarged European army equipped with superior weapons and 
placed in control of the artillery and arsenals, maintained the segregation 
of the three armies and organised them in such a manner as to set caste 
against caste, religion against religion and company against company.
The principle of divide et impera in the organisation of the army was
2
strongly emphasised by the Army Commission of 1879.
The principle of organisation* as stated above* becomes clear by 
taking a glance at the composition of the Bengal army. Before the Mutiny 
almost the whole infantry was drawn from the Uorth-Western Provinces and 
Oudh, but under the scheme of reorganisation it was subjected to a large 
reduction. In the ’nineties the Hindustani portion including Muslims
1 Mil. Des. from India, H0.1J5* 14 Aug, I885,
2 Report, para. $0*
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represented about one-fourth of the total Bengal infantry; the Sikhs and
Gurkhas constituted one-fourth each, the remaining one-fourth “being formed
from Punjabi Muslims* Pathans, Afridis, and Dogras. The total strength
of the Muslims in the infantry was about one-fourth and in the cavalry
1
slightly less than half* The various communities, represented in this
manner, acted as checks on each other. In some cases counterpoise was
provided by recruiting men from different parts though they shared thB
same religious belief. In the Hyderabad Contingent, for instance, stress
was laid on the recuitment of a large proportion of Hindustani, as
distinguished from the Deccani, Muslims* It not only contained a fixed
proportion of men belonging to a number of castes, but also a majority of
non-local Muslims. Defining the principle of composition, the Government
of India observed that the classes and races should be so represented that
no single race or class should greatly predominate* and that the Muslims
element should be largely ’foreign’, i.e., Horth Indian, and the force
2
should not be entirely deprived of its local character*
The principle of counterpoise for Indian troops was provided 
mainly in two ways: first, as daid above, by fixing the strength of the
important communities represented in the army; and secondly, by*, the 
careful make-up of regiments. The Madras and Bombay armies, for instance, 
were organised in ’mixed regiments’, under which men of different races, 
religions and provinces were thrown together into the same company or troop.
1 In the cavalry the Muslims formed 40 out of 87 squadrons in 1899. 
Pari. Papery, LXX (1902), 487-88.
2 Mil. Des. from India, Ho*90, 15 June 1897.
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Such a system of promiscuous mixing was designed to reduce the chances
1
of combination to a minimum. In the Punjab and Bengal armies the
majority of corps were ’class company* regiments, that is, the regiments
-
drew their recruits from three or more different races and recruiting
2
grounds, hut the men of each class were kept in separate companies. The 
Indian officers of each company ordinarily belonged to the race, tribe or 
sect from which the company was recruited. Under this system each 
regiment contained elements of checks and balance. In the event of 
disaffection among a certain class of one or more regiments, the entire 
corps m s  not likely to be affected. Moreover, other classes, having 
no religious or caste affinities with the disaffected group, could be 
safely employed against it. Care was also taken not to make any one 
class in a regiment excessively preponderant. The Punjab Committee of
1 In a memorandum of 1891 on the Reorganisation of the Bombay army, 
the Government of India emphasised the advantages of the class 
company system, remarking that the general mixture regiment was as 
liable to mutiny as the former. It observed that the power of 
putting one class or religion against another would be more developed 
in the case of clas3 regiments in which a regiment of Sikhs would 
have no hesitation in shooting down a regiment of Hindustanis or 
Pathans in case of mutiny, and a regiment of Gurkhas would be opposed 
to any one of them. (Mil. Progs., Ho.57, Bov. 1891). The scheme
of class company system was finally carried out in Bombay in 1895* In 
the same year the Government of India sanctioned, with the approval 
of the Secretary of State, the formation of class companies in Madras. 
(Summary of Measures in the Mil. Dept, during Elgin’s Viceroyalty, 2-j). 
In 1897 the Secretary of State sanctioned the reorganisation of the 
Eyderabad Contingent on the class squadron and class company system. 
(Mil. Des. to India, Ho.62, 5 1897).
2 There were also some ’class regiments’ composed exclusively of men 
belonging to one community or tribe* such as, a number of Gurkha 
corps and regiments of pure Sikh corps.
Report of Army Commission (1879), para.256.
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I858 had suggested that each regiment should have a different predominating
cl^ss, which, however, was not to exceed one-half of its strength^ The
Army Commission of 1879 was not disposed to disturb the existing system.
It re-emphasised the following observations of the Committee: "As we
cannot do withoht a large native army in India, our main object is to mate
that army safe; and next to the grand counterpoise of a sufficient
European force, comes the counterpoise of natives against natives  To
preserve that distinctiveness.... which, while it lasts, makes the
Muhammadan of one country despise, fear, or dislike the Muhammadan of
another, corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical
2
limits, within which differences and rivalries are strongly marked." In
short the Committee recommended that formation of provincial corps on the
grounds that it would prevent the assimilation of the various classes in
the Indian army and remove the discontent arising from service far from the
homes of the soldiers. Generally speaking, it was against the system of
homogeneous corps. The Commission of 1879 endorsed the above suggestion
and recommended that the bulk of the Punjab and Bengal armies should consist
more of less of ’class company’ regiments, each with its own principal
3
recruiting grounds. This sybtem was modified to a large extent in 1893
4
when sixteen Hindustani battalions were converted into class regiments.
1 John Lawrence, The Chief Commissioner, Br.G-en. Heville Chamberlain, and 
H.B.Edwardes submitted their united answers to the questions on the
Recruiting and Composition of Corps, 1 July I858. See supp. to Report
of Peel Commission, 28.
2 Quoted in Report of Army Commission (1879), para. 258.
3 Ibid., para. 239.
4 In 1887 the Bengal army, including the Punjab unit, consisted of 42 class 
company regiments and 22 class regiments, in 1889 it had 22 class company 
regiments and 42 class regiments. Pari. Papes, LXX, 1902, 487-88.
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The Government of India had recommended the change on the grounds that 
it would increase efficiency and attract recruits of a "better stamp. It 
was pointed out that ’class* regiments would lead to the contentment of 
soldiers and facilitate their promotion and strengthen segregation by 
engendering the feeling of rivalry "between regiment and regiment}
So strong was the faith in the principle of division and counter­
poise that’ in its name many distinguished military men continued to oppose
i
the abolition of the system of the Presidency armies long after it had 
outlived its usefulness.
The establishment of three armies with their own commanders-in- 
chief and placed under the administrative control of the Presidency 
governments* was necessitated by the expansion of the British Empire from 
three bases* separated from each other by intervening Indian States.
During the Company’s rule the authority of the Local Governments was 
substantial, but the new developments, which took .place in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, tended to diminish their control. So far as 
the Mutiny itself was concerned, it rather strengthend then weakened the 
cause of the Presidency system. The immunity of the Madras army from 
infection was a strong argument in its favour, though more powerful 
arguments could be advanced against it. When the whole of India came 
under one strong Central Government and all its parts were brought much 
closer to each other by rapid means of communication, the very raison d’etre 
of three distinct armies ceased to hold good. The Army Commission of
1 Mil. Des. from India, No.76, 7 June 1892, Mil. Des.
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1879, presided over by Sir Ashley Eden, recommended its abolition on
several grounds. First, the system was complicated and expensive;
secondly, the Government of India1s responsibility for the final decision
of all great military questions called for a centralised administration;
thirdly, provincial governments should not be invested with military
administration; fourthly, if Madras and Bombay exercised such functions,
other Provinces could reasonably demand separate military arrangements;
fifthly, the system affected the efficiency of the army, involved a break
in the chain of responsibility and caused much embarrassment in wartime^ "
It may also be noted that the military jurisdiction of the Madras and
Bombay Governments was not coincident with their civil jurisdiction.
The Madras army served the Presidency proper.; Hyderabad, the Central
Provinces and Burma; and the Bombay army was in charge of the Presidency
proper, Bajputana, Central India and Sind. In 1881 the Government of
India remarked that there might have been some justification for the
system if the area of their civil and military jurisdiction had been 
2
coincident.
The Army Commission recommended the abolition of the Presidency 
ajrmies and their replacement by four separate and distinct bodies, each 
to be commanded by a Lieutenant-General and all placed under central control. 
The proposed four divisions represented, according to it, the areas of 
distinct nationalities. The Commission strongly emphasised the necessity 
of maintaining the segregation of armies in matters of recruitment* and
1 Benort, paras. 49, 128, 129.
2 Mil* Des. from India, Ho.85, 28. Feb. 1881.
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added that the existing arrangements -under which the Sikhs, the men from
the eastern HortMSfe stern Provinces, the Muslims of the Punjab and of
Oudh served side by side in all parts of the Bengal Presidency was more
favourable to amalgamation than to segregation. It claimed for its
1
scheme the advantages of both centralisation and decentralisation.
In his minute of dissent, P.S. Lumsden, a member of the Commission,
observed that it was the armies of the Presidencies and of the Punjab
which had remained loyal during the Mutiny and that it was due to the
intimate connection between the Punjab Frontier Force and the Local
Government that the latter was able to send substantial help in that
crisis. In support of his views in favour of the Presidency system he
quoted an extract from Sir Robert Montgomery* s minute of 5 December 1862.
Sir Robert had said in a passage of mixed metaphors: "....one great
lesson of the mutinies was not to trust to one uniform system; not to
break down the distinctions of race and character, which preclude the
combinations of native troops, not again to stake all upon one cast, but
to build our ship in compartments, and, by some varieties of constitution,
2
prevent the circulation of any secret poison throughout the body.”
, General Haines* Commander-in-Chief in India, was also opposed to the 
abolition of the system. He remarked that under the Commission* s 
proposal the Commander-In-Chief in India would become Commander-in-Chief 
without an army and that his severance from the Supreme Council would
1 Report, paras. 41, 51»
2 Minute, 15 Nov. 1879, Pari. Papers, LIX, 1884-85, 194. Montgomery 
was Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab from Feb. 1859 to Jan. 1865*
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1
exclude him from all share in the government of the country.
Be iterating the same views in another minute he said that it was not
wise to place all eggs in one “basket and that the Presidency arrangement
was part and parcel of that system which gave the British three separate
“bases from which they could deal with internal trouble while the whole
military power of the country was* for purposes of foreign war* at the
2
disposal of the Commander-in-Chief in India.
Arbuthnot, a member of the Governor-General*s Council, rightly 
remarked that the sympathy supposed to exist between the Local Government 
and their armies was rather imaginary than real, for the attachment of
3
the Indian soldiers was to the military, and not to the civil* authorities. 
Lord Iytton, the Governor-General, gave his unqualified support to the 
proposals. He characterised them as "thoroughly sound in principle, 
perfectly safe and easy from a practical and altogether advantageous 
from a financial point of view." He said that only under a centralised 
system all units of the army would have an equitable share in the 
patronage which under the Presidency system had been practically 
monopolised by the officers of the Bengal army. He pointed out that the 
existing arrangement deprived the Madras and Bombay armies of adequate 
opportunities of active service. Lytton also referred to the inconveniences 
of divided control during the Afghan War. In his opinion, the Commission’s 
proposals, far from weakening the "watertight compartment system", would
1 Minute, 29 March 1880.
2 Minute, 26 Feb. 1881.
3 Minute, 12 April 1880.
17}
tend to extend and develop it. "I am convinced”, Lytton emphasised,
"that the present system of three separate commands is unwieldy, and
■unnecessarily expensive. I am convinced that it tends to promote
friction "between the Supreme and Provincial Governments in time of peace,
whilst in time of war it must always he abandoned, so far as relates to
1
any troops sent into the field."
Lord Ripon’ s Government was also in complete agreement with the 
Commission’s proposals. Its main suggestions were: the direct control
of the Commander-in-Chief in India over the Madras and Bombay armies; the 
change of designations of the officers commanding those armies from 
Commander-ih-Chief to Lieutenant-General commanding; the Commander-in- 
Chief in India to he relieved of the direct control over the Bengal army; 
the retention of his seat in the Governor-General’s Council; and the
2
command of the Bengal army to he placed under two Lieutenant-Generals.
The Secretary of State asked the Government of India to furnish details 
relating to the ahove arrangements including the scope of authority 
proposed to he vested in the Lieutenant-Generals. The Government of 
India said that they would retain, subject to the general control of the 
Commander-in-Chief, all the military functions of the local Commander s-in- 
Chief, such as, the selection of officers for regimental promotion, the 
nomination for staff appointments, and the exercise of the same authority 
in regard to discipline. It also recommended that the Lieutenant-
1 Minute, 16 May 1880.
2 Mil. Des. from India, Ho.85, 28. Feb. 1881. 
5 Mil. Des. to India, Ho.203, 16 June 1881.
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Generals commanding the two portions of the Bengal army should "be placed
1
on the same footing. In October 1881 the Government of India observed that 
while 6ther countries possessed unity of command* it stood alone in 
having to conduct its military administration from a number of "quasi­
independent” centres. As to the fear that the change would increase 
its responsibility, it remarked that owing to the swift means of 
communication the whole Indian military administration was not likely 
to be more burdensome than that of the Bengal army alone before 1857.
cn«4«ci
It stronglyYUtg)#*b*the division of the over--weighty Bengal army into two
units much for the same reasons as accounted for the separate armies of
Z
Madras and Bombay.
Kimberley, then Secretary of State for India, rejected the
proposals. First, he said, centralisation would tend to produce complete
uniformity. Secondly, no complaint had been made to the Home Government
regarding the obstructive action of the Local Governments and their
failure to place unreservedly the whole resources of their departments
at the disposal of the Government of India. Thirdly, a considerable
weight of opinion was against the plan* Men like F.Haines, Commander-
in-Chief in India, E.Johnson* Military Member of the Government of India,
Richard Temple, formerly Governor of Bengal and Bombay, Heville Chamberlain,
former Commander-in-Chief of Madras, were opposed to the scheme. Fourthly,
5
the pl8n was not likely to result in any considerable financial saving.
1 Mil. Des. from India, Ho.282, 29 July 1881.
2 Mil. Des, from India, Ho.401, 29 Oct. 1881.
5 The Government of India estimated the total saving from the abolition
and other changes between £500,000 and £600,000 a year.
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Fifthly* the political advantages of the existing system which enabled the
Madras and Bombay Governments* in the event of any contingency* to act
vigorously by themselves* were too powerful to be set aside. Sixthly*
the Government on the spot was in a better position to represent the
grievances of its army than the Central Government. Kimberley concluded
by saying that "looking to the difference of military opinion on the
question, to the political objections which may be urged against the
proposed changes in the constitution of the Madras and Bombay armies,
and the absence of proof of financial saving, they (Her Majesty’s
Government) do not find such a weight of argument and authority in its
favour as would justify them in recommending to Parliament so extensive
1
and fundamental a change in the Indian military system."
Kimberley’s arguments were essentially in the nature of counter­
arguments, their merit being that they can be put forward against the 
best of plans. The entire question was whether the Presidency system 
was consistent with the essential conditions of a modern centralised 
state. Seduction in expenditure was not the main consideration in 
favour of the proposal. Indeed* the Government of India laid more 
emphasis on efficiency than on economy. In October I883 it again 
observed that the Presidency system violated the first principles of 
vigour, simplicity and responsibility* and involved a degree of circum­
locution in correspondence relating to clothing, equipment, barracks and 
movement of troops, and that its scheme for the division of the Bengal
1 Mil. Des. to India, No.243* 26 July I883.
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army* which the Secretary of State had re5ected* was politically safer♦
It also remarked that under a system of central control it would not have
been possible for the Bombay officers to recruit* in defiance of its orders*
one-third of the presidency army from Northern India* Regarding the
opposition of the Commander-in-Chief and E* Johnson* to which Kimberley had
referred* the Government of India said: "Hiis must be the condition under
which all reforms are effected* Ihere are always to be found persons who
still predict that dangers and inconvenciences will arise from reforms* and
it is impossible to prove beforehand that their predictions will not be 
1
verified** Kimberley's reply was clear and unequivocal* He told the
Government of India that the question had been fully discussed and that no
2
advantage would result from prolonging the discussion* It is interesting 
to note that in 1895 it was Lord Kimberley* then again at the India Office, 
who carried through the abolition act*
Bxe period 187^-84 marked an important stage in the Government 
of India's attempt to end the Presidency system* As a result the three
oydH«H*e
presidency departments were amalgamated in 188J* but the goal was still 
far off* Ihe Government of India had to contend with many difficulties* 
one of which was sentimental attachment to a system which had long been 
in existence* Hie Mutiny had thrown its weight on the side of its 
retention* The immunity of the Madras army was believed to have been mainly 
due to the division of the troops into three armies* though it would be 
more correct to say* as Major-General T*S* Pratt pointed out* that it was 
due to the different composition of the troops in the
1 Mil* Des* from India* No* 200* 15 Oct* 1885*
2 Mil* Des* to India* No* 76* 15 March 1884*
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1
respective armies# The maintenance of their distinct character was not
incompatible with the establishment of a -unified command, and indeed the
Government of India while proposing the change made it absolutely clear
that it had no intention of moulding the Indian army into one pattern.
Z
Separation was to remain as the cardinal principle of its policy# 
Segregation was not, as it rightly said, a necessary consequence of the 
Presidency system. / ^
Kimberley’s decision of 1884 did not mean the end of the Govern­
ment of India’s efforts# In 1885 it reopened the question under the 
circumstances of the Russian menace, stressing the necessity of making
3
the army thoroughly efficient. It urged the Secretary of State to abolish
the Presidency armies, and remarked that it would Regard with considerable
misgivings the prospect of undertaking actual war under such disabilities.”
In its opinion, the time was suitable for reform, since vacancies were
going to occur in the Madras and Bombay commands, to which appointments
4
might be made under the new conditions. Randolph Churchill did not 
accept the proposals on the ground that parliamentary legislation, without 
which they could not be carried out, was then difficult to secure. He 
did not share the Government of India’s view that all reduction in staff
5
and departmental changes was contingent on the abolition of the system#
In 1888 the Government of India strongly urged the Home Government
1 Minutes of Evidence, Peel Commission (I859)., Q. 4919* .
2 Mil.Des. from India, No.401, 29# Oct. 1881.
3 Mil. Des. from India, No. 112, 10 July 1885#
4 Mil. Des. from India, N0.I35* 14 Aug. 1885* paras* 81, 83.
5 Mil. Des. to India, No.275* 29. Oct. I885.
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to carry out the reform without delay. Strong emphasis, was laid on
the conditions which had changed with the occupation of Upper Burma and
the increase of the garrison of Baluchistan. In Burma the responsibility
of civil administration rested with the Government of India and that of
military administration with the Madras Government. In Baluchistan
the military operations were controlled hy one authority and the depart-
1
ments of supply were administered by another.
In August 1888 the Government of India was 1 asked to furnish a 
complete draft of the order which it might issue in the event of its 
proposals being accepted, and also, a draft of all orders to be issued
i
by the Commander-in-Chief regarding all arrangements• such as, postings,
2
divisional staff, the distribution of regiments and officers, etc. The
Government of India1 s scheme provided for the retention of the position,
authority, privileges and titles of the then Commanders-in-Chief of
Madras and Bombay; direct communication with Army Headquarters in India;
the abolition of the military departments of Madras and Bombay, and the
organisation of the Bengal army in two units, the Punjab army and Hindustan
army, each to be placed under a Lieutenant-General. The draft showed a
small reduction of about Rs 3,000 per mensem in the expenditure on office
establishments. Remarking on the economic aspect of the question the
Government of India said that the measure should be primarily regarded
4
with reference to administrative efficiency and not to financial gain.
1 Mil. Des. from India, Ho.87, 1 June 1888.
2 Tel. from Secretary of State, 8 Aug. 1888.
3 Draft General Order, Sncl. to below.
4 Mil. Des. from India, No.191, 15 Oct. 1888.
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Lord Dufferin characterised the change as a complement of all the 
improvements which had recently heen introduced into the army system.
He paid a tribute to General Chesney* the military member, whose scheme 
of army organisation* presented tv/enty years earlier* was in essential 
respects similar to that contained in the General Order# He wished that 
the Home Government should sanction the scheme before his departure from 
India^
It seemed that the end of the Presidency system had at last come. 
For ten years the Government of India had persistently, though 
unsuccesfully, tried for it, but when it was asked to submit the draft 
order, the prospect of success looked very bright# But once again the 
Secretary of State negatived the proposals for reasons which were frivolous 
and unconvincing. He remarked that it would be highly inexpedient to 
have recourse to imperial legislation as "it would certainly give rise to
2
discussions which must cause delay prejudicial to the public service...."
It is difficult to see in what way discussions in Parliament would have 
affected the public service. It appears that pressure from certain 
powerful quarters obstructed the plan. The Government of India was of 
opinion that no extensive and important legislation was necessary, since 
its proposals had retained the status and titles of the then CoramandeiB-in- 
Chief and their membership of the councils, and that in case it was 
decided to exclude their successors from the Councils, it could be done 
under the Act of 179J which made the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief
1 Minute, 1 Oct. 1888,
2 Mil. Des. to India, Ho. 110, JO May 1889.
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to the Council of a Presidency dependent on its "being "specially
1
authorised "by the Court of Directors not otherwise." If it was decided 
to make the Lieutenant-Generals commanding the Madras and Bombay armies 
members of the Councils* an Act of Parliament was necessary, hut
according to the Government of India the matter did not call for
 2
immediate legislation.
It is interesting to note that a large number of changes had
already heen introduced which had gone a long way towards weakening the
Presidency system. By 1889 many departments had heen amalgamated. In
1869 the departments of Military Finance and Accounts were centralised
with the result that the Madras and Bombay Governments lost the financial
control of the local axmie3. In 1876 the Demounts departments were
amalgamated. In 1882 the three separate presidency ordnance departments
were amalgamated into one with a Director-General at its head. In 1889
the three Commissariat departments were amalgamated into one department
under the orders of the Commissary-General-in-Chief. The clothing
3department was also placed under the Central control. The defence works
had already heen brought directly under the Government of India. Thus
by 1890 the process of amalgamation, in the words of G. Bussell, Under-
4
Secretary of State for India, was practically complete. The only 
important department which still remained unamalgamated was the medical 
service.
1 33 Geo.Ill, c.52, s.32.
2 Mil. Des. from India, Hq.35» Feb. 1889.
3 Govt, of India to Madras and Bombay, 22 July 1889. Mil.Progs., Ko.2406, 
Jan. 1890.
4 Indian Pari* Debates, 8 Sept. 1893#
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In July 1889 the Government of India pointed out that urgency
of carrying out the proposals in the hreathing time of peace it fortunately 
1
possessed. It remarked that the proximity of Russia to India had some­
what modified the concept of security inasmuch as considerations of 
counterpoise which were mainly concerned with the question of internal 
security* though they might have heen applicable to conditions existing 
a few years before* were no longer appropriate to the changed conditions.
"To regard the different armies"* the Government of India said, "as mainly 
intended to act as a counterpoise to one another, would be in our view 
to lose sight of the circumstance of India as it exists today." It 
emphasised that owing to certain changes, such as, rapid means of 
communication * a large proportion of Europeans in the army, want of 
homogeneity in the Indian army, and the control of th£ artillery and
2
arsenals in European hands, there was no danger to British rule from within.
On 27 June 1890 the House of Lords debated the question. Lord 
Ripon said that four successive Governors-General, who were men of 
different training and political views, had demanded the abolition of the 
system. He pointed out the inconveniences by referring to an incident 
of his viceroyalty. During the Second Afghan War when, after the battle 
of Maiwand, the expedition was sent to Kandahar, the Bombay Government, 
without waiting for the Government of India’s approval, appointed officers 
to the command of its own brigades. Lord Kimberley remarked that if he
1 Mil. Des. from India, No. 126, 5 July 1889.
2 Mil. Des. from India, No.217, 22 Qct. 1890.
J Hansard’s Indian Debates, 1890, 39J-94*
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were to deal with the question in the face of complete unanimity of
views of four Governors-General he would have great hesitation in
rejecting them. He endorsed the Government of India1 s view that the
annexation of the whole of Burma, the occupation of advanced positions
in Baluchistan and the Russian danger called for the concentration of
1
military authority. Lord Cross, the Secretary of State, remarked that
public opinion was yet not ripe for change. He referred to the strong
opposition of the Duke of Cambridge, then ■ Commander-in-Chief in England,
2
to the amalgamation scheme.
On 17 FebvTl891 T.R.Buchanan moved in the House of Commons a
resolution for the abolition of the Presidency system. He remarked that
an important reason for its retention was that it enabled the home
authorities to bestow high offices on men who had distinguished themselves,
3
at home but had no Indian military experience. Sir William Plowden said:
"The fact is that the only real ground for the refusal of the demand is
to be found in the patronage which rests in the military authorities in 
4
this country." Sir John Gorst, Tinder-Secretary of State for India, told
the House that the reasons for not carrying out further changes were:
The absence of any proof of danger or difficulty; the difference of opinion
among military authorities; practical difficulty in securing parliamentary
legislation; the absence of financial advantage; and the need for watching
5
the effect of the reforms already introduced. These arguments contained
1 Ibid., 409, 411.
2 Ibid., 404.
3 Hansard1s Indian Debates, 1890-91, 80-81.
4 Ibid., 98.
5 Ibid., 84-86.
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nothing new. Whatever their value in the first period of the controversy,
they had lost all force "by 1891. Indeed the real obstacle was the hostile
attitude of the V7ar Office, and especially of the Duke of Cambridge. On
21 August 1892 Henry Brackenbury wrote to CampbellrBannerman, then
Secretary of St&te for War: "I believe the sole obstacle to this reform
1
is the personage whom you used to call the "Pope"." This point is
further confirmed by the letter In which Kimberley says that when he
informed the Queen of the Government’s decision to introduce the ch&fage,
she "made no objection, only saying that she believed the Duke was much 
2
opposed to it."
In July 1892 the Government of India again urged the Home Govern­
ment to abolish the system, and added that decentralisation did not 
signify the isolation and independence of a number of coordinate authorities
but delegation by the superior authority of power and responsibility within
5
reasonable limits to subordinate authorities^ In Hovember 1892 it pointed 
out that the Presidency system with the centralisation of the departments 
of Military Accounts, Ordnance, Commissariat, Remount, Clothing and 
Military Works had been reduced to a shadow of the old system. In addition 
to the other changes already recommended, it suggested the division of the 
army into four units, namely, the army of the Horth, to include the Punjab, 
the trans-Indus territory and Sind; the army of the West, to include the 
territories under the civil government of Bombay and such parts of
1 Add. MSS (Brit. Mus.), 41,255, 71-72.
2 Kimberley to Bannerman, 28 Hov. 1892; Add.MS., 41,221, 125*
5 Mil. Des. from India, Ho. 107, 19 July 1892.
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Eajputana and Central India as were then garrisoned by the Bombay troops;
the army of the East, to include the civil governments of the N.W.P. and
Oudh, Bengal and Assam, and the army of the South, to include the
territories then garrisoned by the Madras Army, Burma was to form a
separate command under a Major-General placed under the direct control
of the Commander-in-Chief in India. The Punjab Frontier Force was
included in the Army of the North, Here it may be noted that in 1881
the Government of India had proposed five commands, i.e., two for the
Bengal Presidency and one each for Madras, Bombay and the Punjab Frontier
Force, and in 1888 it suggested four, Sind and Baluchistan were included
in the Bombay army and Burma in the Madras army. in 1890 it recommended
that Burma should be placed directly under the Commander-in-Chief in 
2
India. The Secretary of State did not accept the proposal relating to
Burma, being of opinion that it would dislocate the arrangements under
3which the Madras army had been kept as a separate army.
The four divisions of the Indian army, as recommended in the 
despatch of 2 November 189E, were based on three considerations: first, 
to frame the division of the army into large military commands, so as to 
allow room for the change likely to be introduced during the following 
years; secondly, to maintain the principles of decentralisation; thirdly, 
to follow the policy of the segregation of races so far as it was consistent 
with the fighting efficiency of the army. The Government of India also
1 Mil. Des. from India, No. 172, E Nov, 1892.
E Mil. Des. from India, No.115* 9 June, 1890.
5 Mil. Des. to India, N0.I65* 11 Sept. 1890.
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emphasised the importance of the army of the North as a bulwark ' 
against aggression*
By 1892, with the exception of the Medical department, all 
important departments had "been amalgamated. In October 1892 Kimberley 
said that he was convinced of the need for abolition, which had become 
all the more urgent on account of the inconveniences caused by the 
arrangements under which the Madras regiments in' Burma were not under 
the Government of India!" He had decided to go ahead despite the 
opposition of the Duke of Cambridge. He told Campbell-Bannerman: MIt
will be excellent if you can bring him into a better state of mind: if 
not* he will have to be told that we mast proceed whether he opposes or 
not.”2
In March 1893 Kimberley informed the Madras and Bombay Governments
3
of his intention to introduce the amalgamation BilK The Madras Government 
remarked that the measure would be politically inexpedient and deprive 
the army of the sympathy which a Local Government alone could entertain
4
with its wants. The Bombay Government was of opinion that the entire 
question had been discussed from the military, and hardly at all from the 
civil point of view. It emphasised that the exclusion of the commander 
from the Council would reduce the balance of power in the Provincial 
legislature and affect the efficiency of the Executive Council by reducing
1 Kimberley to Campbell-Bannerman, 2 Oct. 1892, Add. MSS. 41,221, 98-100.
2 Letter of 28 Nov. 1892, Add. MSS. 41,221, I23.
3 Mil. Des. to Madras, No.10, 9 March I893.
4 Govt, of Madras to Secretary of State, No#24, 19 May 1893#
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its strength from four to three# Commenting on these points, the
Government of India said that the commander of the army, heing frequently
a man of little Indian experience, would not he of great value to the
Council and that there was little proof that a Council of four was more
effective than that of three# As to the question of membership, it
expressed the view that special provision for two commanders would he 
2
anomalous* It should he remembered that as late as November 1892 the
Government of India had been in favour of their membership, but, when
consulted later, it consented to the Secretary of Statets decision*
The Madras and Bombay Armies Bill was introduced in the House of
Lords in April 1895, The subject which gave rise to much discussion was
the question of membership. The Army Commission of 1879 had made no
provision for it, but both Dufferin and Lansdowne had been in favour.
Kimberley justified the decision on three grounds: The inadvisability of
associating the commanders with the Councils after the withdrawal of their
armies from the control of the Local Governments; the necessity of placing
all the four commanders on the same footing; and the consent of the
3
Government of India to the proposal* Lord Cross, former Secretary of 
State, while in complete agreement with the scheme, of abolition, strongly 
objected to the provision relating to exclusion. He pointed out that the 
Government of India had recommended their inclusion in the Councils in 
four of its depatches, and maintained that the Bill would lower their
1 Bombay to Govt, of India, 11 May 1895; Encl. to below.
2 Mil. Be s. from India, No. 144, 11 July 1895.
5 Indian Pari. Debates, 4 May 1895* 255*
4 Mil. Despatches of 1 June 1888, 15 Oct. 1888, 26 Feb. 1889 and 2 Bov. 1892.
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dignity, deprive the Councils of useful advice in military matters,
and upset the balance in the recently enlarged provincial legislatures*
It is interesting to note that the Duke of Cambridge, who had been
consistently opposed to amalgamation, supported the Bill, but agreed
2
with Cross on the question of membership. In Committee Cross moved an
5
amendment which restored the membership. Kimberley again emphasised the 
anomaly of including two generals - who by no means commanded the most 
important of the four armies - in the Councils which were to consult them 
on matters withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Local Governments.
Such a measure, he said, would produce inequality and jealousy* However, 
with a view to securing the speedy passage of the Bill, he accepted the
4
alteration, which was negatived in the Commons by Naoroji’s amendment. 
George Bussell, Under-Secretary of State for India, expressed the view
5
that the alteration might jeopardise the fate of the Bill in the Lords.
On 17 November 1893 Kimberley urged the House not to insist upon its own 
amendment. So the Bill, as altered by the Commons, was passed by the 
Lords*
Kimberley1 s reasons for not accepting the Government of India’s 
proposals regarding the exclusion of Burma from the Madras, and of 
Baluchistan and Sind from the Bombay commands were, first, that they 
would lead to the most unequal divisions of the army, and, secondly that
they would deteriorate the fighting quality of the armies of the South
1 Indian Pari. Debates, 4 May 1893, 26p,265-64*
2 Ibid., 265.
5 Ibid., 16 May 1893, 325.
4 Indian Pari. Debates, 16 May 1893* JZ7.
5 Ibid., 8 Sept. 1893, 63O.
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and the West "by depriving them of the opportunities of frontier training.
These views were mainly those of the Commander-in-Chief in England who
maintained that the proposals would result in the loss of efficiency and
Z
the over-preponderance of the Punjab army.
The Government of India re-emphasised its objections to the
inclusion of Burma in the Madras command, remarking that it had led to
difficulties and delay, and added that the seven battalions, which belonged
to the Madras army, drew no recruits from the Madras Presidency. While
it did not object to the inclusion of Sind in the Bombay Command, it
regarded the transfer of Baluchistan, which had since 1881 been under the
control of the Commander-ih-Chief in India, as a retrogade step; General
White, the Commander-ih-Chief, objected to the transfer on the grounds,
first, that it.might lead to political and military friction between the
civil and military authorities of Baluchistan and the Punjab, and
secondly, that the Bombay General would find it difficult to control from
Poona, over a thousand miles away, the daily movements of the troops in 
4
the field. Fowler, then Secretary of State, remarked that the history
of numerous expeditions on the North-West Frontier, in which regiments
and batteries of the Bengal army and of the Punjab Frontier Force, then
had taken jpart,
under the Punjab Government,/showed that the transfer would not affect the 
operations. Referring to the second objection, he observed that if it 
were valid it would be equally conclusive against the Government of India’s
1 Mil. Des. to India, No. 151, 21 Dec. 1893.
2 Memo, by H.R.H. The Commander-in-Chief, Encl. to above.
3 Mil. Des. from India, No.ll, 26 Jan. 1894.
4 Minute, 18 Jan. 1894#
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proposal for a separate Burma command under the direct control of the
Commander-in-Chief in India?" The Commander-ih-Chief in England said that
the objection from the geographical point of view was equally applicable
to the Bengal and Madras commands in which the distance from headquarters
to their frontier districts was just as great as from Poona to Quetta.
He also remarked that field operations would be conducted under the
£
directions of the Commander-in-Chief in India, and not from Poona. Fowler
asked the Government of India to treat the arrangements as final.
The Act of 1893 abolished the military control of the Madras and
Bombay Governments and the offices of Commander-in-Chief of the Presidency
armies. No provision was made for the inclusion of the commanders of
those armies in the Local Councils. The Secretary of State did not accept
the proposal regarding the formal breaking up of the Bengal army into two
divisions, but sanctioned its organisation, for purposes of administration,
in two portions, each to be placed under a Lieutenant-General. The
4
commands were designated as Bengal, Punjab, Madras and Bombay. In lieu
of the term the 1 Indian army1 the designation the ’army of India’ was
5
accepted. Burma remained in the Madras command and Sind and Baluchistan
1 Mil. Des. to India, No,55* ^  1694#
Z Memo, on Govt, of India’s des., No.ll* £6 Jan. 1894.
3 56 & 57 Viet., c.6£.
4 The Secretary of State accepted the Government of India’s term ’Bengal’ 
in place of ’Bengal and North-West’ as suggested by him.
(Mil. Des. to India, No.55, 10 May 1894).
5 The Government of India pointed out a technical difficulty in the use 
of the term ’Indian army’ , as its legal definition, in its opinion, was 
Her Majesty*s Indian Forces subject to the Indian Articles of War, but 
the British officers with the Indian forces were subject to the Army
Act and not to the Indian Articles of War. The Secretary of State
accepted the amendment. Mil. Des. from India, No.ll, £6 Jan. 1894.
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In the Bombay command. The Act came into force from 1 April 1895 and
brought into existence one army under one Commander-in-Chief, placed
under the authority of one Government, The change was effected after
a year and a half of the passing of the Act, because the Government had
1
to work out a large number of minor changes involved in the process.
In September 1895 the Secretary of State sanctioned the amalgamation of
the three Medical departments into one, with the Surgeon-General with
the Government of India, to be designated Director-General of the Indian
2
Medical Service, as its head.
Thus ended the Presidency system. Though it had long become
completely outmoded, it retained its advocates almost to the end. The
system was generally supported by the older military officers, such as,
Lord Hapier of Magdala, Sir Henry Horman and General Haines, who had been
impressed by its value during the Mutiny, whereas it was denounced by
officers like Stewart, Roberts and White, who had been strongly
influenced by the problem of the Horth-West Frontier. In 1895 Lord
Kimberley told Parliament that a very important consideration which
necessitated the reform was the proximity of Hussia to the frontiers of 
5
India# By the time the system was abolished, it had lost much of its
substance on account of a series of changes sanctioned by the Home Govern-
attachment
ment. The reasons which delayed its abolition were:/to a system which 
had long been in existence; strong belief in its value as a means of
1 Financial Statement, 1895-96, 141.
Z Mil. Des# from India, lTo,65* 13 March 1895* Mil. Des# to India, Ho.91;
26 Sept. 1895#
3 Indian Pari. Debates, 4 May 1895, 254:“55*
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segregation; and the opposition of some influential men. It is
interesting to note that early in the nineteenth century Malcolm had
advocated the amalgamation of the three armies* "but there was no chance
of his proposal “being accepted in the circumstances of that period.
The abolition did not result in any financial saving? on the
contrary* the reorganisation of the army under the four commands involved
2
a slight increase in expenditure. The Government of India explained it 
by saying that many of the economies had already been carried out between 
1888 and 1895* Indeed the economic aspect of. the question was not at 
all impressive. Nevertheless* independently of financial considerations, 
the change should have been made much earlier. The decision to exclude 
the commanders of the Madras and Bombay armies from the Local Councils 
had much to commend it. Under a unified command a special provision for 
two commanders was anomalous and unnecessary. Whatever might have been
3
its advantages under the Presidency system, it was not relevant to the 
scheme of 1895*
Similar, in many respects, to the Presidency armies was the Punjab
1 Malcolm, Political History of India, ii, E1J.
2 The net annual increase amounted to Rs. 118,000.
Mil. Des* from India, No.202, JO Dec# 1896.
5 In his evidence before the Welby Commission Lord Roberts, former
Commander-in-Chief, said that during the four years of his office 
as Commander-in-Chief in Madras not a single military case ever 
came up that could be settled by the Madras Government.
Minutes, iii, Q. 15,743.
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Frontier Force* Its retention as a distinct and separate force was
supported more or less on the same grounds# The Army Commission of
1879 recommended its withdrawal from the Local Government and its transfer,
2
as part of the regular army, to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief#
In his minute of dissent, Peter Lumsden remarked that the invaluable
service rendered by the Force during the Mutiny was due to its intimate
connection with the Local Government# Lord Lytton expressed the view
that the object of the arrangement was to ensure prompt action, but the
conditions under which it was made had been considerably modified by the
construction of the telegraph and the railway# It was emphasised that
the Government of India’s responsibility for general foreign policy and
the conduct of frontier operations rendered the retention of the Force
4
under a semi-independent authority highly inexpedient. In I885 
Kimberley justified the arrangement by saying that the separate character 
of the Force had been one of the greatest elements of strength during
5the Mutiny# Ripon’s Government remarked, first, that the system placed
1 Although the Force may be said to have its origin in 1846 with the 
raising of the Corps of Guides, it will be more correct to say that 
its foundation was based on a permission given in May 1849 to the 
Punjab Board of Administration to raise ten Punjab regiments for 
the protection of the whole western frontier except Peshawar, (Mil# 
Progs., No.1410, Sept# 1886)# Its object, in Dalhousie’s words, was
"to secure for the Local Government the full and complete control of
military means, sufficient to effect any object which political 
considerations may, in their judgment, render it expedient to secure 
on the distant frontier."
The designation "Punjab Frontier Force" was given in I865.
2 Report# para#49,
3 Pari. Papers# LIX (1884-85), 194.
4 Minute, 16 May 1880, paras# 27,
5 Mil. Des# to India, N0.245, 26 July I883# para. 5^ *
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the Force at a disadvantage in its getting an adequate share of staff
appointments, and secondly, that due to the presence of an intermediate
authority, it led to delay in the carrying out of proposals relating to 
1
the Force. In 1884 Kimberley again rejected the proposal.
In August I885 the Government of India recommended the immediate
transfer of the Force with its distinctive local character intact. To
the arguments, which it had already advanced, it added one more. In its
opinion, a considerable part of the Punjab frontier had ceased to be a
frontier in the original sense since it was overlapped and covered by the
territory under its occupation in Baluchistan. It also pointed out the
defects of the arrangements under which the forces stationed in that part
2
of India were placed under the control of two authorities. The Secretary
3of State agreed to the proposal, and the Force was transferred accordingly 
in August 1886.
The Secretary of State took the above decision without consulting
the Punjab Government. Aitchison, then Lieutenant-Governor, maintained
that the decision was dictated mainly by military considerations, and
added that a fair share of appointments could be given to the Force without
a radical change. The remedy lay, according to him, in placing the claims
of its officers before the Governor-General in Council for consideration
on an equal footing with those of the other forces. He added that the
Force had always been fully placed at the disposal of the Commander-in- 
4
Chief in war.
1 Mil. 2)es* from India, No.200, 15 Oct. I883*
2 Mil. Des. from India, No. 135* Aug. I885, para. 84.
3 Mil. Des, to India, No,275* 29 Oct. I885.
4 Mil.Progs.. No.585* Sept. 1886.
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The Secretary of State had not to overcome any serious obstacles 
in arriving at this decision. The reasons were: first* the change did not 
require parliamentary legislation; secondly, in this case the dignity of a 
Presidency Government was not involved; thirdly, the Force was much 
younger and smaller than the Presidency armies. The immediate reason, 
and no doybt an important one, which "brought about the change was the 
Russian menace. its retention had been advocated on grounds of segregation 
and the Mutiny had thrown its weight on this side. Early Yiceroys like 
Canning, Lawrence and Mayo had been its supporters; Kimberley had twice 
rejected the Government of India1s proposal for transfer. Nevertheless 
the system of provincial armies under the changed conditions had become 
anomalous. It is interesting to note that while the needs of internal 
security had strengthened it, those of external security tended to weaken 
it.
The Panjdeh crisis of I885 not only led the Government of India 
to recommend the centralisation of the Local armies but also to propose 
an increase of the regular army, by 30*000 men. The addition was made 
at a time when the Indian finances ¥/ere no longer in a sound condition. 
Indeed, during 1885-98 the financial situation, owing to the fall in 
eichange, was grave. When strictest possible economy was needed, the 
increase put an additional burden on the revenues. Auckland Colvin and 
C.P.Ilbert, two members of Bufferin's Government, put forward a number of 
convincing arguments against this measure. First, the Commission of 1879, 
which had been fully aware of the rapidity and direction of the Russian 
advance, made no recommendation to this effect. Secondly, a scheme of
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strategical frontier railways and defence works* which had been sanctioned 
and were "being vigorously pushed on, were calculated to add immensely to
the mobility and the fighting strength of the Indian army. Thirdly, the
increase would result in an extra-expenditure of £1*500,000 a year, which 
would necessitate further taxation, hut as an alien people, they remarked, 
the British should seek their security in making the taxation light. 
Fourthly, a standing army, larger than necessary, might prove a weapon of 
aggression. They pertinently asked: "Is it the duty of the Government
of India to maintain and charge to Indian revenues a permanent addition 
to its forces, not required for India, hut available for the purpose of 
extending and securing its dominion beyond India?**^
The Government of India maintained that the recent advance of
Eussia had profoundly modified the military problem because the functions 
of the army were no longer limited to maintaining internal peace and 
supplying small bodies of troops for foreign expeditions. In its opinion 
the existing establishments were inadequate for the duties they might be 
called upon to fulfill To make the military service attractive for 
Indians, it recommended the issue of a free railway pass to each man when 
going on and coming "back from furlough, the grant of the second increment 
after six instead of nine years* service and the third after ten instead 
of fifteen years* service, an addition of one rupee to the yearly "half- 
mounting** allowance of four rupees, and the improvement of pension rules 
by entitling them to pension after a period of twenty-one instead of
/
1 Minute, 14 Aug, 1885#
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1
thirty-two years1 service with the colours. All these recommendations
2
were accepted hy the Secretary of State. In January 1895 the Government
of India pointed out the urgency of increasing the pay of the Indian
infantry private from seven rupees to nine a month. The pay had stood
at that figure for about a century. The cost was estimated at Bs.28 lafchs 
5
a year. The increase in pay was recommended because of the difficulty 
in securing efficient recruits. In fact during the Afghan War, recruiting
had practically come to an end. The Secretary of State accepted the
proposal.
Two observations may be made on the increase of the army in 1885*
In the first place* if the addition was unavoidable, it should have been 
made as a temporary measure. In the second place, in view of the 
unsatisfactory condition of Indian finances, instead of 11,000 additional 
British men Indian soldiers should have been recruited. The policy of 
recruitment which demanded that for any increase in the number of Indian 
troops there should be a corresponding proportionate increase in that of 
British troops was essentially defective. Whatever might have been the 
grounds for insisting on a rigid proportion during a few years following 
the Mutiny, there hardly existed any in the ’eighties when the capacity 
of the British Army to deal with any situation had enormously increased. 
Indeed the entire policy was based on exaggerated fear and suspicion of 
Indian troops. The Army Commission had emphasised that it "must be
1 Mil. Des. from India, Nb.155, 14 Aug. I885. O'-*
E Mil. Des. to India, Ho.275, E9 Oct. I885.
5 Mil. Des. from India, Ho.25, 25 Jan. 1895*
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remembered that the native army was a mercenary force serving an alien 
G o v e r n m e n t I n  1893 General Roberts said: "It should never be
forgotten that the native army of India* loyal as it may be at the 
present time* is composed of mercenaries* and is therefore always subject 
to those influences which affect soldiers who are serving alien masters*" 
Such an attitude towards Indian troops led the British Government to 
maintain a large body of European troops largely to act as a check on the 
former. That the maintenance of a certain proportion of European troops 
was necessary was fully admitted* but such a high percentage was both 
unnecessary and inexpedient* Within the limits of security the reduction 
of their strength was quite practicable, but the British Government did 
not allow financial considerations to influence this aspect of its 
military policy. Early in the last century Malcolm had made some 
extremely important suggestions* First* he said* the European army 
should not be regarded as a check on Indian troops; secondly, a policy 
of trust was the necessary condition for maintaining their efficiency 
and attachment; and, thirdly, a European army, being very expensive,
3should not be too large. Suffice it to say that British policy was 
based on altogether different principles.
In addition to a large European army, the British Government 
organised a volunteer force composed of Europeans and Eurasians. The 
Mutiny impressed upon it the necessity of having an organisation for their 
defence. In 1857 when danger was apprehended to British life and
1 Report of Army Commission (1879), para* 259.
2 Minute* 1 April 1893* Encl. to Mil. Des. from India, Ro.78, 10 May 1893*
3 Malcolm* The Government of India, App*239; Political History of India* 
ii, 226, 238.
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property, they were enrolled as volunteers. At first the object of the
force was only to provide security against internal danger, but from
I885 onwards it also provided an efficient supplement to an army called
into active service. In Dufferin’s words* its function was to fill up
the gap in the event of a large proportion of European troops being sent 
1
out. The Government encouraged every European and Eurasian to join the
force. At the beginning of the present century it consisted of about 
2
50,000 men.
Y/hile the Government of India encouraged Europeans and Eurasians
to join the force, it followed an entirely different policy towards Indians.
Their repeated offers for enlistment were turned down. Memorials for
volunteering were submitted, and the question was widely discussed in the
Press, but the Government refused to modify its attitude. The policy of
discrimination became the more apparent in view of the fact that when
every European and Eurasian was induced to join the force, Indians, who
expressed absolute loyalty and showed willingness to play their part in
the internal and external security of the country, were not considered 
5
worthy of trust. When shortly after the Mutiny, applications were
1 Minute, 8 Dec. 1888.
2 In 1884 the volunteers numbered about 12,00(1 in 1891 about 20,000,
in 1896 about 24,000, Mil. Progs., Uo.1955, April 1885; Financial
Statement, 1896-97, 125.
5 Dufferin observed with truth that the admission of Eurasians into the 
volunteer corps could not but cause resentment. "Full-blooded natives," 
he said, "naturally resent seeing those who are so closely akin to them­
selves, endowed with the privilege of carrying arms and being enrolled 
in our volunteer battalions, while they themselves are debarred from 
anything of the kind. I imagine this and the fact that the Arms Act 
does not apply to the Eurasians, occasions much bitterness in the 
native mind." Minute, 8 Dec. 1888. \
- J
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received from Indians in Calcutta and Bombay, Lord Canning said that, 
subject to certain conditions, there was no objection to their admission 
into the Volunteer Corps# But the door remained practically closed to 
Indians# The regulations gave commandants a discretionary power of 
rejecting applicants, and in many instances the rules distinctly limited 
the admission to Europeans and Eurasians# Thus the Government followed 
a policy of completely discouraging Indian volunteering without openly 
prohibiting it#
In 1885# when the situation was alarming, pressing demands were 
made by Indians for volunteering* Nevertheless, the Government did not 
modify its attitude. It put: forward a number of arguments against the 
proposal. First, it remarked, the demand was confined to a small section 
of educated Indians who desired to be recognised as volunteers not because 
they really liked volunteering but because they claimed to be treated on 
an equal footing with British subjects# Secondly, the motive of the 
agitation, according to the Government, was to make political capital 
out of an awkward demand# Thirdly, if the proposal was accepted, it 
would not admit of being subjected to artificial restrictions. The 
Government of India maintained that any attempt to impose limitations on 
strength would be as unpopular as a refusal to move in the matter at all; 
and that to accept the scheme without imposing restrictions on numbers, 
armament and selection of officers, involved a risk which it was not 
prepared to undertake. Fourthly, their enlistment would necessitate a 
corresponding increase in the number of European troops. Fifthly, it 
would be dangerous to train and arm men who-would not, in time of trouble
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hesitate to use arms against Europeans. Roberts in his minute* drafted
just before his departure, remarked that to put arms into the hands of
large numbers of disaffected Bengalis or Marathas would be nothing short 
2
of madness.
%
Though the above arguments were purely speculative in character, 
they fitted in with the general policy of distrust. In such an approach 
there was certainly no place for Indian volunteering. But if the 
Government had slightly altered its attitude, a modest scheme was, 
within the limits of safety, quite practicable. The political effect 
of such a policy of discrimination was indeed unfortunate. Persistent 
inducement in the one case and persistent refusal in the other could not 
fail to increase bitterness among Indians and bring home to them the 
discriminatory character of British rule.
The policy of distrust and racial discrimination becomes more 
evident when we examine the controversy over the question of the appoint­
ment of Indians to commissioned ranks in the European grades. In March 
I885 the Government of India raised the question of granting a 
substahtive position to men of higher classes and to soldiers of proved 
fitness. In its opinion, the time had arrived when on grounds of justice 
and of policy an opening for advancement, similar to that in the civil 
department, might and should be afforded to them in the army. With a 
view: to securing the attachment of the aristocracy, it recommended the 
appointment of cadets from higher classes. The Government ezpressed
1 Mil. Des. from India, Ho.166, 21 Sept. I885.
2 Minute, 1 April 1893.
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■the view that a respectable military career would suit their habits and
traditions most. The nature of the proposed employment in the army was
to be analogous to that in the Statutory Civil Service. According to
these proposals, Indian officers were not required to pass through
Sandhurst or obtain their Commissions by a competitive examination, but
nevertheless, a good knowledge of English was essential. In view of the
difficulty of appointing an Indian officer to a regiment officered by
Europeans, it recommended the formation of two regiments, one of cavalry
and one of infantry, to be officered entirely by Indians. The regiments
were to consist of the posts of a commandant, second-in-command, and an
adjutant, to be filled, in the first instance, by transfers of selected
Indian officers from regular regiments. To these could be added one
^doihg-duty officer1, a cadet of good family. The Government of India
proposed that the appointment of commandant to each regiment might be in
the rank of major, of second-in-command in the rank of captain, and of
the remaining two in the rank of lieutenant. Their pay and allowances
were to be fixed, as in the Statutory Service, at two-thirds of the rates
allowed to Europeans. Vacancies in those regiments occurring thereafter
were to be filled up either by cadets of respectable families or
1
distinguished Indian officers from regular regiments.
In support of its proposals, the Government of India quoted a 
few extracts from the writings of Sir Henry Lawrence. He had emphasised 
that ”justice and liberality forge a stronger chain than suspicious and
1 Mil. Des. from India, No.47, 21 March 1885#
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niggardly policy”, adding that ,the Mughal Empire owed its fall not to 
the policy of liberality under which Jai Singh and Jaswant Singh led the 
armies of Aurangzeb hat to the other causes. He was of opinion that men 
of better education and superior character needed more than the 
opportunities offered to them. Lawrence concluded by saying that English­
men could not hold India for ever and therefore they should conduct their
affairs in such a way as to have in India a noble ally when the connection 
1
ended. In another essay he said that if Asians and Africans could be 
given honourable position in the armies of Bussia and France, Indians, 
after tried service of a century under England, were entitled to the 
"same boon - nay, justice.”^
The views of Lawrence, though remarkably wise and far-sighted, 
were not those of the British governing class, which believed not in the 
withdrawal but in the permanence of British rule; not in a policy of trust 
but in one of distrust. It is not therefore strange that such an
3
opponent of reform as Sir Ashley Eden could not fail to remark that the
proposals could only be carried into effect if the British contemplated
4
withdrawal from India. Eden’s argument was no doubt logical but was 
irrelevant in relation to the small scope of the proposals. While making
1 Lawrence, Essays on the Indian Army and Oudh (Serampur, 1859), 23-24, 
48, 50* The Essay entitled "Our Empire in India” was published in 
Oct. 1844 in the Calcutta Review.
2 Ibid., 190-91. The Essay entitled "The Indian Army” was published in 
March I856•
3 Curzon, in his Memo, of 4 June 1900, remarked that in so far as logic 
and argument were concerned victory rested with the civilian and not 
with the Generals. Para. 7.
4 Memo#** 6 July I885*
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them the Government of India was no less solicitous than Eden about the
stability of British rule. Lawrence’s extract was intended only to
reinforce the argument in favour of reform. Unfortunately it was
interpreted by Eden in an altogether different way,
, Among a large number of military men whom the Secretary of State
consulted, the proportion of those favourable to the plan was high.
Some members of the India Council were also strongly in favour. Among
critics, Eden, then a member of the Council, was most hostile. His
main arguments were: the silence of the Army Commission of 1879 on this
question; the absence of evidence that there was any real demand for a
military career; the impossibility of fixing a limit to the concession
if the principle was once accepted; practical difficulty in placing a
senior Indian officer in command of a detachment over British officers
of junior rank when their detachments would be stationed in the same
cantonment; and the adverse effects of the plan on the safety of British
rule and on the efficiency of the army. Eden characterised the
proposals as revolutionary and dangerous^ Frederick Haines, former
Commander-in-Chief in India, remarked that neither the British officer,
placed in a subordinate position, nor the British soldier would have the
least confidence in an Indian commanding officer. He emphasised that
in small as well as in great things British leading was essential to
2
success in the field. E. Johnson, former Military Member, remarked that 
the plan would produce capable Indian officers on whose loyalty the
1. Ibid.
Z Memo., 18 May 1885#
jr
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1
Government could not depend in time of trouble. Sir Charles Beid of
the Bengal Staff Corps, said that since the Indian army was mercenary,
such of its regiments as would not be under European control might, in
time of internal trouble, act against the British. He also remarked
that any military expenditure on additional forces, not of the highest
2
efficiency, was inadvisable. Sir Charles Brownlow, also of the Bengal 
Staff Corps, criticised the plan as a "policy of sentimental adventure,"
He remarked that "we ought not to allow our emotions to blind us to the
' 5fact that a servant, however loyal, is never unwilling to become a master." 
The above arguments were purely hypothetical. At the most the
y
plan was limited to two regiments and hight/lndian officers. Even if 
they had all proved untrustworthy and Sufficient, they could not, by any 
stretch of imagination, affect the ^loyalty and efficiency of the vast 
body of Indian troops under European officers. In fact, as Sir Peter 
Lumsden, then a member of the Iridia Council, said, the Mutiny had
demonstrated that the presence! of European officers with Indian troops
4 J
was no guarantee of loyalty. / As regards the cost of the plan, even if 
it had involved a slight increase,that would have been insignificant in 
comparison with the expenditure on a number of changes, such as, the 
increase of the army and *|he defence works.
So far as the scoije of the proposals was concerned, the argument 
came to this: so small a /concession was inadequate to satisfy the Indian 
demand, and since its extension was not possible consistent with the 
principles of safety and ^ efficiency, it was not necessary to make the
1 Memo. 22 May 1885.
2 Memo. 19 May I885.
5 Memo. 24 May I885. *
4 Memo. 20 July I885*
205
experiment at all* The apprehension that the appointment of a few
Indians would raise up a class of military adventurers was* as Curzon
1
remarked* greatly exaggerated. The difficulty likely to he caused hy
the seniority of an Indian officer and the unwillingness of European
soldiers to work under him could have heen overcome hy a provision, as
Field-Marshal Lord Napier suggested, that the Colonel of a new regiment
might have a title carrying no seniority over a British colonel. The
2
same principle could he applied to the other grades also.
3
The plan had a very large number of supporters. Napier
remarked that much greater danger might arise from not giving Indians an
opening to regimental command than from their appointments. Sir Neville
Chamberlain of the Bengal Army supported it on grounds of justice and of
policy, heing of opinion that the most likely way to ensure loyalty and
self-sacrifice was to hestow more rewards. He preferred the risk
involved in higher appointments to the one "inseparable from stagnation,"
and suggested that the number of corps should he increased to four - two
for Bengal, and one each for Madras and Bombay. He added that the
Queen’s Proclamation demanded that no distinction should he made on
4
grounds of race or creed. Lieutenant-General Francis Loch of the Bombay 
Staff Corps said that the appointment of men of the upper classes, who 
were not attracted hy civil service, would ensure their loyalty and make
1 Memo.* 4 June 1900, para. 33*
2 Memo., 11 May 1885 •
3 Lord Napier, Gen. N. Chamber lain, Gen. A.Taylor, Gen. H.Daly, Gen. 
Cureton, Gen. S.Browne, Gen. R.Bright, Gen. F.Loch, Gen. R.Meade,
Gen. P.Keyes, Col. F.Jenkins, Gen. Lumsden* R.Montgomery* H.Yule,
and W.Muir. Curzon’s Memo., 4 June 1900, para. 7.
4 Memo., 30 May I885.
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them appreciate more the advantages they derived from British mle^
Sir Robert Montgomery, a member of the India Council* supported the
plan by saying that in view of Russia’s policy of appointing non-Russians
to high military posts* the British Government should follow a similar
policy. He declared: "If the opponents of the present proposals take
the argument of unfitness on the part of the Natives* history and common
sense are against them. If they take the argument of political danger,
then admitting this to its fullest extent, it is a choice of evils, and
the balance is on the whole in favour of a policy which justice and
necessity alike demand.” He aptly remarked: "It is a policy dictated
2
today by wisdom; tomorrow it will be forced upon us by necessity."
Sir William Muir, another member of the India Council, was in favour of 
confining selection to men from "the Upper classes of our own provinces" 
and associating them in approved regiments with European officers* the 
object being to provide the chance of friendly combination between the 
two races in a united command. He was opposed to the idea of having 
regiments to be officered exclusively by Indians';
Kimberley did not accept the scheme in the form in which the 
Government of India suggested, but instead replied by submitting the 
proposals of General Stewart, then member of his Council. The scheme 
provided that two local regiments might be raised and localised on the 
Baluch frontier for the protection of Dera Ghazi Khan and Pi shin. The
1 Memo., 22 May 1885•
2 Memo., 13 July 1885.
3 Memo., 17 Oct. I885.
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officers were to “be taken from among the Indian officers of the army
and placed under the supervision of a British officer]’ In 1887 the
Government of India, for financial reasons, abandoned the proposal, but
suggested in its place a modest scheme for raising the status of Indian
officers by conferring on them the honorary rank of Lieutenant-0olonel,
Major or Captain. According to it, the recipients were to be given all
2
the privileges, attached to substantive rank, except command. General 
Roberts proposed that those to whom the grant might be immediately made 
could be chosen partly for past military services and partly for the
5
political importance of their existing employment. The Secretary of
State remarked that the proposals though limited "at present" to Indian
officers doing extra regimental duty were highly inexpedient because they
were intended to be extended later to the commissioned officers of the
line. He also pointed out that the bestowal of a mere titular British
rank of high grade, which would in every essential be subordinate to the
lowest grade borne by a British officer of the same battalion, would
actually emphasise its inferiority. He, however, proposed that it could
be conferred with benefit on officers employed in certain extra-regimental 
4
capacities. These last proposals of the Secretary of State changed the 
original plan beyond recognition and the question remained where it was 
before.
1 Mil. Des. to India, Ho.88, 15 April 1886. The memoranda above referred
to are to be found in Selections from Despatehes to India (1886),
Part I, 481-520.
2 Mil. Des. from India, Ho. 1^9, 12 Aug. 1887.
3 Mil. Progs.. Ho.1628, Hov. 1887.
4 Mil. Des. to India, Ho,314, JO Hov, 1887; Mil. Des. to India, Ho. 177,
26 July 1888.
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It has "been pointed out that the Government of India’s proposals
provided for the appointment of men of higher classes to the commissioned
ranks. Many supporters of the scheme like Napier felt that the sons of
loyal chiefs and heads of clan “by joining the military service would he
1
warmly attached to the Government, Lieutenant-General Loch was of
opinion that such men, having a stake in the country, would he interested
2
in the stability of British rule. Though the British Government
recognised the political advantages of the scheme, it remained satisfied
with the practice of granting honorary commissions to some Indian Princes
often on political and material grounds. , For instance, in November 1887,
the Government of India recommended’ the appointment of Maharaja Pratap
Singh of Jammu and Kashmir as Honorary Colonel, 3?th Dogras, in order to
get more recruits. On the main question of appointment to substantive
ranks the policy remained unaltered. The Government refused to comply
with the requests of some of the Princes who desired for their sons a
respectable military career.
On the question of granting commissions to Indians two distinguished^
4
military officers of this period - General Chesney, the Military Member,
1 Memo., 11 May 1885*
2 Memo., 22 May 1885*
3 Tel. 12 July 1887, Mil. Progs., N0.I632, Nov. 1887.
4 Chesney was of opinion that the Qneen’s Proclamation had been system­
atically disregarded in this respect. In April 1884, in connection
with a proposal to eonfer an honorary commission upon an Indian chief
(the Nawab of Mamdot), he (then Secretary) emphasised the necessity of 
giving not merely honorary but substantive commission. He proposed to 
begin the experiment with an Indian regiment, starting from the lowest 
commissioned rank then held by a British officer, to which an Indian 
cadet of good family should be appointed. He was to be promoted to the 
higher ranks as successive vacancies occurred. The object was to have 
the entire regiment officered by Indians. In Jan I885 he defended the 
plan also as a measure of economy, observing that an Indian regiment 
would require fewer Indian officers, who would be paid and pensioned at 
lower rates. Curzon* s Memo., 4 June 1900, para.5.
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and General Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief, held opposite opinions.
Chesney was strongly in favour of the plan, Roberts vehemently against it,
being of opinion that men of a proper stamp were not available and even if
they could be obtained their appointment would be a source of danger.
Commenting on these remarks, Chesney said that the first point could not
be determined until the Government made a trial. As to the second, he
said that every course to be pursued in India had its dangers. He
maintained that a policy of associating the people of India with the
Government by opening up to them prospects of appointment was safer than
1
one of distrust and exclusion.
In 1894, Brackenbury, then Military Member, was in favour of
granting commissions to the sons of Kunwar Harnam Singh of the Kapurthala
family, but the Council did not agree to his proposal. General White,
then Commander-in-Chief and other officers- were of opinion that the
presence of coloured men among the officers of British regiments would
Z
not be liked by the British soldier. Lord Elgin, while in favour of 
granting commissions in the British army, was opposed to the proposal 
for commissions in the Indian army?
In March 1897 Hamilton told Elgin that the insuperable barriers 
against Indians in the military department could not be maintained for 
ever, and added that the principle of equality which had been conceded 
in the civil department was denied in the military service. He pointed
1 Minute, 14 April 1891, para. 27.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 24 Feb. 1897, Pr. Cor. Ind., IV, 149.
3 Curzon’s Memo., 4 June 1900, para. 20.
\
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to the policy of Russia who had opened an. almost endless advancement
to her Central Asian subjects, some of whom had heen appointed tp the 
1
Imperial Guard. Referring to the good work done "by the Indiah troops 
in the Swat and Mohraand country, he remarked: "Can we maintain out
present limitation upon the promotion of native officers of good family?
.... If we can keep the affection 6f the fighting races and higher orders 
of society in India we can ignore the dislike and disaffection of the
2
intellectual non-fighting classes, the hahoos, students and pleaders." 
Elgin repeated the objections of White a M  others, adding that the only 
exception made in the case of Prince Victor Dulip Dingh was not wholly 
a success. Commenting on Russian policy, he said that "it would "be an 
evil day for Great Britain when the officers of the British army were 
assimilated to those of the Russian."' In a letter of December 1897 in 
which Hamilton asked Elgin and his advisers to express their views on this 
subjectj He further said that if the concession involved risks there also 
lay a danger in doing nothing to conciliate or win over to the British 
side any section of influential Indian society. His approach to this 
question was determined largely by the necessity of counteracting the
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 19 March 1897, Pr. Cor. Ind., ii, 107-9.
Curzon was of opinion that the argument was unsound. He pointed out
that Russia gave high military posts almost entirely to her Muslim
subjects. Muslim officers were appointed to rule Muslim districts 
or to command Muslim troops. Moreover, Russia, he said, m s  free 
from difficulties as to caste and religion, which beset the Indian 
problem and made it impossible to place a person of one creed in 
command of men of another. (Footnote, Memo., 4 June 1900). Curzon 
could not, however, disprove that Russia’s policy was more liberal.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 16 Sept. 1897, Pr. Cor. Ind., ii, 469-71.
5 Elgin to Hamilton, 1J Oct. 1897, Pr. Cor. Ind., VII, 177-9.
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growing solidarity of Jndian opinion in antagonism to British rule.
Elgin’s attitude was, on the whole, critical. Opinion in England
was also not favourable to the proposal.
in 1899 Hamilton reopened the question with the Government of
E
India by asking it to suggest how the racial bar could be broken. In
June 1900 Lord Curzon proposed the formation of a small corps, to be
called the Imperial Cadet Corps, consisting of from twenty to thirty
young men, drawn from the princely and noble families of India. He
dealt with the subject exhaustively in a memorandum, classifying the
various proposals made earlier into four heads: (1) Proposals to create
new regiments of the Indian army to be officered either wholly or in
an
part by Indians; (E) Proposals to establish /Indian Military College, for 
the instruction of Indian officers; (3) Proposals to give commissions in 
the Indian army to Indian gentlemen, after the ordinary course of 
examination and instruction; (4) Proposals to do the same in the British 
army. The shheme of 1885 was based on the creation of new regiments, 
and it £ad been strongly supported by General Chesney. On its failure, 
he proposed the foundation of a military school, open to young and 
promising Indians of good family. He contended that since education 
was the key that had unlocked the doors of civil employment, it would* 
if applied to the military profession, lead to the same results. The 
third plan was suggested by Brackenbury, who, in consequence of an appeal 
from Hamam Singh, recommended in 1894 to his colleagues the selection by
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 10 Dec. 1897, Pr. Cor. Ind., iii, 41-45*
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the Secretary of State of a limited number of young Indians for
Commissions in the Indian Staff Corps, subject to their passing all
the requisite tests. The proposal was discussed in the Executive
Council on 27 September 1894, and was abandoned. The fourth plan
originated in a request to the Secretary of State from the Maharaja
of Kuch Bihar in 1897 for permission for his son to enter Sandhurst.
The Political Committee of the India Office recommended the occasional
admission to corrmissions in the British army of sons of Indian Princes
and gentlemen under a system of careful selection. The War Office
rejected the proposal on the ground that once a start was made, it would
be impossible to check: the process and that a number of Indian Princes
2
were not wanted in the British army.
The Government of India, in its despatch of July 1900, which 
was based on Curzon’s memorandum, pointed out that there were two ways 
of dealing with the question. Pirst, the commissions could be granted 
in the regular army, British or Indian, carrying with them the various 
stages of official promotion. Secondly, the commissions should constitute 
an independent category, in fact a sort of honorary reserve, conferring 
on the officers so honoured the rank, the pay, and the prospects of 
promotion, but carrying with them the obligations, not of ordinary 
regimental service, but of military employment in extra-regimental billets,
1 D. Stewart, A. Alison, A. Iyall, and J. Gordon suggested that 
selection should be made by the Govt, of India, subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of State in Council and with the con­
currence of the War Office and the Sovereign. Curzon* s Memo.,
4 June 1900, para. 21.
2 Curzon*s Memo., 4 June 1900, Encl. to Mil. Des. from India, N0.IO3, 
19 July 1900.
to "be determined according to the number, the rank, and the aptitudes 
of the qualified candidates# The objections to the first plan# in its 
opinion# lay in social difficulties that were certain to arise out of 
contact between young British and Indian officers in the Begimental 
"Hess” and in the situation consequent on any attempt to place Indian 
officers in command of British officers and eventually of British troops. 
It recommended the second alternative and expressed the view that 
suitable occupation might be provided for them, with the distinction of 
British military rank# on the staff of British officers# to whom they 
would be attached at headquarters# in cantonments# at camps of exercise# 
and in the field. Curzon was anxious that the plan should come into 
force not later than January 1901. He expressed the view that it 
would fill a large gap in the British political and military system in 
India^
Curzon* s plan left the Government with discretion in utilising 
the young men after their probationary period. In case it did not 
work well, it could even be abolished. It differed from those proposals 
which had provided either for the creation of special regiments to be 
officered by Indians or for admission to commissions in the British army. 
But Hamilton’s task in getting the plan accepted by the Home authorities 
was difficult# There was opposition from all quarters. Members of the 
Cabinet# with the exception of the Prime Minister, were generally 
opposed to it; members of his Council# except Izrail, were not favourable;
1 Mil. Bes. from India, N0.IO3, 19 July 1900.
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and the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Colonial Office were hostile.
Commenting on the attitude of the War Office, Hamilton observed that
"they will put Tommy Atkins on a pedestal, and pretend that dire
consequences will ensue if any one, who is coloured, is ever given any
1
position involving any authority over him.” Hamilton no doubt had to 
fight against heavy odds.
It is clear then that in the early phase of the controversy 
emphasis was laid on granting commissions to the Indian officers of the 
army as well to the members of the aristocracy, but later the shift was 
almost entirely towards the latter. The scheme was supported as a 
measure of political expediency and on the ground that the conditions 
which necessitated the appointments of Indians to the Civil Service, 
the Legislature, and the Courts, called for a similar reform in the 
military service. Indeed, the considerations which inspired the 
proposals were mainly political, that is, they were advocated less with 
the object of adding to the efficiency of the army than of gratifying 
legitimate ambitions and of attaching the higher ranks of Indian society 
to the Government, The objections were based mainly on grounds of 
efficiency and racial discrimination. The first point, as discussed 
above, was palpably absurd. We conclude therefore that the principal, 
rather the sole, ground for objection was racial. The British governing 
class clung fast to the doctrine of prestige and racial superiority, and 
it was not until about the close of the First World War, which brought
1 Hamilton to Curzon, 26 Dec. 1900, Pr. Cor. Ind., IT, 460,
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it face to face with new conditions, demanding an entirely different
outlook, that it agreed to the admission of Indians to the commissioned 
1
ranks. Hamilton, who could not he described of heavy liberal views on 
Indian questions, observed: "Whilst I agree that we must be careful in
not undermining race superiority, it is ridiculous to argue that we 
must go on facing an increasingly dangerous problem, without making an
effort to solve it, because the British Private’s feelings would be hurt
2
or annoyed," But the British Government went on until circumstances 
forced it to change its policy.
One of the important military measures, which owed their 
introduction to the Russian danger, was the formation of Indian reserves. 
In 1885 the question of increasing the strength of Indian regiments in the 
event of their being required for war, and of adopting some methods for 
maintaining that strength in the field, was brought prominently to the 
attention of the Government. An obvious, and at the same time, cheap 
and effective method was the creation of adequate reserves. The subject 
had been referred to by Iytton’ s Government which observed in 1879:
1 Curzon’s scheme of Imperial Cadet Corps came into being in 1901 and 
was widely welcomed in Indian circles. The Corps consisted of cadets 
of princely and noble houses. In 1905 a special form of King’s 
Commission in His Majesty’s ’Hative’ Indian Land Forces was instituted 
for those Indians who passed successfully through the full course of 
the Imperial Cadet Corps. But this Commission carried only the power 
of command over Indian troops and the holders of it who could not rise 
above the position of company officer in a regimental unit, had no 
effective military career open to them. Thus before 1918 Indians were 
not eligible to hold the Commission which was held by the British 
officers of the British and Indian armies. Report of the Sandhurst 
Committee. (1927), para. 6.
2 Hamilton to Curzon, 26 Dec. 1900, Pr« Cor. Ind., V . 460.
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"The Indian army is now the only large army in the world which has no
reserves. In other words? India is the only country which, maintaining
a large army* pays in peace time for the whole available force which it
can put into the field in war."^ It expressed the view that the cost
could he reduced by forming a reserve. General Haines.,, the Commander-
in-Chief, did not favour the proposal, arguing, first, that it could not
be worked in accord with the system of service in the Indian armies, and,
secondly, a reserve must be "over and above our present means; in other
2
words a source of outlay rather than economy." The Commission of 1879
recommended the formation of a strictly limited reserve of 200 men to
every infantry regiment. Privates after twelve years1 service with the
colours could choose to pass into the reserve on a salary of four rupees
a months Commenting on this proposal, Johnson, the Military Member,
remarked that a system of Indian reserves, if perfect, was dangerous,
4
and if imperfect, was useless and costly.
In March 1885 the Government of India suggested two alternative 
schemes. The first plan provided that the men joining the reserve 
would continue to belong to their respective regiments and rejoin them 
when called out, being, in effect, on long furlough. The second plan 
made the reserve territorial in character, that is, the men passed into 
the reserve should not belong to any particular regiment, but would be 
called up and formed into a battalion to be stationed at some place near
1 Mil. Des. from India, Ho.168, 22 May 1879.
2 Minute, 20 May 1879, para. 17, Encl. to above. 4
5 Report» Para. 260.
4 Minute, 4 March 1880.
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their homes. The Government of India was in favour of giving a trial 
to "both plans. Under the first plan men were to he called up for 
training once a year or once every two years, receiving pay while under 
training and a gratuity not exceeding twenty rupees for each month of 
such training. It was recommended that the number of long furlough 
men might he limited to 250 men per regiment. The seoond plan provided 
that men would he called out for thirty days* duty once a year, and paid 
a gratuity of twenty-four rupees. Long furlough men could either join 
these local reserve battalions for their annual training or some corres­
ponding class regiment of their own if the regiment to which they 
belonged was too far off. It was suggested that the term reserve should 
he confined to the territorial battalions. No man of more than ten 
years* service was to he admitted into the reserved
The Secretary of State refused to sanction the plan of reserve 
battalions, being of opinion that they would fail to provide for the 
immediate strengthening of corps proceeding on service, or to keep their 
ranks supplied while in the field. He further remarked that hound by a 
common territorial tie and employed solely in maintaining internal order, 
they were likely to he a source of anxiety in the event of any reverses 
befalling the regular forces in the field. But he entirely concurred in 
the long furlough plan, and authorised the Government of India to give 
effect to it to such an extent as it might deem advisable. The objection 
was not to the reserve scheme, hut to a particular system of raising
1 Mil. Des. from India, No.44, 17 March I885.
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1reserves.
In 1886 the measure was introduced in the first instance in the
2
Bengal army and the Punjab Frontier Force. Two reserve forces were 
created, an active reserve composed of men transferred after not less 
than five and not more than twelve years’ service with the colours; and 
the garrison reserve, formed of soldiers pensioned after twenty-one years’ 
service or of men who had completed a total colour and reserve service of 
not less than twenty-one years. Men belonging to the garrison reserve 
were not liable to be employed beyond the frontiers of India. Hen of 
both reserves were given full pay and good conduct pay while embodied
5for training or called up for service during war.
The Government’s estimate was that the changes introduced in
1887 would give not before long a total strength of 26,000, but the rate
4
at which men joined that reserve was very slow. In 1890 a committee, with 
J.W. McvQueen as President, was appointed to inquire into the causes of 
the unpopularity of the system and make suggestions for its improvement.
The Committee’s recommendations relating to the increase of bonus from five 
rupees to twenty-five, granted to men transferred from the colours to the 
reserve, as compensation for the value of kit left with regiments for
5
further- use and the abolition of the garrison reserve were accepted.
1 Mil. Des. to India, No.192, 25 July 1885,
2 The Strength of the reserves of the Bengal army was raised from 100 to
218 men per battalion in 1887. At the same time the system of reserves 
was extended to the Madras and Bombay armies, the numbers being limited 
to 160 men per battalion. Summary of Measures during Dufferin’s 
Viceroyalty, (Mil. Dept.), 45-46.
5 Havildars, Naiks and Sepoys of both reserves, while at their homes, drew
pay at the rates of Hs.4, BS.-5-8-O and Hs.J & month respectively.
Mil. Progs., No.5232, Dec. 1886.
4 In 1895 the number of active reserves was about 15*000.
5 Mil. Progs., Nos.1581-85, July 1891.
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However, the rate of admission into the reserve, remained unsatisfactory.
In his evidence "before the Welby Commission, Gokhale observed that of
the two systems, regimental and territorial, the latter would have been
1
popular and succeeded better.
The formation of reserves, in addition not only to the existing 
but to the enlarged strength of the army, ruled out the question of 
reduction in expenditure. The sfaheme would have been most acceptable 
to Indian opinion if it had relieved the pressure on Indian revenues, 
but in its existing form it offered no financial relief. Another point 
which may be noted is that though the Government had fixed the strength 
at a small figure the supply of reserves remained inadequate for many 
years. The system of territorial reserve, which was not accepted in 
1885, mainly on grounds of distrust, would no doubt have proved more 
successful.
• • ♦ *
An examination of the British policy of army recruitment is 
significant in revealing governmental. motives. Before 1857 the bulk 
of the Bengal infantry was composed of the ’Purbias* - men drawn from 
Oudh and the adjacent districts - about three-fourths of whom belonged 
to the higher castes. In the post-Mutiny period the Bengal army under­
went a revolutionary change in composition. Because of their connection 
with the Mutiny the ’Purbias* came to be thoroughly and permanently 
discredited. In the ’nineties the Hindustani portion of the Bengal
1 Minutes of Evidence, iii, Q. 18219.
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army numbered only 16 regiments of which less than ten were composed 
of Bajputs and Brahmans. The British Government did not modify its 
attitude, and as a result the ,Purhiast, who had rendered great services 
in the past, remained permanently excluded* Service with the Hindustani 
array - which was so popular in the Company* s day - lost much of its 
attraction. Writing in 1891 General Chesney said that it was very
1
necessary to restore the prestige of the discredited Hindustani army. It
was indeed unfortunate that the British Government continuing distrust
did not make use of a valuable source of recruitment.
In the post-Mutiny period the recruiting field shifted largely
to Hepal, the Punjab, and the Horth-West. Fighting efficiency and
loyalty were the principal considerations which determined the area from
which the recruits were drawn. It is clear that loyalty alone was not
the determining factor. Had it been so, it would have been easy to
recruit any number of loyal men from other parts of India. The gradual
reduction in the strength of the Madras army, the elimination of the
lower castes, and the persistent rejection of the Anglo-Indian community’s
requests for enlistment in the army were not based on the matter of
loyalty. But the perfect combination of efficiency with loyalty was not
2
easy to obtain. The Gurkhas no doubt satisfied this condition, and
indeed General Boberts regarded them as by far the best and most trust-
3
worthy of all the Asian soldiers of Britain. In the case of Punjabis
1 Minute, 14 April 1891, para. 40.
2 The number of Gurkha regiments in the Bengal army was 5 1862 and
15 in 1892. Mil. Des. to India, Ho.107, 4 Aug. 1892.
3 Minute, 8 Feb. 1890.
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it was not loyalty so much as efficiency which accounted for their large
recruitment. Just about the end of the Mutiny in I858 a number of
distinguished men expressed the opinion that the services of the Punjabis
1
were not rendered from disinterested motives.
The policy of recruiting larger numbers of Gurkhas and Punjabis 
was dictated mainly by considerations of efficiency. The process was 
facilitated by two factors: the complete distrust of the ’Purbias* and
the availability of better fighting material. The first point has been 
discussed above; as regards the second# it may be pointed out that with 
the expansion of the Empire in the Punjab and the North-West the area of 
choice was correspondingly extended. The Government was concerned to 
improve the quality of the army. An obvious method was to draw recruits 
from those parts of the country which supplied the best men. Moreover, 
the importance of the Punjab and the North-West as recruiting fields 
became much greater with the approach of Russia towards Indian borders. 
For twenty years the Russian menace remained the most dominant factor in 
Indian military policy. It was strongly emphasised by British military 
authorities that the Indian army which might be called upon to meet a
1 Sir George Clerk (Governor of Bombay in 1847, and again in 1860-62# 
and member of the India Council# 1864-76) attributed the loyalty of 
the Sikhs to the lust for plunder. Report of Army Commission (1859),
Q. 1172.
Major-Gen. Mansfield, then Chief of the Staff in India, observed 
that it was not out of love# but out of hatred of the Bengal army, 
that the Sikhs flocked to the British standard. Minute, 1J July I858, 
App. to Minutes of Evidence, Army Commission (1859), 97.
The Punjab Government remarked that the hope of sharing in the spoils 
of Delhi turned the Punjabis towards British service. Punjab to Govt, 
of India, 25 May I858, Selections from Punjab Correspondence, iv, No.l, 
46.
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formidable power like Russia should consist of the best available men.
In 1885 when the army was increased* as many as nine battalions were 
raised from Punjabis and Gurkhas. In 18^0 four Hindustani regiments 
were disbanded and replaced by Punjabi Muslims, Pathans, Dogras and 
Gurkhas. Military authorities maintained, and the Government Of India 
shared their views, that the problem of Indian security had largely 
changed in character since I885. In 1890 O.R. Newmarch, Military 
Secretary to the Government, observed that before I885 military organisa­
tion was based on considerations of internal security* but since then the 
Indian Government, instead of looking inwards, had been required to face 
outwards. He recognised that there was danger in strengthening too 
much the war-like classes of the army, but the risk, he said, had to be 
run under the changed situation?' In 189J General White expressed the 
same view when he said that the greatest danger against which they had
to guard was aggression from without whereas in I859 and the following
2
years the problem was mainly one of internal security.
During the period 1885-95, when General Roberts was Commander-in- 
Chief, the policy of replacement by more war-like troops was actively 
followed. He fully exploited the situation on the North-West Frontier 
and succeeded in introducing many changes which tended to substantially 
increase the importance of the Punjab and the North-West as recruiting f 
fields. In October 1887 he recommended the replacement of 2,018 men of
1 Minute of 50 April 1890 on Govt, of India’s Mil. Des.* No.65 (1890). 
E See his Minute of 4 Feb. 1895* Encl. to Mil. Des# from India, No.46,
EO Feb. 1895.
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the Bengal army by Rajputs, and Jats, These men, serving in 19 regiments,
1
Belonged to the lower classes. The Government of India accepted the
proposals. Accordingly the commanding officers were instructed not to
2
enlist from the lower castes in future. The main grounds for this were, 
first, the difficulty in entrusting them with the command of companies 
or troops consisting of men of higher castes, and secondly, their 
habitual submissiveness to the authority of the superior castes. But
if the attitude of the higher castes had been the only obstacle, it 
could have been overcome by forming separate regiments from the lower 
classes. |t is thus clear that the decision was taken mainly on grounds 
of efficiency.
The policy of elimination was not confined only to the Bengal 
army. In October 1891 the Government of India observed that certain 
low castes, such as, Parwari, Mang and Raxrrusi, who formed ten to eleven 
per cent., and other low caste men amounting to five to six per cent, of 
each battalion in the Bombay army should be replaced by the better
5
fighting material available within the area. In October 1895 the
Bombay Government’s proposal to pension off 15 Indian officers of such
low castes as Parwari and Hochi, irrespective of the length of service,
4
was sanctioned. The same policy was followed towards the low castes of
1 Among those who were eliminated Ahirs numbered 1260, Gujars 186, 
Kurmis 96, Pasis 72, Bhats 41, and other castes like Lohars, Chamars, 
Khatiks, etc. numbered below 40.
Mil. Progs. Ho.275, Feb. 1888.
2 Mil. Progs.. H0.I655, May 1888.
5 Letter to Bombay Govt., 21 Oct. 1891 and Memo., Mil. Progs., Ho.57, 
Hov. 1891.
4 Mil. Des. from India, Ho.171, 10 Sept. 1895; Mil. Des. to India,
Ho.100, 51 Oct. 1895.
the Hyderabad Contingent. In 1891 Brigadier-General Prothero*
Commanding Hyderabad Contingent, recommended that the enlistment of
Dhers and Mangs, except as battery drivers, should be stopped. He
expressed his opinion against the enlistment of low caste men, adding
that the question of their promotion as non-commissioned officers was
of extreme difficuly. On the one hand, he said, there were objections
to their promotion because they lacked influence, and, on the other
1
ha»d, if they were not promoted, they became discontented. In 1895
2
the enlistment of Dhers and Mangs was completely stopped.
General Roberts* entire scheme of military reform was dominated 
by the single consideration of how best to meet Russia if war came. He 
subordinated to this object even principles of counterpoise and balance 
existing in the form of separate armies. In September 1886 he urged 
the desirability of substituting soldiers of the most war-like classes 
for men of doubtful qualities. He held very strong views on the 
fighting qualities of the various classes, placing them in order of 
fitness as follows: Gurkhas, Dogras, Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims (north of 
the Ravi and west of the Jhelum), Jats. and Pathans. ”1 have no 
hesitation myself in stating,w he declared, "that except Gurkhas, Dogras, 
Sikhs, the pick of Punjabi Muhammadans, Hindustanis of the Jat and 
Ranghur castes (such as enlist in the cavalry), and certain classes of 
Pathans, there are no native soldiers in our service whom we could
1 Letter to Resident, Hyderabad, 9 Hov. 1891, Encl. to Mil. Des. from 
India, Ho.Jl, 5 March 1897.
2 Mil. Secretary to Govt, of India to Resident, Hyderabad, 11 March, 1895. 
They were not to be recruited even as drivers in the artillery.
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1
venture with safety to place in the field against the Russians.”
In 1889 Roberts submitted a plan for the larger recruitment
of the trans-Indus Afghan tribes on military grounds as well as political.
Ee emphasised that their presence in the array would give the British a
certain pied a terre in the trans-Indus region* and their local knowledge
and influence would be very valuable in any military operations in that
direction* His proposals for adding eight Afridi companies was accepted
by the Secretary of State* On 1890 he recommended the reduction of the
Madras cavalry from four to two regiments and the increase of the Punjab
cavalry and infantry by one regiment each. The Secretary of State did
not accept these proposals. In 1891 the Government of India submitted
a modified plan providing for the reduction of the Madras cavalry by
only one regiment and the addition of one squadron to each of the three
remaining regiments. Under these proposals the total strength of the
Madras cavalry was kept intact. In the same despatch the Government of
India observed that the Indian army should be looked upon as a f ighting
machine and not as something to gratify the feelings of each Presidency
or to provide employment for unwarlike soldiers. The Secretary of State
accepted the modified proposals.
The history of the Madras army reveals the same governmental
motives at work. The army was reduced in size several times* and later
2
a considerable portion of it was replaced by men from outside. These
1 Minute* 8 Feb. 1890*
2 In 1861-62, four out of eight regiments of cavalry and eight out of
fifty-two infantry regiments were reduced; in 1864-65 four more infantry 
regiments were reduced; and in 1882, the strength was further reduced 
by eight regiments. Between 1902 and 1904 two regiments were converted 
into battalions of Moplahs, one into a Gurkha Corps, and nine into 
battalions of Punjabis.
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changes were introduced despite its unimpeachable loyalty and its record
of valuable service in the Mutiny. Even so not a few military authorities
were of opinion that the Madras army was inefficient as a fighting force.
Sir George White* who later succeeded Roberts as Commander-in-Chief,
reporting on the Madras soldier, said that "there is a want of war-like
instinct and manliness in the class from which he is taken that precludes
the hope of making him into a valuable soldier, and that it would be
injudicious to put him in front line against any fairly armed enemy we
are likely to meet, or even against the irregular and badly armed bands of
1
such braver races as we have on our north-west frontier in India.*1 
Newmarch, the Military Secretary, remarked that many officers were of
2
opinion that the Madras army could never be more than a military police.
^n 1891 General Chesney maintained that it could only be employed against
a European enemy at a tremendous risk. He emphasised that it did not
provide a counterpoise adding that in his view it had not provided even
in the Mutiny inasmuch as its Indian portion had suffered only JO 
J
casualities'. These observations at least indicate that the sources 
from which the army was recruited were not considered so good as Gurkhas 
and Punjabis.
The Madras army underwent two important changes in its composition. 
Between 1890 and 1895 its seven regiments were broken up and replaced by 
men from the military police levies in Burma then in course of reduction.
1 White (late Commanding Upper Burma Force) to Adj. Gen. in India, 
1 July 1889, Encl. to Mil. Des. from India, Ho. 142, 2 Aug. 1889.
2 Minute, JO April 1890.
5 Minute, 14 April 1891, paras. 55*56•
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A portion of the Madras command* consisting mainly of Punjabis, was
1 '
permanently stationed in Burma, a change introduced principally with 
the object of mating that portion of the army more efficient. Another
change resulted in the elimination of the Telingas whom the Commander-
Z
in-Chief of Madras characterised as "the bane of the army." In 1895
their recruitment was discontinued. The Government of India’s policy
was to reduce the strength of the army in the south to a figure just
sufficient for local purposes. In 1890 it had recommended the reduction
of two Madras cavalry and one infantry regiments. In 1892 it suggested
a reduction of six battalions on the ground that they were not required
3for the security of southern India. If these recommendations had been
carried out, the Indian portion of the Madras army would have been reduced
to twenty-five regiments including the fourteen regiments serving in Burma.
We see then that the Madras army was reduced in size and changed
in composition because the sources of recruitment did not, in the opinion
of military authorities, compare favourably with those in the north.
An important reason why better material did not enlist in the south was,
as Colonel Faunce pointed out, that the terms of service were such as
4
could be acceptable only to the poorer classes. The attitude of the
1 In 1900 of these regiments one was a class regiment of Gurkhas and 
six were class company regiments, comprising Sikhs - 22 companies, 
Dogras - 2; Punjabi Muslims - 16; Hindustanis - 1; Pathans - 3* 
Hajputs - 2; and Brahmans - 2. Pari. Papers, LXX (1902), 488.
2 Adj. Gen., Madras army to Madras Govt., 8 Nov; 1890, Mil. Progs.,
Ho.1549, April 1891.
3 Govt, of India to Govt, of Madras, 25 Oct. 1892, Mil. Progs., Ho.676, 
Hov. 1892.
4 Memo, by Col. E. Faunce, Deputy Adj. Gen., Madras Army, 25 Hov. I885, 
Mil. Progs., Ho.3224, Dec. 1886.
Government was that if for the same cost "better men were available in
the Horth-Yfest, it was not advisable to spend more than was absolutely
necessary on inferior material. In 1891 the Government of India
remarked that the army was not meant to afford an easy means of livelihood
at the public expensed The reaction of the Madras Government to the
policy of reduction was one of disapproval, and in 1890 its Commander-in-
Chief strongly emphasised the necessity of fixing the strength of the
2
army an a permanent basis.
The case of the Bombay army, which consisted of about thirty per 
cent, of ’foreigners,’ stood on a different footing. The persistence 
of the Bombay authorities in the recruitment of men from outside, in 
disregard of the clear and repeated instructions of the Government of 
India, shows on the one hand the defects of the Tresidency’ system and on 
the other^he necessity of maintaining a balance in the composition of 
the army.
In September I883 the Supreme Government asked the Bombay Govern­
ment to restrict recruitment generally to territories under its control. 
Stress was laid on the necessity of maintaining, as far as possible, the 
distinct nationality of the army by reducing the strength of ’foreigners’ 
to a minimum. In a resolution of 6 June I885 the Bombay Government 
recommended that the Presidency army should be permitted to recruit 
without restriction in the Punjab and the prohibited districts of Bajputana.
1 Mil. Des. from India, Ho,41, 4 March 1891.
2 Adj. Gen., Madras to Secretary to Govt, of Madras, 8 Hov. 1890. 
Mil. Progs., Ho,1549, April 1891.
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The Supreme Government made some modification in its decision by adding
1
Alwar, Ajmer, and Jaipur to the areas of its recuuitment. The Bombay
officers, however, continued to recruit from the prohibited districts.
According to the Government of India* 15 regiments of the Bombay army
had no less than 3»985 men from the Punjab and the H.W.P., or an average
of 265 men per regiment as against 150 at which the maximum strength of
2
,foreignersT had been fixed. The Bombay Government maintained that 
while their presence in such small strength did not materially affect
the nationality of the Bombay army, it acted on the other hand, in some
3
measure, as a leaven upon the predominant Maratha element.
The explanation for the attitude of the Government of India lies
largely in the policy of recruitment which was to a considerable extent
determined by political considerations. In a despatch of August 1889
it remarked: "From a military point of view the whole Indian army should
be recruited only from the war-like classes. But political considerations*
are in many respects as weighty as military.” It expressed the view
that if military efficiency only had to be taken into account, all the
4
three armies would require a certain amount of reconstitution. However, 
in explaining the Government of India’s attitude we have also to take 
into consideration its hostility to the Presidency system. Perhaps its 
criticism of the Bombay Government was intended to reinforce the case 
for its abolition.
It must be remembered that the Marathas, who formed a considerable
1 Letter to Bombay Govt., 10 Aug. 1885> Mil. Progs., N0.I85* Sept. 1885*
2 Letter to Bombay Govt., 4 Feb. 1889, Mil. Progs., 2415* Feb. 1889#
5 Mil. Progs.. Ho.2412, Feb. 1889.
4 Mil. Be s. from India, Ho. 142, 2 Aug. 1889.
2J 0
proportion of the army, were efficient soldiers and could well have
supplied more men, hut recruitment beyond a certain limit would have
upset the balance# It appears that the Bombay Government under such
circumstances preferred to recruit efficient men from outside.
The composition of the Hyderabad Contingent, which had about
50 per cent, of its men from Northern India, illustrates the point more
clearly. Though the Contingent had an extremely restricted military
jurisdiction, in composition it was only half local^ The Government
of India no doubt tried many a time to fix the proportion of ’foreigners’
in
at a smaller figure, but it failed because of ai/adequate supply of
fit men from the local sources. In 1876 and again in 1882 it insisted
that recruiting should be restricted to the Deccan and Southern India;
and in November 1887 it fixed the admission of ’foreigners’ at 25 per 
Z
cent. The orders were issued in October 1888. In 1891 Prothero 
pointed out the extreme difficulty of obtaining recruits of a suitable 
stamp in the Provinces south of the Narbada and Mahanadi rivers. He 
strongly urged the Government of India to remove the 25 per cent, 
restrictions The Commanding Officers, whom he had consulted, were of 
opinion that suitable men were not available. Kirkwood, Commanding 
Officer of the 6th Infantry went so far as to say that the material
1 In 189J the percentage of men belonging to Southern India was 
about 48. The Contingent numbered about 7,500 strong. In 190J 
it was incorporated in the regular army.
2 Mil. Des. from India, No.220, 29 Nov. 1887; Mil. Des. to India, 
No.10, 12 Jan. 1888,
5 Letter to Resident* Hyderabad, 9 Nov. 1891, Encl. to Mil. Des. 
from India, No.Jl* 3 March 1897.
231
available in the South was, with very few exceptions, "worse than
useless•" Although the orders, restricting the proportion of ’foreigners1
were Issued in October 1888, they were not put into effect. In 1893
Prothero observed that if they were to be rigidly enforced, the regiments
would fall considerably below the strength, and asked whether the
Government of India was prepared to accept such a situation?" In 1894
the proportion of ’foreigners’ was fixed at 50 Per cent, but the recruit-
2
ment of frontier or trans-frontier Pathans was forbidden.
The attitude of military authorities towards the employment of 
Anglo-Indians in the army is quite relevant to our discussion. The 
Anglo-Indians had completely identified their interest with the British 
Government, and were also encouraged to join the volunteer corps, but 
their repeated offers for military service were systematically rejected.
In 1857-58 three local corps of Eurasians, namely, the Lahore Light 
Horse, the East India Regiment, and the Eurasian Battery of Artillery 
had been formed, but the first two were disbanded in 1864-65 and the last 
in 1870. Between 1870 and 1900 the Anglo-Indian community submitted 
many memorials urging the Government to provide a military career for it. 
Military authorities like Roberts, White and Lockhart were opposed to their 
recruitment almost entirely on grounds of efficiency. Roberts said that 
since a Eurasian regiment would cost as much as a British regiment, the 
money would be better spent on the latter. In 1893 Brackenbury suggested
1 Letter to Resident, Hyderabad, 10 Oct. 1893, Encl. to Des. N0.3I*
Z Mil. Secretary, Govt, of India to Resident, Hyderabad, 22 Feb. 1894, 
Encl. to Des. No.31*
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that a small number of Eurasians could be appointed* as an experimental 
nBasure* in the garrison artillery, their cost to be met by reducing 
the number of the less valuable Indian troops/ The scheme was dropped 
on account of General White's opposition. In 1898-99 C. Nairne, then 
Commander-in-Chief, and his successor, V/. Lockhart were strongly opposed 
to the recruitment of Eurasians# Nairne was of opinion that their 
efficiency as gunners would not be more than two-thirds of the same number 
of British gunners. Lockhart observed that their habits and aptitudes 
fitted them for a civil rather than a military career, and added that 
the army should not be utilised as a charitable institution. In 1899 
the Government of India expressed its opinion in favour of making an 
experiment by raising a Eurasian regiment]’ but the Secretary of State did 
not accept the proposal on the grounds, as pointed out by the military 
authorities, that a Eurasian regiment could only be maintained in addition 
to, and not in substitution for, any part of the existing garrison and
that it would involve expenditure incommensurate with the advantages to be
2
obtained. The importance of the question of Anglo-Indian recruitment is 
that loyalty alone was not the passport to admission to the military service. 
Considerations of efficiency weighed very largely with military authorities 
in matters of recruitment.
A policy of recruitment based on efficiency was bound to result 
in a country like India in the preponderance of certain sections of the 
population. Though the principle of balance and counterpoise, as provided
1 Mil. Des. from India, No.55* 5® March 1899.
2 Mil. Des. to India, No.6, 18 Jan. 1900.
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in the shape of local armies composed, as far as possible, of local
element, remained the keynote of British policy, it was considerably
modified by the predominance of the Punjabi element. In 1861 the
Indian army, as reconstituted after the Mutiny, was composed of four
separate bodies of nearly equal strength, but as the years passed, and
especially since I885, an increasingly greater emphasis came to be placed
on recruitment in the Punjab and the North-West. In 1892 the Government
of India observed that the Indian army in any campaign beyond the North-
West Frontier must be composed mainly of Sikhs, Punjabis, Pathans,
1
Baluchis and Gurkhas. In his able minute of April 1891, Chesney remarked
that the inevitable tendency would be to move the centre of gravity of
the military system more and more to the north-west, and such a necessity,
he said, would be incompatible with the policy which demanded four
2separate and, as far as possible, equal armies. The Punjab continued
to supply a large proportion of the Indian army. Even after the end of
the Bussian menace, consequent on the Japanese victory of 1905* the
British Government made no departure from its policy of drawing recruits
largely from Nepal, the Punjab, and the North-West. The preponderance
of the Punjabi element took place at the expense of the other classes in
by
the army. Consequently, the system of balance provided/the constitution 
of more or less equal armies - a point on which the Army Commission of 
1879 had laid strong emphasis - was considerably disturbed, but the other 
principle of counterpoise, namely, the organisation of the army on the
1 Mil. Des. from India, No. 172, 2 Nov. 1892.
2 Minute, 14 April 1891, para. 42.
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“basis of castes and classes* was never abandoned. The Indian army
indeed contained within itself the elements of equilibrium. In 1892
the Secretary of State remarked that the preponderance of the Punjab
division was somewhat counterbalanced by the larger proportion of Sikhs
1
and Bogras of whom it was composed. Moreover* 15 regiments of Gurkhas* 
a class distinct from all others, and a large proportion of European 
troops supplied the most effective counterpoise.
• * ♦ •
An important question on which the V/ar Office and the Treasury 
took decisions often in disregard of the viewsand protests of the Govern­
ment of India related to the payment of troops employed outside India.
That India must supply troops for imperial purposes was not the point 
which the Indian Government could call in question. The point at issue 
was whether she should also pay for the troops employed for purposes with 
which she was either not connected at all or very indirectly connected.
The occasions when England supplied troops for India were much fewer than 
when India did for England* and whenever England lent troops, for instance* 
in the Mutiny, she charged to Indian revenues every farthing of the 
expenses incurred* but in the case of India the principle of reciprocity 
was honoured more in the breach than in the observance. Though the Act 
of I858 had provided that the consent of both Houses of Parliament was
necessary for spending Indian revenues on troops employed for any purpose
2
except for "preventing or repelling actual invasion" of India, it was not
1 Mil. Des. to India, Ho.107, 4 Aug. 1892.
2 21 A 22 Viet., c.106, s.55*
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difficult for any Government to get the necessary sanction*
In the nineteenth century Indian troops were employed many times 
outside India. In the Chinese War of 1859-40 all the ordinary charges 
were home hy India and the extraordinary charges hy England. In the 
war with Persia in I856 India paid the ordinary and half the extra­
ordinary expenses. In the Abyssinian war of 1867-68 she paid the
1
ordinary and England the extraordinary charges. In the Perak expedition 
of 1875 India bore the ordinary and England the extraordinary cost of 
the troops. In the Malta expedition of 1878 England paid both the 
ordinary and extraordinary charges. In the Egyptian expedition of 1882
2
India paid the ordinary and sixty per cent, of the extraordinary expenses.
In the Suakin expedition of I885-86 India paid only the ordinary charges.
In the Mombassa expedition of 1896 England paid both the ordinary and extra­
ordinary expenses. In the Suakin expedition of 1896 India paid the 
ordinary and England the extraordinary charges. Each time when India 
was asked to pay, the War Office and the Treasury argued that Indian 
interests were also involved in the areas where the expeditions were sent.
On this question the Government of India took throughout a 
consistent and strong stand. In 1868 Lawrence declared that India had 
not the slightest interest in Abyssinia and that the war was being fought 
for the vindication of English honour. He further remarked that India 
was very differently treated from the Colonies inasmuch as none could think
1 In the Malaya peninsula,
2 Kimberley’s speech, 16 March I885* Hansard, ccxcv, 1225.
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1
of asking them to pay. On 28 November 1867 Cranborne, former Secretary
of State for India, told the Commons that India should not be "looked
upon as an English barrack in the Oriental seas from which we may draw
g
any number of troops without paying for them." In 1882 the Government
of India strongly protested against the Home Governments decision on
many grounds. First, it argued that since it represented the people
of the country, it had a claim to be heard before being asked to pay the
expenses. Secondly, while the sole interest of India lay in the safety
of the Suez canal, the interests of Britain were much greater. Thirdly,
the British Colonies, such as. New Zealand, Australia, Hongkong and the
Straits Settlements, which were equally interested in the safety of the
Canal, were not called upon to pay their share. Fourthly, from the
political point of view, a decision which imposed more burden on a poor
country having smaller interests would be injurious to the relations
3
between England and India.
In I885 the Indian troops were sent to Suakin. The Government 
of India protested against the financial arrangements remarking that the 
operations neither involved the safety of the Canal, nor were they 
connected with any Indian interests. It expressed the view that on the 
above grounds it might be justified in opposing the employment of Indian 
troops, but since it was not in a position to refuse assistance, it must 
protest by saying that the Indian taxpayer had an overwhelmingly strong
1 Minute, 20 Jan. 1868; Encl. to Fin. Des. from India, No.28, 3 Feb. 1868.
2 Hansard, CXC, 406.
3 Fin. Despatches from India, No.239 of 4 Aug. 1882 and No.274 of
1 Sept. 1882.
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1
case for total exemption from the cost. In M s  minute of 19 February
I885, Sir William Muir, a member of the India Council, declared: "This
is an Egyptian affair, arising out of Egyptian complications, undertaken
2
for the purpose of clearing the.Egyptian frontier."
By May I885 the active operations were suspended, but the Indian 
troops were retained in order to relieve the British troops of duty in a 
very hot climate* The Government of India justifiably demanded that 
under the changed circumstances it should not be asked to pay the ordinary
3
charges with effect from 15 May 1885- Kimberley replied that if the
withdrawal of the Indian garrison m s  delayed beyond May 1886,
4
representation would be made to the Treasury. The reply, as the Indian 
Government rightly interpreted, practically admitted the validity of its
5
claim. Kimberley’s successor, Cross did not press the matter, but urged 
the Treasury not to charge, without the Government of India’s concurrence, 
any portion of the expenses on troops employed in duties not directly
g
concerning Indian interests. The Treasury agreed that on such occasions
the views of the Indian Government and the Secretary of State would be
7
"respectfully weighed" by the Imperial Government.
Early in 1896 an Indian regiment was sent to Mombassa, on the 
coast of East Africa. The India Office said: "There is no justification
1 Fin. Des from India, No.53, 17 Feb. I885.
Z Minutes of Dissent (1881-1900), 183*
3 Fin. Des. from India, No.53* 9 Feb. 1886.
4 Fin. Des. to India, No.92, yi March 1886.
5 Fin. Des. from India, No.336* 26 Oct. 1886.
6 Fin. Des. to India, No.51, 3 Feb. 1887.
7 Treasury to India Office, 19 Jan* 1887, Encl. to above.
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for charging upon Indian revenues any portion of the cost of this force
so long as it is employed out of India and for purposes exclusively 
1
Indian.” The Treasury maintained that in this case there was a 
stronger claim upon Indian funds for ordinary pay than in the expeditions 
of 1867 and 1885* It expressed the view that India had substantial 
interests in the trade of Zanibar and that many of the leading commercial 
firms were Indian in personnel* The India Office rightly remarked that 
it could be shown with much greater force that though the British had
large interests in Indian trade, the English Exchequer did not pay for
2
the military force in India*
In the Suakin expedition of 1896 India had to pay the ordinary
charges of the troops* The India Council decided by a majority that
3
the precedent of 1885 should be made applicable. In a very able
document which also traced the history of previous transactions* the
Government of India showed how the Treasury had very often acted in a
most arbitrary manner in matters of payment* Elgin observed: "But I
4
fail in this case to see where an equitable claim on us comes in." On 
2 June he said that Colonies like Australia, which were also interested 
in Egypt, could contribute, if not by men, at least by money. Be went 
on to say that he took the Indian side on this question, because the 
sentiment was so strong that any opposition would have become a personal 
one5 The Government of India protested against the decision mainly on 
four grounds. First, there was no reciprocity between India and England
1 India Office to Foreign Office, 27 Feb. 1896; C.8I3I (1896).
2 India Office to Treasury, 15 April 1896.
3 Secretary of State’s Tel., 15 May 1896.
4 Elgin to Hamilton, May 1896, Pr. Cor. Ind., ii, 649.
5 Elgin to Hamilton, 2 June 1896, Pr. Cor. Ind., ii, 681.
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in such arrangements, that is, where British troops were employed, their
entire expenses, from the date of their embarkation from England to the
date of their return, were charged to Indian revenues. The Government
of India remarked: "We have little doubt that if we were obliged to ask
for an additional British regiment for the garrison of India during the
absence of the Indian Contingent, the War Office would not only press for
the payment of the whole of the expenses mentioned, but for a contribution
in aid of raising and training the regiment." Secondly, no Indian
interests, however remote, were involved in the operations in the Sudan.
Thirdly, if Indian troops were to be employed at an unhealthy place like
Suakin in the worst season of the year in order to avoid risk to British
troops, India should not be asked to pay their expenses. Fourthly,
such an arrangement would be impolitic in view of the unanimity of Indian
opinion on the question and of the authority of the Indian Legislature to
discuss the budget. The Government of India remarked that the policy
1
exposed it to attacks to which there was no adequate answer.
Beferring to the Treasury* s argument that in case India did not
pay the expenses there would be an actual saving in the Indian Budget,
two members of the Indian Council, Peile and Stewart observed that there
was nothing unreasonable if India made a saving by not paying for what
she did not get. As to another argument that if the troops had not been
paid their entire
sent, India would have charges, they aptly
remarked that there was "great difference between paying your own men for 
doing your own work in your own country, and paying the same men for doing
1 Fin. Des. from India, No. 1^ 4, 2 June 1896.
i
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other perople’s work in a foreign country^"
In June 1896 the Secretary of State laid down three principles
according to which the relations "between India and England were to he
regulated. First, when the temporary loan of a military force was
urgently required, either hy Britain or India, such assistance was to he
promptly given so far as the resources and situation of either country
at the time might permit. Secondly, if the Government lending the troops
had no special interest, the whole cost of the force, including ordinary
and extraordinary charges was to he horne hy the borrower. Thirdly, if
the Government supplying the troops had a distinct and specific interest
it
in the matter, which though/might not he so strong as in the case of the
country requiring assistance, the former should he content to hear, in
2
one form or another the hurden which the operations involved. The 
Secretary of State expressed the view that the principles were based on 
justice and equity. He defended the Suakin arrangement on the basis of 
the third principle though the Government of India in its despatch of 
£ June 1896 had strongly protested against it. Thus the real difficulty 
lay in the application of these principles, because the decision as to 
whether or not Indian interests were involved rested with the Imperial 
Government which was judge as well as the dominant party.
The Suakin expedition provoked a lively discussion in Parliament 
on 6 July 1896. The Government of India’s despatch of £ June 1896 
strongly strengthened the position of the opposition. Morley characterised 
the transaction as an act of ’’melancholy meanness,M and remarked that it
1 Minutes of Dissent (1881-1900), 379.
£ Fin. Des. to India, No .106, 30 June 1896.
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was not advisable to run the risk for a paltry sum of £35,000, Fowler 
expressed the same view when he asked whether it was wise or statesman­
like to defy the public opinion of Xn&ia &&& to overrule the opinion of
2
the Indian Government for that small sum. Though A.J.Balfour, First 
Lord of the Treasury* devoted most part of his speech to defending the 
decision and replying to the criticism, he hinted at the advisability 
of constituting some kind of tribunal of arbitration for determining 
questions of that character* Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, also 
said in the Lords that early in the present year he consulted his 
colleagues about the appointment of an impartial tribunal which should 
have the confidence of the taxpayers of both England and India, but they 
did not consider the details because they thought it best to await the
4
report of the Welby Commission. Michael HiekarBeach, Chancellor of the
Exchequer, observed that he held strong opinions against placing the
5
Government of India in a position of almost independent authority.
Salisbury remarked that though the sum was small, its payment involved
g
a principle of great interest to the British taxpayer.
Though Morley and Fowler argued convincingly against the Suakin 
arrangement, the Opposition case was weakened by the fact that the Liberals, 
themselves had created bad precedents which they now asked the Conservatives 
to set aside. When the Government justified the policy on the principles
1 Indian Pari. Debates (1896), 215*
2 Ibid., 262.
5 Ibid., 266.
4 Indian Pari* Debates, 16 July 1896, 319*
5 Ibid., 6 July 1896, 254.
6 Ibid., 16 July 1896, J16.
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of payment adopted in the years 1882 and 1885* it no doubt had a strong
argument in its favour. Fowler, however, rightly remarked: "A "bad
precedent does not demand, much less justify, its repetition. The
Government which was responsible for the decisions of 1882 and I885
1
was not infallible." Nevertheless, Salisbury’s Government refused to
revise the decision.
It is interesting to note that the British Government tried to
justify its policy also on grounds of principle. Salisbury told
Parliament that the question involved an important principle. But the
Government of India was of the view that the principle to which the
Imperial Government adhered was not correct. In 1890 it strongly
emphasised that the Imperial Exchequer should pay all the expenses when
2
the objects of expeditions were not connected with India. So far as 
Indian opinion was concerned, it was strongly opposed to the principle 
of payment, as laid down by the Imperial Government. As early as 1868, 
commenting on Northcote’s statement that India would be required to pay 
a small sum for the troops in Abyssinia, the Hindu Patriot wrote: "We
do not care for the amount, but the principle involved is of vital
5importance to India." In view of the wide scope of Imperial interests, 
even the principles of 1896 marked, in practice, little improvement on 
the earlier position. In August 1890 the War Office had emphasised that 
any nice distinction, such as the Government of India seemed to contemplate,
1 Ibid., 6 July 1896, 26J.
2 Memo., para. 20, Encl. to Mil. Des., No.70, 25 March 1890.
5 Extract from an article in the Hindu Patriot, 15 Jan. 1868, Encl. to 
Fin. Des. from India, No.28, 5 Feb. 1868.
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■between Imperial and Indian interests could not "be drawn* since the
vital interests of India extended very much "beyond the confines of her
own territory} Lord Rosebery rightly observed that if it were asked
in what foreign questions India had an interest* it would not "be difficult
to prove that all British Mediterranean interests were in the main
connected with India?
It is clear from the above that the Treasury and the War Office
dealt with the question in a most arbitrary and unsympathetic manner, and
when they insisted on payment by India of small sums, they evidently
showed a pettifogging and huckstering mentality. The way in which they
approached the question can, to some extent, be seen in the following
arguments. In AApril 1896 the Treasury said that if there could be any
absence of reciprocity, it was on the side of India and not of England.
It further remarked that the arrangement imposed no additional burden on
India and that she should not save money as the result of the employment
of her troops outside*. To the Government of India’s argument that in
fixing expenditure the poverty of the country should be taken into
consideration, the War Office replied that the time when a plea of poverty
4could be put forth on behalf of India had not yet arrived. Much of the 
controversy of this character could have been avoided if the British 
Government had frankly stated that the entire cost of the troops supplied 
by India in imperial interests was to be borne by her. Such a
1 War: Office to Treasury, 13 Aug. 1890.
2 Ind. Pari. Debates* 16 July 1896, 322.
3 Treasury to India Office, 29 April 1896, Pari. Papers, LXI (1896), $Z8,
4 War Office to Treasury 13 Aug. 1890.
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declaration would have made the policy absolutely clear and unambiguous.
Military expenditure was one of the most important questions on
which Indian leaders held very strong views* That India could not do
without an army was recognised by all* The main point on which British
and Indian opinion greatly differed was whether or not defence expenditure
could be substantially reduced without impairing security* Indian
leaders thought that there was considerable scope for reduction while tie
British Government maintained that the existing army was just sufficient
for India’s requirements* Military men held still stronger views. In
1885* D.M* Stewart, then Commander-in-Chief, recommended an addition o?
41,000 men to the army, whereas the Government of India proposed an
increase of 27,000. His successor Roberts was dead against any propoialL
for reduction* Roberta1 successor White remarked that in view of the
enormous area to be guarded and the proximity of Russia to Indian bordtrsj
in the north-west and of France in the south-east, reduction was neither
1
safe nor practicable.
In 1888 Lord Dufferin said that the question of reduction mighl
be considered when the Imperial Service Troops and the reserves would
2
provide ah additional force numbering between 50*000 and. 60,000 men# Ini 
189J and again in March 1894 Brackenbury emphasised that military 
expenditure could be reduced mainly in three ways: decrease in the numbr*
of troops, the reduction of their pay, and the reduction of the reserve 
of stores. He remarked that the first two proposals were not possible*
1 Minute* 4 Feb* 1895* Enel* to Mil. Des. from India, Ho.46, 20 Feb.B955*
2 Minute, 8 Dec. 1888.
5 Brackenbury1 s Minute, Encl. to Mil. Des. from India, Ho.59* 8 March
1895; Financial Statement, 1894-95* 115*
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and the third method involved danger "because in a vast country like
India the Government could not run the risk of restricting the supply
of the munitions of War, Moreover, the strength of the army, he said,
was not only a question of India hut also bf Imperial policy. In 1895
the Government of India pointed out that the reserve and the Imperial
Service Troops consisted bf 15,J29 and ahout 18,000 men respectively and
made it clear that it was not possible to reduce the strength of the army
1
and to effect any material reduction in expenditure. Two years earlier
Lord Lansdowne had remarked that the Government would do its hast to
2
resist further attempts tp increase the expenditure. Thus it is clear 
that from the Government’s point of view the question was not so much to 
decrease the expenditure as to prevent its further increase.
The Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure, presided over hy 
Lord Welhy, pointed out that military expenditure had remained stationary 
during 1862-84 hut it went up during 1885*97. The second period was 
marked hy a heavy fall in exchange, hy an addition of 30*000 nien to the
army, hy the annexation of Burma, and hy several expeditions on the North-
3
West Frontier. A large number of coastal and frontier defence works and
1 Mil. Des. from India, No.46, 20 Feb. 1895*
2 Financial Statement, 1893*94, 113*
3 The total net expenditure in India on the army was £11,500,000 in
1856-57, £11,293,000 in 1884-85, £14,799,000 in 1892-93, and 
£16,437,000 in 1896-97. In 1884-85 and the subsequent years the 
fall in exchange entailed additional payments in India (included 
in the above figures) on account of the pay of British troops and 
compensation to officers amounting to Rx, 184,000 in 1884-85*
Rx. 1,117,000 in 1893-94, and Rx. 1,500,000 in 1896-97.
Indian Expenditure Commission, 17, para.202 with footnote,
Rx. represents tens of rupees.
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additional expenditure on equipping the British infantry with the Lee-
Metford magazine rifle - the ammunition of which cost twice that of the
old rifle - added considerably to military expenditure. The fall in
exchange was no doubt an important cause of increase, hut the other
measures, undertaken during this period, placed a heavy burden on Indian 
1
revenues. The Indian proposals for reducing the expenditure were: the
formation of a large reserve force, the organisation of an Indian volunteer
corps, the appointment of Indians to the higher ranks of the army, and the
reduction of the army establishment, especially of the British army. If
the British Government had modified its policy of distrust, it would have
been quite practicable, and a sound policy too, to give effect, at any
rate on a small scale, to these proposals. A return, immediately after
the end of the real crisis, to the early I885 strength and a smaller
proportion of Europeans would have considerably relieved the pressure on
the Indian Exchequer, The British soldier was enormously expensive, and
the
there was a further increase, in/i cost due to the fall in exchange. The
Government of India admitted that there had been a large increase in the
2
pay of the British soldier during the past sixty years. Nevertheless in
1 Three members of the Commission, 7/adderburn, Caine and Naoroji showed, 
in a separate report, that the Indian Exchequer was saddled with a huge 
amount of additional expenditure incurred on the following items during 
I885-6 - 1895-6;-
Hx.
Addition to the Army (10 years) ......  16,000,000
Military Charges in Upper Burma ......... 8,655*650
Special Defence Works ... ... ... .... 4,610,065
Military Hailways (11 years)...  .... 11,000,000
Frontier Expeditions and Field Operations .. 7,560,000
47,625,715
(Indian Expenditure Commission,IV, 175).
2 The net receipt by the private of infantry was Hs. 10-1-0 in 1840 
and Hs.25-I5-5 in 1897-98.
Mil. Des. from India, No.47, 24 March 1898.
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1898 it granted him an allowance of Sj- annas per diem on account of 
groceries and extra messing in addition to the abolition of the grocery 
stoppage* that is* a total allowance of 3 annas (3d) a day- The gouund 
for increase was that the British soldier at home and in the Colonies had 
been granted an allowance of an equivalent amount* The allowance was 
given irrespectively of a large increase in the rupee pay of the British 
soldier.
The cost of the training of the British soldier was an important
subject which gave rise to much controversy between the India Office and
the Government of India on the one side and the War Office on the other.
The War Office maintained that India was required to pay less than the
actual cost of training and to contribute a very small sum of £100,000
towards the cost of her general naval defence and the protection of her 
1
trade. Referring to the Government of India’s argument that the short 
service system was more expensive, the War Office observed that it was 
introduced with a view, first, to providing the force economically by 
reducing the charge for pensions and, secondly, to meeting the objection 
to long service in the army. In reply to the argument that the Indian 
army was of great value to Britain* it remarked: "The assumption that
India is a great reservoir of strength to England may be sound, but the
1 The Indian Navy, maintained at a cost of about £300*000, was
abolished in 1862, and the Royal Navy undertook the duty of defence. 
No contribution was asked for six years. From 1869 India paid a 
contribution which varied from £70,000 to £40,000. Finally it was 
fixed on the principles laid down by two Prime Ministers, Salisbury 
and Rosebery, at £117,000 for a period ending in 1901. The contribu­
tion was reduced with the consent of the Admiralty and Treasury to an 
annual sum of £100,000. Indian Expenditure Commission, IV, para. 313*
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British array is rapidly Becoming simply a feeder to the Indian army.
1
India gets the "best men for the Best of their service.”
On this question the India Office and the Government of India
were almost invariably on the same side. Successive Governors-General
and Secretaries of State urged the War Office to deal with it in a more
sympathetic manner. They continued to press for the reduction of certain
charges connected with the training of British recruits in England at
their pensions. In 1890 the Government of India, in an able despatch
accompanied By a memorandum, showed, first, that the cost of recruiting 
2
was excessive; secondly, the short service system was defective, Because
1 War Office to Treasury, 1J Aug. 1890,
2 The effective charges included the cost of recruiting and training
in England; the non-effective charges included the pensions and other 
allowances paid to officers and men who had served in India. In
1860 a committee with Sir. A. Tulloch as president was appointed to 
determine an average rate for the effective charges in England. It 
fixed a capitation rate of £10 on every soldier on the British establish­
ment in India. This was fixed up to 1869. In 1870 the Government of 
India disputed the fairness of the rate, and pending revision of the 
arrangement, declined to pay more than certain sums ”on account.” The 
payments on account average £440,000 a year. In 1879 a committee 
with lord Eofcthbrook as Chairman was appointed to fix the capitation 
rate. The Korthbrook Committee submitted specific sums for payment
by India. These sums, including deferred pay, averaged £520,517 for
the six years of payment. Subsequently, the Committee recommended 
payments for each of the years till 1889-90. For the year 1890-91 . 
and the following year its recommendation fixing the capitation rate 
of £7.10s. per man on the establishment of the British force in India 
was accepted. According to the Indian Expenditure Commission report, 
the rate amounted to £J5 P®r recruit. Report (IV), paras. 258* 270.
Up to 182J India paid nothing for non-effective charges.
Between 1824 and 1861 she paid £5 per head, or £60,000 in all. From
1861 to 1871 a capitation rate of £5.10s. was in force. Thsncapital­
isation was introduced, which lasted up to April 1884. After this 
the Govt, of India paid the proportion attributable to service in India 
of the pensions granted subsequently to that date. See Cullen’s Memo., 
para. 55* Indian Expenditure Commission, iii, 408 and para. 291 of the 
report (IV).
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India received less service for a larger costs thirdly, India provided a
large reservoir of military strength on which England could always draw,
and also a large part of the British army was trained at her cost; fourthly,
the depots were organised on a scale far larger and more expensive than
was warranted by Indian requirements; fifthly, a large number of soldiers
trained at the expense of India formed a highly trained and valuable
portion of the home reserves; sixthly, India spent a large sum on the
increased strength of the army and on armament and fortifications mainly
to maintain British supremacy in the East* "The scope of all these
great and costly measures, * the Government of India remarked, "reaches
far beyond Indian limits, and the policy which dictates them is an
imperial policy** It rightly suggested that the expenditure charged
by England "should be limited not by arithmetical details, but by states-
1
manlike and broad appreciation of the conditions of the two countries*"
The Memorandum pointed out that India had to pay for changes in the
British service about which she was not consulted at all* As early as
1874 the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Finance had
observed that charges in some instances had been imposed on India which
2
ought to have been borne by England* In October 1895 the Government of 
India suggested that the apportionment between Britain and India of the 
payments in England should be investigated by a Royal Commission*
Kimberley refused to accept the suggestion saying that since the questions 
raised by the Indian Government involved important principles of policy,
5
they chould not be submitted to an independent inquiry* Moreover, an
1 Mil* Des* from India* No* 70* 2^ March 1890*
2 Report From the Select Committee on East Indian Finance (1874), IV.
5 Fin. Des to India, No. 52, 15 Feb., 1894.
£50
inquiry, he said, might give an opportunity to the War Office to press
1
for an increase of the expenditure. In 1895 as the result of the
acceptance "by the Liberal Government of Naoroji’s amendment to the
Queen’s Address, the Welby Commission was appointed to inquire into the
administration and management of the military and civil expenditure
incurred hy India and the apportionment of the charges between the
United Kingdom and India for purposes in which both were interested*
The Welby Commission was in full agreement with the following
recommendations of the Select Committee on Indian Finances First, strict
inpartiality in financial arrangements must be effectively secured by
watchfulness on the part of the Commons; secondly, English estimates
ought not to be relieved at the expense of Indian revenues; thirdly,
India, as a component part of the Empire must be prepared to share in
the cost of the system, the expense of which might be enhanced for
Imperial purposes; fourthly, the India Office should be consulted on
changes affecting India; fifthly, payments by India to England should be
in the form of fixed rates for particular charges and should continue for
2
a period of years* The Welby Commission strongly emphasised that no
3
changes should be made without consultation with the India Office* It
1 Mil* Des* to India, No.33* 15 Feb. 1894,
2 Benort From the Select Committee (1874), IV-V.
3 In 1894 the War Office argued that as it was responsible for
recruitment, it should decide what reforms should be introduced to
attract men of a proper stamp. Fowlev protested and emphasised 
that the Secretary of State should be consulted before changes 
having a financial bearing were extended to India. He pointed 
out that under the Act of I858 control over Indian finances was 
vested in the Secretary of State in Council.
Encl. to Mil. Des. to India, No.68, 7 June 1894,
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also supported the Government of India’s suggestion that no change 
involving eapenditure should take effect "before 1 April next. In 1895 
the Indian Government had strongly urged that it should have sufficient 
time to enable it to make provisions in the estimates* The Commission 
accepted the contention of the Y/ar Office that the capitation rate of 
£7. 10s. was not excessive, "being of opinion that India would have to 
pay more were she to maintain a separate army and separate recruiting 
establishments. Referring to the short service system, it remarked 
that though it had increased the expenditure temporarily, it would be 
ultimately more economical since the saving on pensions would more than 
counterbalance the increased cost of trahsport and the additional charge 
involved in the grant of deferred pay. The Commission, however, 
recommended that half the cost of the transport of troops to and from 
India should be defrayed by the Imperial Government*;
It is clear from the above that the approach of the War Office 
and the Treasury was very different from that of the Indian Government 
and the India Office. The very fact that successive Governors-General 
and such Secretaries of State as Wood, Argyll, Salisbury, Kimberley and 
Cross, who did not belong to the same political school, protested against 
the manner in which India was treated in these matters, shows that the 
attitude of the Treasury and the War Office towards India was 
unsympathetic and arbitrary. In a letter of 8 September 1871 the Duke
1 Mil. Des. from India, Ho.48, 27 Feb. 1895*
2 Indian Expenditure Commission, IV* para. 269.
5 Ibid., IV, para. 555.
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of Argyll had observed that it urns neither politic nor just to make
India pay the entire cost of a recruiting establishment which was extra-
1
vagant and had no reference to the exigencies of Indian service*
Remarking on this aspect of relationship between Britain and India,
Hipon’s Government said in August I885 that it was a partnership in which
the rich and powerful partner prescribed the conditions with very little
2
reference to the wishes and the means of the poorer and weaker partner#
Sir Henry Brackenbury, in his evidence before the Welby Commission,
remarked that nobody in India believed in the fairness of the capitation
5
charges; Indeed, in dealing with the question the War Office and the 
Treasury showed throughout a bargaining mentality and took no account of 
the immense value of India to British military strength. Britain main­
tained at India’s cost a large European army - numbering about one-third 
of the Imperial army - which was undoubtedly an important factor in her 
position as a great Asian Power# The fact that the British soldier, either 
in India, or as reserve, existed for the maintenance of the British Empire 
was in itself an unanswerable argument in favour of a just, nay generous 
policy# E.Collen, the Military Member>rightly observed that when India 
was asked to pay every farthing of military expense - which in fact she
did - the enormous value of the Indian Empire to England and her trade was
4
not taken into account# The War Office and the Treasury did not, however, 
allow such considerations to influence their policy. Both Kimberley and
1 Ibid., ii, 564. Quoted in India Office Memo#
2 Ibid., 565#
5 Ibid., iii, Q. 14840.
4 Memo., 17 March 1897, para. $7 (ibid., iii, 408).
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Cross mad© no secret of the fact that the India Office had to face
1
enormous difficulties when it had to deal with these departments# The 
combat was no doubt most unequal# When Lord Cross told the House that
it would not he long before the Indian people would force the British to
2do them justice, he could not have denounced more strongly the attitude 
of the War Office and the Treasury#
• t t *
^  The broad principles of military organisation, according to the 
Secretary of State, were: The organisation of the army in such a way as
to provide an effective safeguard against combination; the selection of 
the best fighting men who were most likely to prove faithful; the equal­
isation of the proportion of each class; the adoption of precautionary 
measures# such as, localisation in order to keep the "national character­
istics" of the various classes distinct and unimpaired^ to which must be 
added a large proportion of Europeans in the army; and the control of the 
artillery and arsenals in European hands. These principles were 
essentially the same as those laid down by the Peel Commission in 1859 and 
re-affirmed twenty years later by the Eden Commission# In composition, 
however, the Indian army, as reorganised in 1861, underwent an important 
modification# The approach of Russia towards Indian borders led the 
Government to make Nepal, the Punjab and the North-West its principal 
recruiting grounds. The Punjab army grew in size at the expense of the
1 Indian Pari# Debates, 15 May 1895* 311$ 5^5*
2 Ibid., 517.
5 Mil. Des. to India, No.107, 4 Aug. 1892.
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other armies with the result that the principle of equilibrium, which 
had existed in the form of more or less equal armies, was largely modified.
The British looked upon the army for the strength and permanence 
of their rule in India. There are many statements to this effect. In 
1880 E. Johnson, then Military Member observed: "India can admittedly
only be held by force; to count on the love and loyalty of the masses
1
would be fanciful and fatal to the continuance of our existence here."
They continued to believe in the dictum that India was conquered by the
sword and must be retained by the sword. Even Eipon’s Government
declared "it is true," but it went on "we do not consider It is the
whole truth; and, moreover, we disagree with many of the conclusions which
2
are frequently drawn from this argument.” The fact, however, remains 
that the ultimate basis of British power was the army, and a cardinal 
feature of British policy was the distrust of Indians and Indian troops. 
There were no doubt a few men like Brigadier-General Jacob and Bartle 
Frere who did not allow their better judgment to be warped by the heat 
and passion of the Mutiny, but theirs was a cry in the wilderness. In 
I858 Jacob said: ”TMs I am convinced that this great empire also cannot
be controlled by English bone and muscle, by numbers of English bodies, 
but it can be held in perfect safety and security by English mind, by 
English moral power, by the influence of a moderate number of cultivated 
English gentlemen rather than Tby a multitude of rude soldiers.” He 
emphasised that any number of English soldiers would be powerless when
1 Minute, 4 March 1880.
2 Mil. Des., No.223, 10 Aug. I883.
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placed in opposition to the whole people of India, and remarked that
Indians, treated literally and commanded as men, could he as good and
1
faithful as Europeans. Bartle Frere, acknowledging the influence of
Jacob.expressed similar views, He showed a clear and correct
appreciation of the situation when he observed that the vital question
was what size of army Indian finances could afford and not what the
British Government thought desirable or sufficient. He said that the
British should govern India through the respect and with the consent of
Indians and that it would be more economical to equip a few Indians with
2
better weapons than to put inferior ones in the hands of many. It will 
suffice to say that the views of Jacob and Frere needed for their 
acceptance an atmosphere of goodwill and trust and not the one of 
suspicion and fear, which prevailed then and continued thereafter.
In fixing the strength of its army the most important consider­
ation which a country has to keep in view is the state of its finances.
In the late nineteenth century the British Government’s strong view was 
that a vast country like India could not do with an army smaller than she
had. In 1893 Roberts stressed that there v/as not one battalion too
3
many even for the ordinary peace requirements. Indian politicians, on 
the other hand, persistently demanded the reduction of military expenditure. 
The question of the irreducible minimum which India must maintain 
con si stent? with her internal and external security was not one on which
1 Jacob to Burand, 7 June I858, Supp. to Eeport (1859), 90.
2 Frere to Burand, 6 Bov. I858, Supp. to Report (1859), 61, 66.
3 Minute, 1 April 1893.
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"both parties were likely to agree. The strength of a country’s 
standing army depends upon the functions it is called upon to discharge. 
According to the Commission of 1879 the Indian army had to do three main 
duties: The maintenance of internal security, protection from external
danger, and the watching and overawing of the armies of the Indian
' 1...........................
Princes, particularly of Sindhia and the Eizam. As regards the last
function, it may he noted that the formation of the Imperial Service 
Troops in 1889 - an army maintained hy the Indian Princes and placed at 
the disposal of the Government - marked an important development in the 
relations of the Crown with the States, inasmuch as the British Govern­
ment felt it could count on the active support of the Princes, The 
functions of the army were therefore in practice hy this time mainly 
twofold: internal peace and external security, for which purposes the
Indian array, without accession to its strength in 1885, should have 
sufficed. The creation of a reserve and in emergency a temporary 
increase of the army should have heen adequate. If the British Govern­
ment had kept the proportion of European troops at a lower figure and 
avoided a permanent increase, more money could have heen spent on civil 
development and the return, even from the British point of view, would 
have heen great. Apart from suspicion, the reason why it did not follow 
this course was that the Indian army was required to discharge functions 
not exclusively Indian. In his evidence before the Welby Commission, 
Lord Lansdowne remarked that the Indian array served hoth Indian and
1 Renort (1879), para. 17.
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imperial purposes, that is, it had heen organised with a view to the
possibility of its employment in operations which had nothing to do
either with the internal policy of the country or with the mere repression
of tribal disorders on the frontier,
A highly objectionable and arbitrary course in which the YiTar
Office and the Treasury persisted related to the payment by India of the
ordinary expenses of the army used for imperial purposes. The repeated
protests of the Government of India failed to convince them of the justice
of its stand. While the saving to the British Exchequer was often small,
the policy emphasised, each time when .the question came up, that the
British attitude was unjust and unsympathetic towards India. If the art
of the politician lies in balancing the advantages and disadvantages of a
particular course of action, British politicians indeed showed themselves
lacking. Jn his evidence before the Welby Commission, Sir Henry
Waterfield, then Secretary of the Finance Department, India Office, said
that it was inexpedient to encourage the belief that wars could be waged
2
in other countries at India’s expense.
In 1893 Lord Kimberley said that British supremacy in India rested
on three bases: the loyalty and goodwill of the Indian Princes and
population, the maintenance of a European Civil Service, and the
3
magnificent European army. While a portion of higher appointments was 
thrown open to Indians in the Civil Service and the principle of legal
1 Indian Expenditure Commission, iii, Qs. 15983-84, 15996.
2 Ibid., Q. 15324.
3 The Times, 13 June 1893, 10.
/
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equality was recognised in this branch* the doors of the military service 
remained closed* though in view of a very large number of commissioned 
officers* being five times the strength of the Indian Civil Service, a 
similar policy could have been conveniently followed. In 1894 General 
Chesney emphasised that apart from considerations of justice and good 
faith* the association of men of talent and ambition with the Government 
was surely safer as a matter of policy than their systematic exclusion^ 
British military policy, in this respect, was marked by selfishness, 
immobility, want of imagination and racial discrimination. It is a sad 
commentary on British rule that during its entire history no Indian rose 
above the rank of Brigadier.
1 Chesney* op. cit.* 271.
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CHAPTER 17
The British Attitude towards the Indian National Movement
The Indian National Congress held its first session at Bombay on
28 December 1885. In its composition, in its aims and objects, and in its
method it represents a unique movement and, indeed, with its foundation there
opens a new chapter in Indian history. The Congress embodied the wishes and
aspirations of a new India which was growing into political consciousness
under the impact of such forces as English education, the Press, swift means
of communication and a period of internal and external security under a stron,
central administration. Early Congressmen looked upon the movement as nthe
soundest triumph of British administration11 and sought inspiration from Britia
and not from Indian political ideas and institutions. The Mutiny of 1857*
which some prefer to call the war of Indian independence, found no place for
admiration and pride in the hearts of nationalist leaders. Whatever may he it
place in Indian history, it cannot he connected, either in its organisation
or its methods, or even in its aims and objects, with the early Congress. In
fact, the Congress leaders, British as well as Indian, viewed the Mutiny as
1
an unfortunate incident. Thus the Congress movement opens a new chapter:
1 A.O. Hume, the Father of the Indian National Congress, says that not 
one per cent, of the masses took any part in ■Hrhat has heen called hy 
some a rebellion, hut was, in reality, mainly a widespread mutiny of
mercenaries. 11 India, April 1896, 104*
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the Mutiny marks the end of an old one*
The early Congress was entirely a political movement* No
doubt the founder of the Congress, A.C* Hume, had at first desired
to establish an all-India social organisation, leaving the political
work to the existing provincial bodies* However, on the advice of
Lord Dufferin, who impressed upon him the need of an organisation
which mi^it perform functions similar to those of Her Majesty's
1
Opposition in England, he changed his mind and a political congress
2
came into existence* It would have been a great misfortune for the 
Congress if it had decided to enter upon a career of social reform*
A national body like the Congress, composed as it was of men belonging 
to different castes and communities, could only at a great peril to Its 
existence play a social role* In 1886 Dadabhai Naoroji, President 
of the Second Congress, explained the role of the Congress in un­
mistakable terms, and his interpretation came to be regarded as
5
authoritative* A number of Congress presidents reaffirmed the
1 William Wedderbum, A*0* Hume, 59-60; W.C* Bonnerjee's Introduction 
Indian Politic* (I898), vii.
2 W.C. Bonnerjee writesthat in April I865 Hume was in Calcutta and 
saw many friends and placed before them his original plan and the 
plan suggested to him by Dufferin* He was also consulted*
Bonner jee further says that "it was to a great extent on my advocacy 
that the Congress leaders agreed to leave out social questions from 
the Congress movement and make it a purely political one*" Ihe 
Hindustan Review, Dec* 1905i 478*
5 Naoroji observed that the Congress was a political body and that if one 
blamed it for igioring social questions one "should equally blame the 
House of Commons for not discussing the abstruser problems of mathe­
matics or metaphysics*" He further said that in view of the presence 
of many castes and communities, and of the differences in customs 
among the Hindus of the seme caste, a national Congress must confine 
itself to questions in which the entire nation had a direct participa­
tion, and leave the adjustment of social reforms to class congresses* 
Report of Second I.N.C* (1886), 54.
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1
above opinion* In 1666* at the instance of Badruddin Tyabji, who had
presided over the third Congress, a resolution was passed, which provided
that the Congress would not discuss any subject to which Hindu or Muslim
2
delegates as a body were unanimously or nearly unanimously opposed* 
lhe object was to remove the fear of the minority community —  the 
Muslims* Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the well-known Muslim leader, and many 
other opponents of the Congress had already started calling the Congress 
a Hindu body* Ihe resolution provided a safeguard for the protection 
of Muslim interests*
It is true that on most of the questions which the Congress 
took up there was much room for agreement, mainly because the concessions 
were sought from a foreign ruling power* However, even in the political 
sphere of its activity, the Congress had to encounter strong Muslim 
opposition* Two of its most important demands, namely, council refora 
on an elective basis and simultaneous examinations for recruitment to the
1 Badruddin fyabji said that the Congress should confine its discussions 
to such questions as affected the whole country and should abstain from 
the discussion of social questions which must of necessity affect some 
particular part or some particular community* Report of ffiiird I*H*0*
(1887), 75-
In 1892 W*C, Bonner jee, President of the Eighth Congress, saids flI es 
one of those who have very little faith in the public discussion of 
social matters ••• We know how excited people become when social subjects 
are discussed in public *•• How is it possible for a Hindu gentleman to 
discuss with a Parses or a Mahomedan gentleman matters connected with 
Hindu social questions? *** We do not all understand in the same sense 
what is meant by social reform*8 Bonner jee was strongly of opinion 
that political reform was not dependent upon the reform of the social 
system. Report of Eighth I.N.C. (1892), 11-12*
Surendranath Baner jea, President of the Eleventh Congress saids "Ours 
is a political and not a social movement; and it cannot be made a matter 
of complaint against us that we are not a social organisation any more 
than it can be urged against any of my lawyer friends that they are not 
doctors*8 Report of Eleventh I*N*0* (1895), 15-
2 Resolution xiii, Report of Fourth I*N*Q* (1888)*
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Indian Civil Service, were looked upon by Sir Syed and his followers
as harmful to the interests of the Muslims. Hie Congress failed to
convince him that its demands were in the interests of Hindus and
Muslims alike* It is significant that as early as 1889 It agreed to
Bradlaugh's proposal which provided that the total number of seats for
minority communities, to be filled by election, should not be less than
1
the proportion of their population in a province*
It may be pointed out that even among the Hindus there was a
wide divergence of opinion on matters of social reform* The Congress
consisted of men of both progressive and conservative views* The
orthodox section, while quite willing to support a scheme of political
reform, would have been most unwilling to undertake social reform* For
Instance, while all agreed that simultaneous examinations should be held
in India, a strong section including Rajendralal Mitter, Chairman of the
Reception Committee,was opposed to the proposal that candidates selected
in India should have a compulsory training in Ehgland* The opposition
2
was based mainly on religious grounds* The result was that Congress 
resolution of 1886 omitted the condition of foreign training which a 
resolution of 1885 had provided* In 1888 John Adam reopened the
5
question and asked the Congress to give a clear verdict, but owing to 
strong opposition the resolution of 1886 was retained* Another instance 
of the difference of opinion is afforded by the controversy over the Age
1 Resolution II, Report of Fifth I.N.O* (1889)•
2 Report of Second I*N*C» (l886), Introduction, 5^* Hie Report says:
"On this question the difference of opinion was notoriously fundamental 
and radical in its character, and it was, therefore, excluded from the 
report *.* *
5 Report of Fourth I*N*0. (1888), 55.
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of Consent Bill in 1891, which sought to mitigate the evils of child 
marriage by providing that the consummation of marriage should not 
take place before a wife reached the age of 12♦ Bie division of 
opinion on such a reasonable and absolutely necessary measure shows 
clearly the character of the national organisation* Hume was in 
favour of the Bill; R#C. Mitter, afterwards Chairman of the Reception 
Committee of the Calcutta Congress in 1696 and a former judge of the 
High Court, was opposed to it# B#G# Tilak, who later became the fore­
most leader of the extremist party, was vehemently against it# In 
1895 kis group objected to the Congress fpandal* (pavilion) being used 
by the National Social Conference* Ihe controversy, which was mild 
in the beginning, roused strong passions and threatened at one time to
do serious harm to the Congress itself# It was the sagacity and
patriotism of Ranade, who did not insist on holding the Social Conference
1
in the Congress •pandal1, which saved the national cause from harm#
Uiue in the interests of the solidarity of the organisation it
was necessary to confine its activity to political matters. Battle 
against the deadweight of ignorance and prejudice was oertainly more 
hazardous than that for political rigjhts. In the former resistance 
would have been offered not only by the uneducated people but also by 
the educated social reactionaries, but in the latter* there was much 
common ground for a united stand# Moreover, to the educated classes 
the criticism of a foreign government and persistent demands for
1 Report of Eleventh I#N#C. (1895), Introduction#
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political concessions appealed more than the rather monotonous work
of social reform. Valentine Chirol, a hostile critic of the national
movement, observes that it diverted many of the best talents from
social reform but he also admits that work on the social side was thorny
1
idiereas political agitation offered a popular field* We must also 
remember that a number of organisations, such as, the Brahmo Samaj, the 
Arya Samaj and the Iheosophical Society had already been doing social 
and religious work* In 1897 Swami Vivekananda established the 
Ramkrishna Mission Association and in 1899 he founded a math (monastery) 
at Belur, near Calcutta to train a band of monks for self-realisation 
and the service of the world. It is true that the activity of these 
associations was determined by the conditions of their religious approach, 
but it is difficult to see how the Congress could have avoided those 
limitations and retained its national character* It is thus clear that 
its dissociation from a programme of social ref c m  contributed on the 
whole to its strength and unity.
Ihe fact that the Rational Social Conference held its session in 
the Congress 1 panda 11 and that a number of Congress leaders also 
attended its meetings might produce the impression that the Conference 
was the adjunct of the political body and, indeed, some Congressmen 
regarded it as such. But nothing could be further from the fact.
Ihe work of the Social Conference was separate and distinct and found 
no place in the Congress report. *Ihe Congress was entirely political 
and eschewed the discussion of social questions from the very beginning*
1 Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest, 156-57*
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Hie holding of the two meetings at one place, as India says, was a
matter of general convenience, as most of the visitors sympathised
1
with both lines of reform work.
There is also a tendency among writers on the national move­
ment to connect it with the religious and social movements of the nine­
teenth century, which, i& their opinion, created an atmosphere of national 
consciousness from which the Congress derived much inspiration. The 
view ignoxjs two obvious facts: first, the unadulterated political
character of the Congress; and, secondly, the part played by the non- 
Indian leaders of the Congress, namely, Hume, Wedderbum and others. 
During the first fifteen years their influence on its policy was 
indeed very great. The very fact that the originator of the movement 
was an Englishman, who was not associated with any of the above-mentioned 
religious bodies, substantially weakens the force of this contention. 
Moreover, such prominent Indian leaders as Dadabhai Naoroji, W.C.
Bonner jee, Surendranath Banerjea and Fherozeshah Mehta do not appear to 
have been influenced by any of these movements. It is therefore a mis­
take to connect the Congress with the non-political movements of the last 
century.
Only a passing reference to the composition of the Congress can
be attempted here. The Fifth Congress was described as ffa compendium of
2
all the races, castes, creeds, professions, trades and occupationsf
1 India, Feb. 96, 52.
2 Report of Fifth I.N.C., Introduction, iv.
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To these we may also add provinces* Indeed, the Congress has always 
consisted of these elements, but such a broad description does not give 
us any correct idea of its true composition* A glance at the lists of 
Congress delegates shows, however, a great disparity in the representation 
of various classes, occupations, provinces and castes of which the Congress 
was composed* Among the classes, the educated middle class was by far the 
largest; among the occupations, the legal profession was heavily represented 
among the castes, the Brahmans were comparatively larger in number; and 
among the provinces, Bengal, Bombay and Madras, which were educationally 
more advanced, took an active part* The masses, partly due to lack of 
education and partly due to the absenoe of any programme of mass contact, 
practically took no part* The landed classes, mainly due to the 
Government's unsympathetic attitude towards the Congress, held aloof*
Thus the Congress was almost entirely a middle class affair*
Early Congressmen had great faith in the efficacy of peaceful
and constitutional agitation* The Press, the platform and the annual 
sessions were methods by which they carried on the work* The Press was 
a very powerful force, and indeed it was the only agency through which 
Congress propaganda was carried on throughout the year* Not a few
1
Congress leaders were editors of Biglieh or 'vernacular1 newspapers.
Besides, a host of other Indian papers supported the Congress demands*
The tone of these papers was often strongly critical. In 1887 the 
Bengal Government wrote: "it is'not a slight thing that the daily mental
1 Many Congressmen were associated with newspapers* A few names may be
mentioned here* Surendraneth Banerjee was editor of the Bengalee*
G* Subramania edited the Hindu* The Kesari and the Mahratta were 
edited by Tilak* The Indu Prakash was in charge first of Telang and 
next of Chandavarkar* Narendra Nath Sen was editor of the Indian 
Mitror*
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food of a whole generation of students should outside their lessons,
consist in systematic denunciation of the honesty, justice, and good
I Hamilton,
intentions of the English.* /the Secretary of State, as we shall 
see later, felt extremely irritated at the criticism of the Indian 
Government in the newspapers, particularly, in the Congress organ 
India.
Among the various methods of Congress propaganda the holding 
of annual sessions was by far the most important. It was at these 
meetings that Congress leaders discussed the Governments policy and 
put forward their demands in an author!tive manner; and it was then 
that the Congress machinery was in full swing. 3he annual sessions 
not only attracted the attention of the educated classes but also of 
the Government. But the greatest defect of the Congress was that it 
functioned as an organised body only for three days in the year. It 
set up no committees to carry on the work during the long interval be­
tween the annual sessions. Writing in 1905, Hume rightly said: "You
meet in Congresses; you glow with a momentary enthusiasm; you speak much 
and eloquently ... but the Congress closes, every man of you, broadly 
speaking, goes off straightway on his own private business, and not one
per cent, of you seem to give thereafter any earnest thougjht or many
2
days1 real work to poor India's public business.1'
Congressmen believed that the British nation was essentially 
just andL^ood and that if it could be acquainted with the true state 
of Indian affairs, all their grievances would be redressed. Ihe
1 Government of Bengal to Government of India, 25 Nov. 1887, 
Pub. Progs., March 1888.
2 Bie Hindustan Review, Dec. 1905, 480.
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only obstacle to reform, in their opinion, was the bureaucracy* Samuel
Smith, who had visited India in 188^ , observes that the Indians had the
impression that the British nation was just and good and that the
1
English officials stood between them and their just rights* The 
fertility of Congressman's imagination which drew such a nice distinction 
between the nation^ and the machinery which it had set up for the 
administration of the ruled evokes surprise and pity. They failed to 
understand that the British machinery in India was only carrying out the 
orders of that section of the British people who exercised the supreme 
power.
The Congress urged the Government to introduce a number of 
reforms, the more important of which were the reorganisation of the 
councils, simultaneous examinations, the abolition or reconstitution of 
the India Council, the separation of the judiciary from the executive, 
the repeal of the Arms Act, the enlistment of Indians as volunteers, 
the appointment of Indians to the commissioned ranks, the reduction of 
military expenditure, and the extension of the Permanent Settlement to 
other parts of India. Besides, the Congress expressed its opinion on 
all the important measures of the Government and protested against the 
unpopular ones. It emphasised that the only way to make the British 
Government popular, and thereby stable, was the acceptance of its de­
mands. It repeated most of its important demands year after year be­
cause there was little response from the Government. It is interesting 
to note that during the first twenty years there was practically no
1 Samuel Smith, India Revisited (1886), 28-29.
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change in the Congress programme* Judged from its resolutions* the
Congress shoved maturity at its very inception* The major demands
remained more or less the same as those formulated at its first two
or three sessions*
In spite of its many limitations the Congress was a thoroughly
national body* Its doors were open to all classes and communities*
Indeed* there was nothing in its programme to which any class could
take exception* It was a supporter of the interests of the landed
0I&88* and though it kept the affairs of the Indian States outside its
programme* it was also a friend of the Indian chiefs* In 1889 Charles
Brad laugh* who was a great supporter of the Congress, took up in Parlia-
1
ment the cause of the Maharaja of Kashmir* who had been deposed* In
1896 the Congress passed a resolution that no Prince should be deposed
on the ground of maladministration or misconduct until the charge was
established to the satisfaction of a public tribunal commanding the
2
confidence alike of the Government and of the Princes* As regards the 
landed classes, Congress policy was largely in their favour. The
5
Congress stood for the extension of the Permanent Settlement, which 
had been so greatly advantageous to the zemindars and so little to the 
ryot and the State* Accounting for this aspect of Congress policy,
Lord Elgin observed with truth that the Bengal zamindars were powerful 
and had "business relations with the men1 who did the talking and writing
1 Hansards Indian Debates, 20 June 1889* 550-51*
2 Resolution XVIII* Report of Twelfth I*N*C* (I896)*
5 A«0* Hume was not in favour of the proposal* He said that the Bombay
and Madras delegates* who looked upon it as a remedy for the poverty 
of the masses* had no practical experience of a permanent settlement* 
He emphasised that in Bengal where the system had been in operation 
for one hundred years the masses were comparatively much poorer* 
Report of Second I+H*C* (1886), 68*
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1
in that province, Though the Congress did not succeed in securing
the active cooperation of the aristocracy, it did enjoy their sympathy.
Its programme was broad enough to accommodate all interests* It was
not a party but a movement though the leadership and, for the most part,
the following were supplied by the educated classes* The aristocracy
and the masses practically held aloof* Nevertheless, the movement was
national because it transcended all local and exclusive interests*
Some of the important features of the movement may be now 
2
summarised* First, the Congress was loyal to the ruling power* The 
expression of loyalty was genuine because Congressmen fully appreciated 
the advantages of British rule* lhe only alternatives to British rule, 
said Wedderbum, were Russian rule or anarchy, and none of which
5
commended itself to Congressmen* Secondly, the stability of British 
rule was, in their opinion, the sine quo non for Indiafs progress.
Thirdly, while they acknowledged with gratitude the grant of concessions, 
they urged the Government to meet their demands in full* Fourthly, their 
constitutional agitation was based on strong faith in the justice and 
reasonableness of the British nation* Fifthly, the Congress organisation 
and its method were adapted to a body of intellectuals who persisted in 
constitutional struggle under all circumstances* In other words,
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 1 June 1897* Fr. Cor* Ind. V, 255
2 Wedderbum said that the Congress had three great principles: first,
all its actions were based on the stability and prosperity of British
rule; secondly, its methods were open and above board; thirdly, its 
method: was strictly constitutional and law-abiding. Indian Pari* 
Debates, 5 1897* 5^5*
5 India, Nov. 1897* 5^7*
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Congress leadership was in the hands of those who barked well but shrank 
from biting* lhe advantage of this method was that the movement went 
on without serious opposition from the Government; the disadvantage was 
that it lacked the necessary strength which alone could make the ruling 
authority part with some of its powers and privileges.
lhe Congress also carried on its work in Ehgland. Ihis side 
of Congress activity during our period is extremely important. It was 
no doubt to a considerable extent responsible for stiffening the British 
attitude* lhe reasons for starting Congress propaganda were quite
j
obvious. lhe year 1887 marked the end of friendly relations between the 
Congress and the Government* The Congress found itself discouraged by 
the unsympathetic official attitude. It was felt that work In Ehgland 
would be carried on in an atmosphere free from suspicion and fear* More­
over, the seat of power was there, and the Congress believed that if the 
British nation and parliament were properly informed, success would soon 
follow* Prominent Congress leaders like Wedderbum, Hume and Naoroji 
laid much emphasis on propaganda in Ehgland* Though the result of their 
efforts remained consistently disencouraglng they continued to believe in 
the soundness of the movement* Naoroji wrote in October 1898: "Any well-
directed effort here will always be far more effective, as this is the
1
fountainhead where the chief work lies*" Writing in 190J Hume urged 
upon Indians the necessity of "consistent and persistent importunity" 
both in India and in Ehgland, and more specially in the latter, for the
1 Letter to Chambers, 5 Oct. 1896# Quoted in R.P* Masani, Dadabhai 
Naoroji, 415*
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1
purpose of securing their alms* As late as 1915, when the Congress
movement in Ehgland had little vitality left in it, Wedderbum wrote:
"Unfortunately the party of progress in India *#• have brought upon
themselves endless woes by futile resistance in India to irresistible
force, while neglecting to conduct effectively in England the operations
which, with a moderate expenditure of labour and of money, would have
2
secured to them a painless victory*" Wedderbum and Naoroji were the 
heart and soul of the movement in Ehgland and regarded it as important 
as that in India*
lhe object of the movement in England was to educate Ehglish 
opinion on Indian affairs* Jxi 1888 a paid Indian Agency was established 
in Ehgland under the charge of William Digby* An energetic campaign of 
meetings and publications was started* In July 1889 the British Committee 
of the Indian National Congress, with Wedderbum as Chairman and Digby as 
Secretary, was established* lhe Congress voted every year about £5,000 
for carrying on the work in Ehgland* The establishment of the British 
Committee was indeed a very important event* Congress propaganda was 
placed on an active and organised footing* lhe Press, the Platform, 
and Parliament were the means by which the Committee sought to achieve 
its aims* In 1890 the Committee started a monthly paper India which 
supplied an authoritative and detailed information about the national 
movement both in England and in India* The articles and comments, 
which appeared in it exercised a great influence on the Indian
1 lhe Hindustan Review, Dec* 1905, 481*
2 W. Wedderbum, A*0* Hume, 86.
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1
Press* In July 1895 the British Committee succeeded in forming an
Indian parliamentary Committee consisting of those members who were
willing to cooperate in favour of a just and sympathetic policy to- 
2
wards India* They were not committed to the Congress programme 
and reserved their full discretion* Herbert Paul, one of the original 
members, said that he would not speak or vote in the Commons for any 
scheme, merely because the Congress supported it, and that he would
5
keep himself perfectly free to take his own line on any Indian subject* 
Before the formation of the Parliamentary Committee interests 
in Indian affairs had been taken by a few isolated individuals of whom 
the most prominent were John Bright, Henry Fawcett and Charles Bradlaugh* 
In 188J, threw years before his death, Bright approved the formation of 
an informal Indian Committee having for its object to secure combined 
parliamentary action* Some fifty members of Parliament were willing 
to cooperate on the broad ground of a just and sympathetic policy to-
4
wards India* However, there was little progress in this direction 
and nothing was heard of the proposal after 1885- In 1888 Bradlaugh,
1 C*S* Bay ley, General Superintendent of the Thagi and Dakaiti Dept* 
wrote that one leading object in the establishment of the Journal 
was "to bring grist to the Congress mill*" His note says that the 
paper was popular and exercised a "pernicious8 influence on the 
Indian Press* Note of 18 June 1899» Hncl* to Curzon*e letter to 
Hamilton, 28 June 1899* Pr* Cor* Ind*, XIV, 65*
The Bengal Government wrote that of the 6,000 copies published in 
Bag land 1,500 were allotted to Bengal, and that all the leading 
zamindar8 of Bengal were subscribers*
2 In 1694 the Indian Parliamentary Committee consisted of I52 members*
In 1695 the strength dropped to 85 because of the defeat of a large
number of members at the general election* In I896 forty new members 
joined, bringing its total strength to 125 ♦ India, Sept* 1895, 259; 
May 1896, 155*
5 India, Nov* 1895* 557*
4 Ibid*, Aug* 1895* 24l.
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on the persuasions of W*C* Bonner jee, Norton, Naoroji, and Digby, agreed
to support the Indian cause* John Gorst, Under Secretary of State for
India, expressed concern at Indian questions being brought before the
Commons by a group of men* He remarked that clever men had begun to
look upon Indian affairs as a promising field for earning parliamentary
distinction, and pointed out that the Congress party had connection with
1
several members of Parliament. During 1888-90 Brad laugh strongly 
advocated the Indian cause* He asked questions on almost all important 
matters relating to India* In 1890 he introduced two Bills which 
provided for the enlargement of the councils and the extension of their 
functions* His death in January 1891 was regarded a terrible loss in 
India* During the last three years of his life he was really the spokes­
man of the Congress in Parliament* His biographer Robertson aptly
remarks: * In his last enfeebled years he did for India what some men might
2
have reckoned good work for a life time*" Bradlaugh !s services should
not, however, be measured in terms of the amount of success* In 1892 
several members of Parliament, such as, Schwann, MaoNeill, Seymour Seay, 
pressed for the introduction of the elective system in the Indian Councils 
Bill* Speaking on the Bill, Samuel Staith, a great supporter of the 
national movement, remarked that the Congress was loyal and constitutional, 
and "an exact copy of ourselves in Indian fora*" He emphasised that there 
was no way of getting at Indian opinion more reliably than through the
5
national Congress* Schwann laid emphasis on the representative character
1 Letter to the Viceroy, 25 Nov* 1888, quoted in Newton, op* cit*, 60-62*
2 Bradlaugh Bonner & J.M* Robertson, Charles Bradlaughs 416*
5 Indian Pari* Debates* 28 March 1892, 182*
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and the elective basie of the Congress, and added that it represented
1
to a great extent, the national voice of India*
lhe British Committee of the Congress attached very considerable 
importance to agitation in Parliament* "India to him (Wedderbum)”,
2
writes Ratoliffe, "was in a pre-eminent sense a House of Commons concern*”
With the election of Naoroji and Wedderbum to Parliament one finds a
sort of organised agitation on behalf of the Congress* Naoroji was
returned in 1892, and was the first Indian to achieve this distinction*
Wedderbum was elected in 189? &n<£ for seven years during which period
he was a member he strongly advocated the Indian cause* There was
hardly any important Indian question which he did not bring to the
notice of the House* In June 189? the supporters of the Congress
succeeded in carrying through a resolution for holding simultaneous 
?
examinations* In September 189? Naoroji*s amendment to the Madras 
and Bombay Armies Bill was accepted* In the same month he urged 
the House to hold an independent inquiry into the condition of India*
On 14 August 189^ a resolution moved by Samuel Stadth, and seconded by 
Naoroji pressed the same demand* Fowler, the Secretary of State, 
undertook to appoint, at the commencement of the Session, a select 
committee to inquire into the expenditure of the Indian revenues* In 
189? the outcome of Naoroji*s amendment to the Address, the Indian 
Expenditure Commission was appointed* In 1896 some of the important
1 Ibid*, 28 March 1892, 1?6-??.
2 S*K* Ratcliffs, Sir William Wedderbum, 76#
? See above, &8 .
k See above, j g7 .
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subjects which were discussed were the Cotton Duties, expenditure
relating to the Suakin expedition, and the deposition of the Maharaja
of Jhalawar. In 1897*96 Wedderbum moved an amendment to the
Address for a full and independent inquiry into the condition of the
people of India*
For seven years Wedderbum was the spokesman of the Congress
in Parliament* He was also the chairman of the Indian Parliamentary
Committee* Judged by results, the Committee achieved little* lhe
reason was that it did not function as an organised group committed
to the Congress programme* Explaining its organisation, Wedderbum
said that it consisted of two portions: (i) those who were prepared
actively to advocate the Indian cause and (ii) those who were prepared
1
to give both sides an impartial hearing* lhe number of active
members was indeed very small, perhaps between 20 and 50* lhe London
Correspondent of the Amrita Bazar Fatrika who rebuked the British
Committee for doing nothing in opposition to Fowler1 s decision not to
give effect to Paul*s resolution of 2 June 1895 admitted that if the
friends of the Congress proceeded to a division and the Government
made it a matter of confidence, not more than 20 or 50 would ^ atand
2
by their vote of last year* On 15 August 1896 only 50 members 
supported Wedderbum fs amendment, which provided that accounts should 
each year be examined and reported on by a select committee of the
5
House* Even after the formation of the Indian Committee debates on
1 India, Oct. 189^ , 505*
2 Ibid., Sept. 189^ , 258-59.
5 Indian Pari* Debates, 15 Aug* I896, 58^*
the Indian Budget took place in a very thin House. Except on a few
occasions, the Opposition was more or less indifferent to Indian
1
questions* In February 1898 when the Sedition Laws and the detention 
2
of the Natus were debated in Parliament the leaders of the Opposition 
took no part* and the discussion remained confined to a few members of 
the Parliamentary Committee. Hamilton remarked that Wedderburn was
5
completely “blown upon.®
Though success in Parliament was far from encouraging*
Wedderbum remained undaunted* Some prominent Indian leaders* too*
believed in the soundness of this method of agitation* In a message
issued to the Indian people* on his defeat in 1895* Naoroji said that
the battles of grievances end necessary reforms had to be fought in 
4
the Commons* It was* however* certain that unless Indian affairs 
were drawn into the arena of Ehglish party politics no substantial 
results were likely to attend the agitation in Parliament* As regards 
the work done by the Parliamentary Committee* Ratcliffe observes with 
truth that it “was a valuable aid to the keeping alive of Indian questions
5
in the House**
Congress leaders believed that the national interests would 
be better served if a few Indians became members of Parliament* Even
1 An amendment widened the scope of Section 124a of the Indian Penal Code 
The insertion of Section 108 in the criminal Procedure Code enabled 
magistrates to deal with persons alleged to be offenders under Section 
124A*
2 ha 1897 Rand, officer in charge of plague preventive operations, and 
Ayerst*on plague duty* were assassinated by the Chapekar brothers* The 
Government suspected a conspiracy. The Natu brothers were deported 
under Bombay Regulation XXV of 1827 without a trial*
5 Hamilton to Elgin, 25 Feb. 1896* Pr* Cor* Ind., iii, 118.
4 India* Aug. I895, 24l.
5 S.K. Ratcliffs* op. cit** 76*
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before the establishment of the Congress, Lalmoh&n Ghose unsuccessfully
contested Deptford* In 1886 Naoroji failed to get returned as a
candidate for Holbom. In 1892 he succeeded as a Liberal' candidate
by a majority of three rotes.. His election was receired with great
satisfaction in Congress circles# In 189? Naoroji was unseated, and
another eminent Congress leader, W.C. Bonner jee, who was a candidate
for Barrow-in-Furness was also defeated, but another Indian, though an
opponent of the Congress, M.H. Bhownaggree, was returned a a Unionist
candidate* He played the role of a hostile critic of prominent Congress 
1
leaders. He challenged the bona fides of Naoroji, Wedderbum and others
to speak on behalf of India* and thus served, in the hands of the
Conservatives, as a counterpoise to the Congress agitation in Parliament.
In 1897 he was awarded a knighthood for, according to Hamilton, his
courageous and able fight against the Congress and also for producing
the impression that flhonour and notoriety can be obtained as well by
2
supporting as attacking the Government. 1 lhe elections of 189? re­
sulted in a considerable decrease in the strength of the Indian Committee.
5
Of the nine members of the British Committee five were defeated.
1 One or two instances of how he attacked the Congress may give some idea 
of his role in Parliament. He remarked that the public opinion of India, 
which Wedderbum and his supporters claimed to express, was manufactured 
in a small room, not far from the House of Commons. Indian Pari.
Debates, 26 Jan. 1897* 52*
He ridiculed the merit of the witnesses, who appeared before the 
Welby Commission, by saying: NCne of them was a schoolmaster, another
was a clerk in a mill office, and a third was a leader writer on a
native paper.■ Indian pari. Debates, 7 June 1898, 656. lhe remark 
that such men as G.K. Gokhale, D.E. Wacha, and G. Subramania Iyer were 
not fit persons for giving evidence shows little regard for truth.
2 Hamilton to Elgin 27 May 1897* Pr. Cor. Ind., ii, 2^5.
5 E.H. Bay ley, W. 3. Caine, Seymour Keay, W.S.B. Mclaren, and Dadabhai
Naoroji.
279
The question of representation of India in Parliament, though
formally taken up by the Congress much later, was referred to as early
as 1886 by Naoroji in his presidential speech* He observed that not a
single genuine voice was there in Parliament to acquaint it with Indian
1
opinion on any question* In 189?, in his presidential speech at the
Lahore session, he emphasised the need of direct Indian representation 
2
in Parliament* In 1897 Gokhale, in his evidence before the Welby 
Commission, suggested that India should have six representatives in 
Parliament* He remarked that while such a small number would introduce 
no disturbing factor, the House would be in a better position to ascertain 
Indian opinion* As regards the method of appointment, he proposed that 
the elected portion of the legislative councils of Madras, Bombay, Bengal,
5
the N*W*P*, the Punjab and Burma should each appoint one member. In 
1898 A*M* Bose, the Congress President, suggested that fifteen seats 
should be assimed to the inhabitants of some of the chief cities of
4
India* In 1904 the Congress unanimously passed a resolution that each 
Province or Presidency should be authorised to send at least two members
5
to the Commons* The resolution was repeated in 190?* Some British 
men were also in favour of Indian representation; for instance, W.W* 
Hunter, who had long served in India and was author of several books, ..
1 Report of Second I*N*C* (1886), 5
2 Report of Ninth I*N.C, (1895), 2?.
5 Minutes of Evidence, iii, Qs. 18016-17* It may be pointed out that
the legislative councils of the Punjab and Burma, which were established 
in 1897, consisted of offical and nominated members* The Indian Councils 
Act of 1892 was not applicable to them*
4 Report of Fourteenth I»N*C* (I898), ?4*
5 Resolution IX, Report of Twentieth I.N.C* (1904)
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was of opinion that India should be represented in parliament by Indians
1
elected by British constituencies*
It is clear from the above that membership of Parliament had
a great appeal to many Congress leaders* Ike reasons are not far to
seek* First, it was believed that the presence of Indian members would
accelerate the pace of reform* Secondly, association with Parliament
would, as Gokhale said, elevate Indians from the position of a subject
2
race to an equality with the rest of the Empire* Ihirdly, the atmosphere 
of Parliament was suited to the temperament of early leaders*
It is idle to speculate what benefits would have accrued to 
India from lhe membership of a few Indians* But if the proposal had been 
accepted certain complications must have inevitably arisen* In case some 
of the Indian members had decided to join one party and some had associated 
themselves with the other, the situation would have been extremely difficult* 
We have seen how Bhownaggree, in his role as an opponent of the Congress, 
became a source of much inconvenience to its supporters in Parliament* 
lhe Congress proposal presumed for its success that all members would share 
more or less the same views, but in all probability such a condition would 
have been difficult to obtain* Moreover, a handful of members, even if 
they had worked as a team, would not have succeeded in bringing to bear 
adequate pressure on British political parties to do justice to India*
On the other hand, their presence, as Robert Knight rightly says, would 
have served as a pretext for declaring that India enjoyed the same
1 W*W* Hunter, India of the Queen, 48.
2 A Debate on the Awakening of India, London, 15 Hov. 1905*
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1
representative rights as the people of Ehgland. lhe reviewer of
Xnigfct1* book remarks that this would have been true if it were proposed
to introduce into the House members from Calcutta and Bombay but it could
2
not. be applicable to Indians sent by British constituencies. But we
i
have seen that the Congress resolution provided for the bestowal of 
franchise on the Provinces* Indeed, there were difficulties associated 
with either of the two methods of Indian representation and the success 
of the proposal even under favourable conditions, would have been highly 
p roblemati cal•
The Congress, as has been pointed out, had full faith in the 
justice of the British people* lhe question was how to convince that 
"great tribunal" of the justice of its stand* Delegates were sent 
from time to time, who appealed to the British nation to redress Indian 
grievances* In 1889, just before the establishment of the Congress, a 
delegation consisting of N.G* Ghandavark&r, Manomohan Ghose and Salem 
Ramaswamy Mudaliyar spoke at several meetings. They appealed to British 
electors to take a pledge from the candidates, Liberal or Conservative, 
to support some of the Indian demands* These demands were more or less 
the same as those put forward by the Congress in 1889 or subsequently.
In 1889 the Congress appointed the first official deputation to Ehgland. 
lhe team, which visited England in 1890, consisted of Surendranath 
Banerjea, R.II. Mudholkar, W.C. Bonner jee, Eardley Norton and A.O. Hume*
In 1890 the Congress appointed George Yule, Pherozeshah Mehta, Bonner jee, 
John Adam, Manomohan Ghose, Hume, Naoroji, K.C. Banerjee, and D.A* Khare
1 Robert Knig^ it, The Indian National Congress, (1898), 16.
2 India, 15 May I898, 292.
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to represent its views in England and press upon the consideration of 
the British public the political reforms Which it had advocated*
Another resolution provided that a Congress of not less than 100 delegates
2
should meet in Ehgland in 1692* In 1691 lhe British Committee invited 
the Congress to hold the proposed session in 1895* some time after the
5
General Election of 1892* It may be noted that the plan of the Congress 
to hold a session in England never took effect* In 1897 G»K* Gokhale, 
Surendranath Baner jea, D.E* tfacha and G* Subramania Iyer, who had gone to 
England to give evidence before the Welby Commission, addressed a large 
number of meetings* In 1898 A*M* Bose, who presided over the Congress 
session of that year, and W*C* Bonner jee spoke at various meetings* In 
January 1899 Bepin Chandra Pal addressed a series of meetings in Scotland* 
It is impossible to say how far these deputations changed the 
political climate of Ehgland in India's favour* Perhaps not to any 
appreciable extent* But the Congress continued to believe in this method 
and persisted in it for a long time* The British Committee always 
impressed upon the Congress the need of sending more Indians to England 
for this purpose* However, one thing became very clear* Prom the very 
beginning Congressmen received no encouragement in their efforts from 
Conservative politicans* Though the Indian delegates of 1885 had made 
it perfectly clear that they had no mind to depend upon the support of 
any one party, they found little response from Conservative circles* The
1 Resolution XV, Report of Sixth I*H*Q* (I89O).
2 Resolution XI*
5 India, 27 Hov. I89I 291*
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meetings were organised mostly by a number of Liberals, who were
sympathetic towards the movement, and even the audience for the most
part, consisted of Liberals. lhe Congress deputations and speakers
later had the same experience.- Ihus the want of sympathy on the part
of the Conservatives drove the Congress into the arms of the other party.
In fact, Raja Rampa1 Singh, a Congress leader, charged the British
Committee and the Congress authorities with having made the Congress an
appendage of one political party in Ehgland. In reply to this charge,
India pointed out that there was little response from the Conservatives
and that the Tory papers, in general, were most unsympathetic. W.S. Caine,
who was a member of the British Committee and attended the Congress session
of 1896, asked Congressmen not to expect anything from the Tories, and
added that the Congress in India and the Liberal party in England had
2
similar aims and objects and must work together.
lhe above account Of the composition, aims, and methods of the 
Congress would be of great value in our assessment of the British attitude 
towards the national movement.
We have seen how the Congress came into existence as a political 
body on the advice of Lord Dufferin. lhe founders of the Congress wanted 
to work in complete harmony with the Government and indeed they suggested 
that Lord Reay, then Governor of Bombay, should preside over the first 
session. Dufferin did not approve of this proposal on the grounds that 
in the presence of a high official Congressmen would not speak out their 
minds and that the association of the Government might lead to other 
complications. In 1886 a considerable number of Government servants
1 India, 5 Feb. 1892, 54.
2 Report of Twelfth I.N.C. (I896), 75*
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visited Calcutta at the time of the Congress session, and though they
took no part in the proceedings, they privately gave the delegates of
1
their own Provinces advice at many of the informal consultations.
According to the Congress report, the impression, however, prevailed,
and well or ill-founded it was universal, that European officials as
a body were hostile to the movement* At a large party given at the
Town Hall to welcome the delegates only a very few Europeans attended
it though invitations had been sent to the majority of the leading
2
official and non-official Europeans. Ihis attitude was not likely 
to be a cause of much concern so long as the Viceroy was sympathetic. 
Lord Dufferin was friendly and gave private interviews to a number of 
delegates, explaining, however, that he received them not as delegates 
but as distinguished visitors* He also entertained than at a garden 
party.
In 1887* til© year of the Queen1 s Jubilee, at a very large 
number of meetings held all over India, resolutions for the enlargement 
of the councils were passed* lhe Punjab Government pointed out that 
the leading part in getting up the meetings and in forming some of the 
societies was taken in most places by Indian officials* lhe question 
naturally arose whether officials should be permitted to take part in 
the proceedings of such meetings* While the Government of India was 
not disposed to issue any formal order prohibiting officials from 
participating in them, it was laid down that an official attending a 
meeting at which an improper attack was made on the Government's policy
1 Report of Second 1*3*0* (1886), Introduction, 50**
2 Ibid*, Introduction, 7» 17*
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or action, was liable to be called to account by his official superior
1
without any special rule or order* lhe year 1887 was otherwise marked 
by friendliness towards the Congress* lhe Madras Government showed its 
sympathy by lending a large number of tents to supplement the Reception 
Committee's preparations when, at the last moment, a large number of
4 ...............
delegates appeared* Lord Connemara, Governor of Madras, invited the
2
Congress delegates to a garden party*
lhe Madras session marks the end of cordial relations* From 
then onwards the attitude of the Government was far from friendly if not 
actually hostile* lhe Congress Report of 1887 says that animosity did 
not extend to the highest and most enlightened officials and mentions 
the names of Dufferin, Connemara, Reay and Auckland Colvin among the 
sympathisers of the movement, but the publication of the report was 
followed by a marked hostile attitude in the highest official circles*
In a letter of 19 September 1888 to Colvin, Hume said that “you are 
personally hostile to the Congress - that you desire to ruin all who 
take a prominent part in it - that you will favour and reward all who J
5
oppose it * . *“ A circular of 29 October prohibited Government servants
4 .
from collecting subscriptions for political purposes* In November, on 
the eve of his departure, Lord Dufferin denounced the Congress in the 
strongest terms* Thus within a few months friendly relations between 
Government and Congress became a thing of the past*
1 Punjab Govt* to Govt* of India, 2 Sept* 1887; Govt* of India to
Punjab Govt*, 26 Sept* 1887*
2 Report of Third I*N*C* (1887), Introduction, 19*
5 Audi Alteram Partem (1888), 5*
4 To Provincial Govts*, 29 Oct* 1888, Pub* Progs** April 1890*
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Auckland Golf in took very great exception to the pamphlets 
entitled " Catechism on the Indian National Congress B and * A Conversa­
tion between Maulfcti Fariduddin and Rambaksh", which had been distributed
1
in thousands and had appeared as appendices to the Third Report* He
remarked that the "hideous caricatures" of British rule could not but
undermine the loyalty of the people, and addeds "I think it was an evil
hour for the interests of the Congress party that those pamphlets were
permed or published"♦ He criticised the Congress for laying claim to
represent the majority of the people, for not devoting itself to social
reform, and for demanding representative institutions, unfamiliar to
the vast masses and unsuited to Indian conditions* He also pointed out
that some of the newspapers supporting the Congress used scurrilous 
added
language and /that it was highly objectionable that the Indian Government 
and its officials should be held up to the hatred of the people as 
standing between them and the benevolence of Her Majesty's Government*
1 They appear as Appendices II and III to the Report* Colvin selected 
a few passages to show how dangerous the pamphlets were* One or 
two extracts are given below:
"So the Ehglish Nation, as a body, has no conception of all the hard­
ships and disadvantages under which we labour •*• Nor do the Ehglish 
officials in India ever report to the Members of Parliament what we 
know to be the true state of this country •*• The Government offer some 
native gentlemen seats in the Council *•• to lead the people of 
Ehgland into the belief that in the Government of this country Native 
opinion receives due weight ••• these Councils are a mere sham ••• And 
they (members) dare not fight for the people's cause on pain of never 
being appointed ••• Prom Catechism*
The second pamphlet draws distinction between the happy state of the 
villagers of Shamshpur and those of Raja Harbansrai, who "lives away 
in the Sadder, and he never comes near us, and he never reads any of our 
petitions, and never consults any of us sends out an order for us 
to speak to the Naib, (his Deputy or agent) or the Gomashtah (Factor)
• and as for the Gomashtah he never knows anything about us or the 
village, for one comes for six months and then goes ••«" Colvin said
that Harbansrai was obviously the Govt, of India and the Provincial 
Governors were his naibs* Audi Alteram Partem, 10-15*
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As to the benefits of British rule, Colvin remarked that anything
which Congressmen said on this point was completely obscured by the
1
vehemence of their attack*
In a long letter A.O* Hume, General Secretary of the
Congress,dealt with all the points raised by Colvin* He said that
the Congress was the most efficacious safety-valve for the escape of
great and growing forces, that it represented the people of India not
less faithfully than the House of Commons represented the people of
Ehgland, that the bulk of its representatives would always be drawn
from the more highly educated classes, that the Congress demanded a
more liberal and less bureaucratic policy, and not representative
institutions; and that a large number of Congressmen had been working
2
for the regeneration of India along other lines also*
Ihe Auckland-Hume controversy raised some very Important 
questions as to the composition, functions and methods of the Congress* 
We have already discussed these points and need not go over the same 
ground. One looks in vain for a dispassionate analysis of the national 
movement by Sir Auckland who had then thrown himself heart and soul 
into an anti-Congress movement, nor, in view of Hume^ position as 
General Secretary, can we accept as entirely correct all his arguments 
and claims in favour of the Congress* For instance, the elective 
basis and representative character of the organisation - on which he
1 Auckland Colvin to A»0* Hume, 8 October, 1888*
2 A*0. Hume to Auckland Colvin, 15 October, 1888*
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laid much emphasis * can be accepted in a very limited sense* But 
Colvin's charge that the Congress was weakening the loyalty of the 
people was absolutely unfounded* It is to be regretted that so much 
importance was attached to the pamphlets and little to the proceedings 
of the third Congress* The Madras Session more or less had reaffirmed 
what had been discussed at the previous sessions*
A much harder blow was struck to the Congress by Lord Dufferin 
in his speech at St* Andrew's dinner on 50 November 1888* He emphasised 
the division of India into two mighty political communities and a number 
of minor nationalities, and criticised the Congress for seeking the 
introduction of a parliamentary system which England herself had reached 
by slow degrees* In his words, the adoption of democratic methods would 
be "a big jump into the unknown*" He remarked that under the existing 
condition of the people with their "multitudinous interests, and their 
tesselated nationalities," no real or effective representation of the 
people was possible* Ee characterised the Congress as a microscopic 
minority, which could not be allowed to control the administration* In 
support of his argument he said: "If they had been really representatives 
of the people of India - that is to say, of the voiceless millions - 
instead of seeking to circumscribe the incidence of the income tax, as 
they desired to do, they would probably have received a mandate to 
decuple it*" He further observed,that the Congress should have devoted 
its attention to such matters as excessive and useless expenditure on 
marriages and other ceremonies, the chronic indebtedness of the peasant 
to the money-lenders, sanitary refoims, the reform of the bad customs of
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Hindu society* end the problem of over population end the excessive
pressure on Land. He went on to say that the Congress could have supplied
the Government with valuable information about social and religious
questions* but it concerned itself with matters in regard to which its
assistance was likely to be less profitable* He denounced the Congress
for distributing pamphlets with the manifest object of exciting the hatred
of the people against the public servants* He also referred to a letter
of 6 November 1887 in which Hume had said that the large body of more or
less educated (not Ehglish educated) men who were supporting the movement
* do hold in their hands the keys of a good many magazines of physical force*
1
though they are not going to put those keys in the locks.* He remarked that
such a *81117* threat was not calculated to restore confidence in the
discretion of Congressmen even when accompanied by an assurance of doing
2
nothing of the kind*
IXtfferin had already recorded these observations in his famous 
minute which contained recommendations for the reform of the Council. On 
putting the speech and the minute side by side* one, however* finds that 
the tone of the letter is more militant* He observed that in nine out 
of ten cases* the instinct of the classes who formed the Congress and other 
like associations was actuated by the desire to promote their own interests. 
In support of this point* he said that the Indian members of the Supreme
1 The Pioneer* 24 Nov. 1887* 6. Hume said that in two years the great 
bulk of the Ihdian army could become strong supporters of the move­
ment* but the Congress was opposed to any step which would lead the 
Government to suspect its loyalty* He added that the Congress did 
not encourage Indian military officers* when at their homes on 
furlough* to take part in Its demonstrations*
2 Dufferin, Speeches (1884-88), 257-44*
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Council, while accepting an increase of the salt duty, showed a strong
dislike to the income tax, and added that the Government's land legislation,
such as, the Bengal Tenancy Act and the Oudh Rent Bill, had been undertaken
in the interests of the peasants. Referring to the Congress resolutions
on the Arms Act and Indian volunteering, he said that they were neither wise
nor practical, because far from increasing the military strength, the
measures, in view of the unfriendly relations between different creeds and
communities, would add to the numerous anxieties of the Government. He
remarked that in thousands of pamphlets issued by the Congress "the most
libellous and caluminous accusations11 had been preferred against the Indian
Government and the civil servants, and added that instead of trusting to
the benevolence of the English people at large, the Congress was committing
the mistake of endeavouring to associate itself with a particular party in
Ihgland. In his opinion, Congressmen "neither represented the aristocratic
sections of Indian society, nor are they in special contact or sympathy
with the great masses of the population,* they do not understand their wants
or necessities, if indeed they are not indifferent or even opposed to them -
as was evidenced by the strenuous resistance of the important native
associations to our recent land legislation ..." He went on to say that
the transfer of the Government of India, either partially or otherwise, to
such a body of men would "simply be to place millions of men, dozens of
nationalities, and hundreds of the most stupendous interests under the
domination of a microscopic minority, possessing neither experience,
administrative ability, nor any adequate conception of the nature of the
1
tasks before them"
1 See Dufferin's Minute, Encl. to Pub. Des. from India, Ho. 67, 6 Hov. 1886.
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Many of the point a emphasised by Duffer in were more or less
identical with those which Colvin had dealt with in his letter to Hume*
Hie speech was received in Congress circles with great disappointment* the
more so because it came from the head of the Indian Government and from
one who was believed to have been a sympathiser since the beginning of the
movement* Ihe Congress leaders denied that they demanded representative
institutions on the British model and that their propaganda had seditious 
1
objectives* As to the representative character of the Congress* they
said that though the masses did not take part in large numbers in election*
the delegates were elected by associations or at open public meetings and
represented all classes and creeds* So far as the indifference of the
Congress to social matters was concerned* it must be remembered that
Dufferin himself had encouraged the formation of a political congress* In
its role as a political body* believing in constitutional methods* it could
not perhaps have functioned very differently* As regards the Congress
demand for raising the amount of minimum taxable income from Rs* 500 to
Rs* 1,000 it is difficult to agree or disagree with Dufferin*s criticism
that Congressmen were actuated by selfish motives* Reports are silent
on the question of the incomes of delegates* A Congressman* however*
remarked that the demand was put forward in the interests of the lower
middle class and not of the delegates* of whom very few had an annual
2
income less than Rs* 1*000*
1 As regards the objectionable character of the pamphlets* Eardley Horton 
said that the authoritative exposition of Congress policy* was contained 
in its resolutions and not in the "Cat&chism* which stated the personal 
views of the writer* Hie National Congress Vindicated or Horton versus 
IXifferin, 18*
2 Report of Hiird I*N*C* (1887), 1J1.
2 92
Oppoeiticn to the Congress in 1668 came not only from the Govei7i- 
ment but also from other quarters* In the N.W.P* the anti-Congrese move­
ment was active, and it was an open secret that Auckland Colvin, the 
Lieutenant Governor, had encouraged it* Sir Syed Ahmad Khan delivered 
two militant speeches, on» on 26 December 1667 when the Third Congress was 
meeting at Madras and the other in March 1666, in which he denounced the 
Congress as a Hindu body inimical to Muslim interests* It was believed 
that the second speech was delivered at the instigation of Colvin* He 
warned the Muslims not to fall in the trap laid for them and urged the 
Government not to accept its demands* He asked his co-religionists to
win the confidence of the Government and not to join a movement which would
1
make them the subjects of the Hindus* In August 1686 the United Indian
Patriotic Association was formed at Aligarh, ; which both Hindus and
Muslims joined* Sir Syed was the principal figure in this movement* Its
object was to counteract the Congress agitation and to strengthen British
rule* In 189? a new organisation called the Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental
Defence Association was formed, the objects of which were to protect Muslim
interests, to prevent political agitation from spreading among the Muslims,
and to strengthen British rule* Sir Syed remained hostile to the last days
of his life, and in his anti-Congress work he was greatly assisted by
2
Theodore Beck, Principal of his College at Aligarh*
The year 1886 was also marked by opposition from some members of J  
the aristocracy* In a pamphlet entitled >>Democracy Not Suited to India,R
1 For details see Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Present State of Indian Politics 
(1668).
2 See Rajendra Prasad, India Divided (19^6), 98-101*
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Baja Udai Pratap Singh of Bhinga denounced the programme and the
representative character of the Congress* He remarked that the real
subjeotspressing for solution were social problems, which Congress leaders
1
had neither the energy nor the moral courage to take up* The Maharaja 
of Banaras observed that if the Government did not put down t&&mischievous 
movements and writings, the minds of the ignorant masses might be prejudiced 
against it* He, too, maintained that representative institutions were
a
not suited to India* In 1894 Udai pratap Singh went to the length of 
accusing Congressmen of encouraging the Hindu-Muslim riots of 1895* The 
charge was not only absurd, It was also mischievous* The Baja criticised 
the British Government for showering honours on those who had been trying 
to subvert it and suggested that the British nation must define the lines
5
on which India was to be governed* As to the responsibility of Congress­
men for the riots, Herbert Reynolds rightly observed that it was incon­
ceivable that the Congress which was endeavouring to weld together various 
classes and^communities into one harmonious nationality would foster enmity 
among them*
Urns in 1888 the Congress had to encounter opposition on many 
sides* The Government, a section of the aristocracy and Sir Syed1 a party 
had become hostile* In reply to a question on this subject, John Gorst, 
Under-Secretary of State for India, said that the Government of India had
1 Raja of Bhinga, Democracy Not Suited to Dadja, 90* Hume said that the
Raj* could not write a single page of really good English and got some
one to write for him. The Hindu of Madras observed that he wrote the 
pamphlet under •dictation* from Sir Auckland Colvin* Hie Hindu1 a 
opinion quoted in India, May 1895* 15^*
2 Hie Times, 15 Aug*”1555, 5*
5 Article on *Hae Gqw Agitation,* The nineteenth Century* April 1894*
4 India, May 1894, l46.
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received representations from Indian Chiefs and leading Muslims regarding
the mischievous effect of the publications and the speeches made by the
1
Congress delegates* J.M* Maclean, who asked the question, expressed
the view that the Oongress aimed at destroying the security of British 
2
rule in India*
ftie Oongress of 1666 met in an atmosphere altogether different 
from that of the earlier sessions* Ajodhyanath, Chairman of the Reception 
Committee, referred to the difficulties which the organisers had to en~ 
counter in fixing the site for holding the session* lhe authorities gave 
and cancelled permission, first, for the use of the Xhusro Bagh, then, of 
a plot of waste land lying between the Port railway station and the Port* 
Ihen the Congress managed to secure a group of houses belonging to members 
of the Reception committee and other friends* Some of the houses were 
situated within the Cantonment limits, and the military authorities raised
5
obstacles* In spite of these difficulties the Congress session was held 
at Allaha bad, of course, not at the above-mentioned places, but at Lowtber 
Castle itiiich, soon after its purchase by the Maharaja of Darbhanga, was 
made available for Congress use* Ajodhyanath also pointed out that the 
officials in many districts had told the people that they would come to 
grief if they joined or helped the Congress* Bie report says that a 
number of subscribers wanted to keep the fact of their aid secret and
1 Hansard1 s Indian Debates, 6 Dec* 1866, 114^*
2 Ibid., 4 Dee. 1888, ll4j.
5 See Pandit Ajodhyanathfs Speech, Report of the Fourth I*N*C* (1668)*
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that the money came also from nobles and chiefs and even from men whose
names appeared among the leaders of two or three anti-Gongress associations,
1
got up by Government officials*
The Government’s attitude, during Lansdowne’s Yiceroyalty, was j
neither friendly nor hostile* Strong and outright condemnation of the
movement in the manner in which Dufferin had done was avoided* In reply
to a question, John Gorst said that Dufferin and Colvin had not objected
to the Congress, but to the action of some of its supporters, the language
2
of some of the newspapers, and the character of the pamphlets* It is 
interesting to note that even in Liberal dovecots the language of the 
pamphlets caused some flutter* Speaking on the Indian Councils Bill,
Lord Northbrook said that some of them had been couched in language which,
5
if read by any large number of Indians, might be decidedly dangerous*
It would be wrong to say that but for these publications friendly relations 
would have lasted much longer, but they did contribute, to some extent, to 
the hastening of the crisis*
In December 1890, on the eve of the Congress session at Calcutta,
V
a disconcerting situation, though it was short-lived, arose out of the 
Bengal Go Vermont’s circular which pointed out that the Government of India1 s 
orders definitely prohibited the presence of Government officials at such 
meetings* Ihe seven cards of admission to the visitors* enclosure of the 
Congress pavilion, which had been sent to the Lieutenant Governor and the
1 Report of Fourth I*N*C» (1888), vii*
2 Hansard*s Indian Debates, 22 Feb* 1889, 16* 
? Ibid., 6 March 1890, 5^-55.
296
members of his household were returned* When the Congress drew the
attention of the Governor-General to this matter, he at onoe declared
that the orders had no special reference to the Congress movement which
was "perfectly legitimate" and which private persons were free to promote*
The letter goes on to say that the Government of India looked upon the
Congress as representing what in Europe would be called the more advanced
liberal party and that is attitude was one of neutrality so long as it
acted strictly within constitutional limits* Government servants were
also asked to maintain a similar attitude and to abstain from active
participation in political or quasi-political movements of all kinds, and
not to put pressure upon others in order to induce them to join or not to
join them* Zt was also pointed out that the orders did not apply to 
1
pensioners* The Governor-General^ clarification was received with
much satisfaction*
The attitude of lansdowne*s Government remained more or less 
2
indifferent* When interviewed by a representative of Reuter, Dadabhai 
Naoroji, on his return to Ehgland after presiding over the Congress of 
1893* said that all he could say was that the"Government shows no hostility
5
nor opposition to the movement* Of course it is being closely watched*"
1 Report of Sixth I*N*C* (1890), Introduction, XXXIV$ Pub* Progs** Nos* 
1-4, Jan* 1891*
2 Congressmen reacted favourably to the viewpoint of Antony Macdonnell, 
then Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, who, just before the 
seventh Congress was held at Nagpur, told Narayan Swami, Chairman of 
the Reception Committee, and others that he would not think any the 
better or any the worse of any man because he was a Congressman or not*
He further said that if they asked him as a private friend, then "I 
shall say that if you see your way to benefit your country and your
fellows by these Oongrsses, then must certainly do your duty as good 
citizens end attend*" Of* India, Oct* 1895* 291*
5 Ibid*, 1 March 18$4, 89*
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Critics of the Congress spared no pains to emphasise that it 
was a very small minority with which the people were not concerned. In 
1892 Curzon, then Under Secretary of State for India, told Parliament 
that it represented a minute and microscopic minority whose plans and
policy left the "vast amorphous residuum", that is, the ryots and
 1 ..................................
peasants, absolutely untouched. Fitzpatrick, Lieutenant-Governor of
the Punjab, said that the Congress represented an infinitesimal fraction
of the population, and that the question of larger admission of Indians
into higher services, as demanded by it, might be considered when it
2
would represent a great mass of the population. Among distinguished 
men, George Gheaney, formerly Military Member of India, was extremely 
hostile. He remarked that the Congress had been for the most part 
connected with the representation of that small and special class which 
desired to get a large share of the official loaves and fishes, and 
criticised it for demanding the reduction of the income tax - the one
5
tax, he said, the middle class paid. At another place he observed that 
the Congress resolutions, if taken seriously, were in the strongest degree 
condemnatory of the Government, and if carried out, they would make all 
government impossible. "In truth, the holders of these congresses," 
writes Chesney, "are a set of inept, blundering, political charlatans. 
They have never made one useful or practical suggestion, but their 
proceedings, when not merely silly, are undoubtedly mischievous."
1 Indian Pari. Debates, 28 March 1892, 151-52*
2 Note of 25 Sept. 1895* Pub. Progs., No. 67* Nov. 1895*
5 Indian Pari. Debates, 21 Sept. 1895* 675*
4 Article on "India - The Political Outlook," The Nineteenth Century, 
June 1894, 897* 901, Indian Polity (1894), 5S5-S7*
298
The above views are marked by a great deal of exaggeration* The
Congress, despite its limitations, had many strong points in its favour*
In reply to Chesney1 s accusations, Sir Richard Garth, former Chief Justice
of the Calcutta Hi$i Court and Tory in his personal views, made some important
observations* He said that the Oongress was a large and influential
assembly of patriotic men, who had dared to think for themselves and for
the millions of ignorant men, had the courage to denounce abuses and propose
important reforms, such as, the reduction of extravagant expenditure, the
reform of the Police administration, inquiry into the Home charges, a
Council for the Punjab, and the establishment of military colleges* He
further remarked that many persons of high rank* and position had been
deterred from taking a direct and open part by the “determined jealous
1
hostility* shown by the Government towards the movement* Garth's assess­
ment of the movement well accords with the facts; and is remarkably sober 
and well-balanced*
During the first two years of Elgin's Viceroyalty, there does not 
appear to be any marked change in the Government's attitude* In January
1896 India wrote that there was good reason to believe that the Government
2
of India was adopting a more sensible and friendly attitude* However, 
this optimism did not last long and there ensued a long period during 
which the Congress looked in vain for sympathy, and indeed in Curzonfs time 
contemptuous treatment coupled with hostility was its lot* Lord Hamilton,
1 India, April 1895* *22
2 Ibid*, Jan* 1896, 1*
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who was Secretary of State for India for about seven and a half years, 
remained consistently suspicious and unsympathetic* Elgin, however, 
showed a better understanding of the movement, but he was too weak to 
take any independent line of action* ihe Government's attitude took 
a turn for the worse during the last three years of his administration 
when a number of events, such as, the outbreak of famine, the un­
popularity of the plague operations resulting in the assassinations of 
Hand and Ayerst, the arrests of the Natu brothers, the imprisonment of 
B*G* Tilak, the enactment of sedition laws, and the North-West Frontier 
expeditions, provoked strong criticism in Congress circles*
In 1897 Elgin's Government suspected a conspiracy for the purpose 
of obtaining possession of the correspondence between the Viceroy and the 
Secretary of State* Elgin said: "What a bombshell it would be if we could
put one of the most prominent leaders of the Congress in the dock on the
1
charge of stealing letters!" Babington Smith, Private Secretary to the
Governor-General, gives a list of documents which had leaked out saying:
*!he man who receives them and pays for them is W.C* Bonnerjee, one of the
Congress leaders and a successful Calcutta barrister* Ihe agent he
enploys for the purpose is one O'Brien Moore, manager of the 'Cambridge
2
Press' - a low-class press in Calcutta*" Even if the details furnished
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 10 March 1897* Pr* Cor* Ind*, IV, 175“8*
2 Babington Smith writes that information was received in Dec. 1895 
that a printed copy of the Viceroy's letter to the Secretary of 
State, dated 25 October 189^ was in the hands of the Editor of the 
Editor of the Anrita Bazar Patrika* Other documents which leaked 
out were the Viceroy's letter to the Secretary, 15 Jan* 1897* the 
Secretary's letter to the Viceroy, 12 Feb* 1897* the Viceroy's letter 
to the Secretary, 5 March 1897* and a page from the Secretary's letter 
to the Viceroy, 5 Feb# 1897* Enel* to Elgin's letter to Hamilton, 10 
March 1897* IV, 181-85*
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by Smith may be taken as correct, there is nothing to prore that the 
Oongress was interested in getting possession of secret papers* Hie 
Congress stood for certain reforms and it knew well that the Government 
was not sympathetic* Moreover, Bonnerjee is not to be identified with 
the Congress*
Hie Government was anxious that the movement should receive
no financial help from rich men and indeed it derived much satisfaction
from the disclosure that Wedderbum, despite his repeated protests, was
1
supplied with inadequate funds for Congress work in Ehgland. The
financial position of the Congress was alwayB unsound* Much difficulty
was experienced in raising about £5*000 for the expenses of the British
Committee in Ehgland* In a strongly worded letter to Congressmen, Hume
said: "As a fact, however, but a small sum, comparatively is provided -
a wholly inadequate sum, and even that, though promised, is paid so
tardily that thousands of letters, circulars, and reminders are needed to
2
get in even this ineffectual contribution** One need not accept this 
statement on its face value, but the fact of the unsound financial position 
was fully realised by Congressmen* Until 1687 members of the aristocracy,
5
who sympathised with the movement, helped it openly, but when the displeasure
1 On 15 Oct* 1899 Hume and Wedderbum wrote that Congressmen did not fully 
realise the trouble and anxiety which their dilatory habits entailed up­
on those who had been fighting a most difficult battle in Ehgland for 
justice in the face of much obloquy* Biey emphasised that unless the 
Congress remitted the sum promptly, the work of the British Committee 
might come to an end* According to this letter, out of Ha* 60,000, 
being the sum voted annually for the British Committee, only Rs* 16,205 
had been received on account of 1898, and Rs* 2,064 on account of 1899, 
then in its last quarter# Bad* to Curzon*s letter to Hamilton, 28 Dec* 
1899* Pr* Cor* Ind*, XV,
2 Hume*s letter of 16 Feb* 1892, India, 15 May 1892, 159*
5 Hie Oongress Report of 1886 mentioned the names of the Maharajas of Coocl
Bihar, Darbhanga, Hathwa, and Dumraon* Darbhanga had contributed Rs* 
2,500. (Report, Introduction, 10)* According to the Report of 1887
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of the Government became known, only a few had the courage to support
it* Some of them no doubt continued to help it secretly, but as the
years passed, the number of such sympathisers became almost negligible*
The Report of I898 says that the Madras Reception Committee received no
contributions from Rajas and Maharajas or the rich classes and that its
    1
funds were chiefly obtained by house to house collections* In 1899t
when the Congress session was held at Lucknow, the richer classes and
the landed aristocracy rendered no material help* The official report
2
says that they lived in constant dread of inquisitorial officialdom*
In 1899 Hamilton asked the Government of India to find out 
the nameB of those rich men who financed the Congress* Since 1888 
Congressmen, for fear of the Government's reprisal, had been maintaining 
strict secrecy about this matter* Among the early supporters of the 
Congress the name of Maharaja Sir Lak shine ah war Singh of Darbhanga stands 
out pre-eminent* The Government was fully aware of this fact, but it 
had Imperfect information about the precise amount of support* The 
Intelligence Department supplied some details in this connection, Which 
though they cannot be accepted as wholly cor root, reveal some important 
details* It has already been pointed out that he had contributed 
Rs* 2,5000 in 1886 and purchased Lowther Castle in 1888 and thus enabled 
the Congress to hold its session at Allahabad* He helped in the 
publication of the Congress journal India* Government circles believed
the Maharajas of Mysore, Vizianagaram and Travancore donated Rs* 1,000,
1,000 and 500 respectively* The Rajas of Cochin# and Venkatagiri 
gave Rs* 500 each. Raja Gajapathy Rao and the Raja of Bobili donated 
Rs* 525 and Rs* 200 respectively. (Report, Introduction, 15) In 1895 
the Maharaja of Ramnad contributed Rs* 10,000*
1 Report of Fourteenth I*N*C* (1898), Introduction, iii.
2 Report of Fifteenth I.N.C* (1899), Introduction, V*
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that it was largely owing to his assistance that it became a weekly
paper in 1893 and that he also contributed Rs* 10,000 annually to the
1
Congress* The note of C*S. Bay ley, however, says that there was
nothing to prove that he gave that particular amount, though his pecuniary
assistance was no doubt very large* The note goes on to say that in 1888
it was rumoured that he was going to be nominated President* In 1890
he and the Raja of Vizianagaram each subscribed Rs* %000 towards the
2
cost of HSurendranath Banarjis deputation1 to Ehgland, and in the same 
year he was said to have given Re* 2,000 to W*C. Bonnerjee as his first 
instalment towards the expenses of the next Congress* On 2 February 169^ 
Surendranath Banerjea said that the Maharaja had given Rs* 20,000 in the 
previous year* In 1895 ^ d  1895 an "Indian Friend11, who was supposed to 
be the Maharaja, gave Rs* 15,000 to the Permanent Fund of the Congress and 
Rs* 8,000 to the Special Fund for "India**
The Note gives further details about other supportera* It points 
out that the Maharaja of Baroda had financed Naoroji's election to Parliament. 
The note refers to a letter from Colonel Biddulph, then Agent to the Governor- 
General, who stated that the Maharaja had drawn one lakh of rupees from the 
Treasury, presumably for some secret purpose* It gives no information 
about the contributions of the Maharaja of Shavnagar* According to the
5
note, J«N« Tata subscribed Rs* 500 in 1895 ^ d  the same amount in 1896*
1 Then General Superintendent of operations for the Suppression of 
Thagi and Dakaiti (Dacoity)*
2 Banerjea writes in his autobiography that members of the Congress
deputation of I89O paid every farthing of their expenses* A Nation
in Making, 111.
5 C.S* Bay ley fs Note, 18 June 1899, Enel* to Curzon1 s letter to Hamilton,
28 June 1899, Pr* Cor* Ind., XIV, 65-65*
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Another confidential letter on this subject says that many of 
the Chief8 and leading men of India sympathised with the Congress move­
ment, some of whoa also gave pecuniary help in a very secret and in­
direct manner and that it was impossible to find out the extent of help*
1
The letter points out that the princes of Kolhapur, Baroda and Gondal
■ ■ ■ ■ 2 .............................
were believed to be subscribers to the Congress Fund* On 28 June 1899*
in the course of conversation with Curzon, the Maharaja of Baroda admitted
that he had given £1,000 towards Haoroji’s election expenses, and had
5
subscribed Rs* 1,000 annually towards the Congress Fund*
A letter of the Chief Secretary to the Bengal Government throws 
some light on the attitude of the Bengal zamindars to the movement* 
According to it, they did not subscribe largely though a few of them were 
regular subscribers, and the principal subscribers were the members of
4
the legal profession and their clients*
1 J*W* Wray, Political Agent, said that he could not find that the Raja 
of Kolhapur had contributed to the Congress Fund* Bhcl* to Curzonfs 
letter to Hamilton, 27 Sept* 1899* Pr* Cor* lad* XV, 55*
2 H* Kennedy to E*C* Cox, 20 July 1899* end* to Curzon^ letter to 
Hamilton, 27 Sept* 1899, Pr* Cor* Ihd*, XV, 55* Kennedy writes that 
only four Congress leaders - Wedderbum and Naoroji in England, and 
P*M* Mehta and D*E* Wacha in India - could give the information about 
the help given by the chiefs and leading mens
In a letter of 21 Sept* 1899 to W*R* Lawrence, Private Secretary to 
the Viceroy, C*S* Bay ley wrote that from inquiries it appeared that none 
of the Chiefs or leading Indians of position in Rajputana contributed to 
funds of the Congress or to India* Pr* Cor* Ind*, XV, 59*
5 Bad* to Curzon^ letter to Hamilton, 12 July 1899* Pr* Cor* 3nd*» XIV, 
172.
4 Among the regular subscribers were Manmath Hath Mitra and Narendranath 
Mitra, Raja Benoy Krishna Deb of the Sobhabazar family, Maharaja Jagendrc 
Hath Roy of Hator, Raja Sashishikaseahwar Roy of Gahirpur, Maharaja 
Suryakant of Mymensingh, and Yotindranath Ghaudhri of Gatri* Sir 
Jotindra Mohan Tagore and Sir Surendra Mohan Tagore subscribed to the 
Congress, not, says the letter, from active sympathy with the movement, 
but from fear of newspaper attacks* Members of Debendra Hath Tagorefs 
family were active Congressmen* Maharaja Mohendra Chandra Handi of 
Kasimbazar was believed to have given until then no pecuniary help thougl
504
It is clear from the above that a number of the Indian princes
and big zamindars helped the Congress* In his biography, R*P# Maaani also
refers to the help rendered by a few Indian Princes to Naoroji# In 1892
the Maharaja of Baroda placed at his disposal twenty coaches on the day of
polling, and about the end of the year when he was in financial difficulties3
he received substantial help from Gondal, Bhavnagar, and other Indian 
1
states# Though our information as to the exact amount of help given by 
the Chiefs and zamindars is scanty, we can say with a degree of certainty 
that the Congress had its friends also among the upper classes# The reason
was that it was a supporter of the interests of the landed aristocracy and
Princes# In 1891 the Bengal Government remarked that whenever the re­
lations of the Indian Government with any Chief attracted public attention,
2
the sympathies of the Press were strongly on the side of the latter*
The private letters of Hamilton to Elgin and Curzon are very
significant in revealing his attitude towards the movement* He appears 
to have been extremely Irritated at the criticism of his policy in the 
Indian Press and in Parliament* In some of his letters he no doubt shows 
a fairly correct reading of the situation, but his failure to put forward 
constructive suggestions is also evident*
his predecessor Mah&ranl Swaroamoyee had contributed liberally. 
According to the letter, the late Maharaja of Darbhanga had paid Rs*
10,000 annually* To Gen* Supt. T & D# Dept* 18 July 1899, Bhcl* to
Curzon1 s letter to Hamilton, 2 Aug* 1899* Pr* Cor Ind*, XIV, 227-JO*
1 R#P* Masani, op# cit*, 276, J2J*
2 Bengal to Govt, of India, 1J June I89I, Pub* Progs*, No* 261, Oct* I89I1
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Writing about the famine and plague of 1897* he said that,
while the Congress and its friends exaggerated the famine and attributed
it to the Government, they ignored the plague because it was due to the
uncleanliness of Indians* Then he commentss "They are all of them a
thankless, ungrateful, venomous crew, and Wedderbum ought to know better
1
than head the gang** In June 1897» after the murder of Rand and Ayerst
at Poona, he observed: "The more I see and hear of the National Congress
party the more I am impressed with the seditious and double-sided character
2
of the prime-movers of the organisation*" Poona was, in hie opinion, the 
centre of a seditious propaganda and the headquarters of the more violent 
section of the national Congress* He called the Maratha Brahmans the
5
ablest and most determined of the opponents of British rule*
Hamilton’s letters show how greatly annoyed he was at the
criticism of the Government’s policy. He says that ever since Wedderbum
had been in Parliament he used his whole influence to discredit the Indian
Government and that all his questions had that object in view* He was
so bitter that he declined to meet Wedderbum when the latter expressed
4
his desire to see him with a view to clearing up misunderstandings*
One can have some idea of the degree of his irritation by the use of such 
terns as "Wedderbum and Co** and "Naoroji and Co*” for the supporters of 
the Congress* About Naoroji he said that long residence in Qigland and
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 5 Feb* 1897> Pr* Cov* Ind*, ii, 29*
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 24 June 1897, Pr. Oor. Ind., ii, 295.
5 Hamilton to Elgin, 20 Oct. 1899, Pr. Oor. Ind.. IV, 565, 16 Hov. 1898,
Pr. Cor tod., iii, 486.
4 Hamilton to Curzon, 22 Feb. 1900, Pr. Oor. Bid.. V, 55*
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association with the "least reputable portion of the political world hare
hopelessly deteriorated whatever brains or prescience he may originally
1
have possessed." He expressed his extreme dislike of the Congress Journal
"India" which he called the "pernicious little rag" edited and written by
men holding extreme radical views. Much of the information about India,
 2
Hamilton said, was derived from this paper. Its articles and comments 
were no doubt strongly critical of the Government’s policy and exercised 
a great influence on Indian newspapers.
Beferring to the educated classes of Bengal, Hamilton said: "We 
have certainly contrived to produce a hybrid or rather I should say a 
mongrel personality in the educated Baboo possessing the most annoying and
3
useless attributes."
He accused Dufferin of purchasing popularity by leaving to his
successors unpleasant legacies. The origin and development of the Congress,
4
he observed, was due to his mismanagement and want of Judgment.
As regards the loyalty of Congressmen, Hamilton said that they 
did not fail, either in speech or writing, to criticise the Government of 
India and its officers. He added that though the Indian Press did not 
advocate the overthrow of British rule, its everlasting criticism "must 
ultimately make an ispression Just as perpetual drip wears out stone."
5
He remarked that in India criticism was unalloyed by praise or appreciation.
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 2 April 1897, Pr. Cor. Ind., ii, 129-
2 Hamilton to Curzon, 18 May 1899# Br. Cor. Ind., IV, 137*
3 Hamilton to Elgin, 7 April 1897, Pr. Cor. Ind., Hi,239*
4 Hamilton to Curzon, 17 May 1900, Pr. Cor. Ind., V, 169*
5 Hamilton to Elgin, 3° Oct* 1896, Pr. Cor. Ind., i, 411*
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Some of the observations only reveal his resentment and annoyance 
at the strong criticism of his policy, and some clearly Indicate the 
imperfect appreciation of the situation with which the British Government 
was confronted* To say that the Congress had a double-sided character 
was far from correct. The leadership of the Congress was in the hands 
of extremely moderate men who had blind faith in constitutional agitation. 
The only eminent Congressman whom the Government suspected of being the 
leader of the more violent section was B.G. Tilak, but even if we admit, 
for the sake of argument, that he was so, the fact remains that the Congress 
as an all-India body dominated by moderate leaders had not in the least 
changed its character. So far as the criticism of British policy was 
concerned, the tone of Congressmen was strong. This is to be attributed 
to the fact that they found little response to their appeals and protests* 
Rebuffs and disappointments they had galore. Therefore when they 
gathered at the annual meetings or when they wrote and spoke something they 
employed stronger language. Talk, written or spoken, was their first and 
last weapon. As regards Hamilton's remark that while the Congress was so 
vociferous in the criticism of British rule it was so niggardly in the 
appreciation of its merits, it may be said that some of the important 
advantages, such as, internal and external security, equality before the 
law, and the development of the means of communication, had by that time 
come to be taken for granted. Even so Congress were deeply conscious of 
the advantages and it was the recognition of this fact which made them 
lay so great an emphasis on the stability of British rule. The Congress 
movement represents a phase in Indian history when the various forces 
which had been at work called for a new approach on the part of the British.
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Hamilton’s criticism of Dufferin is hardly correct because the formation
of a political hody like the Congress could not have been long delayed*
Elgin’s letters to Hamilton, however, show a better
appreciation of the Congress movement* In 1896 he said that, though
Congressmen might be discontented, they were not disloyal, and added that
it was incredible that men like Pherozeshah Mehta would wish to overthrow 
1
the Government. In another letter he expressed the view that he did
not find in Indian papers Hmnch trace of a desire to substitute for British
authority a native, far less another, foreign rule.” He went on to say
that Indian papers not uncommonly appreciated the work of British officers
2
who had earned a reputation for fairness and kindness* In 1897 he observed 
that Indian politicians of necessity used a little "spicy11 language but did 
not mean anything offensive* He expressed the view that the Central and 
Provincial Councils were the right place for some of them, because they 
were able men and could do good work when not carried away by platform
3
oratory. As regards the Indian Press, Elgin said that it had been useful
4
to him in giving him some indication of. what the people were thinking about. 
About the advisability of prohibiting the Congress, he observed that, though 
it was a red-rag to many Britishers, no responsible person would propose
5
its prohibition.
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 25 Aug. 1896, Pr* Cor. Ind., ii, 828
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 7 Oct. 1896, Pr. Cor. Ind.,iii, 1^3* •
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 21 April l897»Pr* Oor. Ind., I?, 445“6*
4 See Hamilton’s letter to Curzon, 3 Aug. l899» Pr. Cor Ind., IV, 252.
5 Elgin to Hamilton, 27 July 1897• Pr. Cor. Ind., VI, 151*
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The Governments attitude towards Congressmen in matters of
nomination to certain offices may now be examined. During 1885-I9OO
1
a number of Congressmen were appointed as High court judges and a very 
large number of them were nominated to the legislative councils. The 
appointments or nominationswere made purely on grounds of merits. None 
the less they indicated two things: first, the Congress was not treated
as a seditious body, and, secondly, its membership was not a bar to one^ 
promotion. In fact Congress leaders emphasised that by joining the 
Congress one could secure greater recognition from the Government.
Generally speaking, Congressmen were appointed or nominated to certain 
offices because they were able men and could not be ignored. The Govern­
ment *s policy was not to show special favour to them nor was it one of 
penalising them. The appointment of N.G.Chandavarkar as a Judge of the 
High Court in 1901 is a case in point. He presided over the Congress session 
of 1900 and was appointed a few weeks later. His nomination to the Bench 
was known before he presided over the Congress. Hamilton felt like 
cancelling the appointment on the ground that it would be wrong in principle
to appoint a man to one of the highest posts immediately after he had
2
attacked the Government. Curzon1 s view was that such a decision would 
infuriate Chandavarkar and make the moderate party in the Congress hostile 
whereas the appointment would disarm him in the future and get him on the
3
British side.
1 K.T. Telang, Badruddin Tyabji and S. Subramania Iyer*Tyabji was the
President of the Third Congress, and became a High Court Judge in 1895*
2 Hamilton to Curzon, 24 Jan. 1901, Pr. Cor. Ind., VI, 26.
3 Curzon to Hamilton, 21 Feb. 1901, Pr. Cor. Ind., XIX, l6l.
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Between 1885 and 1900 a large number of Congressmen were
1
nominated to the Central and Provincial Councils. Bven before the
passing of the Councils Act of 1892 a number of them had been nominated
to some of the Provincial Councils, but with the coming of that Act into
force, many more became members. In the Bengal Council of 1894 there
were as many as five out of the six recommended members. The success
of Congressmen was mainly due to their popularity and ability. It
appears that the Local Governments, on the whole, were favourable to
the Idea of having a few Congressmen on the Councils. In 1897* while
recommending the nomination of one Madan Gopal to the newly established
Punjab Council, the Government of the Punjab also enphasised his association
2
with the Congress party.
Congressmen were also selected as members of certain commissions. 
In 1895 Wedderbum, Haoroji and Caine, who were members of the British 
Committee of the Congress, were appointed members of the Welby Commission. 
The Indian witnesses, namely, Surendranath Banerjea, Gokhale, Wacha, G. 
Subramania Iyer and K.N. Bahadurji, were all associated with the Congress. 
This was indeed a great achievement for the Congress. Though the 
Government sneered at the Congress claim to represent Indian opinion, it 
did realise that the Congress was the only body which, with all its
1 Some of the important Congressmen who were nominated to the Central 
or Local legislatures were Pherozeshah Mehta, Telang, Baoroji, 
Tyabji, Tilak, B.M. Sayani, Gokhale, W.C. Bonnerjee, Surendranath 
Banerjea, A.M. Bose, Baapal Singh, Ananda Charlu, C. Sankaran Bair, 
and C. Vijayaraghavachariar.
2 Punjab Govt, to Govt, of India, l8 Sept. 1897* Pub. Progs., Bo. 4^ 4> 
Oct. 1897.
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imperfections, gave expression to the views of the educated classes* In
18969 while suggesting that Fherozeshah Mehta should be selected as a
witness before the Welby Commission, Elgin said that "it might be a good
thing if we sent home some one to represent the Native, or shall I say
1
the Congress view?" In I898 H«C* Dutt, who had retired from the Indian
Civil Service in 1897* was selected as a witness before the Currency
Commission* Though in his evidence he made it clear that he did not
represent the Congress view, his selection as president in the following 
%
year leaves no doubt as to where his sympathies lay* In 1900 Lord Curzon
recommended the name of Ananda Charlu, who was an eminent Congress leader,
for membership of the gamine Commission, because the Government wanted
2
some representative of 'native1 opinion*
We arrive at the conclusion that whenever the Government felt 
the necessity of giving representation to Indian opinion, it could not, 
despite its indifference and coolness, ignore the Congress* Elgin’s 
view was that the nomination of Congressmen to the Councils would make 
them more responsible in their criticism and their exclusion would make
5
them less* He maintained that the representatives of the advanced
section of Indian opinion were men of ability and applied themselves to
the wo lie of legislation with assiduity and in a spirit of loyalty and
4
thus were distinctly useful members of the Councils* J* Woodbum, a 
member of the Governor-General’s Council remarked that since they became 
members of the Councils, the leaders of the Congress had been learning
1 Elgin to Hamilton, J1 March 1896, Pr. Cor. Ind*, ii, 579c.
2 Curzon to Hsmilton, 28 Nov* 1900, Pr* Cor* Ind*, X7III, J27*
Charlu was, however, not appointed* One Shyam Sundar lal took the 
place of K*C* Mukharji, on the letter's death*
5 Elgin to Hamilton, 25 Aug. 1896, Pr. Cor. Ind., ii, 828.
4 Elgin'a Minute, 24 Aug. 1896, Pub. Proga.. No. 182, Aug. 1896.
512
1
moderation and sobriety*
It Is clear from the above that since 1888 the Government’s 
attitude towards the Congress had been either one of indifference or 
hostility* nevertheless during 1888-1900 a number of Congressmen were 
appointed as judges or members of Commissions, because they were able 
men and were regarded as better representatives of Indian opinion* It 
is true that the Government spoke contemptuously of their representative 
character, but it could not point to a better representative body* In­
deed, it disliked the Congress, sneered at it, and yet feared it* Perhaps 
nothing could have pleased the Government more than the disappearance of 
the Congress* Curzon derived much satisfaction from his imaginary picture 
of the Congress tottering to its fall* Hamilton, too, expressed delight 
at his prophecy*
The question with the Government was how to weaken the national 
movement* So long as the Congress adhered to the constitutional method, 
its suppression by force was out of the question* But there were other 
methods by which the Government sought to weaken the Congress*
First, the Muslims were persuaded in a Province like the H*W#P* 
to keep aloof from the Congress* The anti-Congress movement derived much 
strength therefrom the hostile attitude of Sir Auckland Colvin* However, 
it is very difficult to say how and to what extent the Central Government 
widened the gulf between Hindus and Muslims* In 1895* vhen riots took 
place at Bombay, Rangoon, Azamgarh and Ballia, many Indian papers 
expressed the view that the Government had instigated them so that the 
Muslims mij£rb not join the Congress* There is little evidence to
1 Minute of 15 Aug* I896, Pub* Progs* Ho* 180, Aug* 1896*
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support the view* Indeed, in 1897 Elgin said: "We have fortunately
1
escaped lately the religious riots of 1895 Ihe attitude of the
Indian Government was that the Muslims should not associate themselves
with the Congress* But it does not appear that the Government pursued
during this period a policy intended to intensify Hindu-Muslim tension*
Nor was attempt made to win the support of the Muslims by granting them
special privileges* Vfaen the Muslim organisations demanded more places
in the public services they were asked to equip themselves. Neither in
the services nor in the Councils seats were reserved for them* The
wishes and prayers of leading Muslims were ignored on the question of
election to the Councils* Nevertheless the Government was quite
2
sympathetic towards the Muslims, largely because their opposition to 
the Congress strengthened its own position in denouncing the representa­
tive basis of that body*
Hie second important class which could be set against the 
Congress was the aristocracy** It has already been pointed out that 
owing to Government pressure many members of the upper classes seceded 
from the Congress* Ihe Amrita Bazar Patrika wrote that a good many 
Indians belonging to this class broke their connection solely due to 
the hostile attitude of the officials, and added that many of the 
zemindars of Bengal, but for their hostility, would have attended the
5
Madras session of 189&* Some of the Princes and landlords continued
1 Elgin to Hamilton, JO Dec* 1897* Pr* Cor. Ind** viii, 5^5*
2 Queen Victoria had great faith in the loyalty of the Muslims. On
20 Sept* 189^ she wrote to Elgin: "But she cannot help feeling that 
the Brahmins are those who irritate the people against us, and that 
the Mohammedans are the real supporters of the British rule.” G.E* 
Buckle, Letters, Jrd ser*, ii, 426*
5 See India, 6 Jan. 1899* 4*
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to give financial support to the movement secretly, but the pressure 
was too great to be resisted* In June 1899* in the course of his 
interview with the Maharaja of Baroda, Curzon told him that he had 
given both his name and money to a movement hostile to . the Government*
The Maharaja, says Curzon, advanced a number of Inconsistent arguments, 
saying that the Congress was a social and not political movement? that 
the Government had given no indication of its disapproval, that the bulk 
of educated opinion was in its favour, that his contribution was small, 
that other Chiefs did the same, and that subscription did not mean agree­
ment with the principles of the movement* Curzon remarks that the
1
Maharaja was taken aback by his challenge* Suffice it to say that the 
fear of the Government prevented many Princes and zamindars from giving 
support to the Congress*
A third method by which the movement could have been weakened 
was dividing the educated Hindus, who for the most part formed the
f
Congress, into two sections* Hamilton was of opinion that the real
danger to British rule was the gradual adoption of western ideas of
agitation. He pointed out the need of laying greater emphasis on the
religious and moral training of students with the object of creating
a new olass having little sympathy with the Congress agitation* It
2
is interesting to note that the educational scheme of Annie Besant, 
the well-known Iheosophist, appealed to him as one likely to be a
1 Enel* to Curzonfs letter to Hamilton, 12 July 1899* Pr* Cor* Ind*,
XIV, 172-75* “
2 Besant started the Central Hindu College, which is the nucleus of the 
present Banaras Hindu University, in 1898* She laid emphasis on the 
religious and moral training of students, and thus her scheme was be­
lieved to introduce an important change in the existing system which was 
too much dominated by western ideals*
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■useful antidote* to the existing system. Hamilton was in favour of
1
encouraging her movement, but it may be remarked that he was attaching too 
much importance to Besant1 s experiment* The later history of the movement 
shows that with greater awareness of and pride in the culture and history 
of their country Indians became more assertive and more fearless than the 
early nationalists whose outlook was almost entirely western* In 1916-17 
Besant herself took the lead in starting the Heme Rule agitation which marked 
a departure from the old method. An important reason why Hamilton was 
enamoured of Besant9 s movement was that in 1899 she had come in conflict 
with the Congress leaders in Madras.
A fourth method by which a portion of the supporters of the move­
ment could have been weaned away was acceptance of some of the demands*
Dufferin1 s minute of 1888, which denounced the Congress movement so strongly, 
also contained a plan of Council refora designed to give "full play to the 
legitimate and praiseworthy ambition of the loyal, patriotic, and educated 
classes.* He maintained that the advantage of such a reform would be to 
shift the centre of gravity of Indian political activity from "the self­
constituted associations and the little knot of politicians and newspaper
2
writers* to "the really responsibly classes .* Indeed, the Act of 1892 
was regarded by the opponents of the Congress as a concession to political 
agitation though, as we have seen above, it fell far short of its demands*
1 Hamilton to Curzon, 9 Aug* 1899* Pr* Cor* Ind*, 17, 262; 20 Sept* 1899* 
Pr* Cor* had** 17, 525,
2 Duff erin * s Minute, Enel* to Pub* Des* from India*, Ho* 67* 6 Nov* 1888*
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It would be wrong to say that the grant of concessions# even in large
measure# would have meant the end of Congress demands* But there is
no doubt that the Congress of 1885*1905 could have been conciliated
without the Government being required to make very large concessions*
In 1899 Hamilton suggested three methods for counteracting
the Congress movements first# to ascertain who subscribed among Princes
and noblemen to the Congress end to let them know that the Government was
aware of the fact; secondly# to prefer for honours and distinctions those
who were not Congressmen, and thirdly# to exercise a greater control over
1
the educational system* We have already discussed the first and seen 
why the aristocracy kept aloof* As to the second# Government honours 
were no doubt coveted by a very large number of early Congressmen because 
they were loyal and sought to achieve their objects within the framework 
of the British fiupire* But distinctions ceased to have any attraction for 
those who took to an entirely different method of agitation* As regards 
the system of education, Curzon made certain changes but his arbitrary 
measures# far from solving the question# made the solution far more 
difficult* The methods suggested by Hamilton were put into effect but 
were powerless to check later the emergence of an enormously mighty 
Congress under Mahatma Gandhi} in fact# they assisted this development* 
During the first twenty years the Congress movement met with 
little success* Its principal demands, such as# simultaneous examinations# 
the reduction of military expenditure# the abolition or reform of the 
India Council# the repeal of the Arms Act# the establishment of military
1 Hamilton to Curzon, 18 May 1899# Pr* Cor* Ind*, 17# 155*6*
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colleges in India, a system of Indian volunteering, the separation of 
the judiciary from the executive, and the extension of the permanent 
Settlement were not conceded, and the Government1 s attitude remained 
most unsympathetic* The only important reform for which Congressmen 
could take credit was the Indian Councils Act of 1892* Some of the 
opponents of the Congress like A.C. Trevor, a member of the Governor-
1
General's Council characterised it as a ”concession to political agitation," 
but in view of the extremely limited character of the reform, this view 
deserves little attention* Thirty years of progress demanded a much
greater advance than the Act provided* Congressmen also claimed credit
«
for the establishment of a Council in the N*W.P*, but, as it has been shown
above, praise is due to Alfred lyall, then Lieutenant Governor, who had
2
taken up the question even before the formation of the Congress. The 
supporters of the movement in Eagland also failed in their efforts to 
convince the British nation and Parliament of the justice of their stand. 
Perhaps their most important achievements were Paul's resolution in favour 
of simultaneous examinations and the appointment of the Indian Expenditure 
Commission, but the first was not accepted by the Government and as regards 
the second, the Commission's recommendation provided for a small contribution 
of £2,57,000 by the British to the Indian Exchequer* The Congress, as 
Hevinson rightly observes, failed in its two avowed objects* First, it 
did not succeed in exerting influence upon the action of the Indian
5
Government; seoondly, it had no influence on English opinion at home*
1 Trevor's Minute, 21 Aug* 1896, Pub* Progs** Mo* 181, Aug. 1896*
2 See above, 15»
5 H.W. Nevinson, The New Spirit In India, J26-27*
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But, in spite of its failures, the Congress played a very important
role in Indian political life* It brought together men of various castes
and communities on a common platform and focussed their attention on
important common problems* In a word, it marks the rise and growth of
national life in hidia. Its approach to politics was intellectual and
had justification in the beginning, but it emerged discredited because
of the Government's unsympathetic attitude*
It has to be remembered that during these twenty years the
Liberals were less than four years in office* Congressmen had, however,
come to believe that nothing could be expected from the Conservatives*
Between 1895 and 1905 one finds a marked stiffness in the Government's
attitude though the Congress programme and method remained unaltered*
In 1905 such eminent leaders as Hume, Wedderbum, Naoroji, and W*C.
Bonnerjee felt the necessity of exhorting Congressmen not to lose heart,
and they held out the prospect of a Liberal victory at the next elections*,
"With & fresh Parliament, and an awakened national conscience," said
1
Wedderbum, "the Court of Appeal will be open*1
It need not be supposed that if the Liberals had been in office
the Congress would have achieved much* On important matters of Indian
policy both parties were in complete agreement. In 1895 Fowler, then
Secretary of State, told the House that there would be no greater
calamity to the Indian Bapire than that it should become one of the
2
"shuttlecocks with which the Party game of battledore is played*"
1 "A Call to Arms" by Wedderbum, Naoroji, Bonner jee and Hume,
Ihe Hindustan Review, Dec* 1905*
2 Indian Pari* Debates, 15 Feb* 1895*
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Between 1892 and 1895» when, the Libera la were in office, some very
unpopular measures relating to India were passed* Hie closing of
the Mints and the grant of Exchange Compensation Allowance in 18951
outright refusal to implement the Commons1 resolution in regard to
simultaneous examinations, and the imposition of counter-veiling duties
on Indian ootton goods were strongly criticised by Congressmen and yet
their entire sympathies were with the Liberal party because they did
not regard it as reactionary* Explaining the reasons why the Congress
supported the Liberals, Surondranath Bener jee said, in his presidential
address, that the bulk of its friends belonged to the Liberal side and
that with the exception of Fincott and Garth it had no supporters among
1
the Conservatives*
We have numerous references which at least indicate that the
Congress did not gain in strength during 1896-1901* Critics like
Chesney had already started thinking in terms of its early end* Writing
in June 1894 he said that the Congress of 1895 lacked enthusiasm and
2
vitality and that it might come to an end of itself before long* From 
1896 even the highest authorities began to think along these lines* 
Hamilton remarked that the Congress as a political power had steadily 
gone down during the last two years* Ihia was, in his opinion, largely 
due to the indifference and unconcern shown by the Government to its
5
proceedings* In July 1899 the Bengal Government observed that since
the expansion of the Councils on an elective basis - which was a very
♦
1 Report of the Eleventh I*N*0» (1895)» ^8*
2 Blhe Political Outlook,9 Hie Nineteenth Century, June 1894, 901*
5 Hamilton to Elgin, 11 Dec* 1896, Pr* Cor* Ind*7 i, 447*
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important demand of the Congress - it had been exciting much less
1
enthusiasm than it did some years before* In 1900 Curzon wrote:
flMy own belief is that the Congress is tottering to its fall, and one
of my greatest ambitions while in India is to assist it to a peaceful
demise ••• My belief is that the best men In the Congress are more and 
. . .  2 
more seeing the hopelessness of their cause *«*fl Three months later
he re-emphasised that the Congress was sinking into insignificance•
Hamilton told Curzon that the loss of its popularity was due to the
latter1 s sympathy with the Indian communities* A few weeks later he
remarked that pouring ridicule on the fantastical parts of the Congress
creed did a lot of good and added that if the Congress collapsed within
5
a year or two the credit for its destruction would go to Curzon*
Hamilton^ letters contain some important observations on the 
situation with which the British Government was confronted though they 
also reveal a lack of clear thinking as to how it could have been dealt 
with in a statesmanlike manner* He refers to the difficulty of combining 
the working of a free press with an autocratic rule, remarking that under 
such a system the Press attacks not the Government of a particular
4
political stamp but the very foundations of Government* Referring to 
the educated classes, he observed that it was regrettable that the Govem-
5
ment spent 1 large* sums which only turned out the element of discontent*
1 Encl. to Curzon^ letter to Hamilton, 2 Aug* 1899, Pr* Cor* Ihd*,
XIV, 227*
2 Curzon to Hamilton, 18 November 1900, Pr* Cor* Ihd*, XVIII, 295*94*
5 Hamilton to Curzon, 15 Dec. 1900, Pr* Cor* 3hd*, V, 446, 24 Jan. 1901,
VI, 26.
4 Hamilton to Curzon, 5 Aug* 1899, Pr* Cor* Ind** IV, 252.
5 Hamilton to Elgin, 25 Feb. 1898, Pr* Cor* Ind., iii, 118*
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Earlier he had said* "I do not see the end of the present system* Every
year we turn out more and more educated natives; every year the Press will
increase, and become more powerful •••a generation hence the position will
be worse, and how it is to end I cannot see, though during our lifetime the
1
evil will be one of inconvenience rather than of danger** He was of
opinion that a free Press and the prevailing condition of education were
2
bound to widen the gulf between the ruler and the ruled* He regarded the 
Congress movement as 8an uprising of Indian native opinion against, not 
British rule, but Anglo-Indian bureaucracy8 and added that the relations be-
5
tween the civil servants and Indians had not improved* As to the situation
confronting the Government, he observed that the troubles that lay ahead were
not in what the British had inherited but in what they themselves had 
4
created* As regards the principle of equality laid down in the Queen*s 
Proclamation, to which Congressmen used to refer invariably, he remarked 
that it was not consistent with the conditions necessary for the maintenance 
of a foreign government* He declared that the British Government could not 
accept the Congress demands for representative institutions and the diminution
5
of the European establishment* He expressed concern at the constant
reference to the party affiliations of the Indian authorities as contrasted
6
with none in 187& 'hen he was Under-Secretary of State for India.
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 50 Oct* 1696, Pr* Cor* Ihd», i, 411-12*
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 21 Jan. 1896, Pr* Cor* Ind*, iii, 57*
J Hamilton to Curzon, 20 Oct. 1899* Pr* Cor* Ind*, IV, 562*Indian Pari* Debates, 5 Aug* 1897, 552; 11 Aug* I898, 862*
5 Hamilton to Curzon, 17 Hay, 1900, Pr* Cor* Ind*, 7, 169; 14 April, 1899, 
Pr* Oor* Ind*, IV, 91*
6 Hamilton to Elgin, 17 July I896, Pr* Cor* Ind*, i, 520*
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The above observations, which refer to the difficulty of 
reconciling the principles of a foreign autocracy with a free Press, 
uncontrolled education, the principle of equality, and the establishment 
of elected councils with very large powers, have a great deal of truth*
The acceptance of the Congress demands, in entirety, would have no 
doubt considerably narrowed the are* of British authority and privileges* 
In 1900 Hamilton told Naoroji: "You announce yourself as a sincere 
supporter of British rules you vehemently denounce the conditions and
1
consequences which are inseparable from the maintenance of that rule*1 
The above statement contains much exaggeration but it indicates that 
concessions to the Congress involved diminution in the power and 
privileges of the ruling nation* The Congress leaders maintained that 
such a policy would make the Government popular and therefore more stable* 
But the British Government was not disposed to disturb the autocratic 
system* To it the price of popularity appeared prohibitive*
The Government1 s attitude was friendly in the beginning, in 
1888 it became hostile, between 1889 and 189?, broadly speaking, it was 
neither friendly nor hostile, and thereafter it became hostile* How­
ever, during the first twenty years, official opposition was not 
carried to the length of preventing the Congress from holding its 
annual sessions*
The Government* s dislike of the Congress was due to its active 
propaganda in the Press, on the Platform, and in Parliament* Constant 
and strong criticism of its policy was not something which could be
1 Enel* to Hamilton fsletter to Curzon , 1? Dec* 1900, Pr* Cor* Ind** V,
5*5
palatable to an autocratic government* Ihe British Government was
not prepared to grant concessions and resented criticism* It is
difficult to see how the Congress could ask for changes from an
unsympathetic Government and at the same time continue to enjoy its
sympathy* Ihe Congress was told that it represented a small minority,
that its demands could not be aocepted and that it was not friendly to
the Government* In 1899 Curzon remarked that the whole of the British
case against the Congress was that it was in no sense a national body ,
as it claimed to be, and that if it was not actively disployal it was
1
far* from friendly. The likelihood is that the British Government 
found it convenient to reject the Congress demands by attacking its 
representative baste*
The Congress represented a movement which for the first time 
brought the British Government into contact with developing Indian 
political opinion* But even a partial acceptance of its demands 
called for a change in the British outlook, and so long as the 
principle of efficiency was retained intact not much could be expected 
in this respect* It is therefore not surprising that the Congress 
achieved so little* Curzon, the greatest exponent of efficiency, 
believed that the movement itself could be brought to an end by a scheme 
of economic reforms designed to improve the condition of the masses*
He perfected the practice of treating the movement in a contemptuous
1 Curzon to Hamilton, 27 Sept* 1899# Pr* Cor* Ind*, X7, 27•
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manner and succeeded* to some extent* in arresting its progress* but
little did he know that the failure of the moderates would be followed
by the rise of an extremist party in the Congress* It was unfortunate
from the British point of view that early Congress leaders, who could
hqve been conciliated without the British Government being required to
introduce much modification in its character* were not trusted and 6a a
consequence* emerged discredited* In 1900 Hamilton remarked that the
1
Congress had effected nothing since it / came into existence* It is 
true that the Congress method had failed* but it is equally true that
2
the British approach to the movement lacked clarity of mind and direction. 
The picture that one forms of the British mind* in relation to the national 
movement* is an involved one* marked by fear and suspicion* irritation and 
resentment* derision and contempt. Though the British Government ex­
pressed much oonoem at the manner of its criticism by Congressmen it is 
extremely doubtful that a more moderate method would have evoked & 
sympathetic response*
1 Hamilton to Curzon, 22 Feb* 1900, Pr* Cor* Ind** V, 55*
2 The following assessment of British policy by a recent historian 
deserves attention*
"Thus down to 1909* lacking clarity of mind and directness in 
approach, the British Government in India followed a confused, un­
certain policy towards Indian nationalism, most of the time assuming 
an attitude of coolness and inflexibility - which really concealed 
its perplexity - varied on occasion by a retreat from position to 
position, each move being made a little too late to satisfy the bulk 
of educated Indian opinion.1 O.H. Philips, India (1948) 109*
Chapter V
The Currency Question
Between 1885 and 1898 the Government of India was 
confronted with a serious financial difficulty caused 
mainly by the steady decline in the value of the rupee.
A considerable proportion of Indian revenues was remitted 
to England in discharge of the gold obligations which con­
sisted of interest on debt and the stock of the guaranteed 
railway companies* expenses on account of the British 
troops maintained in India, pensions and non-effective 
charges payable in England, the cost of the Home admini­
stration, and stores purchased in England for use or 
consumption in India* Since the Indian revenues were 
raised in rupees, the burden of the Home charges increased 
simultaneously with the fall in the value of the rupee* As 
a consequence the Government of India was required to find 
more rupees to meet its gold obligations. The problem of 
payment became still more difficult because the Home charges 
were not a fixed quantity and had a tendency to rise.
Only a passing reference will be made here to the 
history of Indian currency before 1885. In 1835 a uniform 
silver currency was introduced for the whole of India. Gold 
coins no longer remained legal tender and passed at their 
market value as compared with silver coins. The Act of
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1835, however, authorised the coinage of the gold 
mohur or fifteen-rupee piece and correlated coins*
In 1864 Sir Charles Trevelyan, then Finance Member, 
proposed a gold currency for India by declaring so­
vereigns and half-sovereigns to be legal tender at the 
rate of ten rupees to the sovereign* Sir Charles Wood, 
then Secretary of State, practically turned down the 
proposal. The only concession that he made was to permit 
the acceptance of gold coin at public treasuries at a 
rate to be fixed by the Government* In November 1864 the 
Government of India issued a notification which proclaimed 
that sovereigns and half-sovereigns * shall until further 
notice be received in all the Treasuries of British India 
and its dependencies in payment of sums due to Government; 
as the equivalent of 10 and 5 Rs* respectively; and that 
such sovereigns and half-sovereigns shall, whenever available 
at any Government Treasury, be paid at the same rates to any 
person willing to receive them in payment of claims against 
the Government*1 The notification remained inoperative and 
the currency situation did not improved
In 1866 the Government of India appointed a commission 
to inquire into the operation of the paper currency. The 
Commission reported that the evidence it had taken unani­
mously proved a demand for a gold currency. The objection
1 Amedkar, The Problem of the Rupee* 46.
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to the note currency was based on the popularity of gold.
The Commission^ general report was that the Indian currency 
should consist of gold, silver and paper. By another noti­
fication the Government of India altered the rate of the 
sovereign to Rs. 10-8, but even this change in the rate failed 
to bring gold into circulation. In 1870 the Act of 1835 was 
repealed. The new Act, however, made no substantial change 
in the system then in force. Its 11 juridicial provisions 
were designed to perfect the monetary law of the country as 
had never been done before.
Under the Acts of 1835 and 1870 silver was received 
without limit when tendered for coinage at the mints and the 
gold value of the rupee depended on the gold price of its 
silver bullion. Before 1873 the currency problem was not 
of any serious embarrassment to the Indian Government, but 
from then onwards the trouble began,^ and may be said to have 
lasted until 1898. The period of acute trouble was, however, 
between 1885 and 1895. The fall has been attributed to two 
causes: first, the substitution of gold for silver by a number
1 Ibid., 49.
2 For 40 years before 1873 the price of silver in London was 
never less than 59d. per ounce. Between 1873 and 1875 the 
price fell to nearly 56d.
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of countries, such as Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark 
and Holland; secondly the increased production of silver 
in the United States*
In 1876 the Government of India drew the attention of 
the Secretary of State to the likelihood of a further decline 
in the exchange, emphasising that for every one penny by 
which the sterling equivalent of a rupee might fall below 
Is. B|-d* one crore of rupees would be required to meet the 
expenditure* Two alternatives were suggested to meet the 
situation: Ztlh&r# an addition to the weight of fine silver in 
the rupee or a change to a gold standard and currency* The 
former, in its opinion, was a cheaper method but did not 
possess the element of finality, while the latter was a more 
complete remedy, but its disadvantages lay in raising the 
weight of Indian net foreign obligations* It was pointed 
out that any rise in the value of gold would necessitate a 
corresponding addition to the quantity of commodities which 
India would be required to supply for this purpose* The 
Government of India preferred for the time being to adopt 
remedies such as the curtailment of all avoidable expenditure 
and the development of its exisitng resources.*■
In 1878 the Government of India put forward new proposals
1 Pin* Des* from India, No. 368, 13 Oct* 1876.
529
which provided for the introduction of a gold standard
and facilities for the introduction of gold coins without
giving them immediate recognition as legal tender. It was 
suggested that the Government should accept British or Indian 
gold coins in payment for its demands till the exchange had 
settled at 2s# Simultaneously with this, the seigniorage on 
the coining of silver was to be raised to such an extent as 
virtually to make the cost of a rupee equal in amount to the 
above rate. The aim was the “eventual adoption of the 
British standard, and the extension to India of the use of 
British gold coins.” The Government of India remarked that 
the improvement of the exchange, which would enable it to 
reduce taxation, would be of great political advantage. It 
also emphasised that the time was extremely favourable for 
such a change because the import of silver was very small. It
further suggested that It should be invested with power to end
the operation of the law by executive order if the system did hot
n
work well.
In April 1879 the above proposals were unanimously 
rejected by a committe which the Secretary of State had ap­
pointed to consider them.^
1 Govt, of Indiafs des. of 9 Nov. 1878, paras, 14, 50, 51,
58, 74, G. 4868 (1886).
2 The Committee consisted of Louis Mallet, Edward Stanhope,
T*L. Seccombe, R.E. Welby, T.H* Parrer, R. GIffen and A.J. 
Balfour.
550
The Treasury also rejected the Government of India’s 
proposals, emphasising that, though they would give relief 
to the Government o the Civil Servants, and Englishmen who 
had invested their money in India, such a "relief will be 
given at the expense of the Indian taxpayer, and with the 
effect of increasing every debt or fixed payment in India, 
including debt due by ryots to money-lenders ... Then the 
measure would result in drawing into circulation hoards of 
silver coin, so would prevent or retard the operation of the 
proposed remedy and lead to temptations to forging.11 The 
Treasury emphasised that the Government of India had indulged 
in too hasty a generalisation and that it was "no light matter 
to a ccept innovations which must sap and undermine that 
system." ^
During Ripon’ s viceroyalty the exchange position was on
the whole satisfactory, so much so that large remissions of
2
taxation were made.
The estimates of 1885-86 showed that the financial 
situation was quite sound, but on 12 January 1886 the Govern­
ment of India strongly urged that the silver question should
1 Treasury to India Office, 24 Nov. 1879, C. 4868 (1886}•
2* In 1881-82 there was a surplus of £2582000. Govt, of 
India’s Pin. Des., No. 45, 2 Feb. 1886.
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be settled by international agreement, and added that a 
fall by one penny would involve the absorption of the famine 
grant and any considerable fall would entail an increase in 
the salt tax. ^ Early in 1886 the exchange rate had fallen 
from Is. 7d. to Is. 6d. The Government’s financial difficulties 
were further aggravated by additional expenditure incurred on 
the increase of the army and the construction of frontier and 
coastal defence works. It was estimated that the additional 
cost would exceed In a few years £2000000. In a despatch of 
2 February the Government of India re-emphasised the necessity 
of fixing the exchange by international agreement. In Its 
opinion the fall was mainly due to speculation regarding the 
repeal or modification of the Bland Act^ by America. It 
remarked: ’’The soundness of our estimates for 1886-87 depends 
not on the existing state of our finances, nor on the probable 
revenue of the coming year, nor on expenditure which we can 
control, but on the balance of political parties in regard to 
currency of a foreign and distant country." The Government 
of India expressed the view that it was not advisable to secure 
temporary relief by borrowing in England, as an addition to the
1 Tel* to Secretary of State, 12 Jan. 1886*
2 The Bland Act required the Secretary of the Treasury to 
purchase and coin each month not less than $ 2000000 and 
not more than jS 4000000 worth of silver bullion into 
standard silver dollars.
3 Fin. Des. from India, No. 45, 2 Feb. 1886*
gold debt of India would create further embarrassments*
It urged the Home Government to take the initiative in 
promoting an international conference for the consideration 
of remedial measures.
Lord Randolph Churchill, then Secretary of State, 
concurred fully In the Government of India’s proposals 
of 12 January, which was elaborated in its February despatch. 
In his letter to the Treasury, he remarked that a further 
taxation, which would be necessitated by the fall in exchange, 
would constitute a danger more political than financial. He 
pointed out that the financial difficulties of India had been 
caused by her position in relation to England inasmuch as 
all principal administrative offices and a large part of the 
army were in the hands of foreigners. Recommending the Govern 
ment of India’s proposals for the Treasury’s consideration, he 
remarked: "The impatience of new taxation which would have to 
be borne wholly as a consequence of the foreign rule imposed 
on the country and virtually to meet additions to charges 
arising outside of the country, would constitute a political 
danger, the real magnitude of which it is to be feared is 
not at all appreciated by persons who have no knowledge of, 
or concern in, the Government of India, but which those res­
ponsible for that Government have long regarded as of the 
most serious order." ^
1 India Office to Treasury, 26. Jan. 1886.
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The Government of India's letter of 2 February 
was also forwarded# The Treasury re-emphasised the 
arguments which it had advanced as far back as 1879#
It argued that the loss sustained by the Governement 
was more than counter-balanced by the increased wealth 
derived from the Indian export trade and that it was 
1 impossible to regard this question exclusively from 
the point of view either of the Indian Exchequer or of 
the Anglo-Indian official without a corresponding regard 
to the general effect of the fall in the gold price of 
silver upon the trade and prosperity of the great mass of 
the population#11 As to the proposal for promoting an 
international agreement the Treasury stuck to the stand . 
taken by the British Government at the International 
Monetary Conference of 1881 at Paris#**" It remarked that 
the fixing of the relative value of gold and silver by 
such a method would involve departure from the 1 natural
i nIt has been the policy of this country to emancipate
commercial transactions as far as possible from legal 
control, and to impose no unnecessary restrictions upon
the interchange of commodities. To fix the relative value 
of gold and silver by law would be to enter upon a course
directly at variance with this, principle, and would be
regarded as an arbitrary interference with a natural law,
not justified by any pressing necessity#..England would
not herself take the initiative in making changes which
would have the effect of disturbing a monetary system
underwhich she has enjoyed much prosperity# • ? Report of
C#W# Fremantle, 2 Bee# 1881, Pari# Papers, LIII (1882), 
803# Fremantle was the British Government's delegate at
the Paris Conference#
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operation of economic laws!t • It impressed on the 
Government of India, as it had done in 1879, the neces­
sity of curtailing expenditure.’*'
In April 1886 the Secretary of State forwarded a 
scheme proposed by General Strachey, which provided for 
establishing a constant rate of exchange between the
2rupee and the sovereign by limiting the coinage of rupees*
In the Government of India* s opnion the proposal meant the
circulation of the rupee above its intrinsic value and
would result in the substitution of a gold for the silver
standard. It was not in favour of a scheme of currency
under which the rupee would cease to be the representative
Secondly >
of a definite quantity of silver«A tt was doubtful whether 
a fixed rate of exchange could be maintained for some years. 
Thirdly, the closing of the mints to the free coinage of 
silver, it observed, would have an Injurious effect on the 
silver market and might bring about a wide difference in 
the ratio between silver and gold as compared with the 
accepted ratio between the rupee and gold. Fourthly, 
owing to an upward tendency In the price of gold - and as 
the Government of India was inclined to believe that gold
1 Treasury to India OffIce, 31 May 1886,
2 Financial Des, to India, No, 115, 22 April 1886
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was appreciating - Indian trade would be seriously 
affected.
In a letter of September 1886 the G-overnment of 
India replied to a number of points raised by the Trea­
sury in opposition to its proposals* The Treasury's 
main arguments were: (l) whether it was possible to 
secure a stable ratio between gold and silver; (2) 
it was not proved that rise in the gold value of silver 
would be on the whole a gain to India; (3) the points 
raised in 1879 had not been adequately answered; (4) 
the difficulty could be met in great measure by the re­
duction of expenditure; (5) the Government of India1 
had not stated the nature of the remedy it sought to 
apply* In its reply the Government of India dealt with 
these points in an effective manner*
The Government of India maintained that in 1881 it 
was within the power of the British Government to secure 
the adoption of a fixed ratio and that it v«ras still within 
its power to secure the result* !t It appears to ust!, the 
Government of India observed, n that if Her Maje sty's Govern­
ment abandoned the attitude of absolute reserve ••• there 
would remain no obstacle to tie establishment of international
1 Pin. Des. from India, No*222, 24 July 1886
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agreement which could not be surmounted," It was of the 
opinion that the active and sympathetic intervention of 
Britain would "at any rate have the effect of mitigating 
existing evils, and removing grave grounds of apprehension 
as regards the future," With regard to the question of 
India*s gains from the fall in exchange, the Government of 
India admitted that the decline had coincided with a large 
development of trade, but it remarked that instability In 
exchange had discouraged the investment of capital In India 
and introduced great uncertainty in such commercial transactions 
as involved the element of time. Referring to its proposals 
of 1878 to which the Treasury had objected in 1879, the 
Government of India observed that there was no analogy between 
them and those which had recently been suggested. While the 
proposals of 1878 aimed at a gold standard and sought to 
restrict the circulation of silver coin by means of a 
seigniorage so as to raise the ratio to 2s., and could have 
been effected by legislation in India, its recent proposals 
provided for the establishment of a stable ratio between 
gold and silver by an International agreement. Further, the 
scheme of 1878 would have the effect of raising the gold 
value of silver whereas the new proposals aimed at stability.
So far as reduction in expenditure was concerned, it was of 
the opinion that considerations of India1 s security did not 
leave much scope for economy in expenditure and that further 
reduction was "unlikely to give us financial relief in any
\
degree commensurate with the magnitude of our difficulties; 
and that the contention that the alarming growth of expen­
diture in late years is that principal element in the 
unfavourable condition of Indian finances will not stand 
the test of examination," As to the Treasury1 s observation 
that the nature of international agreement had not been 
definitely indicated, the Government of India said that the 
end to be aimed at was a stable ratio and that the means for 
its attainment was a settlement betv/een the countries inter­
ested in the question, "For the attainment of these ends" ,
It bbserved, "we propose generally the utilisation of silver 
as currency to a greater extent than is the case at present, 
as well as an international agreement for the free coinage 
of silver and the making of both gold and silver coin a 
legal tender at a fixed ratio by a group of nations possessed 
of a metallic currency of sufficient extent to maintain that 
ratio permanently," According to these proposals the ratio 
was to be fixed by the nations which would undertake to coin 
both gold and silver freely at a ratio not lower than the 
average market rate of recent years and not higher than that 
of 1 to 15|r. In its own turn it was willing to undertake 
either to maintain the existing silver standard or to coin 
both silver and gold at the fixed ratio. It emphasised that
*i
the financial situation of India had become intolerable.
1 Fin, Des. from India, No. 277, 4 Sept. 1886.
It is clear from the above that the Government of 
India had abandoned its proposals of 1878 and was now 
strongly in favour of a bimetallic system. It is also 
clear that the British Government, enjoying as it did 
supremacy in international finance, was not willing to 
support the new proposals. In seeking to strengthen Its 
case the Government of India, however, raised an argument 
with which one cannot agree. Its contention was that the 
difficulty was solely due to the fall In exchange. But we 
know that in 1885-86 and subsequent years an additional 
burden was placed on the Indian revenues on account of the 
enlargement of the army, the construction of defence works, 
the conquest of Burma and its pacification and later in the 
'nineties1 the expeditions on the north-west. These measures 
could not conceivably keep the expenditure at the old level.
We conclude therefore that the difficulty caused by the fall 
in exchange was no doubt great but Its severity would have 
been considerably less if the increase of expenditure had not 
taken place.
Meanwhile the Government of India adopted several measures 
to meet the increased expenditure. In 1886 an income-tax 
was levied on all non-agricultural incomes above Rs. 500, and 
in 1887 the salt-tax was raised from Rs, 2 to Rs, 2^ per 
magfund. In 1887-88 the Famine Insurance Fund was suspended; 
in 1889 it was reduced from 1-|- crores of rupees to one crore 
but was restored in the following year and again in 1895-96
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it v/as reduced to one crore. The diversion of the Famine 
Fund to purposes for which originally it v*ras not intended 
was strongly ciriticed by Indian leaders. The Local Govern­
ments were also required to make contributions to the Supreme 
Government and indeed the financial difficulty obliged the 
latter to interfere with the Provincial financial arrange­
ments. All the above expedients adopted by the Government 
of India came In for strong criticism in Indian political 
circles.
The Gold and Silver Commission of 1886, which submitted 
Its final report in 1888, too, was unable to suggest any de­
finite solution for the currency question. Half the members 
expressed their opinion against the proposal that England 
should negotiate with other countries a treaty embodying a 
bi-metallic agreement. They said that departure from mono­
metallism by her would be "a leap in the dark." ^ The other 
six were strongly in favour of a bi-metallic system to be 
established by international agreement, the essential features 
of which lay in the free coinage of metal into legal tender 
money, and the fixing of a ratio at which the coins of either 
metal were made available for the paymemt of all costs at
p
the option of the debtor.
1 Final Report of the Gold and Silver Commission (1888), Part I]
2 Ibid., Part III.
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A very important question relating to bi-metallism 
was the settlement of the ratio between gold and silver*
In 1890 in a debate on bi-metallism W.H. Smith, First Lord 
of the Treasury,. ref erredfothis difficulty. Expressing his 
individual opinion, he said that a bi-metallic change would 
be dangerous.*** Sir ^illiam Harcourt, a distinguished Liberal 
leader, observed that there would be difficulty in maintaining 
an agreement even if it was secured* He added that England, 
who had her own financial and commercial system, should not
o
make it dependent upon an international settlement.
From 1885 the decline in the gold value of the rupee 
was rapid, and except for a brief period in 1890-91 when 
the exchange rose to Is. 6d., the downward tendency continued 
until 1895* At the beginning of 1892 the Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce called the attention of the Government to the fluc­
tuations in exchange and inquired what steps it would take 
in the event of the failure of the conference of Powers, which 
the United States had invited, and of her decision to abandon 
the purchase of silver.^ The Government of India asked the
1 Hansard^ Indian Debates, 18 April 1890, 194, 198.
2 Ibid., 199-201.
3 Bengal Chamber of Commerce to Govt, of India (Fin. Dept.),
4 Feb. 1892, Report of the Indian Currency Committee (1893), 
145.
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Bengal chamber to make suggestions with these possibilities 
in view. The Chamber suggested that the ratio should be 
fixed by international agreement, but it also emphasised 
that if success was not likely to be secured the Government 
of India should take steps to introduce a gold standard.'1'
In these views the Government of India concurred.
The Government of India called the Secretary of State1s
attention to the possibility of the cessation of the purchases
of silver by the United States and urged him to consider the
subject in all its bearings beforehand, lest they might be
2
left with no time and silver might depress further. Mean­
while, the Indian Currency Association, which was established 
in May 1892 under the presidency of James Mackay, President 
of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, carried on a vigorous 
agitation in favour of a gold standard at the rate of ls.6d. 
to the rupee. Several meetings were held for this purpose.
In its memorials the Association emphasised that since an 
international conference was not likely to succeed owing to 
England’s indifference, the adoption of a gold standard 
remained the only alternative* Lord Lansdowne acknowledged 
the importance of the work done by the Association in a tele­
gram of 3 February 1893 and in his speech of 26 Jane^y
1 Letter of 18 Feb. 1892.
2 Fin. Des. from India, No.68, 23 March 1892.
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1893* There is no doubt that its agitation strengthened 
the Government of India’s case for closing the mints*
In June 1892 the Government of India urged that if it 
became evident that an International conference was not 
likely to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion and if a direct 
agreement between India and the U.S.A. was found to be unat­
tainable, it should be allowed to close the mints at once 
and make arrangements for the introduction of a gold standard* 
In arriving at this decision it was influenced by the possibi­
lity that the United States might abandon silver, in which 
case its gold value might fall to any lower level* In 
support of its proposals the Government of India said: nWe 
believe that public opinion in India is ripe for the adoption 
of decisive measures, that the stoppage of the free coinage 
of silver would be generally approved, and that we might 
safely count on receiving every reasonable assistance from 
the commercial and banking classes in the attempt to introduce 
a gold standard.”^ David Barbour, then Finance Member, was 
of the opinion that a final settlement of the question lay in 
the adoption of the system of double legal tender and suggested 
that the mints should not be closed until it became evident
3
that the U.S.A. would not adopt the free coinage of silver.
1 Frogs, of the Leg. Council of India (1893), XXXII, 281.
2 Fin. Des. from India, No. 160, 21 June 1892.
3 Minute, 21 June 1892.
f
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In August 1892 the Government of India again 
emphasised that a gold standard was the only remedy in 
default of a bi-metallic system which it had been demanding 
for about ten years, and remarked that ninaction involves 
at least as great risk and as much responsibility as would 
the undertaking of an enterprise even more hazardous than 
the introduction of a gold standard into India." It main­
tained that the existence of a common monetary standard in 
England and in India would facilitate both the import and 
export trade and encourage the flow of capital to India. 
Referring to the criticism that the change would appreciate 
gold, it argued that much force could not be attached to it 
unless it could be shown that there had already been an 
injurious appreciation of gold in Western countries, and added _ 
that India would be placed at a disadvantage if she was not 
allowed to introduce change until every country had supplied 
Itself with the gold it required for that purpose. As a 
remedy against the chances of any disturbing effect on con­
tracts and financial obligations, the Government of India 
was in favour of proposing a rate for the transfer from 
silver to gold which was not to be greatly different from 
the market value. So far as Its proposals concerned deferred 
payments, it did express some doubt as to their expediency,
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but added that if gold had proved a satisfactory standard
of value in Europe, there was no reason why it should not
be so in India. Finally, even if gold appreciated, India,
with its proposed ratio of about 1 to 20, would, in its
opinion, be in a better position to meet the situation than
%
those countries which had adopted a gold standard at the 
old ratio of 1 to 15^ - or 16.1
In a letter of 31 August 1892 Kimberley, the Secretary
of State, expressed the view that the Government of India
should be allowed a free hand in this question, but the free­
dom which he was willing to concede ruled out a bi-metallic 
settlement. His own predisposition was against tampering 
with the silver currency. He, however, confessed that in 
a question of such complication much weight could not be 
attached to his individual opinion. He added that the evils 
resulting from the fall in exchange were mainly three, namely, 
the loss sustained by Civil Servants in remitting money home,
the loss of the Indian Government on its remittances, and
2
inconvenience to trade.
In November 1892 the Secretary of State sougjat the 
Government of India1 s opinion on Sir John Lubbock1 s proposal
1 Fin. Des. From India, No* 205, 2 Aug. 1892.
2 Kimberley to Gladstone, 31 Aug. 1892, Add.MSS., 44229, 
34-36.
which provided for a high seigniorage on the coinage of 
silver or the imposition of an import duty on all silver 
imported into India. The Government of India expressed 
the view that the above measure would alleviate the finan­
cial difficulties for a time, but would afford no guarantee 
against depreciation in the future; and moreover they would 
indefinitely defer the complete solution."*"
The Government of India1 s proposals, as submitted in 
January 1893, were, first, to close the mints to the free 
coinage of silver, secondly, to retain the power of coining 
silver rupees on Government account, thirdly, to make 
English gold coins legal tender in India at a rate of not 
less than 13 l/3 rupees for one sovereign, that is, ls.6d. 
per rupee, fourthly, to allow an interval of time to pass 
between the closure of the mints and any attempt being made 
to coin gold In India. The power to admit sovereigns, 
however, was to be put into force only in the- case of 
necessity.
1 Fin. Des. from India, No. 328, 7 Dec. 1892.
2 Tel. to Secretary of State, 22 Jan. 1893.
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On r eceiving Landsdowne's telegram which contained 
his as well as Barbour1s acceptance of the proposals 
of the Indian Currency Committe, Kimberley impressed 
upon Gladstone the necessity of taking an immediate 
decision* He pointed out that three courses were open* 
First, to do nothing, which, he said, was not possible 
in view of financial embarrassments. He remarked that 
the increase of taxation would be politically most 
dangerous, and the raising of the salt tax, besides 
being a ”hateful expedient’1, would deprive the 
Indian Government of its only resource in emergency* 
Borrowing, he said, would give only momentary relief*
The second course was, as Bertram Currie had advised*,'' 
to close the mints without fixing any ratio. Kimberley 
himself preferred this plan, saying that it was 
hazardous to fix Is* 4d. in the vineertainty of the effect 
of closure. He further remarked that under Currie1 s 
plan things might settle themselves and no Government 
action might be required* The third plan, namely, 
the Herschell Committee's, he said, would reassure the
Betram Currie, who was a member of the Currency 
Committe of 1893, said that he should have preferred 
to approve the proposals ”without imposing the condition 
that the closing of the mints should be accompanied by 
an announcement that rupees will be coined in exchange 
for gold at the ratio of 1. 4d*” Report (1893), 42.
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minds of those who feared the effect on the Indian 
population of a great rise in exchange. He expressed 
the view that while Currie1s plan was preferable on 
economic grounds, policy and convenience lent their 
support to the Committee’s proposals. He, however, 
did not support Lord Herschell’s proposal that the 
Home Government should wait until it had more certainty 
as to the policy of the United States. Kimberley 
emphasised that the public both at home and in India 
would be anxious to know the Government’s opinion. 
Moreover, prolonged uncertainty, he said, would produce 
great disturbance in the money market and interfere
i
with British trade. He therefore urged prompt action.
The Government of India accepted the modifications
of the Herschell Committee as making some improvement
on its original proposals. It also concurred in the
opinion that the closing of the mints should be resorted
to with the object of preventing a further fall rather
2
than of raising the gold value of the rupee. Lord
Lansdowne observed that the Committee’s scheme ”is our
scheme with the addition of safeguards and precautions”
■3
wisely conceived. The main proposals of the Committee
1 Kimberley to Gladstone, 11 and 13 June 1893,
Add. Mss., 44229, 92-94, 110.
^ Tel. from Viceroy, 15 June 1893*
 ^ Progs, of the Leg. Council of India (1893), XXXII, 283.
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provided, first, that the Indian mints were to he 
closed to the free coinage of silver with a view to 
the adoption of a gold standard, and, secondly, that 
the mints, though closed to the public, were to be 
used by the Government for the coinage of rupees in 
exchange for gold at a ratio to be then fixed. The 
Government treasuries were also to receive gold in 
satisfaction of public dues at the same ratio. The
Committee was in favour of fixing the ratio at 1s. 4d.
1 *per rupee.
The act by which the Committee’s proposals were 
put into effect was passed at a meeting of the Legislative 
Council at Simla on 26 June 1895. No Indian members 
were present, and among non-officials only James Mackay, 
who had been agitating for these changes, was present.
The standing rules were suspended and the proceedings 
were finished at a single meeting. The entire procedure 
was such as to rule out any amendment of the proposals. 
Lord Lansdowne justified it on grounds of urgency, 
emphasising that prolonged discussion would be 
inadvisable. He supported the change by saying that 
"to leave matters as they were meant for the Government 
of India hopeless financial confusion^ for the commerce 
of India a constant and ruinous impediment; for the
 ^ Report of the Currency Committee (1893), paras., 155-56.
taxpayers of India the prospect of heavy and unpopular 
burdens; for the consumers of commodities a rise in 
the prices of the principal necessaries of life; 
and for the country as a whole a fatal and stunting 
arrestation of its development". He further remarked 
that the Government had offered "this solution not as 
one which is ideally perfect, but as the best which
i
can be devised".
The object of the Government in introducing this 
change was to establish a gold standard. It was also 
made clear that the Government did not seek to raise 
the value of the rupee but to prevent a further fall. 
For the "present" no attempt was to be made to fix the 
legal tender price £>r gold. The ratio, it was 
emphasised, was not permanent and was well within the 
limits of recent variations. The risks of the change c 
were, however, recognised by the Herschell Committee. 
The fear of false coining, an injurious effect on 
Indian trade with silver-using countries and loss on 
hoarded uncoined silver were no doubt strong objections 
Perhaps the most important interest that was bound to 
be adversely affected was the producing class which had 
been getting more money for its produce. David Barbour
 ^ Progs, of the Leg. Council of India (1895)* XXXII,
279, 283, 286.
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however, argued that the question "must be decided not
with reference to any one consideration, or to a limited
number of considerations, but after a careful
examination of all the circumstances of the case, and
that we must decide where the balance of advantage lies
,f 1and act accordingly.
The principal reason for the closing of the
mints was undoubtedly the serious financial situation
with which the Government was confronted. Between 1891
and 1893 the condition was grave, and there was still
greater apprehension as to what would follow might be 
2worse. The fluctuations were so rapid that they defied 
all forecasts. In a letter of May 1892 the Under­
secretary of State for India said that within a few 
weeks the Indian Government was liable to find itself 
exposed to the necessity of providing a sum greater
1 Ibid., 275.
2 The average rate per rupee at which Council Bills 
and Telegraphic Transfers were sold in London was 
22.351 d. (1873-74), 21.626 d. (1875-76), 19.956 d.
(1880-81), 19-536 d. 
16.898 d. (1887-88), 
(1890-91), 16.733 d. 
14.54* d. (1893-94), 
(1895-96), 14.451 d.
Report (1899), para. 63.
1883-84), 18.254 d. (1885-86), 
6.379 d. (1888-89), 18.089 d.
1891-92), 14.985 d. (1892-93), 
3.101 d.(1894-95), 13.638 d. 
1896-97), 15.354 d. (1897-98).
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than the whole of its receipts from either of the
various taxes including the increased duty on salt.
The fall in exchange compelled the G-overnment in
1892-93 to find about eighty millions of more rupees
than would have been required at the 1873 exchange 
2rate.
Besides the Government, the other important
interest which was adversely affected by the decline
in exchange was the powerful class of European Civil
servants. Their pressure on the Government was very
great and indeed it was believed that the decision of
1893 was considerably influenced by them. In a letter
of August 1892 Lansdowne referred to the difficulty of
civil servants, emphasising that as time went on men
of that class might not like to enter the service
and the incumbents might be tempted to take their pensions
3
as soon as they could.
The Act of 1893 was strongly critised by Congress
 ^ Letters to the Treasury, 13 May 1892.
^ In 1892-93 India remitted a sum of Rx. 26, 478, 415 
which at the exchange rate of 1873-74 (1s . 10.351 d.) 
would have been Rx. 17, 751, 920. Report (1893), 
para. 3*
3
Lansdowne to Kimberley, 23 Aug. 1892, quoted in 
Newton, op. cit., 103-4.
leaders. They maintained that the producing class had 
benefited from the fall. The Congress resolution of 
1893 said that the Act had subjected the people to a 
further indirect taxation and disorganised some of the 
most important trades and industries.^ In his evidence- 
before the Herschell Committee Naoroji said that rise 
in exchange would compel the cultivator to part with 
more produce• A number of other witnesses also
expressed similar views. Sir Frank Forbes, former
President of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, said that 
on balance the fall had been "most beneficial" to the 
people of India. He suggested that it was desirable to 
develop Indian'industries with Indian capital.
Another witness Y/illiam Fowler remarked that from the 
Indian point of view no other standard was needed.^*
In order to appreciate the Governments standpoint 
certain things have to be borne in mind. First, the 
exchange position was serious and could not be left to 
the chances of an automatic adjustment. Secondly, in
 ^ Resolution XIV of 1893#
2
.Minutes of Evidence. Q. 2418.
5 Ibid., Q. 1908.
4 Ibid., Q. 1594
view of the Home -and Government's decided opinion
against bimetallism, the Government of India had to
fall back upon the adoption of a gold standard.
Thirdly, the reduction of the Home charges, though
an ideal solution, was hardly practicable since it
involved major issues of policy in the determination
of which power lay with the Home Government. If the
currency system was not to be disturbed, further
taxation was the only remedy. Among taxes, the
imposition of duty on imports would have been, as the
Herschell Committee pointed out, very popular but
Lancashire's opposition presented an insurmountable
obstacle , and indeed the entire proceedings of import
duties during 1894-96 justified its apprehension. As
regards the salt tax, even the Government was not
inclined to raise it further. The Committee was not
in favour of an increase in the income-tax on the ground
that it would produce political discontent among those
who were capable of appreciating and criticising the 
2Government. Thus the Indian Government found itself
1
Report, para. 39*
2 Ibid., para. 41.
35^
compelled to Interfere with the currency system.
The approach of British politieans to this 
question was determined by the principles to which they 
adhered. In Parliament the Conservatives for the most 
part criticised the measure while the Liberals 
supported it. In some cases, however, belief in one 
or the other principle cut across party boundaries.
The banking interests were in favour of monometallism 
and the industrialists supported bimetallism.
In Parliament A.J. Balfour denounced the
decision of 26 June 1893 as a "financial crime”.
Salisbury expressed the view that England should resume
2negotiations with the other nations of Europe. G-oschen, 
who was Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Conservative 
Government, supported the proposal for the re-assembly 
of the Monetary Conference though, it must be noted, that 
in April 1890 he had not encouraged the holding of such 
a conference. Sir William Harcourt, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, remarked with truth that the Conservatives, 
who were advocating the settlement of the question by 
international agreement, did not promote their scheme
 ^ Indian Pari. Debates, 8 Aug. 1893> 563*
2 Ibid., 19 Dec. 1893, 953.
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when they were in office although the financial
situation was quite serious. Gladstone, the Prime
Minister, was against a bimetallic system. In
Pebruary 1895 he had said that an international
agreement would involve great sacrifice on the part of
England, which was the great creditor of the countries
of the world and had created an unparalleled commercial 
2
fabric.
In August 1895 the Government of India asked 
Lord Kimberley to settle certain preliminary matters 
relating to the coinage of gold, which, of course, was 
not be be undertaken for some time. It was in favour 
of striking a coin, specially Indian in character, and 
limited in circulation to India. It proposed that by 
a Proclamation issued under Section 11 (8) of the Act 
of 1870 the Indian mints should be declared branches 
of the Royal Mint only in respect of the coinage of 
sovereigns. The Government of India said that a 
separate act of Parliament would have been more 
convenient but it pointed to the difficulty of getting 
it passed. The Secretary of State observed that an
1 Ibid., 18 Dec. 1893, 915.
2 Ibid., 28 Feb. 1893, 94-95.
^ Fin. Des. fron India, No. 270, 15 Aug, 1893.
55*
act of -Parliament would be essential if the gold coin 
of India was to be made sovereign and that there would 
be great opposition to the proposal unless the Indian 
Government had accumulated a reserve of gold. He 
added that it was premature to make an application to 
the Royal Hint for the tools and apparatus needed to 
undertake the coinage of gold.
It was not until 1896 that signs of recovery became 
evident. In November the Government of India proposed 
the alteration of the rate from 1s. 4d. to 1s. 3d. It 
remarked that the former rate was selected for two 
reasons: first, as the Herschell Committee pointed 
out, it was not much above that which was then 
prevailing, and, secondly, the object was to give 
substantial relief to the Government. The Government 
of India emphasised that the time was opportune for 
making the change because no sovereigns had been 
received. It intended to keep the gold, if received, 
either as part of its treasury balance, or preferably 
as part of the currency reserve. It expressed the 
view that the rate of 1s. 3d. would not cause 
inconvenience to it or to commerce. It was also
1 Pin. Des. to India, No. 204, 12 Oct. 1893.
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emphasised that the revised rate was hot intended to
i
be final* In a telegram of 27 October the G-overnment
of India had stressed that the importation of gold
in supplement of Council Bills seemed the only way
of preventing a money famine*
The Secretary of State refused to accept the
proposal. He remarked that it would be a mistake
lightly to depart from the policy of 1895 and that it
was not advisable to fix the rate at a lower figure when
the public had been looking forward for nearly three
2
and a half years to an exchange rate of 1s. 4d.
In February 1897 the G-overnment of India suggested 
certain changes in the notifications of 1893 relating 
to the reception of gold in the mints and treasuries.
It remarked: "Our policy should therefore be to do 
everything we can, consistently with safety to ourselves, 
to encourage the importation of gold into India the 
moment that the rate of exchange makes it pay to 
import it". It recommended the removal of limitations 
under which gold coins could be received at the 
treasuries only in payment of sums due to the Government, 
and gold at the mints only "until further orders".
1 Fin. Des* from India, Ho. 328, 4 Nov* 1896.
2 Fin. Des. to India, Ho. 226, 17 Dec. 1896.
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It was proposed that merchants and bankers who made
arrangements to import gold should have an assurance
that it would not be refused on arrival* Secondly,
the Government should offer to receive gold coin in
exchange for rupees without the qualification "until
further orders". The removal of these limitations,
the Government of India remarked, would be an important
step towards the establishment of a gold standard.
The Secretary of State was not disposed to make any
alterations unless some real necessity arose and some
clear advantage was to be gained. In view of the
uncertainty of the future action of America and other
nations, and the serious disorganisation of Indian
trade owing to the famine and plague he declined to 
2
make change•
In a letter of 16 July 1897 Hamilton told Elgin 
that France and America were prepared to go very 
far towards adopting a bimetallic currency at the 
ratio of 15i- ^0 1 and added that it would be a great 
relief if the intrinsic value of the rupee would rise 
to 1s. 6d. In a telegram of 19 July he expressed
 ^ Fin. Des. from India, Ho. 4-9, 17 Feb. 1897*
 ^ Fin. Des. to India, No. 96, 13 May 1897.
^ Hamilton to Elgin, 16 July 1897, Pr. Cor. Ind. 
ii, 341#
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M s  willingness to accept their proposals if the 
offer was to hold good for a fixed term* Lord Elgin,
p
who mentioned them to Westland and Finlay , observed 
that a sudden rise in exchange would cause "unprecedented 
disaster" to Indian exports. V/estland was of opinion 
that any direct advantage to G-overnment finance would 
be more than counter-balanced by indirect injury 
resulting from trade depression, and that the 
combination of France and U.S.A. alone would not 
give adequate security for a stable agreement. On 
23 July Hamilton asked Elgin whether he adhered to 
the opinions expressed by the Government of India 
in its despatch of 20 June 1892^. In reply to this 
Elgin said that the despatch did not propose any 
great advance in exchange and that the opinions then 
expressed were subject to modification resulting from 
the policy of 1893* He further remarked: "We do not 
admit that rise in the exchange is beneficial to 
India. Wh&4h we aimed at both in 1892 and now is 
stability"
1 Tel. to Viceroy, 19 July 1897#
2 James V/estland was Finance Member and James Finlay 
was Finance Secretary.
^ Tel. from Viceroy, 21 July 1896.
^ Tel. to Viceroy, 23 July 1897.
 ^ Tel. from Viceroy, 26 July 1897*
Two members of the India Council, Crosthwaite
and Mackay, were strongly in favour of accepting these
proposals. Lord Lansdowne, former Viceroy of India,
was also attracted by them. They said that if such
proposals had been made in 1892-93 they would have
been welcomed. Hamilton remarked that it was worth
incurring the risk when compared with the enormous
benefits likely to result from their adoption. He
emphasised: "It is a great step - securing the
cooperation of these two rich countries - towards
the attainment of a general international bimetallic
system". A week later he endorsed the Government
of India’s view that a sudden rise in exchange might
2
cause a great disturbance in the money market. In 
a despatch of 5 August he referred to the Government 
of India’s demand for an international settlement
*7
which it abandoned only when it failed to secure it.
On 12 August he said that even if India reopened her 
mints she should reopen them to silver alone so that
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 23 July 1897, Pr. Cor. Ind., 
ii, 348.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 30 July 1897* Pr. Cor. Ind., 
ii, 359. -------------
■5
Pin. Des. to India, Ho. 129, 5 Aug. 1897.
if the experiment failed she should be free to adopt 
1any course.
The above correspondence took place in response 
to the inquiry made by France and the U.S.A. as to 
whether India would open her mints if they opened 
their mints to the free coinage of silver and gold 
at a ratio of 15s' to 1. The Government of India 
advanced a number of arguments against the reopening 
of mints. It was not prepared to support a settlement 
which Great Britain refused to join. It argued that 
a settlement between three countries would have too 
narrow a basis and was different from its earlier 
proposals for an international agreement. It 
emphasised that the frequent changes of ministry in 
France and the dependence for their continuance of 
fiscal arrangements on the chances of a party triumph 
in the U.S.A. would make the settlement uncertain.
It indicated that the break-down of the agreement 
would be extremely injurious, and added that the 
difficulties of Indian exchange were nearly over and 
a stable rate of 1s. 4d. was well within sight. It 
also emphasised, as it had done it its telegram of 
21 July, that a sudden rise in exchange would paralyse 
Indian trade and industry. It concluded by saying:
1 Hamilton Elgin, 12 Aug. 1897. Pr. Cor. Ind.,
ii, 391•
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"Our unanimous and decided opinion is that, it would 
be most unwise to reopen the mints as part of the 
proposed’arrangements, especially at a time when we 
are to all appearances approaching the attainment 
of stability in exchange by the operation of our own
i
isolated and independent action".
The Secretary of State agreed with the views 
of the G-overnment of India. The Treasury also concurred 
in them. As a result the proposals of Prance and 
the U.S.A. fell through.2
In November 1897 Elgin said that there were only
ways
two altornat-iveo Of the establishment -of a gold 
standard, one was to wait till sufficient gold had 
accumulated in the treasuries at 1s. 4d. to the rupee, 
the other was to hasten the process by a direct purchase 
of gold. The objection to the first proposal that 
the date of accumulation was most indefinite. As 
regards the second, Finlay, then Finance Secretary, 
was of opinion that the purchase of gold, except 
on the condition that the Imperial Government was
1Fin. Des. from India, No. 261, 16 Sept.- 1897.
2India Office to Treasury, 13 Oct. 1897; Treasury 
to Foreign Office, 16 Oct. 1897, E n d s ,  to Fin.
Des. to India, No. 218, 23 Dec. 1897.
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1
to assist the operation, would spell ruin to India.
Hamilton preferred to postpone the enunciation of
any definite scheme, remarking that the knowledge
that such a measure was in immediate contemplation
would make the bimetallists more virulent in their
2
attacks in Parliament. In March 1898 he emphasised 
that the Government of India should not pbhlicly 
commit itself to any one definite scheme and content 
itself with general argument on the advisability of
a gold standard for India.
In 1893, when the mints were closed, the rupee 
stock was abundant, but in a few years superfluity 
gave place to stringency. In 1898 to afford a means 
of relief to the severe stringency then prevailing 
in the Indian money market, an act was passed, 
empowering the Government of India to direct by order 
the issue of currency notes on the security of gold 
received in England by the Secretary of State. A 
notification ofi 21 January announced that notes
would be issued in exchange for gold held by the Secretary
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 11 Hov. 1897* Pr. Cor. Ind.,
VII, 249.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 3 Dec. 1897, Pr. Cor. Ind., 
iii, 28A.
 ^ Pel. to Viceroy, 14 March 1898.
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of State at the rate of one rupee for 7*53344 grains 
of fine gold* Under this notification, the Secretary 
of State in Council gave notice of his readiness 
"to sell until further notice, telegraphic transfers
on Calcutta, Madras and Bombay at a rate not
5 1
exceeding 1s. 4-j^-d. for the rupee".
In March 1898 the Government of India strongly 
urged the Secretary of State to terminate the period 
of transition by taking active steps to secure the 
early establishment of a gold standard. Its main 
proposals were, first, to reduce the rupee 
circulation, and, secondly, to obtain a reserve of 
actual gold coin by borrowing in England. The 
Government of India suggested that the Secretary of 
State should be empowered by legislation to borrow 
V p  to a maximum of £20,000,000 for the purpose of 
establishing a gold standard and that, as soon as 
the statute was passed, £5,000,000 in gold should 
be shipped to India. Thus its plan provided for 
facilitating the flow of gold into India by creating 
scarcity in the amount of silver coin. The Government 
of India, however, made it clear that it did not 
contemplate the actual issue of gold coins, either
1 Report of the Indian Currency Committee (1899),
para. 15.
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for treasury purposes or in payment of currency
notes, until the measures resulted in the establishment
of the value of the rupee at 1s. 4d. and the use of
sovereigns, however small, as a permanent part of
1the circulation.
To the Government of India the principles of 
its currency policy were no longer at issue.
Remarking on the suggestion of the Bombay Chamber 
of Commerce that the whole subject of the Gold 
Standard versus the Silver Standard should be re­
opened, it emphasised that the question of principle
2had been settled. A week earlier, referring to 
the protest of the United Planters1 Association of 
Southern India, which had suggested that the mints 
should be reopened, it had remarked that the adoption 
of its policy should not be prevented by the fact 
of the previous system being advantageous in certain
3
exceptional cases.
Evidently the Government of India’s proposals 
were intended to bring to completion the policy 
which was initiated in 1893* Hamilton said that since
1 Pin. Des. from India, No. 70, 3 March 1898.
2 Pin. Des. from India, No. 92, 24 March 1898.
 ^ Pin. Bes. from India, No. 79, 17 March 1898.
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the proposals involved important issues, a final
decision could only be arrived at after a thorough
investigation. The question was referred to a committee
1
presided over by Sir Henry Fowler.
Hamilton experienced some difficulty in forming 
the Committee. He said that a number of interests, 
namely, the exporter for India, the bimetallists, 
and Lombard Street were arrayed against the Indian 
proposals. In May 1898 he wrote that pressure was 
being brought to bear on him by certain prominent 
bankers and directors of the Bank of England, who 
urged him. to enlarge the Committee by including their 
representatives. He also remarked that Lombard Street 
would resolutely oppose any proposals likely to cause 
a further demand for gold.
David Barbour was included in the Committee 
though he.had bimetallic proclivities. Hamilton 
argued that the Government might get his support if 
he was a member, whereas it would get his criticisms 
if he was excluded.
As regards the appointment of Indian witnesses, 
Hamilton was against the selection of Congressmen.
He said that this would give them an opportunity to 
repeat before a public tribunal the "trash about 
India being bled to death”. He further remarked that 
the ’’witnesses are required more for show than for 
the value or novelty of their opinions”. In September 
1898 Elgin said there would be difficulty in finding 
any other than a Congress politician to undertake 
a journey. He also observed that those who had the 
knowledge of currency could not speak well, and those 
who had no knowledge could express themselves well.*
* Hamilton to Elgin, 20 May 1898, Pr. Cor. Ind., 
iii, 337; 30 Aug. 1898, iii, 425; 22 Slept. 1898, 
iii, 442, Elgin to Hamilton, 13 Oct. 1898, Pr. Cor. 
Ind., XII, 174; 8 Sept. 1898, XII, 109.
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Elgin suggested that the Currency Committees
should be asked solely to consider the best means
of establishing a gold standard. Hamilton remarked
that in viev; of the diversity of interests to be
reconciled, it would be unwise to restrict the limits
of inquiry. He, however, agreed to make it clear
that neither the Home nor the Indian Government had
any intention of reopening the mints.
The position in 1898 was that the exchange rate
was nearly the same as that fixed in 1895* Secondly,
gold was not a legal tender though the Government
was prepared to receive it in the payment of public
dues. Thirdly, the rupee remained by law the only
coin in which payments other than small ones could
be made. Fourthly, there was no legal relation between
2rupees and gold.
The Fowler Committee concurred with the Government 
of India in the decision not to revert to the silver 
standard and recommended the# establishment of a 
gold standard without delay at -I6d. to the rupee. 
However, it did not accept the Government of India’s 
proposals for reducing the volume of the currency,
i
Tel. from Viceroy, 26 March 1898; Tel. from Secretary 
of State, 28 March 1898.
p
Report of the Indian Currency Committee (1899)9
para. TEZ
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being of opinion that such a step might aggravate
stringency in the Indian money market. Replying to
those who favoured the unrestricted coinage of
silver on the grounds that a lav/ exchange encouraged
the export trade, the Committee observed that ”as
regards the ultimate levels of beneficial fall,
we have failed to discover at which precise point,
if at all, the advocates of this view would hold that
the alleged advantages of a falling exchange cease”.
It expressed its opinion in favour of making the
British sovereign a legal tender and a current coin
in India, and also suggested that the Indian mints
should be thrown open to the unrestricted coinage
of gold. Further, the exclusive right to coin
fresh rupees was to remain vested in the Government of 
2
India. In short, the Committee recommended ’’the 
effective establishment in India of a gold standard 
and currency based on the free inflow and outflow of 
gold”.^
So far as the rate of exchange was concerned, 
the majority of the members supported the I6d. rate 
of the Herschell Committee. Two members of the Committee, 
Robert Campbell and John Kuir criticised the above
1
Ibid., para. 28.
2 Ibid., para. 60.
3
Ibid., para. 54.
569
rate as ”an excessive, arbitrary enhanc ement.11 They
remarked: M It can never be sound policy to handicap
native industry while giving a bounty to foreign exports,
and in the case of India with large foreign obligations,
which can only be met by surplus exports of produce, it
1
would be fatal course to pursue . W.H. Holland, a
member of the Committee, was of opinion that the permanent
2
rate should be fixed in the light of further experience.
The Committee argued that if the rate of 15d. was 
to be fixed in order to benefit the Indian exporters, tbe 
same argument would justify a further reduction to a lower 
figure. In reply to the argument that the rate of 15d* 
would have been in conformity with the rate prevailing in 
1893, it observed that if the mints had been closed a few 
years earlier the permanent rate would have been fixed at 
a considerably higher point and if they had been closed a 
few years later it would have been lower than 15d. The 
Committee remarked: f,The experience gained since the 
mints were closed in 1893, and particularly that of 
the last eighteen months, appear to us to justify
1 Ibid., 23-26.
2 Ibid*, 22*
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the anticipation that the existing rate of 1s, 4d. 
will, with possible temporary fluctuations, due to
i
the course of trade, be maintained in the futureft.
The currency policy of the Government of India
since 1895 had been a subject of strong criticism
by the Congress. Its Resolution IV of 1899 said
that f,The decision accepted by the Government will
in effect add to the indebtedness of the poorer classes
in India, depreciate the value of their savings in
the shape of silver ornaments, and virtually add to
their rents and taxes". In a letter of July 1898
submitted to the Currency Committee, Dadabhai Haoroji
asked for the free coinage of silver. He was of
opinion that the reduction of high salaries, a large
proportion of Indians in the administration, and the
contribution by England of a fair share of military
expenditure would solve the problem of India’s gold 
2
payments. Suffice it to say that the Government 
was not prepared to accept these suggestions.
The recommendations of the Fov/ler Committee 
were intended to place the arrangements of 1895 on 
a permanent basis. The Committee found its hands
Ibid., paras. 68-69*
2 Ibid., App. I, 51 ♦
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strengthened by favourable circumstances. Soon
after its appointment the rupee had reached the rate
of I6d. In 1898-99 the Government of India had been
able to accumulate a gold reserve of £2,378,609.
Under its proposals, which were accepted by the Secretary
of State, gold coins and rupees were made unlimited
legal tender. The Committee envisaged the ultimate
establishment not merely of a gold standard but also
of a gold currency in active circulation,The rate
of I6d., except for one temporary fall during 1907-8,
was maintained.
The Indian Currency Act of 1899 made the sovereign
and half-sovereign legal tender at Rs. 15 and Rs. 7 i
respectively, but, as the Chamberlain Commission pointed
out in 1914> it did nothing to prevent the rupee from
falling below I6d. As regards the opening of the mint
for the coinage of gold in India, the scheme was dropped
after nearing completion in 1902, Though gold coins
were made legal tender, the public continued to
2
demand rupees. The G-overnment of India made an active
1
Report of the Royal Commission on Indian Finance
and Cur r erfcy, para. 21 , Cd. 7256 (1914) .
2
On 11 April 1900 the Calcutta Currency Office refused to 
give rupees in the encashment of currency notes of three 
lakhs of rupees and was closed before the proper time 
because it had no rupees in hand to meet the current 
requirements of the general public. This failure was 
accompanied by the failure of the Treasuries at Cawnpore 
and elsewhere in the N.W.P. Pin, Des. from India, No. 302, 
6 Sept. 1900.
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effort to induce the people to use sovereigns. The 
Currency Offices, the Post Offices and other 
institutions under Government control were instructed 
to offer sovereigns, but the results were unsatisfactory. 
Many of the gold coins soon made their way back into 
Government hands. In these circumstances the Government 
of India resumed the coinage of silver on a considerable 
scale. The Chamberlain Commission remarked that the 
"difficulties of the Government since 1899 had been, 
not in .the direction of keeping exchange up to 1s. 4d., 
but in providing sufficient rupees to meet the demands 
of the public, which continued to demand rupees 
rather than gold". Thus the currency system did not
2
develop on the lines proposed by the Powler Committee.
Viewed from the Government of India’s standpoint - 
and this is a very important aspect of the currency 
question - the arrangements of 1893 worked on the 
whole well. They proved effectual in preventing the 
fall of the rupee. For ten years (1885-95) the 
Indian Government had been in the grip of serious 
financial difficulty. The choice before it was betwe.en
Report of the Royal Commission (1914), para. 29.
2
Ibid., para. 50.
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further taxation and the adoption of a gold standard 
and it chose the latter. It is interesting to note 
that it was so much concerned to arrest the fall in 
exchange that in framing the currency system that 
it took no account of the contingency of preventing
i
a great rise in the value of silver.
Thus the currency question was one of the most 
important problems with which the Government of India 
was confronted in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. The trouble began in 1073 and became acute 
between 1885 and 1895. The Government of India 
proposed first a gold standard in 1875 but, after 
its rejection by the Home Government, it pressed for 
the establishment of a bimetallic system by inter­
national agreement and continued to do so until 1892. 
In 1893 the mints were closed but the closure did 
not bring about an immediate recovery. In 1896 the 
situation improved and at the time of the Fowler 
Committee's inquiry the rate reached the point fixed 
by the Herschell Committee. In 1899 steps were taken 
to establish a gold standard with a gold currency. 
7/hen it was found that there was no demand for gold 
coins the experiment of forcing a gold currency was 
abandoned in 1902.
i
Beport of Committee on Indian Exchange and Currency 
(1919), para. 33.
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